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THE  UNITED  STATES 

AND 

LATIN   AMERICA 


SOUTH  ALIERICA 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

AND 

LATIN  AMERICA 


BY 

JOHN  HOLLADAY  LATANE 

PH.D.,   LL.D.  " 

PROFESSOR   OF    AMERICAN    HISTORY    AND    DEAN    OF   THE 

COLLEGE  FACULTY   IN  THE  JOHNS   HOPKINS    UNIVERSITY 

Author  of   ^^Frorn  Isolation  to   Leadership,^'' 

''^  America  as  a  World  Ponver,  "  etc. 


GARDEN   CITY  NEW   YORK 

DOUBLEDAY,  DOBAN  &    COMPANY,   INC. 
1929 


COFYRIGHT,    igao,    BY 

DOUBLEDAY,    PACK   ft   COMPANY 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

SEVENTH    PRINTING 


FKINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  (TATES 

AT 

THE  COUNTRY  LIFE  PRESS,  GARDEN  CITY,  N.  T. 


F 

m 


TO  THE   MEMORY  OF 
MY   FATHER 
WHOSE   DAILY   COMMENTS   ON    PUBLIC   QUES- 
TIONS WERE  MY  FIRST  LESSONS  IN  THE  STUDY 
OF  POLITICS 

AND   TO 

MY   MOTHER 

WHO   IMPARTED  TO   ME  A  LOVE  OF   HISTORY 

AND  WHOSE  APPROVAL  IS  STILL  THE  RICHEST 

REWARD  OF  MY  EFFORTS 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  based  on  a  smaller  volume  issued  by 
the  Johns  Hopkins  Press  in  1900  under  the  title  "  The 
Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spanish 
America,"  which  contained  the  first  series  of  Albert 
Shaw  Lectures  on  Diplomatic  History.  That  volume 
has  been  out  of  print  for  several  years,  but  calls  for 
it  are  still  coming  in,  with  increasing  frequency  of  late. 
In  response  to  this  demand  and  in  view  of  the  wide- 
spread interest  in  our  relations  with  our  Southern 
neighbors  I  have  revised  and  enlarged  the  original 
volume,  omitting  much  that  was  of  special  interest  at 
the  time  it  was  written,  and  adding  a  large  amount  of 
new  matter  relating  to  the  events  of  the  past  twenty 
years. 

Chapters  I,  H  and  V  are  reprinted  with  only  minor 
changes;  III,  IV  and  VI  have  been  rewritten  and 
brought  down  to  date;  VII,  VIII  and  IX  are  wholly 
new. 

J.  H.  L. 

Baltimore, 

May  7,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PACK 

I  The  Revolt  of  the  Spanish  Colonies      .        3 

II  The  Recognition  of  the  Spanish-Ameri- 

can Republics 48 

III  The  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States  in 

Regard  to  Cuba 83 

VlY      The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  Panama 

Canal 144 

V  French  Intervention  in  Mexico      .       .     193 

VI  The  Two  Venezuelan  Episodes   .       .       .     238 

VII  The  Advance  of  the  United  States  in 

THE  Caribbean 261 

^^III  Pan  Americanism 292 

IX     The  Monroe  Doctrine 320 

Index 335 

MAPS 

South  America Frontispiece 

The  Caribbean Facing  page    262 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

AND 

LATIN    AMERICA 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
LATIN  AMERICA 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Revolt  of  the  Spanish  Colonies 

The  English  colonies  of  North  America  renounced 
allegiance  to  their  sovereign  more  through  fear  of 
future  oppression  than  on  account  of  burdens  actually 
imposed.  The  colonies  of  Spain  in  the  southern  hemi- 
sphere, on  the  other  hand,  labored  for  generations 
under  the  burden  of  one  of  the  most  irrational  and 
oppressive  economic  systems  to  which  any  portion  of 
the  human  race  has  ever  been  subjected,  and  remained 
without  serious  attempt  at  revolution  until  the  de- 
thronement of  their  sovereign  by  Napoleon  left  them 
to  drift  gradually,  in  spite  of  themselves,  as  Chateau- 
briand expressed  it,  into  the  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment. To  carry  the  contrast  a  step  further,  when 
the  conditions  were  ripe  for  independence,  the  Eng- 
lish colonies  offered  a  united  resistance,  while  the 
action  of  the  Spanish  colonies  was  spasmodic  and  dis- 
concerted. The  North  American  revolution  gave 
birth  to  a  federal  republic,  that  of  the  South  to  a 
number  of  separate  and  independent  republics,  whose 
relations  with  one  another  have  at  times  been  far 
from  amicable.     The  causes  for  these  striking  dif- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ferences  are  to  be  explained  not  alone  by  race  psy- 
chology, but  by  a  comparison  of  the  English  and 
Spanish  colonial  systems  and  of  the  two  revolutions  as 
well.  The  history  of  the  English  colonies  and  of  their 
revolt  has  been  pretty  well  exploited,  but  information 
in  regard  to  the  Spanish-American  revolution  and  its 
causes,  although  the  sources  are  abundant,  is  not  easily 
accessible  to  English-speaking  people. 

By  virtue  of  the  celebrated  Bull  of  Pope  Alexander 
VI,  the  Spanish-American  colonies  were  looked  upon 
as  possessions  of  the  crown,  and  not  as  colonies  of 
Spain,  Their  affairs  were  regulated  by  the  king,  with 
the  assistance  of  a  board  called  the  Council  of  the 
Indies.  This  council,  which  was  on  a  footing  of 
equality  with  the  Council  of  Castile,  was  established 
by  Ferdinand  as  early  as  151 1,  and  was  modified  by 
Charles  V  in  1524.  It  was  to  take  cognizance  of  all 
ecclesiastical,  civil,  military,  and  commercial  affairs  re- 
lating to  the  colonies.  From  it  proceeded  the  so-called 
Laws  of  the  Indies,  and  all  colonial  offices  in  the  gift 
of  the  crown  were  conferred  by  it.  In  the  course  of 
time,  however,  the  personnel  of  this  council  became 
merged  with  that  of  Castile,  and  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses the  colonies  became  dependencies  of  the  Spanish 
nation. 

There  were  from  the  first  establishment  of  Spanish 
rule  in  America,  two  viceroyalties  on  the  continent. 
The  viceroy  of  New  Spain  ruled  over  Mexico  and 
Central  America,  whilst  all  South  America  subject  to 
Spanish  control  was  for  about  two  centuries  under 
the  viceroy  of  Peru,  In  regions  too  remote  to  be 
under  his  immediate  control,  audiencias,  or  courts  of 
justice,  were  established,  the  president  of  the  audiencia 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

being  known  by  the  title  of  captain-general.  Thus 
audiencias  were  established  at  Quito  in  1542,  at  Char- 
cas  (in  modern  Bolivia)  in  1559,  in  New  Granada  in 
1564,  in  Chile  in  1568,  and  later  at  Caracas  and  at 
Buenos  Aires.  In  1740,  New  Granada  was  raised  to 
the  rank  of  a  viceroyalty,  with  its  capital  at  Bogota; 
and  in  1776  the  same  dignity  was  conferred  on  Buenos 
Aires.  There  were  thus  on  the  southern  continent 
three  viceroyalties  widely  separated :  one  on  the  Main, 
one  on  the  Atlantic,  and  one  on  the  Pacific. 

The  powers  of  the  viceroy,  or  captain-general,  as 
the  case  might  be,  were  limited  only  by  the  audiencia, 
consisting  of  from  three  to  five  members,  always  of 
Spanish  birth,  whose  functions  were  largely  advisory, 
but  who  had  the  privilege  of  corresponding  directly 
;with  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  and  who  in  case  of 
emergency  sometimes  went  so  far  as  to  depose  the 
viceroy. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  Spanish  America 
the  native  Indian  races  were  not  driven  beyond  the 
frontier  of  civilization,  as  they  were  by  the  English 
settlers,  but  became,  and  remain  to  this  day,  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  population.  There  was  thus  in  the 
Spanish  colonies  an  unusual  admixture  of  races. 
There  were  (i)  European  Spaniards;  (2)  Creoles,  or 
children  born  in  America  of  Spanish  parents;  (3) 
Indians,  the  indigenous  race;  (4)  Negroes  of  African 
race;   (5)   Mestizos,  children  of  whites  and  Indians; 

(6)  Mulattoes,  children  of  whites  and  negroes;  and 

(7)  Zambos,  children  of  Indians  and  negroes. 

The  maladministration  of  Spain's  colonies  may  be 
summarized  under  two  heads :  ( i )  acts  of  oppression 
against  the  native  Indian  race,  and  (2)  regulations  of 

5 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

a  commercial  and  political  character,  which  acted  in 
restraint  of  the  economic  and  social  development  of 
her  own  offspring  in  America. 

Under  the  first  head  may  be  mentioned  the  mita,  or 
forced  labor  in  mines,  farms,  and  factories,  and  the 
repartitniento,  or  encomienda,  which  was  an  allotment 
to  Spaniards  of  territory  including  the  native  inhabi- 
tants as  peons  or  vassals.  In  spite  of  humane  re- 
strictions placed  by  law  upon  them,  these  institutions 
degenerated  into  systems  of  fearful  oppression,  which 
led,  in  1781,  to  the  heroic  but  unsuccessful  efforts  of 
Tupac  Amaru,  the  last  of  the  Incas,  to  free  the  land 
of  his  fathers  from  the  cruel  rule  of  the  Spaniard. 
So  deep-seated  was  the  dissatisfaction  and  so  formid- 
able the  revolt,  that  it  was  not  suppressed  for  more 
than  two  years.  The  unfortunate  Inca  and  most  of 
his  family  were  cruelly  put  to  death. 

The  economic  and  commercial  restrictions  imposed 
upon  the  colonies  require  fuller  notice.  The  whole 
object  of  Spain's  colonial  policy  was  to  extract  gold 
and  silver  from  America  and  to  force  Spanish  manu- 
factures and  products  upon  that  country.  Commerce 
was  confined  to  Spain  and  to  Spanish  vessels. 

No  South  American  could  own  a  ship,  nor  could  a  cargo 
be  consigned  to  him;  no  foreigner  was  allowed  to  reside  in 
the  country  unless  born  in  Spain ;  and  no  capital,  not  Spanish, 
was  permitted  in  any  shape  to  be  employed  in  the  colonies. 
Orders  were  given  that  no  foreign  vessel,  on  any  pretence 
whatever,  should  touch  at  a  South  American  port.  Even 
ships  in  distress  were  not  to  be  received  with  common  hospi- 
tality, but  were  ordered  to  be  seized  as  prizes,  and  the  crews 
imprisoned.* 

•HtU'i  "Journal  oa  Chili,  Peru,  and  Mexico,"  2  Vol*.  Ediaburgfa. 
llJ4.  VoU  I,  p.  a49,  *^ 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

As  late  as  1816,  when  the  United  States  protested 
against  the  blockade  established  by  General  Morillo, 
as  contrary  to  international  law,  M.  Onis,  the  Spanish 
minister,  replied  that  the  object  of  the  blockade 
was  to  maintain  the  laws  of  the  Indies,  which  dur- 
ing the  Napoleonic  wars  had  been  somewhat  relaxed, 
adding : 

You  are  aware  that,  agreeably  to  those  laws,  no  foreign 
vessel  was  allowed  to  trade  with  the  dominions  of  his  majesty 
on  that  continent  without  a  special  license,  and  that  vessels 
found  near  or  evidently  shaping  a  course  towards  them  were 
liable  to  confiscation  as  interlopers. 

When,  later  in  the  year,  a  United  States  commissioner 
was  sent  to  Cartagena  to  reclaim  American  vessels  so 
seized,  the  Spanish  viceroy  gave  him  to  understand 
that  he  did  not  pretend  to  be  acquainted  with  the  law 
of  nations.^ 

Not  only  were  the  colonists  prohibited  from  en- 
gaging in  manufactures  which  interfered  with  those  of 
Spain,  but  restrictions  were  even  placed  on  agriculture 
in  the  interests  of  the  Spanish  producer.  Thus  the 
cultivation  of  flax,  hemp,  and  saffron  was  forbidden 
under  severe  penalty;  the  cultivation  of  tobacco  was 
not  allowed;  and  grapes  and  olives  could  be  raised 
only  for  table  use,  so  that  oil  and  wine  had  to  be 
imported  from  Spain.  Upon  one  occasion  (in  1803) 
orders  were  sent  "  to  root  up  all  the  vines  in  certain 
provinces,  because  the  Cadiz  merchants  complained  of 
a  diminution  in  the  consumption  of  Spanish  wines."  * 

The  carrying  out  of  this  commercial  system  in  all 

'  Am.  St.  Pap..  For.   Rel.,  Vol.  IV,  pp.   156-159. 

*  Hall's  "  Journal,"  Vol.  I,  p.  296.  See  also  Rodney's  report  on  South 
Aaicrica,   in   Vol.   IV,  Am.  St.   Pap,,   For.   Rel. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

its  details  was  entrusted  to  the  Casa  de  Contratacion, 
or  House  of  Trade,  which  was  located  at  Seville  until 
171 7,  when  it  was  transferred  to  Cadiz.  The  India 
House,  as  it  was  called,  was  established  by  warrant  of 
Queen  Joanna  in  1503.'*  To  this  house  were  to  be 
brought  all  merchandise  for  the  colonies  and  all  prod- 
ucts from  them  of  whatever  character.  The  colonial 
trade  was  thus  limited  to  one  Spanish  port.  The  af- 
fairs of  the  house  were  in  charge  of  three  commis- 
sioners or  judges,  who  had  jurisdiction,  civil  and  crim- 
inal, over  all  cases  arising  out  of  the  trade  with  Amer- 
ica. Their  authority  was  subordinated  to  no  other 
court  or  council  but  that  of  the  Indies. 

Not  only  were  no  foreigners  allowed  to  go  to  the 
Spanish  colonies,  but  careful  restrictions  were  placed 
on  the  movement  of  Spaniards  to  and  from  America. 
In  151 1  King  Ferdinand  had  by  a  special  order  per- 
mitted all  subjects  of  Spain  without  distinction  to  go 
over  to  the  Indies  upon  entering  their  names  at  the 
India  House;  but  in  the  years  15 18,  1522,  1530,  and 
1539  several  orders  were  passed  "that  no  person 
reconciled,  or  newly  converted  to  our  holy  Catholic 
faith,  from  Judaism  or  Mahometanism,  nor  the  chil- 
dren of  such,  nor  the  children  or  grandsons  of  any 
that  had  worn  the  St.  Andrew's  Cross  of  the  Inquisi- 
tion, or  been  burnt  or  condemned  as  heretics,  or  for 
any  heretical  crime,  either  by  male  or  female  line, 
might  go  over  to  the  Indies,  upon  pain  of  forfeiting 

*  A  full  history  of  the  India  House  and  an  account  of  its  regulations 
is  given  by  Veitia  Linage  in  his  "Norte  de  la  Contratacion,"  Seville,  1672; 
translated  into  English  by  Captain  John  Stevens  under  the  title,  "  Spanish 
Rule  of  Trade  to  the  West  Indies,"  London,  1702.  Linage  was  for  a 
number  of  years  Treasurer  and  Comptroller  of  the  India  House.  A 
good  summary  of  the  history  and  regulations  of  the  House  is  given  by 
Prof.  Bernard  Moses  in  his  "  Casa  de  Contratacion  "  in  the  Papers  of  the 
Am.  Hist.  Ass.  for  1894,  and  in  the  third  chapter  of  his  "Establishment 
of  Spanish   Rule  in  America." 

8 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

all  their  goods,  of  an  hundred  lashes,  perpetual  ban- 
ishment from  the  Indies,  and  their  bodies  to  be  at  the 
king's  disposition."  ^ 

The  commissioners  might  "  grant  passes  to  mer- 
chants to  go  over,  or  return  if  they  came  from  thence, 
including  married  merchants,  provided  they  have  leave 
from  their  wives,  and  give  i,ooo  ducats  security  to 
return  within  three  years."  * 

There  were  also  strict  rules  about  passing  from  one 
province  in  America  to  another.  This  could  not  be 
done  without  special  leave  from  the  king.'  "  The 
inhabitants  of  the  Indies  may  not  come  to  Spain  with- 
out leave  from  the  viceroys,  presidents  or  governors 
of  the  places  of  their  habitation,  in  which  they  are  to 
express  the  causes  of  their  coming,  and  whether  it  is 
to  stay  here  or  return."  ^  "  In  the  Indies,  the  mag- 
istrates are  directed  to  apprehend  any  persons  they 
find  are  gone  over  without  leave,  to  imprison  them 
till  they  can  send  them  back  into  Spain,  upon  pain  of 
losing  their  employments."  ^  In  1594  and  1602  it  was 
decreed  that  persons  going  over  without  leave  should 
be  sent  to  the  galleys  for  four  years.  In  1622  King 
Philip  IV  decreed  that  a  person  simply  going  aboard 
a  ship  bound  for  the  Indies  without  leave  should  be 
immediately  sent  to  the  galleys  for  eight  years." 
Other  decrees  equally  severe  were  issued  from  time 
to  time. 

In  order  to  keep  the  trade  strictly  under  control 
and  to  properly  protect  it,  intercourse  with  the  colo- 
nies was  held  only  once  a  year.  Two  squadrons,  con- 
sisting of  merchant  ships  and  convoys  under  com- 

'  Linage,  "Norte  de  la  Contratacion,"  p.   107.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  114. 

'Ibid.,  p.   110.  'Ibid.,  p.  109. 

''Ibid.,  p.  113.  ^°  Ibid.,  p.  109. 

9 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

mand  of  an  admiral  and  vice-admiral,  made  the  trip 
each  year.  The  fleet  for  New  Spain  (Mexico)  sailed 
in  the  spring,  and  that  for  the  mainland  in  the  early 
fall.  The  first  touched  at  some  of  the  islands  and 
then  went  to  Vera  Cruz;  the  latter  touched  first  at 
Cartagena  and  passed  on  thence  to  Porto  Bello,  where 
the  fair  was  held  about  the  middle  of  March.  This 
fair  was  the  great  event  of  the  year,  and  lasted  forty 
days  from  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  fleet.  From 
this  point  goods  were  distributed  by  way  of  Panama 
to  Peru,  Chile,  and  even  across  the  continent  to 
Buenos  Aires.  The  gold  bullion  was  sent  in  turn  to 
this  point  by  the  viceroy  of  Peru.  It  came  in  fifteen 
days  from  Potosi  to  Arica,  thence  by  sea  in  eight  days 
to  Callao,  and  in  twenty  days  from  Callao  to  Panama. 
The  viceroy  of  Peru  was  to  take  care  to  have  the 
plate  at  Panama  by  the  middle  of  March.  At  Porto 
Bello  it  was  taken  aboard  the  galleons.  About  the 
middle  of  June  the  galleons  met  the  fleet  from  New 
Spain  at  Havana,  and  from  that  point  the  two  fleets 
with  their  convoys  proceeded  in  greater  safety  to 
Spain.  Thus  for  two  centuries  all  intercourse  be«- 
tween  Spain  and  her  colonies  at  one  end  of  the  line 
was  limited  at  first  to  Seville,  and  then  to  Cadiz ;  and 
at  the  other  to  Vera  Cruz  and  Porto  Bello.^*  At  a 
later  period  this  arrangement  was  modified  to  some 
extent,  and  Buenos  Aires  was  made  a  port  of  entry. 
The  reason  for  not  permitting  trade  with  Buenos 
Aires  during  the  earlier  period  was  the  fear  that  the 
British  and  Dutch  would  smuggle  through  that  port. 
While  the  relations  of  the  colonies  with  Spain  were 
kept  under  the  strictest  control,  intercourse  with  for- 

*'  Linage,  "  Norte  de  la  Contratacion,"  pp.  191-193. 

10 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

eign  nations,  although  absolutely  prohibited  under  the 
severest  penalties,  could  not  be  entirely  prevented.  In 
speaking  of  Spain's  restrictive  policy,  a  British  naval 
officer,  who  was  on  the  South  American  station  during 
the  revolution,  says : 

Unfortunately,  however,  for  that  system,  the  South  Ameri- 
cans, notwithstanding  the  network  of  chains  by  which  they 
were  enveloped,  had  still  some  sparks  of  humanity  left,  and, 
in  spite  of  all  their  degradation,  longed  earnestly  for  the 
enjoyments  suitable  to  their  nature;  and  finding  that  the 
Spaniards  neither  could  nor  would  furnish  them  with  an 
adequate  supply,  they  invited  the  assistance  of  other  nations. 
To  this  call  the  other  nations  were  not  slow  to  listen ;  and,  in 
process  of  time,  there  was  established  one  of  the  most  ex- 
traordinary systems  of  organized  smuggling  which  the  world 
ever  saw.  This  was  known  under  the  name  of  the  contra- 
band or  forced  trade,  and  was  carried  on  in  armed  vessels, 
well  manned,  and  prepared  to  fight  their  way  to  the  coast, 
and  to  resist,  as  they  often  did  with  effect,  the  guar  da  castas, 
or  coast  blockades  of  Spain.  This  singular  system  of  warlike 
commerce  was  conducted  by  the  Dutch,  Portuguese,  French, 
English,  and  latterly  by  the  North  Americans.  In  this  way 
goods  to  an  immense  value  were  distributed  over  South 
America;  and  although  the  prices  were  necessarily  high,  and 
the  supply  precarious,  that  taste  for  the  comforts  and  luxuries 
of  European  invention  was  first  encouraged,  which  after- 
wards operated  so  powerfully  in  giving  a  steady  and  intelli- 
gible motive  to  the  efforts  of  the  Patriots  in  their  struggle 
with  the  mother-country.  Along  with  the  goods  which  the 
contraband  trade  forced  into  the  colonies,  no  small  portion 
of  knowledge  found  entrance,  in  spite  of  the  increased  ex- 
ertions of  the  Inquisition  and  church  influence,  aided  by  the 
redoubled  vigilance  of  government,  who  enforced  every 
penalty  with  the  utmost  rigor.  Many  foreigners,  too,  by 
means  of  bribes  and  other  arts,  succeeded  in  getting  into  the 
country,  so  that  the  progress  of  intelligence  was  gradually 
encouraged,  to  the  utter  despair  of  the  Spaniards,  who  knew 
no  other  method  of  governing  the  colonies  but  that  of  mere 

II 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

brute  force,  unsupported  by  the  least  shadow  of  opinion,  or 
of  good  will." 

The  trade  carried  on  by  foreign  interlopers  grew  to 
such  alarming  proportions  that  before  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century  Spain  found  it  necessary  to 
relax  the  restrictions  upon  the  private  trade  of  her 
own  subjects.  This  led,  about  1748,  to  the  discon- 
tinuance of  the  annual  fleets  or  galleon  trade. 

The  political  administration  of  the  country  was 
absolutely  in  the  hands  of  Spaniards,  who  as  a  rule 
were  not  allowed  to  marry,  acquire  property,  or  form 
any  permanent  ties  in  America.  In  the  summary  of 
charges  against  Spain  appearing  in  the  Argentine 
Manifesto  of  181 7,  one  of  the  specifications  is,  that  of 
one  hundred  and  sixty  viceroys  who  had  governed  in 
America,  four  natives  of  the  country  alone  were  num- 
bered; and  of  six  hundred  and  two  captains-general, 
all  but  fourteen  had  been  Spaniards. 

The  monopoly  of  Spanish  trade  in  South  America 
was  partially  surrendered  by  the  treaty  of  Utrecht, 
signed  in  1713,  at  the  close  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession.  By  this  treaty  England  agreed  to  recog- 
nize Philip  V  as  king  of  Spain  and  the  Indies,  and  in 
turn  was  granted  the  assiento,  or  contract  for  supply- 
ing the  Spanish  colonies  with  African  slaves."  The 
importation  of  negroes  into  the  Spanish  possessions 
had  been  carried  on  under  contract  from  the  very  first. 
The  assiento,  which  had  been  previously  granted  to 
Spanish  subjects,  was,  in  1696.  granted  to  the  Portu- 
guese Company  of  Guinea,  and  in  1702  to  the  Royal 

'*  Hall's  "  Journal,"   Vol.   I,  pp.   253-254. 

*•  "  The  Assiento;  or  Contract  for  Allowing  to  the  Subjects  of  Greet 
Britain  the  Liberty  of  Importing  Negroes  into  the  Danish  America." 
Printed   by  John    Baskett,    London,    1713. 

12 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

Guinea  Company  of  France;  but  in  1713  England 
secured  this  lucrative  monopoly  and  became  the  great 
slave-trading  power  of  the  world. 

The  assiento  of  17 13,  which  was  very  carefully 
drawn  up  in  42  articles,  granted  to  an  English  com- 
pany the  sole  right  of  supplying  slaves  to  the  Spanish 
West  Indies  and  to  South  America  for  the  period  of 
thirty  years  from  May  1,1713.  By  it  the  Queen  of 
England  undertook  to  see  that  the  company  chartered 
by  her  should  introduce  into  the  Spanish  West  Indies, 
including  South  America,  144,000  negroes  of  both 
sexes  and  all  ages  within  thirty  years,  at  the  rate  of 
4,800  a  year.  The  company  was  to  pay  a  duty  of 
33%  pieces  of  eight  (dollars)  for  each  negro  im- 
ported. In  addition  to  the  4,800  a  year,  other  negroes 
might  be  imported  at  a  duty  of  16%  dollars  each,  thus 
encouraging  larger  importations.  The  negroes  could 
be  brought  in  either  Spanish  or  English  vessels, 
manned  with  English  or  Spanish  sailors,  provided  only 
no  cause  of  offense  be  given  to  the  Catholic  religion. 
The  majority  of  the  negroes  were  to  be  taken  to 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  and  to  the  ports  on  the  Main; 
but  of  the  4,800,  the  company  had  the  right  to  take 
1,200  to  Buenos  Aires,  800  to  be  sold  there  and  400 
to  be  carried  to  the  provinces  up  the  Plata  and  to 
the  kingdom  of  Chile.  They  were  also  allowed  to 
carry  negroes  across  the  isthmus  from  Porto  Bello 
to  Panama,  and  there  re-ship  them  to  Peru.  Either 
Englishmen  or  Spaniards  could  be  employed  in  the 
business,  provided  that  there  were  not  more  than  four 
or  six  Englishmen  in  any  port,  and  that  these  should 
be  amenable  to  the  laws  in  all  respects  as  Spanish 
subjects.    By  no  means  the  least  remarkable  provision 

12 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  this  treaty  was  that  their  British  and  Catholic  ma- 
jesties were  each  to  receive  one-fourth  of  the  profits 
of  this  traffic. 

Ships  engaged  in  this  trade  were  to  be  searched  on 
arrival  at  port,  and  all  merchandise  found  on  board 
was  to  be  confiscated  and  heavy  penalties  inflicted. 
On  condition,  however,  that  the  company  should  not 
attempt  any  unlawful  trade,  his  Catholic  Majesty 
granted  them  the  privilege,  during  thirty  years,  of 
sending  annually  a  ship  of  500  tons  to  the  fair  at  Porto 
Bello.  The  Spanish  king  was  to  be  concerned  one- 
fourth  in  the  profits."  It  seems  that  the  company 
stretched  this  privilege  to  the  utmost.  The  ship  always 
stopped  at  Jamaica,  took  on  all  the  goods  she  could, 
and  carried  along  with  her  five  or  six  smaller  vessels 
laden  with  goods.  When  she  got  near  Porto  Bello,  all 
her  provisions  were  put  in  the  tenders  and  the  goods 
these  bore  taken  aboard.  She  then  entered  the  harbor 
laden  down  to  the  water's  edge.  Thus  this  single  ship 
was  made  to  carry  more  than  five  or  six  of  the  largest 
galleons." 

Thirty  years  before  the  Spanish  colonies  began  their 
war  of  independence,  the  British  government  had  en- 
tertained the  idea  of  revolutionizing  and  separating 
them  from  Spain.  This  idea  seems  to  have  arisen  in 
1779,  during  the  administration  of  Lord  North,  when 
Spain  joined  France  in  the  alliance  with  the  American 
colonies  against  Great  Britain.^*    It  was  suggested  at 


**"The  Assiento;  or  Contract  for  Allowing  to  the  Subjects  of  Great 
Britain  the  Liberty  of  Importing  Negroes  into  the  Spanish  America." 
London,    1713. 

*•  Ulloa,  "  Voyage  to  South  America."  English  translation,  London, 
1806,  Vol.  I,  p.   105. 

"  "  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.  VII,  p.  266  ff.  This 
volume  is  rich  in  information  in  regard  to  England's  Spanish-American 
policy. 

14 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

first,  no  doubt,  as  a  measure  of  retaliation,  but  was 
frequently  agitated  in  later  years  with  the  avowed 
object  of  opening  up  South  America  to  British  com- 
merce. The  same  idea  was  the  basis  of  Miranda's 
scheme  for  the  liberation  of  his  native  land. 

Francisco  de  Miranda"  (1754-1816),  a  native  of 
Caracas,  Venezuela,  was  the  first  Spanish-American 
patriot.  He  was  with  the  American  army  for  a  time 
during  the  Revolutionary  War,  but  in  what  capacity 
is  not  quite  settled.  It  is  stated  by  some  writers  that 
he  held  a  commission  under  LaFayette.  The  success 
of  our  war  inspired  him  with  the  hope  of  freeing  his 
own  country  from  Spanish  control.  He  confided  his 
views  to  his  friends  in  the  United  States,  particularly 
to  Alexander  Hamilton,  "  upon  whom  he  fixed  his 
eyes  as  a  coadjutor  in  the  great  purpose  of  his  life." 
Shortly  after  Miranda  had  returned  to  his  native  land 
his  schemes  were  discovered.  He  fled  to  the  United 
States,  and  later  to  England,  where  he  had  repeated 
conferences  with  Pitt.  Finding  no  help  for  his  revo- 
lutionary schemes  in  England,  he  went  to  the  conti- 
nent and  traveled  through  France,  Germany,  Turkey, 
and  Russia.  At  the  Russian  court  he  was  warmly 
received,  but  was  soon  dismissed  at  the  demand  of  the 
Spanish  minister.  At  news  of  the  dispute  between 
England  and  Spain  about  Nootka  Sound  in  1790,  he 
hastened  to  England  and  communicated  his  scheme 
to  the  British  ministry.  Pitt  lent  a  ready  ear  to  his 
views  as  long  as  the  dispute  lasted,  with  the  intention 
of  making  use  of  him  in  the  event  of  a  rupture  with 
Spain.     But  when  the  dispute  was  peaceably  settled, 


*'  W.   S.   Robertson,  "  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing  of 
Spanish  America"   (1909). 

15 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Miranda's  hopes  fell  to  the  ground  and  he  left  Eng- 
land. His  scheme  was  only  temporarily  abandoned, 
however.  He  considered  himself  to  have  been  ill-used 
by  Pitt  on  this  occasion,  as  he  subsequently  stated  to 
Rufus  King,  the  American  minister  to  England. 

The  French  Revolution  was  now  well  under  way, 
and  the  wars  upon  which  the  republic  was  entering 
offered  an  attractive  field  for  a  soldier  of  republican 
ideas.  In  April,  1792,  Miranda  went  to  Paris  with 
introductions  to  Petion  and  the  leading  Girondists, 
hoping  that  the  revolutionary  party  might  help  him  in 
his  plans.  He  was  given  a  commission  as  brigadier- 
general  in  the  French  army,  and  served  in  responsible 
posts  under  Dumouriez  on  the  eastern  frontier.  He 
conducted  the  siege  of  Maestricht  and  commanded  the 
left  wing  of  the  French  army  at  the  disastrous  battle 
of  Neerwinden,  March,  1793,  in  which  Belgium  was 
reconquered  by  the  Austrians.  Dumouriez  now  de- 
clared against  the  Convention,  but  his  troops  having 
refused  to  follow  him,  he  went  over  to  the  Austrians 
in  company  with  the  Duke  of  Chartres,  Louis 
Philippe.  Miranda  fell  under  suspicion  of  treason 
and  was  forced  to  undergo  a  court-martial,  but  was 
acquitted.  For  some  unexplained  reason  he  was 
shortly  after  thrown  into  prison.  He  soon  secured 
his  release,  but  for  several  years  disappears  from  pub- 
lic view.  His  services  in  behalf  of  the  republic  re- 
ceived in  time  due  recognition.  His  name  appears  on 
the  Arc  de  Triomphe  in  Paris  in  the  list  of  the  heroes 
of  the  Revolution. 

In  January,  1798,  Miranda  returned  to  England. 
As  Spain  was  now  the  close  ally  of  France,  he  hoped 
to   secure  the  cooperation   of   Great   Britain   in   his 

16 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

scheme.  He  also  hoped  to  secure  aid  from  the  United 
States.  The  people  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were 
far  from  satisfied  with  the  provisions  of  the  Spanish 
treaty  of  1795  in  regard  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River.  Then,  too,  just  at  this  time,  war  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  France  seemed  inevitable, 
on  account  of  the  resentment  by  France  of  the  Jay 
treaty  and  her  treatment  of  the  American  representa- 
tives. Washington  had  been  called  from  his  retire- 
ment at  Mt.  Vernon  to  assume  the  post  of  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army,  while  the  active  command  was 
to  be  given  to  Hamilton.  Hamilton  had  expressed 
great  interest  in  Miranda's  projects  and  was  a  man  of 
known  ambition.  His  appointment,  therefore,  as  the 
virtual  commander-in-chief  of  the  American  army 
made  Miranda  hopeful  of  his  cooperation. 

Mr.  King,  the  American  minister  at  London,  en- 
tered heartily  into  the  plans  of  General  Miranda,  and 
his  correspondence  on  that  subject,  during  the  year 
1798,  with  his  government  and  with  Hamilton  is  quite 
voluminous.^®  For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  would  cooperate  for  the  pur- 
pose of  revolutionizing  Spanish  America.  The  plan, 
as  entertained  by  Miranda  and  Hamilton,  was  for  Eng- 
land to  supply  the  naval  force  and  the  United  States 
the  land  forces.  Miranda  believed  that  six  or  eight 
vessels  of  the  line  and  four  or  five  thousand  troops 
would  be  sufficient,^®  though  Hamilton  thought  it 
would  require  ten  thousand  troops.  England's  partici- 
pation in  the  scheme  depended  upon  the  relations  be- 

*'  "  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King,"  New  York,  1894,  Vol.  II, 
App.  5.  For  further  information  regarding  his  relations  with  Miranda, 
see  extracts  from  his  Memorandum   Book,  in  Vol.   Ill,  App.   3. 

'•  See  Miranda's  letter  to  President  Adams,  March  24,  1798.  "  Life 
*«»d  Corresp.  of  King,"   Vol.  II,  p.  654. 

17 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

tween  France  and  Spain,  Mr.  King  wrote  to  his  gov- 
ernment, February  26,   1798: 

Two  points  have  within  a  fortnight  been  settled  in  the 
English  cabinet  respecting  South  America.  If  Spain  is  able 
to  prevent  the  overthrow  of  her  present  government  and  to 
escape  being  brought  under  the  entire  control  of  France, 
England  (between  whom  and  Spain,  notwithstanding  the 
war,  a  certain  understanding  appears  to  exist)  will  at  present 
engage  in  no  scheme  to  deprive  Spain  of  her  possessions  in 
South  America.  But  if,  as  appears  probable,  the  army 
destined  against  Portugal,  and  which  will  march  through 
Spain,  or  any  other  means  which  may  be  employed  by  France, 
shall  overthrow  the  Spanish  government,  and  thereby  place 
the  resources  of  Spain  and  of  her  colonies  at  the  disposal  of 
France,  England  will  immediately  commence  the  execution  of 
a  plan  long  since  digested  and  prepared  for  the  complete 
independence  of  South  America.  If  England  engages  in  this 
plan,  she  will  at  Philadelphia  propose  to  the  United  States  to 
cooperate  in  its  execution,  Miranda  will  be  detained  here, 
under  one  pretense  or  another,  until  events  shall  decide  the 
conduct  of  England."" 

England's  policy  in  regard  to  South  America  for  the 
next  twenty  years  substantially  confirmed  the  inter- 
pretation of  her  motives  here  given  by  Mr.  King. 

During  the  summer  of  1798  Mr.  King  had  several 
conferences  with  the  British  ministry  in  regard  to  the 
Spanish-American  question,  but  it  was  always  under- 
stood that  they  were  personal  and  wholly  unauthor- 
ized. What  occurred  at  these  interviews  was,  of 
course,  always  communicated  to  the  American  govern- 
ment, but  as  they  were  unofficial  and  communicated 
merely  in  the  nature  of  information,  the  State  De- 
partment preferred  to  keep  the  matter  on  the  same 

*•  "  Life  and  Corresp.   of  King,"   Vol.    II,  p.   650. 

18 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

basis  and  did  not  refer  to  the  matter  in  its  dispatches 
to  Mr.  King.  This  caused  him  no  little  annoyance.*^ 
In  the  same  way  no  notice  was  taken  of  General 
Miranda's  letter  to  President  Adams. 

Hamilton,  however,  was  very  frank  in  the  expres- 
sion of  his  views  both  to  General  Miranda  and  to  Mr. 
King.  Under  date  of  August  22,  1798,  he  wrote  to 
the  latter: 

I  have  received  several  letters  from  General  Miranda.  I 
have  written  answers  to  some  of  them,  which  I  send  you 
to  deliver  or  not,  according  to  your  estimate  of  what  is 
passing  in  the  scenes  where  you  are.  Should  you  deem  it 
expedient  to  suppress  my  letter,  you  may  do  it  and  say  as 
much  as  you  think  fit  on  my  part  in  the  nature  of  a  com- 
munication through  you.  With  regard  to  the  enterprise  in 
question,  I  wish  it  much  to  be  undertaken,  but  I  should  be 
glad  that  the  principal  agency  was  in  the  United  States — 
they  to  furnish  the  whole  land  force  necessary.  The  com- 
mand in  this  case  would  very  naturally  fall  upon  me,  and  I 
hope  I  should  disappoint  no  favorable  anticipation. 

The  United  States,  however,  succeeded  in  coming 
to  an  understanding  with  France,  while  England  was 
unwilling  to  deal  such  a  serious  blow  to  Spain  as  long 
as  there  was  a  chance  of  arraying  her  against  Na- 
poleon. The  communication  of  the  views  of  the  Brit- 
ish government  at  Philadelphia,  to  which  Mr.  King 
referred  as  a  preliminary,  was  never  made.  Miranda's 
hopes  finally  fell  through  at  the  reestablishment  of 
peace  in  Europe  by  the  treaty  of  Amiens,  which  lasted 
until  1803.  He  lingered  in  Europe  some  time  longer, 
until,  wearied  out  by  years  of  fruitless  negotiation 
with  the  British  government,  he,  for  the  time  being, 

'*  See  King's  letter  to  Hamilton,  March  4,  1799.  "  Life  and  Corresp.," 
p.  662. 

19 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

gave  up  all  hope  of  success  in  that  quarter  and  re- 
turned once  more  to  the  United  States. 

Arriving  in  New  York  from  England  in  November, 
1805,  Miranda  proceeded  to  lay  his  cause  once  more 
before  Mr.  King,  who  had  so  warmly  befriended  him 
in  London,  and  to  solicit  his  cooperation  in  fitting 
out  an  expedition  for  South  America,  While  express- 
ing his  full  sympathy  with  the  cause,  Mr.  King  stated 
emphatically  that  he  could  render  him  no  assistance, 
nor  could  any  individuals  safely  do  so,  without  the 
countenance  of  the  government.  He,  therefore,  ad- 
vised Miranda  to  go  to  Washington  and  lay  his  plans 
before  the  administration.  This  Miranda  did.  He 
was  admitted  to  informal  conferences  both  with  Presi- 
dent Jefferson  and  Secretary  of  State  Madison.  Upon 
his  return  to  New  York  he  represented  to  those  in- 
terested in  his  schemes  that  he  had  secured  from  the 
government  a  secret  sanction  of  his  project,  and  that 
the  administration,  though  unwilling  to  take  the  ini- 
tiative, would  support  the  undertaking  so  soon  as  the 
standard  of  revolution  should  once  have  been  raised 
on  the  Spanish  Main.  Miranda's  chief  supporter  was 
Colonel  Smith,  surveyor  of  the  port  of  New  York, 
whose  influence  as  a  public  official  in  close  touch  with 
the  administration  was  decisive  in  persuading  many 
adventurous  spirits  to  join  the  expedition  with  the  be- 
lief that  it  was  really  secretly  backed  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States. 

Miranda  left  New  York  in  the  early  part  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1806,  in  the  Leander,  with  an  imperfectly 
equipped  force  of  about  200  men,  most  of  whom  were 
commissioned  as  officers  and  promised  commands  in 
the  South  American  army,  which  was  expected  to 

20 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

spring  from  the  soil  at  the  magic  touch  of  Miranda's 
step  upon  the  shores  of  his  native  land.  The  ship 
proceeded  to  Jacquemel,  San  Domingo,  where  Mi- 
randa expected  to  get  the  necessary  supplies  and  re- 
inforcements. Here  disappointments  awaited  him, 
disputes  with  the  ship's  captain  ensued,  and  over  a 
month  was  fruitlessly  spent,  while  the  Spanish  au- 
thorities on  the  Main  had  time  to  put  themselves  on 
the  alert.  It  was  not  until  the  last  of  April  that  the 
expedition,  reinforced  by  two  schooners,  appeared  off 
the  coast  of  Venezuela  near  Porto  Cabello.  They 
were  attacked  by  two  Spanish  vessels,  which  captured 
the  schooners  with  about  sixty  men  and  large  stores, 
while  the  Leander  ignominiously  took  to  flight. 

Miranda  then  sailed  for  Barbados,  where  he 
solicited  aid  from  the  British  admiral.  Lord  Cochrane, 
in  command  on  the  West  Indian  station.  Lord 
Cochrane,  without  definite  instructions  from  his  gov- 
ernment, but  acquainted  with  its  general  policy  in 
regard  to  South  America,  and  knowing  of  the  close 
relations  in  which  Miranda  had  stood  for  years  with 
the  British  ministry,  decided  to  assist  him  in  landing. 
With  this  imderstanding  he  signed  with  Miranda  an 
agreement  to  the  effect  that  in  the  event  of  the  success 
of  the  expedition,  Great  Britain  should  always  be  held 
on  a  footing  with  the  most  favored  nation,  and  that 
British  ships  should  receive  a  deduction  of  ten  per 
cent,  upon  duties  paid  by  all  other  nations,  except  the 
United  States. ^^  On  the  twentieth  of  June,  the  ex- 
pedition left  Barbados  under  convoy  of  a  part  of 
Admiral  Cochrane's  squadron,  and  on  August  2,  1806, 
effected  a  landing  near  Coro,  Venezuela.    They  easily 

**  "  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.  Vll. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

took  possession  of  the  town,  the  unarmed  inhabitants 
fleeing  before  them.  Here  Miranda  remained  about 
ten  days,  issuing  proclamations  and  vainly  waiting  for 
the  natives  to  join  him.  His  position,  meanwhile,  was 
becoming  unsafe,  so  he  abandoned  it  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  little  island  of  Aruba  off  the  coast.  Lord 
Cochrane,  seeing  that  the  expedition  was  a  failure, 
and  not  wishing  further  to  compromise  his  govern- 
ment, sent  no  reinforcements  and  finally  ordered  the 
withdrawal  of  the  ships  that  had  accompanied  the  ex- 
pedition. Miranda  was  offered  a  convoy  back  to 
Trinidad,  which  he  accepted,  leaving  Aruba,  Septem- 
ber 27,  1806.  At  Trinidad  the  members  of  the  expedi- 
tion dispersed.^' 

The  Americans  who  had  taken  part  in  the  expedi- 
tion and  survived  were  prosecuted  in  the  United  States 
courts  for  violation  of  the  neutrality  laws.  They 
claimed  that  they  had  enlisted  in  the  undertaking  with 
the  connivance  of  the  government  at  Washington. 
Jefferson's  enemies  made  great  political  capital  of  the 
affair.  Members  of  the  cabinet  were  summoned  as 
witnesses,  but  refused  to  appear.  Privately  Jefferson 
ajid  Madison  both  denied  most  emphatically  having  in 
any  way  committed  the  government  to  Miranda's 
undertaking,  or  having  acted  in  any  way  in  disregard 
of  our  obligations  to  Spain.^* 

Aside  from  accomplishing  nothing,  the  expedition 
of  1806  was  a  great  injury  to  Miranda's  cause.  He 
himself  lost  prestige  as  a  military  leader  and  brought 
his  character  into  question  as  having  misrepresented 
his  connection  both  with  the  British  and  United  States 

"  See  Sherman,  "  General  Account  of  Miranda's  Expedition,"  N.  Y.,  1808. 
'*  H.  A.  Washington,  "  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,"  Vol.  V,  p.  474; 
"  Madison's  Writings,"  Vol.  II,  pp.  220,  225. 

22 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

governments.  However,  upon  the  occupation  of 
Spain  by  Napoleon  in  1808,  Miranda  again  hastened 
to  England  and  urged  upon  the  ministry  the  claims 
of  his  country,  in  whose  interests  he  had  now  been 
laboring  incessantly  as  an  exile  for  more  than  twenty 
years.  We  cannot  but  admire  his  tenacity  of  purpose 
in  the  face  of  the  most  disheartening  failures. 

Not  only  did  the  British  government  lend  its  en- 
couragement, through  Lord  Cochrane,  to  the  filibuster- 
ing expedition  from  the  United  States  with  which 
Miranda  hoped  to  revolutionize  Venezuela,  but  about 
the  same  time  it  sent  an  expedition  against  the  prov- 
inces of  the  Plate.  This  attack,  like  the  assistance 
given  to  Miranda,  was  ill-timed  and  not  properly  fol- 
lowed up.  The  policy  seems  to  have  been  outlined  by 
Pitt,  but  was  put  into  execution  after  his  death  by  the 
short-lived  ministry  of  Grenville  and  Fox.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  Duke  of  Portland,  which  succeeded 
after  a  few  months,  and  in  which  Castlereagh  and 
Canning  were  the  most  conspicuous  figures,  did  not 
deem  it  expedient  to  follow  up  the  undertaking.^'  In 
fact,  the  fate  of  the  expedition  was  already  sealed 
when  Portland  came  into  power. 

The  victory  of  Trafalgar  had  given  the  English 
control  of  the  Atlantic.  A  force  of  some  6,000  men 
was  dispatched  to  the  South  Atlantic  without  its  desti- 
nation being  known.  It  proceeded  to  Rio  Janeiro,  Por- 
tugal then  being  in  alliance  with  England.  The  vice- 
roy of  the  Plate  became  alarmed  and  prepared  to 
defend  Montevideo,  which  he  thought  would  be  the 
first  point  of  attack.  The  expedition,  however,  passed 
by  and  proceeded  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  which 

*»"  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.  VII,  p.  auff. 

23 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

it  wrested  from  the  Dutch.  In  1806  a  dash  was  made 
from  the  Cape  for  the  river  Plate.  Sir  Home  Popham 
commanded  the  fleet,  and  General  Beresford  the  land 
force,  which  amounted  to  1,635  men.  On  June  6  the 
squadron  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Plate.  The 
ships  had  some  difficulty  in  ascending  the  river,  but 
on  the  25th  they  came  to  anchor  at  a  point  fifteen  miles 
below  Buenos  Aires.  The  city  was  captured  with 
little  or  no  resistance,  the  inhabitants  having  been 
led  to  believe  that  the  British  had  come  to  liberate 
them.  The  contents  of  the  public  treasury  were 
handed  over  to  the  invadtrs.  The  inhabitants  were 
required  to  swear  allegiance  to  George  III,  private 
property  was  respected,  the  free  exercise  of  their  re- 
ligion was  allowed,  and  all  officials  who  took  the  oath 
were  continued  in  office.  When  Beresford  refused  to 
proclaim  the  independence  of  the  province,  or  to  give 
any  assurance  for  their  future  independence,  the  in- 
habitants, who  had  now  learned  how  insignificant  the 
invading  force  really  was,  began  to  prepare  for  re- 
sistance. A  leader  was  readily  found  in  the  person 
of  Jacques  Liniers,  a  Frenchman,  who  had  been  for 
thirty  years  in  the  service  of  Spain.  He  and  Juan 
Martin  de  Puyrredon  began  an  organized  movement 
for  the  expulsion  of  the  English.  On  the  12th  of 
Augast,  Beresford,  who  had  remained  all  this  time 
without  reinforcements,  was  compelled  to  surrender. 
Troops  ordered  to  his  support  from  the  Cape  did  not 
arrive  until  later. 

Sobremonte,  the  viceroy,  had  deserted  Buenos 
Aires  and  established  himself  at  Montevideo.  The 
people  of  Buenos  Aires,  therefore,  deposed  him  and 
chose  Liniers  in  his  place. 

24 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

During  the  fall  other  English  reinforcements  ar- 
rived, and  in  January,  1807,  Montevideo  was  taken  by 
assault.  As  soon  as  the  defeat  of  Beresford  was 
known,  General  Whitelocke  was  sent  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  united  English  forces  of  the  Plate,  now 
some  twelve  thousand  in  number.  He  arrived  in  the 
spring.  The  reconquest  of  Buenos  Aires  now  seemed 
an  easy  matter.  It  had  been  taken  in  the  first  instance 
by  sixteen  hundred  men ;  there  were  now  ten  thousand 
available.  On  June  28  the  British  landed  at  the  small 
port  of  Ensefiada,  forty-eight  miles  below  Buenos 
Aires.  The  fighting  continued  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
city  in  a  desultory  maner  and  without  any  decisive 
action  for  several  days.  But  finally,  owing  to  the  bad 
generalship  and  incompetency  of  Whitelocke,  his 
troops  got  into  such  a  muddle  that  half  the  force  was 
captured  or  disabled.  On  July  6,  Liniers  decided  to 
send  a  flag  of  truce  with  the  proposal  to  surrender  all 
the  English  prisoners,  including  those  taken  with 
Beresford,  provided  Whitelocke  would  evacuate  the 
territory  of  Buenos  Aires.  One  of  Liniers'  asso- 
ciates, Alzaga,  insisted  that  the  terms  of  surrender 
should  include  Montevideo.  This  demand  seemed  pre- 
posterous, but  the  clause  was  finally  inserted,  and  to 
their  surprise  agreed  to,  so  complete  was  the  demorali- 
zation of  the  English.  On  July  7  the  terms  of  capitu- 
lation were  signed.^*  Thus  through  a  lack  of  decision 
in  the  cabinet  and  a  display  of  incapacity  in  the  field, 
without  parallel  in  British  annals,  the  empire  of  the 
Plate  was  lost.^^ 

With  Napoleon's  invasion  of  Spain  in   1808,  the 

"  See    Watson,    "  Spanish    and    Portuguese    South    America."      2    Vols. 
London,   1884,   Vol.   II,  p.   271  ff. 
"  See  "  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.  VII,  p.  316  ff. 

25 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Spanish-American  question  came  to  the  front  once, 
more.  Miranda  returned  to  London  and  was  de- 
tained there  by  the  cabinet,  as  before  by  Pitt,  with  a 
view  to  using  him  if  occasion  should  require.  At  the 
same  time  Castlereagh,  now  Foreign  Secretary,  had 
other  solutions  of  the  question  in  view.  It  was  pro- 
posed, and  the  matter  seriously  discussed  in  the  cabi- 
net, to  alienate  the  colonies  from  Spain,  if  possible, 
without  revolution;  and,  instead  of  establishing  repub- 
lics according  to  Miranda's  plans,  to  unite  them  all 
under  a  prince  of  the  House  of  Bourbon.  Louis 
Philippe,  Duke  of  Orleans,  was  suggested  as  the  most 
suitable  person  for  the  new  crown.  Some  thirty  years 
prior  to  this,  immediately  upon  the  recognition  by 
Spain  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  Count 
de  Aranda  had  advised  Charles  III  to  forestall  the 
movement  for  independence,  which  must  inevitably 
come  in  his  own  provinces,  by  establishing  among  them 
three  great  empires — one  in  Mexico,  one  in  Peru,  and 
one  on  the  Main — each  to  be  ruled  by  a  prince  of  the 
royal  family  of  Spain.^® 

Chateaubriand  brought  forward  a  similar  plan  sev- 
eral years  later  at  the  Congress  of  Verona.  The  present 
scheme  was  suggested  by  General  Dumouriez  in  the 
interests  of  his  friend,  the  Duke  of  Orleans.  Several 
memorials  on  the  subject,  both  by  Dumouriez  and  the 
duke,  were  presented  to  the  British  government  in  1807 
and  1808.'' 

Napoleon's  invasion  of  Spain  constitutes  at  once 
the  most  contemptible  and  the  most  disastrous  chapter 
in  his  career.    In  1807,  under  the  terms  of  an  agree- 


'•  Romero,  "  Mexico  and  the  United   States,"  Putnam.    1898,   p.   387. 
'•  "  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.   VII, 

26 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

ment  with  Godoy,  the  unworthy  favorite  of  the  queen 
and  the  virtual  ruler  of  Spain,  a  French  army  was 
introduced  into  the  kingdom  for  the  nominal  purpose 
of  punishing  Portugal  for  her  refusal  to  join  the 
continental  system.  The  Portuguese  royal  family, 
fully  appreciating  the  danger  in  which  they  stood,  fled 
to  America  and  founded  the  empire  of  Brazil,  which 
in  1815  was  declared  independent  of  Portugal.  The 
Spanish  rulers  attempted  to  follow  their  example,  but 
their  intended  flight  became  known  and  they  were  pre- 
vented by  the  populace  from  leaving  the  capital.  In 
the  meantime  a  disgraceful  quarrel  having  arisen  be- 
tween the  old  king,  Charles  IV,  and  Prince  Ferdinand, 
Napoleon,  whose  troops  were  now  firmly  established  in 
Spain,  stepped  in  as  arbiter  between  father  and  son 
and  summoned  them  both  to  meet  him  on  the  northern 
frontier.  Having  purposely  lingered  in  France  beyond 
the  appointed  time,  he  succeeded  in  enticing  them  over 
the  border  to  Bayonne,  where  he  compelled  both  to 
renounce  forever  the  crown  of  Spain  and  the  Indies, 
which  he  forthwith  bestowed  upon  his  brother  Joseph. 
When  the  truth  dawned  upon  them,  the  Spanish  nation 
rose  to  a  man.  Napoleon  had  unwittingly  aroused  the 
latent  principle  of  nationality;  he  had  put  into  action 
a  force  which  was  new  and  one  which  the  statesmen 
of  Europe  had  hitherto  left  out  of  account,  but  which 
was  to  prove  the  most  potent  factor  in  the  new  epoch 
of  political  history  introduced  by  the  French  Revo- 
lution. 

Provisional  juntas  were  rapidly  organized  in  the 
various  provinces  of  the  kingdom  of  Spain  and  affairs 
administered  in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.  The 
Junta,  or  as  it  is  better  known,  the  Regency  of  Cadiz, 

27 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

rapidly  gained  a  position  of  national  importance,  and 
became  the  chief  executive  body  of  the  Spanish  nation. 
The  American  provinces,  which  had  long  been  restive 
under  Spanish  rule,  now  claimed  the  same  right  of 
self-government  that  the  provinces  of  the  Peninsula 
had  assumed,  and  began  to  depose  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernors and  to  set  up  juntas  of  their  own,  still  acting 
in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.  The  Americans 
claimed  that  they  were  not  politically  a  part  of  Spain, 
but  connected  only  through  the  sovereign,  and  that 
with  the  removal  of  the  sovereign  the  connection 
ceased.  The  Regency  of  Cadiz,  on  the  other  hand, 
maintained  that  the  colonies  were  integral  parts  of 
Spain,  and  claimed,  therefore,  the  right  to  govern  them 
in  the  absence  of  the  sovereign. 

The  first  throes  of  revolution  were  felt  in  1809, 
almost  simultaneously  in  Upper  Peru,  Quito,  and 
Mexico.  These  movements  were  quickly  suppressed 
■with  great  cruelty.  In  the  year  18 10  the  revolution 
opened  upon  a  vast  scale.  All  the  Spanish  colonies 
on  the  mainland,  with  the  exception  of  Lower  Peru, 
revolted  at  the  same  time  and  proclaimed  their  inde- 
pendence of  Spain,  although  still  professing  allegiance 
to  Ferdinand  VII,  the  dethroned  king. 

The  colonial  authorities  were  deposed  in  most  cases 
by  force  of  public  opinion  and  without  violence.  The 
revolution  was  municipal  in  character,  that  is  to  say, 
the  cahildos,  or  town  councils,  the  only  popularly  con- 
stituted political  bodies  in  the  colonies,  assumed  the 
initiative  in  the  work  of  revolution  and  named  the 
juntas.  The  junta  of  the  capital  city  in  each  province 
was  usually  recognized  as  the  chief  executive  body 
for  that  province,  and  assumed  for  the  time  being 

28 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

all  the  functions  of  government.  National  conventions 
were  then  called  in  many  cases  to  decide  upon  the  form 
of  government.  These  in  most  cases  entrusted  the 
executive  power  to  regencies  or  triumvirates,  almost 
all  of  which  rapidly  gave  way  to  military  dictatorships. 

The  Regency  of  Cadiz  had  anticipated  trouble  from 
the  colonies  and  had  recognized  their  rights  as  free- 
men by  inviting  them  to  send  deputies  to  the  national 
Cortes,  but  at  the  same  time  had  abridged  those  rights 
by  allowing  them  only  a  very  limited  representation, 
absurdly  out  of  proportion  to  their  population  and 
commercial  importance.  Upon  the  establishment  of 
the  provisional  governments  or  juntas  in  the  colonies, 
the  Regency  refused  them  the  freedom  of  trade  that 
had  been  promised,  declined  the  proffered  mediation 
of  England,  and  proceeded  to  stigmatize  the  Ameri- 
cans as  rebels  and  to  declare  them  guilty  of  high 
treason,  although  they  had  been  guilty  only  of  the 
same  conduct  that  the  Spaniards  themselves  were  pur- 
suing at  home. 

Venezuela  then  (1811)  declared  herself  independent 
of  both  the  Spanish  nation  and  of  the  Spanish  mon- 
arch, and  adopted  a  republican  constitution.  The  pro- 
mulgation of  the  Spanish  constitution  of  18 12  further 
encouraged  the  spirit  of  independence  in  the  colonies, 
but  when  Ferdinand  was  restored  in  18 14,  the  colonies 
were  still  governed  in  his  name,  for  the  revolution  of 
Venezuela,  which  alone  had  declared  for  independence, 
had  been  crushed  out.  Had  Ferdinand  acted  with 
any  moderation  or  judgment,  his  American  posses- 
sions would  have  been  saved  to  his  crown.  But  the 
refusal  of  the  colonies,  which  had  now  enjoyed  prac- 
tical self-government  for  several  years,  to  take  upon 

29 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

them  without  conditions  the  yoke  of  absolute  author- 
ity, was  met  with  the  proclamation  of  a  war  of  re- 
conquest.  Reconciliation  was  thereafter  no  longer 
possible,  and  independence  only  a  question  of  time. 
By  the  close  of  1815  the  revolution  had  been  put  down 
in  all  the  provinces  except  La  Plata.  There  it  was 
never  suppressed.  For  this  reason  we  shall  first  trace 
rapidly  the  course  of  the  revolution  in  the  south,  of 
which  San  Martin  was  the  directing  power. 

Jose  de  San  Martin  was  born  in  1778  in  Paraguay, 
his  father  being  the  governor  of  Misiones.  When 
eight  years  of  age,  his  family  went  to  Spain  and  he 
was  entered  as  a  pupil  in  the  Seminary  of  Nobles  at 
Madrid.  At  the  age  of  twelve,  he  joined  a  regiment 
as  cadet  and  saw  his  first  service  in  Africa.  He  served 
in  the  Spanish  army  for  more  than  twenty  years,  and 
won  promotion  as  well  as  special  distinction  for  brav- 
ery. In  the  battle  of  Baylen,  where  a  detachment  of 
Napoleon's  disciplined  troops  was  beaten  by  an  army 
of  recruits  inspired  by  patriotism,  San  Martin,  then  a 
captain,  won  a  gold  medal  and  a  commission  as  lieu- 
tenant-colonel for  his  conduct.  Hearing  of  the 
struggle  for  liberty  in  his  native  land,  he  resigned  his 
commission  and  returned  to  America.  He  was  almost 
unknown  personally,  but  his  reputation  as  a  brave  sol- 
dier and  a  skilful  tactician  procured  for  him  immediate 
employment.  At  this  time  the  Argentine  Republic  had 
two  armies  in  the  field,  the  one  operating  near  at  home 
against  the  Portuguese  in  Uruguay  and  the  Spanish 
in  Montevideo,  and  the  other  in  Upper  Peru  (Bolivia) 
against  the  forces  sent  by  the  viceroy  of  Peru  to  sup- 
press the  Argentine  revolution.  San  Martin  was 
soon  given  the  command  of  this  army  in  the  north, 

30 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

succeeding  General  Belgrano.  He  soon  placed  his 
army  in  an  excellent  state  of  discipline  and  put  a  check 
to  the  advances  of  the  Peruvian  army.^° 

On  May  i6,  1814,  the  Argentine  naval  force,  under 
command  of  an  Irishman  named  Brown,  defeated  and 
almost  entirely  destroyed  the  Spanish  squadron  sta- 
tioned at  Montevideo,  and  that  city  soon  after  sur- 
rendered to  the  besieging  army  of  Alvear,  San 
Martin's  old  comrade  in  the  Spanish  army.  Alvear, 
whose  political  influence  was  much  greater  than  San 
Martin's,  now  aspired  to  the  conquest  of  Peru,  and 
therefore  desired  the  command  in  the  north.  This  San 
Martin  willingly  relinquished  to  him.  He  had  other 
plans  in  mind,  and  the  state  of  his  health  demanded 
rest.  Upper  Peru  had  been  the  high-road  from  Peru 
to  Buenos  Aires  in  times  of  peace,  and  was,  therefore, 
naturally  looked  upon  as  the  line  of  advance  for  the 
liberating  army.  San  Martin,  however,  after  a  care- 
ful study  of  the  question,  had  become  convinced  that 
this  was  not  the  strategic  line  of  approach,  that  the 
Argentine  Republic  would  never  succeed  in  conquer- 
ing Peru  from  this  quarter.  His  idea  was  to  carry 
the  war  to  the  west,  to  cross  the  Andes,  occupy  Chile, 
and,  having  secured  a  naval  base  there,  to  attack  Peru 
from  the  coast,  continuing  military  operations  in  the 
north  merely  as  a  diversion.  The  success  of  this  plan 
depended  upon  the  performance  of  two  apparently  im- 
possible tasks — the  passage  of  the  Andes  and  the  crea- 
tion of  a  navy  on  the  Pacific.  San  Martin  was  by  far 
too  shrewd  a  man  to  advocate  such  an  undertaking 
before  maturing  his  plans.    He,  therefore,  confided  it 


»»  Mitre,     "  The     Emancipation     of     South     America."       Translated    by 
Pilling.     London,   iSgs- 

31 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

only  to  a  few  of  his  intimate  friends,  and,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  his  ill  health,  asked,  as  a  favor  for  him- 
self, the  government  of  the  obscure  province  of  Cuyo, 
where  from  its  capital  of  Mendoza  he  could  place  him- 
self in  communication  with  the  Chilean  patriots. 

On  August  lo,  1814,  San  Martin  was  appointed 
governor  of  Cuyo,  and  at  once  devoted  himself  to  the 
development  of  the  plans  which  led  to  the  emancipa- 
tion of  half  a  continent  and  gave  him  his  place  in  the 
world's  history.  The  revolutionary  movement  in  Chile 
had  just  been  crushed  out.  It  was  begun  in  1810 
and  the  general  course  of  events  had  been  somewhat 
similar  to  the  Argentine  movement,  but  it  had  fallen  a 
victim  first  to  disputes  between  the  Patriot  leaders  and 
finally  to  the  troops  of  the  viceroy  of  Peru.  It  would 
require  more  space  than  we  can  give  to  trace  the  vary- 
ing fortunes  of  the  cause  in  Chile  through  the  stirring 
events  that  marked  the  leadership  of  Dr.  Rosas,  of  the 
Carrera  brothers,  and  of  Bernardo  O'Higgins.  After 
the  final  collapse,  O'Higgins,  with  a  number  of  other 
Patriots,  fled  over  the  Andes  to  Mendoza  and  readily 
entered  into  the  plans  of  San  Martin.  It  took  the 
latter  two  years  to  organize  and  equip  an  army  and  to 
convince  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires  of  the  prac- 
ticability of  his  plan. 

At  length,  on  January  17,  1817,  he  began  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Andes  with  about  5,000  men,  1,600  horses, 
and  9,000  mules,  the  latter  carrying  the  field  artillery, 
ammunition,  and  provisions.  The  summit  of  the 
Uspallata  Pass  is  12,700  feet  above  the  sea-level,  5,000 
feet  higher  than  the  Great  St,  Bernard,  by  which 
Napoleon  led  his  army  over  the  Alps,  In  many  other 
respects  San  Martin's  achievement  was  more  remark- 

32 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

able.  Each  piece  of  artillery  had  to  be  carried  sus- 
pended on  a  pole  between  two  mules,  or,  where  the  road 
was  particularly  dangerous,  dragged  by  ropes.  There 
were  chasms  that  could  be  crossed  only  by  cable 
bridges.  The  march  over  the  Andes  occupied  three 
weeks.  Both  men  and  animals  suffered  greatly  from 
soroche,  the  illness  caused  by  rarefied  atmosphere. 

At  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  at  Chacabuco,  the  van- 
guard of  San  Martin's  army  defeated  a  body  of  4,000 
Royalists,  and  thus  opened  the  road  to  Santiago,  which 
San  Martin  entered  February  14,  1817.  The  Chileans 
chose  him  Supreme  Director  of  their  government,  but 
he  declined  the  office,  and  O'Higgins  was  chosen. 

San  Martin's  great  object  was  to  crush  the  colonial 
power  of  Spain  in  its  stronghold,  Peru.  Having  by 
the  successful  passage  of  the  Andes  and  the  victory 
of  Chacabuco  in  a  measure  justified  his  plan  of  cam- 
paign, he  returned  to  Buenos  Aires  for  reinforce- 
ments. The  Royalists  meanwhile  retreated  to  the  south. 
On  February  18,  1818,  the  independence  of  Chile  was 
proclaimed.  A  month  later  the  Patriots  were  sur- 
prised at  Cancha-Rayada  and  almost  routed,  but  within 
two  weeks  the  army  was  again  ready  for  action,  and 
on  April  5,  1818,  encountered  the  Royalists  at  Maipo. 
This  battle  was  a  complete  victory  for  the  Patriots 
and  decided  the  fate  of  Chile.  Only  one  or  two  for- 
tresses in  the  south  were  now  held  for  Spain.  Five 
days  after  the  battle  of  Maipo,  San  Martin  returned 
once  more  to  Buenos  Aires  and  began  organizing  an 
expedition  for  the  liberation  of  Peru.  Puyrredon, 
now  Supreme  Director,  supported  his  undertaking. 

While  San  Martin  was  soliciting  aid  from  the  Ar- 
gentine Republic,  the  Chileans  were  not  idle.     They 

33 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

saw  that  the  only  way  of  insuring  their  independence 
was  by  the  creation  of  a  navy.  Through  its  agent  in 
London,  the  Chilean  government  secured  the  services 
of  Lord  Cochrane,  an  English  naval  officer  of  great 
distinction  and  remarkable  talents,  who  by  a  curious 
turn  of  fortune  had  been  brought  into  unmerited  dis- 
grace and  dismissed  from  the  British  service."  He 
reached  Valparaiso  in  November  and  hoisted  his  flag 
on  board  the  O'Higgins,  December  22,  18 18.  During 
the  course  of  the  next  year,  Cochrane  made  two  at- 
tempts to  take  Callao,  the  seaport  of  Peru,  but  with- 
out success  beyond  harassing  the  enemy  in  some  of 
the  smaller  coast  towns.  In  February,  1820,  by  a  bril- 
liant move,  he  captured  Valdivia,  a  strongly  fortified 
town  still  held  by  the  Spaniards  in  southern  Chile. 

San  Martin  returned  to  Chile  in  January,  1820,  and 
began  to  assemble  at  Valparaiso  the  army  destined  for 
the  invasion  of  Peru.  Of  the  5,000  men,  two-thirds 
were  from  Buenos  Aires,  while  nearly  all  of  the  offi- 
cers were  Argentine  or  European  volunteers.  Of  65 
foreign  officers,  37  were  British  and  3  were  from  the 
United  States.  There  were,  besides,  30  English  officers 
in  the  Chilean  navy.  The  expedition  sailed  on  August 
21,  1820,  on  board  the  fleet  commanded  by  Cochrane. 
San  Martin  landed  his  army  at  Pisco,  to  the  south  of 
Lima,  and  sent  an  expedition  into  the  interior  under 
General  Arenales.  who  had  served  the  Patriots  for 
years  in  Upper  Peru.  In  October,  San  Martin  re- 
embarked  his  troops  and  landed  them  again  at  Huacho, 
a  point  seventy  miles  north  of  Lima.  Meanwhile  the 
Spanish  squadron,  completely  demoralized  by  the  ap- 

»>  See  Cochrane   (Earl  Dundonald).  "  Service  in  Chili."     2  Vols.     Lon- 
don,  1859. 

34 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

pearance  on  the  Pacific  of  Lord  Cochrane,  whose  dar- 
ing exploits  were  well  known,  was  lying  under  the  guns 
of  Callao  Castle.  On  the  night  of  November  5,  1820, 
Lord  Cochrane  led  a  force  of  volunteers,  consisting 
of  180  seamen  and  100  marines,  in  open  boats  right 
under  the  batteries  of  Callao,  surprised  and  over- 
powered the  crew  of  the  Esmeralda,  the  largest  Span- 
ish frigate,  and,  cutting  her  loose,  carried  her  off  to 
his  own  squadron. 

After  Cochrane's  exploit  at  Callao,  the  moral  effect 
of  which  was  very  great,  he  urged  upon  San  Martin 
an  immediate  advance  upon  Lima,  but  San  Martin  had 
two  campaigns  before  him,  the  one  military,  the  other 
political.  On  first  landing  at  Pisco  he  had  issued  an 
order  to  his  army  in  which  he  said,  "  Remember  that 
you  are  come  not  to  conquer,  but  to  liberate  a  people; 
the  Peruvians  are  our  brothers."  And  in  spite  of  the 
impatience  and  restlessness  of  his  officers,  he  steadily 
adhered  to  his  plan,  to  the  no  small  loss  of  his  military 
prestige  and  ultimately  to  his  retirement  from  the 
scene  of  activity.  His  purpose  was  by  the  presence  of 
the  liberating  army  to  give  the  people  of  Peru  a  chance 
to  rise  and  throw  off  the  yoke  of  Spain.  To  this  end 
he  scattered  proclamations  and  addresses  of  a  revolu- 
tionary character  broadcast  through  the  land  and 
quietly  awaited  results.  The  contest  in  Peru,  he  said, 
was  not  a  war  of  conquest  and  glory,  but  entirely  of 
opinion;  it  was  a  war  of  new  and  liberal  principles 
against  prejudice,  bigotry,  and  tyranny. 

People  ask  why  I  don't  march  to  Lima  at  once ;  so  I  might, 
and  instantly  would,  were  it  suitable  to  my  views,  which  it 
is  not.  I  do  not  want  military  renown ;  I  have  no  ambition 
to  be  the  conqueror  of  Peru;  I  want  solely  to  liberate  the 

35 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

country  from  oppression.  Of  what  use  would  Lima  be  to 
me  if  the  inhabitants  were  hostile  in  political  sentiment? 
How  could  the  cause  of  independence  be  advanced  by  my 
holding  Lima,  or  even  the  whole  country,  in  military  pos- 
session? Far  different  are  my  views.  I  wish  to  have  all 
men  thinking  with  me,  and  do  not  choose  to  advance  a  step 
beyond  the  gradual  march  of  public  opinion.  The  capital  is 
now  ripe  for  declaring  its  sentiments,  and  I  shall  give  them 
the  opportunity  to  do  so  in  safety.  It  was  in  sure  expecta- 
tion of  this  movement  that  I  have  hitherto  deferred  advanc- 
ing; and  to  those  who  know  the  full  extent  of  the  means 
which  have  been  put  in  action,  a  sufificient  explanation  is 
afforded  of  all  the  delays  that  have  taken  place.  I  have  been 
gaining,  indeed,  day  by  day,  fresh  allies  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people,  the  only  certain  allies  in  such  a  war.  In  the  sec- 
ondary point  of  military  strength,  I  have  been,  from  the 
same  causes,  equally  successful  in  augmenting  and  improving 
the  liberating  army;  while  that  of  the  Spaniards  has  been 
wasted  by  want  and  desertion.  The  country  has  now  become 
sensible  of  its  true  interests,  and  it  is  right  the  inhabitants 
should  have  the  means  of  expressing  what  they  think.  Public 
opinion  is  an  engine  newly  introduced  into  this  country;  the 
Spaniards,  who  are  utterly  incapable  of  directing  it,  have 
prohibited  its  use;  but  they  shall  now  experience  its  strength 
and  importance." 

The  campaign  of  Arenales  in  the  interior  was  suc- 
cessful. In  the  presence  of  the  liberating  army,  the 
people  everywhere  rose  in  revolt.  San  Martin's 
method  of  conducting  the  campaign  was  the  correct 
one.  Public  opinion  was  soon  aroused  in  the  capital 
itself,  and  the  Royalists  finally  decided  to  evacuate 
Lima.  The  viceroy  retired  with  his  forces  to  Cuzco 
in  the  highlands.  In  response  to  an  invitation  from 
the  city  authorities,  the  Patriots  entered  Lima  July  6, 
1821.    San  Martin  himself  entered  without  ceremony 

•*    Hall's  "Journal,"  Vol.  I,  p.   i8i.     Report  of  Conversation  with  San 
Martin  in  Callao   Roads. 

%6 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

after  dark  a  few  days  later.  The  independence  of 
Peru  was  proclaimed  July  28  with  imposing  cere- 
monies in  the  great  square  of  Lima.  San  Martin  was 
proclaimed  Protector  of  Peru.  He  proceeded  to  or- 
ganize a  civil  government,  and  established  the  cele- 
brated Order  of  the  Sun,  distinctively  aristocratic  in 
character. 

San  Martin  had  played  a  great  part  thus  far,  but 
he  had  reached  the  zenith  of  his  influence  and  power. 
Dissensions  soon  arose.  The  task  he  had  undertaken 
was  difficult  in  the  extreme.  It  was  much  easier  to 
acquire  power  than  to  use  it.  At  the  time  of  the  evacu- 
ation of  Lima  by  the  Spaniards,  he  said  to  Captain 
Hall: 

For  the  last  ten  years  I  have  been  unremittingly  employed 
against  the  Spaniards;  or  rather  in  favor  of  this  country, 
for  I  am  not  against  any  one  who  is  not  hostile  to  the  cause 
of  independence.  All  I  wish  is  that  this  country  should  be 
managed  by  itself,  and  by  itself  alone.  As  to  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  to  be  governed,  that  belongs  not  at  all  to  me. 
I  propose  simply  to  give  the  people  the  means  of  declaring 
themselves  independent,  and  of  establishing  a  suitable  form 
of  government ;  after  which  I  shall  consider  I  have  done 
enough  and  leave  them." 

When  the  time  came  he  kept  his  word. 

While  San  Martin  was  leading  the  army  of  libera- 
tion from  the  Argentine  Republic  to  Chile,  and  from 
Chile  to  Peru,  Simon  Bolivar,  the  liberator  of  the 
north,  was  pursuing  his  chequered  career  in  Venezuela 
and  Colombia,  unfurling  the  standard  of  revolution 
wherever  he  could  get  a  foothold.  He  was  a  man,  in 
every  respect,  the  opposite  of  San  Martin,  fiery,  im- 

*»  Hall's  "Journal,"  Vol.   I,  p.   194. 

37 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

petuous,  wholly  given  over  to  personal  ambition, 
neither  a  statesman  nor  a  soldier,  but  one  of  the  great- 
est revolutionary  leaders  of  any  age  or  country.  His 
ignorance  of  military  affairs  led  him  into  undertakings 
from  which  an  experienced  soldier  would  have  held 
back,  but  his  indomitable  pluck  carried  him  safely 
through  all  calamities,  and  his  wonderful  enthusiasm 
fired  his  followers  even  in  the  midst  of  disaster. 

This  remarkable  man,  whose  reputation  in  the  new 
world  stands  second  to  that  of  Washington  alone,  was, 
like  Miranda,  a  native  of  Caracas.  Sprung  from  a 
family  of  wealth  and  influence  he  had,  like  most  young 
South  Americans  of  his  class,  received  his  education 
abroad,  and  had  for  several  years  led  a  dissipated  life 
in  Paris.  At  first  he  held  himself  aloof  from  the  revo- 
lutionary leaders,  but  after  the  accomplishment  of  the 
revolution  of  Caracas,  April  19,  18 10,  he  was  per- 
suaded to  join  the  Patriot  cause,  and  was  sent  to 
London  to  solicit  assistance  from  Great  Britain.^* 

The  junta  of  Caracas,  like  those  subsequently 
formed  in  the  south,  professed  to  act  in  the  name  of 
Ferdinand  VII,  and  fearing  the  influence  of  Miranda, 
then  in  London,  whose  advocacy  of  absolute  indepen- 
dence had  been  open  and  avowed,  they  instructed  Boli- 
var and  their  other  agents  not  to  allow  him  to  come 
to  Venezuela.  Miranda  came  in  spite  of  them,  how- 
ever, under  an  assumed  name,  and  was  everywhere 
received  with  enthusiasm.  Under  his  influence  a  con- 
gress was  elected  which,  on  July  5,  181 1,  declared 
Venezuela  a  republic,  free  and  independent  of  all  for- 
eign dominion.  Miranda  was  appointed  Director. 
This  was  the  first  South  American  declaration  of  inde- 


*•  Holstein,    "  Life    of    Bolivar."      Boston,    1829. 

38 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

pendence.  The  formal  independence  of  the  Argentine 
Republic  was  not  declared  until  July  9,  1816,  although 
the  country  had  been  self-governing  for  several  years. 

The  Patriot  cause  was  ruined,  however,  by  the 
earthquake  of  March  25,  18 12,  which  almost  destroyed 
the  city  of  Caracas  and  several  towns  of  importance. 
Twenty  thousand  people  are  supposed  to  have  per- 
ished. As  the  disaster  occurred  on  Holy  Thursday, 
the  clergy  were  not  slow  to  turn  it  to  political  account 
and  to  persuade  the  people  that  it  was  a  direct  chas- 
tisement of  Heaven  upon  them  for  their  rebellion 
against  Spain.  The  cause  of  the  Patriots  steadily  lost 
ground  until  the  fall  of  Porto  Cabello,  through  the 
inefficiency  of  Bolivar,  caused  its  complete  collapse. 
Miranda  was  forced  to  sign  with  Monteverde  the 
treaty  of  Vittoria,  July  26,  1812,  on  the  basis  of  com- 
plete submission  and  a  general  amnesty.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  add  that  the  Spanish  general  did  not 
abide  by  the  terms  of  the  capitulation.  Miranda  him- 
self was  detained  by  Bolivar,  as  he  was  on  the  point 
of  embarking  for  England,  accused  of  having  received 
bribes  from  the  Spaniards  and  of  being  unwilling  to 
share  the  fate  of  his  followers,  and  treacherously 
handed  over  to  the  Spaniards.  He  was  sent  to  Spain 
and  after  languishing  for  three  years  in  a  dungeon  at 
Cadiz,  died  July  14,  1816.  His  fate  was  a  sad  blot 
upon  the  reputation  of  Bolivar. 

The  revolution  in  New  Granada,  which  had  been 
inaugurated  July  20,  18 10,  was  still  holding  out  and 
thither  Bolivar  proceeded  to  offer  his  services  to  the 
Patriots  of  that  province.  As  soon  as  he  had  firmly 
established  himself  in  influence  and  power,  he  per- 
suaded the  government  that  their  only  safety  lay  in 

39 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  reconquest  of  Venezuela.  He  was  provided  with 
troops,  and  in  May,  1813  crossed  the  frontier  and  took 
several  important  cities.  He  now  assumed  a  new  atti- 
tude and  became  a  self-appointed  dictator.  He  pro- 
claimed a  war  of  extermination  against  Spaniards  and 
adopted  a  new  system  of  dates :  "  3d  year  of  Indepen- 
dence and  1st  of  the  War  to  the  Death."  He  entered 
Caracas  in  triumph  August  6,  181 3.  He  proclaimed 
himself  dictator  with  the  title  of  Liberator.  Mean- 
while Marino,  another  Patriot  leader,  had  landed  in 
the  eastern  part  of  Venezuela  near  Cumana  and  de- 
clared himself  dictator.  There  were  thus  two  dic- 
tators and  no  cordiality  between  them.  Before  they 
could  come  to  an  agreement  the  enemy  had  recovered 
their  position.  In  December,  181 4,  the  last  Patriot 
force  was  defeated. 

Bolivar  and  Marino  retired  once  more  to  New 
Granada.  Bolivar  was  made  captain-general  of  the 
forces  of  New  Granada,  his  title  of  Liberator  was 
recognized,  and  another,  that  of  Illustrious  Pacificator, 
bestowed  upon  him.  A  second  time  he  undertook  the 
conquest  of  Venezuela  from  the  west.  Dissensions 
soon  arose  between  Bolivar  and  the  other  leaders.  He 
was  refused  reinforcements  and  foolishly  marched 
against  the  Patriot  garrison  of  Cartagena.  He  was 
now  forced  to  give  up  his  command,  and  embarked  for 
Jamaica,  May,  1815. 

Meanwhile  Ferdinand  had  been  restored  to  the 
throne  of  Spain,  and  an  army  of  10,000  men,  com- 
manded by  Marshal  Morillo,  the  ablest  Spanish  gen- 
eral of  the  time,  had  been  sent  to  reduce  the  provinces 
on  the  Main.  This  expedition  reached  Cumana  in 
April,  181 5,  and  before  the  end  of  the  year  all  the 

40 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

colonies,  with  the  exception  of  the  provinces  of  the 
River  Plate,  were  reduced  to  submission. 

Far  from  giving  up  hope,  however,  Bolivar  pro- 
ceeded to  Haiti,  and  from  that  island,  in  May,  1816, 
made  a  descent  upon  the  eastern  part  of  Venezuela, 
but  was  routed  by  the  Spaniards  in  July,  and  soon 
returned  to  Haiti.  A  few  of  the  Patriots  still  kept 
the  field,  and  towards  the  close  of  the  year  Bolivar's 
partisans  secured  his  recall.  On  December  21  he  left 
Haiti  with  a  second  expedition  for  the  relief  of  his 
native  land.  He  determined  now  to  direct  all  his 
efforts,  not  as  hitherto,  to  the  support  of  the  Patriot 
cause  in  the  capital,  but  to  the  holding  of  the  great 
plains  of  the  Orinoco.  With  this  territory  as  a  base, 
he  carried  on,  during  the  year  1817,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Llanero  horsemen  of  General  Paez,  a  des- 
perate struggle  with  the  Spaniards.  When  the  rainy 
season  of  18 18  began,  Bolivar's  army  had  been  cut 
almost  to  pieces,  he  had  lost  prestige  as  a  general,  and 
his  civil  authority  amounted  to  nothing.  Only  the 
cavalry  of  Paez  maintained  the  Patriot  cause.  Still 
the  position  of  the  Spaniards  was  not  much  better. 
Morillo  had  12,000  men  scattered  about,  but  neither 
money,  arms,  nor  supplies.  He  reported  to  the  viceroy 
of  Peru :  "  Twelve  pitched  battles,  in  which  the  best 
officers  and  troops  of  the  enemy  have  fallen,  have  not 
lowered  their  pride  or  lessened  the  vigor  of  their  at- 
tacks upon  us." 

In  February,  1819,  the  second  Congress  of  Vene- 
zuela convened  at  Angostura.  The  Dictator  resigned, 
but  was  unanimously  elected  President  and  given  abso- 
lute power  in  all  provinces  which  were  the  actual 
theater  of  war,     The  army  was  reorganized  by  the 

41 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

accession  of  foreign  troops,  in  particular  the  British 
legion,  consisting  of  2,000  well  equipped  men,  which 
achieved  much  of  the  success  of  the  next  year.  Boli- 
var now  conceived  the  idea  of  crossing  the  Cordillera 
and  reconquering  New  Granada.  General  Paez  was 
to  attract  the  attention  of  Morillo  on  the  plains  in 
front,  and  a  demonstration  was  to  be  made  on  the 
coast  near  Caracas,  while  Bolivar  marched  to  the  west. 
This  movement  changed  the  whole  face  of  affairs  and 
had  a  similar  effect  to  the  passage  of  the  Andes  by 
San  Martin.  New  Granada  was  won  by  the  battle 
of  Boyaca,  August  7,  18 19.  Morillo  was  now  iso- 
lated in  Venezuela.  In  December,  1819,  a  congress  of 
delegates  from  Venezuela  and  New  Granada  met  and 
decreed  the  union  of  the  two  provinces  in  the  Republic 
of  Colombia.  Bolivar  was  named  provisional  Presi- 
dent. An  armistice  was  signed  by  Bolivar  and  Morillo 
in  November,  1820,  which  gave  the  Patriots  breathing 
time.  The  Spanish  troops  remaining  in  Venezuela 
were  defeated  by  Bolivar  in  the  battle  of  Carabobo, 
June  23,  1821.  Only  a  few  fortresses  on  the  coast 
were  still  held  by  the  Spaniards. 

Bolivar  entered  Caracas  once  more  in  triumph  and 
tendered  his  resignation,  an  act  always  considered  by 
him  necessary  for  giving  the  proper  dramatic  setting 
to  such  occasions.  Congress  took  no  notice  of  it,  but 
drew  up  a  constitution  providing  for  a  limited  presi- 
dential term  of  four  years.  The  Liberator,  "  as  he 
feared,"  was  elected  President.  He  repeated  his  resig- 
nation, but  added  that  he  would  yield  if  Congress  per- 
sisted.   Congress  did  persist. 

After  the  battle  of  Boyaca,  Bolivar  had  sent  General 
Sucre  by  sea  to  Guayaquil,  nominally  to  aid  the  new 

42 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

state  against  the  Royalists,  but  in  reality  to  induce  it 
to  join  the  Republic  of  Colombia.  Sucre  met  with 
reverses,  and  had  to  call  on  San  Martin  for  assistance 
from  Peru.  Meanwhile  Bolivar  was  advancing  by 
land.  On  July  ii,  1822,  he  entered  Guayaquil  in 
triumph,  and  two  days  later,  on  his  own  responsibility, 
announced  its  incorporation  with  Colombia.  The 
junta  resigned  and  took  refuge  on  board  the  Peruvian 
squadron  in  the  harbor.  On  the  25th  San  Martin 
arrived  by  sea,  and  Bolivar  sent  two  of  his  aides  to 
welcome  him  "  on  Colombian  soil."  On  the  following 
day  San  Martin  went  ashore  and  he  and  Bolivar  met 
for  the  first  and  last  time.  They  had  two  private  in- 
terviews, after  which  San  Martin  sent  his  baggage 
aboard  his  ship  and  announced  that  he  would  sail  after 
attending  the  ball  to  be  given  that  night  in  his  honor. 
At  the  public  banquet  that  evening  Bolivar  rose  and 
proposed  a  toast:  "  To  the  two  greatest  men  of  South 
America — General  San  Martin  and  myself."  San 
Martin  also  proposed  a  toast :  "  To  the  speedy  con- 
clusion of  the  war;  to  the  organization  of  the  different 
republics  of  the  continent;  and  to  the  health  of  the 
Liberator  of  Colombia " — words  which  well  con- 
trasted the  personal  and  political  aims  of  the  two  men. 
San  Martin  and  Bolivar  had  been  unable  to  agree  upon 
any  plan  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Spaniards  from  the 
highlands  of  Peru.  The  self-denying  patriot  gave  way 
before  the  man  of  ambition.  To  O'Higgins  he  wrote: 
"  The  Liberator  is  not  the  man  we  took  him  to  be." 
Upon  his  return  to  Peru,  San  Martin  wrote  to  Boli- 
var: "My  decision  is  irrevocable.  I  have  convened 
the  first  Congress  of  Peru;  the  day  after  its  installation 
I  shall  leave  for  Chile,  convinced  that  my  presence  is 

43 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  only  obstacle  which  keeps  you  from  coming  to 
Peru  with  your  army."  On  the  20th  of  September, 
182J.  he  bid  his  resignation  before  the  Congress,  and 
issued  an  address  to  the  nation.  *'  The  presence  of  a 
fortunate  soldier,*'  he  said,  "  however  disinterested  he 
may  be.  is  dangerous  to  a  newly  founded  state.  1  have 
proclaimed  the  independence  of  Peru.  I  have  ceased 
to  be  a  public  man."  These  words,  whether  inten- 
tionally so  or  not.  were  prophetic  of  Bolivar's  subse- 
quent career.  San  Martin  wrote  to  O'Higgins :  "  I 
am  tired  of  hearing  them  call  me  tyrant,  that  I  wish  to 
make  myself  king,  emperor,  the  devil.  On  the  other 
hand,  my  health  is  broken,  this  climate  is  killing  me. 
My  youth  was  sacrificed  to  the  sers'ice  of  Spain;  my 
manhood  to  my  own  country'.  I  think  I  have  now  the 
right  to  dispose  of  my  old  age.'* 

Boli\-ar's  jealousy  of  San  Martin  prolonged  the  war, 
which  might  have  been  brought  to  a  close  in  a  few 
months,  for  nearly  three  years.  After  the  withdrawal 
of  San  Martin.  Bolivar  became  Dictator  of  Peru.  On 
December  9,  1S24,  was  fought  the  last  battle  for  South 
American  independence.  On  the  little  plain  of  Aya- 
cucho.  11.600  feet  above  the  sea.  General  Sucre  de- 
feated and  captured  the  forces  of  the  viceroy.  Upper 
Peru  was  organized  as  a  separate  republic,  with  the 
name  of  Bolivia. 

Bolivar  had  been  proclaimed  President  of  Peru  for 
life,  but  the  unpopularity  of  this  measure  led  him  to 
leave  the  country-  in  1826,  never  to  return.  That  same 
year  he  summoned  the  Congress  of  Panama,  but  his 
plans  for  the  union  of  South  America  in  one  republic 
failed.  San  Martin's  idea  finally  triumphed.  In  1829 
Venezuela  separated  itself  from  Colombia  and  passed 

44 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

a  decree  of  perpetual  banishment  against  Bolivar.  In 
April,  1830,  through  pressure  of  public  opinion,  Boli- 
var resigned  the  presidency  of  Colombia  and  retired 
into  private  life.  Congress  voted  him  an  annual  pen- 
sion of  $30,000.  A  month  later  Quito  and  Guayaquil 
separated  from  Colombia  and  formed  the  independent 
state  of  Ecuador.  Even  the  name  Colombia  was 
dropped  by  the  remaining  state,  and  the  old  name  of 
New  Granada  adopted.  In  1857  the  name  Colombia 
was  assumed  once  more. 

Bolivar  died  in  a  small  house  near  Santa  Martha, 
December  17,  183 1,  having  witnessed  the  failure  of 
his  most  cherished  plans.  San  Martin  had  retired  to 
Europe  in  1823  with  his  only  child,  a  daughter  named 
Mercedes.  They  lived  a  retired  life  in  Brussels.  Once 
only,  in  1828,  he  returned  to  his  native  land,  but  was 
received  with  such  denunciation  by  the  press  of  Buenos 
Aires  that  he  quickly  turned  his  face  towards  Europe 
again.  He  died  at  Boulogne,  August  17,  1850. 
Thirty  years  later  the  Argentine  people  had  his  re- 
mains brought  back  to  his  native  land.  In  May,  1880, 
with  imposing  ceremonies,  they  were  laid  to  rest  in  the 
Cathedral  of  Buenos  Aires. 

Mexico  was  twice  revolutionized.  The  first  struggle 
began  in  1809  and  18 10,  and  was  carried  on  spasmodi- 
cally until  18 1 7,  The  second  revolution  broke  out  in 
1820  on  receipt  of  the  news  from  Spain  of  the  revolu- 
tion of  March,  1820,  and  the  re-adoption  of  the  con- 
stitution of  1812.  The  old  revolutionists  demanded 
the  proclamation  of  this  constitution  in  Mexico,  but 
the  Viceroy  Apodaca  opposed  them.  Augustin  de 
Iturbide,  a  native  Mexican,  who  in  the  first  revolution 
had  steadfastly  adhered  to  the  cause  of  the  king,  now 

45 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

defected  to  the  popular  side  with  a  large  body  of 
troops  which  the  viceroy  had  entrusted  to  his  com- 
mand. On  February  24,  182 1,  he  issued  the  cele- 
brated document  known  as  the  Plan  of  Iguala,  from 
the  town  of  that  name.  In  it  he  proposed  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Roman  Catholic  religion  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  others,  the  independence  of  Mexico  from 
Spain,  and  the  establishment  of  a  limited  monarchy. 
The  Imperial  Crown  of  Mexico  was  to  be  offered  first 
to  Ferdinand  VII;  in  the  event  of  his  declining,  to  the 
younger  princes  of  his  house;  and  in  the  event  of 
their  refusal,  the  duty  of  naming  an  emperor  was  to 
fall  to  the  representative  assembly  of  Mexico.  The 
personal  and  property  rights  of  Spaniards  in  Mexico 
were  carefully  guaranteed.  In  securing  the  interests 
of  Spaniards  and  of  the  clergy,  those  who  had  most 
to  lose,  this  plan  differed  essentially  from  the  revo- 
lutionary policy  of  the  other  Spanish  colonies.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Creole  element  was  satisfied  with 
the  promise  of  independence  and  a  representative  gov- 
ernment. The  revolutionary  army  became  known  as 
"  the  Army  of  the  Three  Guarantees,"  these  being  (i) 
the  maintenance  of  the  religious  establishment  in  its 
present  form,  (2)  independence,  and  (3)  the  union  of 
Americans  and  Spaniards.^^  This  ingenious  document 
received  immediately  the  widest  approval. 

The  Viceroy  Apodaca  had  practically  abdicated 
when  his  successor.  General  O'Donaju,  arrived  from 
Spain.  As  the  latter  had  come  without  troops,  there 
was  nothing  left  but  for  him  to  recognize  the  revolu- 
tion as  an  accomplished  fact  and  make  the  best  terms 
for  his  country  he  could.    Accordingly  he  met  Iturbide 

••Hall's   "Journal,"    Vol.    II,    p.    188. 

46 


REVOLT  OF  THE  SPANISH  COLONIES 

in  conference  at  Cordova,  and  after  a  brief  discussion 
signed  the  treaty  bearing  that  name,  August  24,  182 1. 
It  was  agreed  that  a  provisional  junta  should  be  ap- 
pointed, that  O'Donaju  should  be  a  member,  and  that 
the  junta  should  proceed  to  carry  into  effect  the  plan 
of  Iguala.  O'Donaju  then  persuaded  the  Royalists  to 
open  the  gates  of  the  capital,  and  on  September  27, 
182 1,  Iturbide  entered.  Shortly  thereafter  O'Donaju 
died  from  the  yellow  fever,  thus  leaving  Iturbide  free 
to  carry  out  his  plans.  The  Spanish  government,  of 
course,  repudiated  the  treaty  of  Cordova. 

The  Congress,  which  assembled  in  pursuance  of  the 
program  of  Iguala,  was  divided  between  Imperialists 
and  Republicans.  In  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the 
latter,  Iturbide  had  himself  proclaimed  emperor  and 
his  family  ennobled.  Congress  soon  fell  into  disputes 
with  the  emperor,  who  finally,  in  October,  1822,  dis- 
solved it  by  force.  A  few  months  later  Santa  Anna 
inaugurated  a  counter-revolution  from  Vera  Cruz, 
which  resulted  in  the  abdication  of  the  emperor.  Itur- 
bide was  allowed  to  leave  the  country.  He  retired  to 
Italy,  where  he  resided  until  toward  the  close  of  1823, 
when  he  went  to  London.  In  May,  1824,  at  the  solici- 
tation of  certain  of  his  partisans,  he  sailed  again  for 
Mexico,^®  ignorant  of  the  decree  of  perpetual  banish- 
ment passed  against  him  by  the  Congress  a  few  weeks 
before.  He  landed  at  Tampico  July  12,  but  was  seized 
and  executed  a  few  days  later.  The  new  assembly 
then  in  session  adopted  a  constitution,  and  the  Republic 
of  Mexico  was  launched  upon  what  was  to  prove,  for 
years  to  come,  a  career  of  turbulence  and  anarchy. 


»•  See  the  statement  of  Iturbide  in  regard  to  his  political  life  published 
in  the   Pamphleteer,    London,    1827. 

47 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Recognition  of  the  Spanish-American 
Republics 

The  struggle  of  the  South  American  peoples  fof 
independence  was  viewed  from  the  first  with  feelings 
of  profound  satisfaction  and  sympathy  in  the  United 
States.  From  the  commencement  of  the  revolution 
South  American  vessels  were  admitted  into  the  ports 
of  the  United  States  under  whatever  flag  they  bore. 
It  does  not  appear  that  any  formal  declaration  ac- 
cording belligerent  rights  to  the  said  provinces  was 
ever  made,  though  a  resolution  to  that  effect  was  in- 
troduced into  the  House  by  committee  as  early  as 
December  lo,  i8ii.^  Such  formal  action  was  appar- 
ently not  deemed  necessary  and,  as  there  was  no 
Spanish  minister  resident  in  the  United  States  at  that 
time  to  protest,  our  ports  were  probably  thrown  open, 
as  a  matter  of  course.^  The  fact  that  they  were  ac- 
corded full  belligerent  rights  from  the  first  was  after- 
wards stated  by  President  Monroe  in  his  annual  mes- 
sages of  1817  and  1818  and  in  his  special  message 
of  March  8,  1822.' 

At  an  early  date  of  the  revolutiori  "commissioners 
arrived  in  Washington  seeking  recognition  of  inde- 
pendence, and  agents  were  forthwith  dispatched  to 
South  America  to  obtain  information  in   regard  to 

»  Am.   St.   Papers,   For.   Rel.,  Vol.   Ill,   p.   538. 
"      ~"  " Di 


*  Wharton's   Digest,    Sec.    69,   and    Moore's   Digest   of   Int.    Law,    Vol 

•esid 
48 


177. 

"Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  Vol.  I*.    X>-  13.  58,  and  116. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

the  state  of  the  revolutionary  governments  and  to 
watch  the  movements  of  England  and  other  Euro- 
pean powers.  Joel  R.  Poinsett  was  sent  to  Buenos 
Aires  in  1811,  and  the  following  year  Alexander 
Scott  was  sent  to  Venezuela.*  In  1817  Caesar  A.  Rod- 
ney, Theodorick  Bland,  and  John  Graham  were  dis- 
patched as  special  commissioners  to  South  America. 
They  proceeded  to  Buenos  Aires,  where  they  arrived 
in  February,  1818,  and  remained  until  the  last  of 
April.  Rodney  and  Graham  then  returned  to  the 
United  States  while  Bland  proceeded  across  the  con- 
tinent to  Chile.  Their  reports  were  transmitted  to 
Congress  November  17,  1818.^  In  1820  Messrs.  J.  B. 
Prevost  and  John  M,  Forbes  were  sent  as  commercial 
agents  to  Chile  and  Buenos  Aires.  Reports  from 
them  on  the  state  of  the  revolutions  were  transmitted 
to  Congress,  March  8  and  April  26,  1822." 

In  the  meantime  a  strong  sentiment  in  favor  of  the 
recognition  of  South  American  independence  had 
arisen  in  the  United  States.  The  struggling  colonies 
found  a  ready  champion  in  Henry  Clay,  who,  for  a 
period  of  ten  years  labored  almost  incessantly  in  their 
behalf,  pleading  for  their  recognition  first  with  his 
own  countrymen  and  then,  as  secretary  of  state  under 
the  Adams  administration,  with  the  governments  of 
Europe.  His  name  became  a  household  word  in  South 
America  and  his  speeches  were  translated  and  read 
before  the  patriot  armies. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  our  own  political  interests 
were  so  closely  identified  with  the  struggling  republics, 
the  President  realized  the  necessity  of  following  a  neu- 

*  Lyman,    "  Diplomacy    of   the    United    States^"      2    Vols.      Boston,    1828, 
Vol.    II,    p.    432.      Romero,    "  Mexico   and    the    United    States." 

•  Given  in  full  in  Am.  St.   Papers,  For.   Rel.,  Vol.  IV.  pp.  217-370. 
•Am.  St.  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  818-851. 

49 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

tral  course,  and  in  view  of  the  aid  the  colonies  were 
receiving  from  citizens  of  the  United  States,  called 
upon  Congress  for  the  enactment  of  a  more  stringent 
neutrality  law.  Clay  delivered  a  vigorous  speech  in 
opposition  to  this  measure  in  January,  1817.  His 
greatest  effort  in  behalf  of  South  America,  however, 
was  his  speech  of  March  25,  1818,  on  the  general 
appropriation  bill.  He  moved  an  amendment  appro- 
priating $18,000  for  the  outfit  and  year's  salary  of  a 
minister  to  the  United  Provinces  of  the  Plate.  With- 
out waiting  to  hear  the  report  of  the  three  commis- 
sioners who  had  been  sent  to  inquire  into  the  state  of 
the  revolutionary  governments,  he  urged  that  a  minis- 
ter be  regularly  accredited  to  Buenos  Aires  at  once. 
In  a  speech,  three  hours  in  length,  he  concluded  the 
arguments  he  had  begun  the  day  before.  Painting 
with  even  more  than  his  usual  fire  and  enthusiasm  the 
beauties  and  resources  of  the  Southern  continent,  he 
said: 

Within  this  vast  region,  we  behold  the  most  sublime  and 
interesting  objects  of  creation;  the  loftiest  mountains,  the 
most  majestic  rivers  in  the  world;  the  richest  mines  of  the 
precious  metals;  and  the  choicest  productions  of  the  earth. 
We  behold  there  a  spectacle  still  more  interesting  and  sublime 
— the  glorious  spectacle  of  eighteen  millions  of  people  strug- 
gling to  burst  their  chains  and  be  free.' 

He  went  on  to  say  that  in  the  establishment  of  the 
independence  of  the  South  American  states  the  United 
States  had  the  deepest  interest.  He  had  no  hesita- 
tion in  asserting  his  firm  belief  that  there  was  no 
question  in  the  foreign  policy  of  this  country,  which 
had  ever  arisen,  or  which  he  could  conceive  as  ever 

^  Benton's   "  Abridgment,"   Vol.   VI,  p.   139. 

50 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

occurring,  in  the  decision  of  which  we  had  so  much 
at  stake.  This  interest  concerned  our  poHtics,  our 
commerce,  our  navigation.  There  could  be  no  doubt 
that  Spanish  America,  once  independent,  whatever 
might  be  the  form  of  the  governments  estabHshed 
in  its  several  parts,  those  governments  would  be 
animated  by  an  American  feeling  and  guided  by  an 
American  policy.  They  would  obey  the  laws  of  the 
system  of  the  new  world,  of  which  they  would  com- 
pose a  part,  in  contradistinction  to  that  of  Europe.* 
The  House  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  his  brilliant  rhetoric. 
The  motion  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  115  to  45,  but 
Clay  did  not  abandon  the  cause  of  South  America. 

Two  years  later  he  reopened  the  question  in  a  direct 
attack  on  the  policy  of  the  administration,  which 
greatly  disturbed  President  Monroe.  On  May  20, 
1820,  he  again  introduced  a  resolution  declaring  it 
expedient  to  send  ministers  to  the  "  governments  in 
South  America  which  have  established  and  are  main- 
taining their  independence  of  Spain."  His  arraign- 
ment of  the  administration  became  more  violent  than 
ever: 

If  Lord  Castlereagh  says  we  may  recognize,  we  do;  if  not, 
we  do  not.  A  single  expression  of  the  British  minister  to 
the  present  secretary  of  state,  then  our  minister  abroad,  I 
am  ashamed  to  say,  has  molded  the  policy  of  our  government 
toward  South  America. 

A  charge  of  dependence  upon  Great  Britain  in  affairs 
of  diplomacy  was  as  efifective  a  weapon  then  as  it 
has  been  since  in  matters  financial.  Clay's  resolu- 
tion passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  80  to  75,  but 

•  Benton's   "  Abridgment,"    Vol.    VI,   p.    142. 

51 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

still  the  executive  arm  of  the  government  did  not 
move.  In  1817  and  1818  the  question  of  South 
American  independence  was  continually  before  the 
cabinet  for  discussion.  President  Monroe  seemed 
strongly  inclined  toward  recognition,  but  in  this  he 
was  opposed  by  Adams  and  Calhoun,  who  were  un- 
willing to  act  in  the  matter  without  some  understand- 
ing with  England,  and  if  possible  with  France.  Our 
relations  with  Spain  in  regard  to  the  Indian  troubles 
in  Florida  were  in  a  very  strained  condition  and  any 
action  taken  at  that  time  in  recognition  of  South 
America  would  have  involved  us  in  war  with  Spain 
and  almost  inevitably  with  other  European  powers. 
The  President,  therefore,  as  a  matter  of  expediency 
postponed  the  action  which  his  sympathy  prompted, 
and,  in  his  annual  message  of  November  16.  1818,  ex- 
pressed his  satisfaction  at  the  course  the  government 
had  hitherto  pursued  and  his  intention  of  adhering  to 
it  for  the  time  being.®  Under  the  President's  direction, 
however,  efforts  were  made  to  secure  the  cooperation 
of  Great  Britain  and  France  in  promoting  the  inde- 
pendence of  South  America." 

In  18 1 9  an  amicable  adjustment  of  our  differences 
with  Spain  seemed  to  have  been  reached  by  the  nego- 
tiation of  a  treaty  providing  for  the  cession  of  the 
Floridas  to  the  United  States  and  the  settlement  of 
long-standing  claims  of  American  citizens  against 
Spain.  An  unforeseen  difficulty  arose,  however,  which 
proved  embarrassing  to  the  administration.  The  Span- 
ish monarch  very  shrewdly  delayed  ratifying  the 
treaty   for  two   years   and   thus   practically   tied   the 


Messages   a^nd   Papers  of  the   Presidents,"    Vol.    II.   p.   44. 
'     "  "'  "  '  '        to  December,  :  ' 

404  and  458. 

52 


»*'•  Adams's  Diary,"  September.   1817,  to  December,  1818.    "Letters  and 
Despatches  of  Castlereagh,''  Vol.  XI,  pp. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

hands  of  the  administration  during  that  time  as  far 
as  the  South  American  question  was  concerned. 

In  spite  of  the  awkward  position  in  which  the  ad- 
ministration found  itself,  Clay,  who  was  opposed  to 
the  treaty  on  account  of  its  unwarranted  surrender 
of  our  claims  to  Texas,  continued  to  plead  the  cause 
of  South  America.  Early  in  the  year,  182 1,  a  decla- 
ration of  interest  in  the  South  American  struggle,  in- 
troduced by  him,  was  carried  by  an  overwhelming 
majority  (134  to  12),  but  the  administration  held 
back  another  year  until  the  de  facto  independence 
of  the  colonies  no  longer  admitted  of  reasonable  doubt. 
Meanwhile  the  Florida  treaty  had  been  ratified.  On 
March  8,  1822,  President  Monroe,  in  a  special  mes- 
'iage  to  Congress,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  time 
had  come  for  recognition  and  asked  for  the  appro- 
priations necessary  for  carrying  it  into  efifect.  The 
President's  recommendation  was  received  with  ap- 
proval, and  in  due  course  the  sum  of  $100,000  was 
appropriated  for  **  such  missions  to  the  independent 
nations  on  the  American  continent  as  the  President 
of  the  United  States  may  deem  proper."  In  accord- 
ance with  this  act  Mr.  R.  C.  Anderson  of  Kentucky 
was  appointed  minister  to  Colombia,  Mr.  C.  A.  Rod- 
ney of  New  Jersey  to  the  Argentine  Republic,  and 
Mr.  H.  Allen  of  Vermont  to  Chile,  in  1824.  and  Mr. 
Joel  R.  Poinsett  of  South  Carolina  to  Mexico  in  1826. 

While  the  United  States  government  was  concern- 
ing itself  with  the  political  interests  of  the  Spanish 
provinces.  Great  Britain  was  quiedy  reaping  all  the 
commercial  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  situa- 
tion and  was  apparently  well  satisfied  to  let  things 
follow  the  drift  they  had  taken.     By  the  destruction 

53 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  the  combined  fleets  of  France  and  Spain  at  Trafal- 
gar, in  1805,  Nelson  had  won  for  Great  Britain  un- 
disputed control  of  the  Atlantic  and  laid  open  the 
route  to  South  America.  Ever  since  the  assiento  of 
17 13  had  placed  the  slave  trade  in  her  hands,  Great 
Britain  had  realized  the  possibilities  of  South  Ameri- 
can commerce,  and  the  intercourse,  which  had  been 
kept  up  with  that  country  after  the  termination  of 
the  slave  monopoly  by  smugglers,  now  that  the  dan- 
ger was  removed,  became  more  regular  and  profitable. 
During  the  changes  of  ministry  that  followed  the 
death  of  Pitt,  the  policy  of  England  in  regard  to 
South  America  was  weak  and  vacillating.  We  have 
already  called  attention  to  the  political  indecision  that 
marked  the  attack  upon  the  provinces  of  the  Plate. 
With  Napoleon's  invasion  of  Spain  and  the  national 
uprising  it  occasioned,  British  policy  became  once  more 
intelligible.  It  was  wisely  deemed  of  more  impor- 
tance to  spare  the  colonies  and  to  win  Spain  over 
to  the  European  alliance  against  Napoleon,  than  to 
take  her  colonies  at  the  cost  of  driving  her  perma- 
nently into  the  arms  of  France.  Meanwhile  British 
commerce  with  the  South  American  states  was  stead- 
ily growing  and  that  too  with  the  connivance  of  Spain. 
At  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  Spain,  fearing 
that  England,  through  her  desire  to  keep  this  trade, 
would  secretly  furnish  aid  to  the  colonies  in  their 
struggle  for  independence,  proposed  to  the  British  gov- 
ernment to  bind  itself  to  a  strict  neutrality.  This 
England  agreed  to,  and  when  the  treaty  was  signed, 
there  was,  according  to  Canning,  "  a  distinct  under- 
standing with  Spain  that  our  commercial  intercourse 
with  the  colonies  was  not  to  be  deemed  a  breach  of 

54 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

its  stipulations."  ^^  Notwithstanding  this  tacit  com- 
pact,  British  commerce  suffered  greatly  at  the  hands 
of  Spanish  privateers  and  even  Spanish  war  vessels. 
Numbers  of  British  merchantmen  were  captured  by 
Spanish  ships,  carried  into  the  few  ports  left  to  Spain 
on  the  Main,  and  condemned  as  prizes  for  trading 
with  the  insurgent  colonies.  Thus  at  the  time  of  the 
acknowledgment  of  South  American  independence  by 
the  United  States,  a  long  list  of  grievances  had  ac- 
cumulated in  the  hands  of  the  British  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  and  in  spite  of  urgent  and  repeated  remon- 
strances, remained  unredressed. 

Canning  was  deterred  from  making  final  demands 
upon  the  government  of  Madrid  by  the  consideration 
that  he  did  not  wish  to  hamper  the  constitutional  gov- 
ernment of  Spain,  which  had  come  into  being  by  the 
revolution  of  March,  1820,  and  against  which  the  other 
powers  of  Europe  were  preparing  to  act.  The  con- 
dition of  affairs  on  the  Spanish  Main  was,  however, 
critical  and  demanded  instant  redress.  He  decided, 
therefore,  to  take  matters  into  his  own  hands  without 
harassing  the  government  of  Spain,  and  to  dispatch  a 
squadron  to  the  West  Indies  to  make  reprisals.  In  a 
memorandum  to  the  cabinet  on  this  subject,  Novem- 
ber 15,  1822,  in  which  he  outlines  his  policy,  he  com- 
mends the  course  of  the  United  States  in  recognizing 
the  de  facto  independence  of  the  colonies,  claiming  a 
right  to  trade  with  them  and  avenging  the  attempted 
interruption  of  that  right  by  making  reprisals,  as  a 
more  straightforward  and  intelligible  course  than  that 
of  Great  Britain,  forbearing  for  the  sake  of  Spain  to 
recognize  the  colonies,  trading  with  them  in  faith  of 

"  Stapleton,   "Political  Life  of  Canning,"   Vol.  II.  p.  lo. 

ss 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  connivance  of  Spain  and  suffering  depredations 
without  taking  redress.  It  was  not  necessary,  he 
thought,  to  declare  war  against  Spain,  for  "  she  has 
perhaps  as  little  direct  and  available  power  over  the 
colonies  which  she  nominally  retains  as  she  has  over 
those  which  have  thrown  off  her  yoke.  Let  us  apply, 
therefore,  a  local  remedy  to  a  local  grievance,  and 
make  the  ships  and  harbors  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and 
Porto  Cabello  answerable  for  the  injuries  which  have 
been  infiicted  by  those  ships,  and  the  perpetrators  of 
which  have  found  shelter  in  those  harbors."  In  con- 
clusion, he  says  that  the  tacit  compact,  which  sub- 
sisted for  years,  by  which  Spain  was  to  forbear  from 
interrupting  British  trade  with  the  South  American 
colonies  having  been  renounced  by  Spain,  and  the  old 
colonial  system  having  been  revived  in  as  full  vigor 
as  if  she  had  still  a  practical  hold  over  her  colonies 
and  a  navy  to  enforce  her  pretensions,  "  no  man  will 
say  that  under  such  circumstances  our  recognition  of 
those  states  can  be  indefinitely  postponed."  " 

While  Great  Britain  was  thus  considering  the  ex- 
pediency of  following  the  example  of  the  United 
States  in  the  recognition  of  Spain's  revolted  colonies, 
the  powers  of  central  Europe  had  taken  upon  them 
the  task  of  solving  the  difficulties  of  that  unfortunate 
country  both  at  home  and  in  America.  The  restored 
rule  of  the  Bourbons  in  Spain  had  been  far  from 
satisfactory  to  the  great  mass  of  the  people.  In 
March,  1820,  the  army  which  Ferdinand  had  assembled 
at  Cadiz  to  be  sent  against  the  rebellious  colonies,  sud- 
denly turned  against  the  government,  refused  to  em- 
bark, and  demanded  the  restoration  of  the  constitution 


*' Stapleton,  "Official  Correspondence  of  Canning,"  Vol.  I,  p.  48  ff. 

56 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

of  1812.  The  action  of  the  army  was  every-where 
approved  and  sustained  by  the  mass  of  the  people,  and 
the  king  was  forced  to  proclaim  the  constitution  and 
to  swear  to  uphold  it.  The  March  revolution  in  Spain 
was  followed  in  July  by  a  constitutional  movement 
in  Naples,  and  in  August  of  the  same  year  by  a 
similar  movement  in  Portugal;  while  the  next  year 
saw  the  outbreak  of  the  Greek  struggle  for  independ- 
ence. Thus  in  all  three  of  the  peninsulas  of  Southern 
Europe  the  people  were  struggling  for  the  right  of 
self-government.  The  movement  in  Greece  was,  it 
is  true,  of  an  altogether  different  character  from  the 
others,  but  it  was  a  revolt  against  constituted  author- 
ity and  therefore  incurred  the  ill-will  of  the  so-called 
legitimists.  The  powers  of  Europe  at  once  took  alarm 
at  the  rapid  spread  of  revolutionary  ideas  and  pro- 
ceeded to  adopt  measures  for  the  suppression  of  the 
movements  to  which  these  ideas  gave  rise.  The  prin- 
ciple of  joint  intervention  on  the  part  of  allied  govern- 
ments in  the  internal  affairs  of  European  states  had 
been  developed  in  the  years  immediately  following 
the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  and  was  the  outcome  of 
the  wholly  anomalous  condition  in  which  he  had  left 
the  politics  of  Europe.  In  the  hands  of  Prince  Met- 
ternich,  the  genius  of  reaction  against  French  revo- 
lutionary ideas,  this  principle  had  become  the  most 
powerful  weapon  of  absolutism  and  now  threatened 
the  subversion  of  popular  institutions  throughout  Eu- 
rope. 

The  rapid  development  of  this  doctrine  of  interven- 
tion in  the  seven  years  immediately  following  the  sec- 
ond fall  of  Napoleon  not  only  seriously  menaced  the 
liberties  of  Europe,  but  also  threatened  to  control  the 

57 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

destiny  of  the  new  world.  At  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
Austria,  France,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia 
had  formed  a  close  union  and  had  signed  the  treaty 
upon  which  the  peace  of  Europe  rested  for  the  next 
half  century.  The  agreement  made  at  Vienna  was 
reaffirmed  with  some  minor  changes,  after  the  second 
overthrow  of  Napoleon,  at  Paris,  November  20,  1815. 
France  was  now  practically  excluded  from  the  alliance. 
This  treaty  undertook  especially  to  guard  against  any 
further  disturbance  of  the  peace  of  Europe  by  Napo- 
leon or  France.  One  of  the  most  significant  features 
of  the  treaty,  or  what  was  10  prove  so,  was  the  agree- 
ment definitely  laid  down  in  the  sixth  article,  provid- 
ing for  meetings  of  the  powers  at  fixed  periods. 

The  first  conference  held  in  accordance  with  this 
understanding  was  that  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  in  October, 
1 81 8.  France  was  readmitted  as  a  member  of  the 
alliance  and  her  territory  evacuated  by  the  allied 
armies.  The  quintuple  alliance  thus  formed  declared 
that  it  had  no  other  object  than  the  maintenance  of 
peace;  that  the  repose  of  the  v^rorld  was  its  motive 
and  its  end.  The  language  of  the  declaration  had 
been  in  a  large  measure  neutralized  to  suit  the  views 
of  the  British  government.  Lord  Liverpool  had  said 
to  Castlereagh  before  the  meeting  of  the  conference: 
"  The  Russian  must  be  made  to  feel  that  we  have  a 
parliament  and  a  public,  to  which  we  are  responsible, 
and  that  we  cannot  permit  ourselves  to  be  drawn  into 
views  of  policy  which  are  wholly  incompatible  with 
the  spirit  of  our  government."  The  members  of  the 
British  cabinet,  except  Canning,  did  not  object  seri- 
ously to  the  system  of  congresses  at  fixed  intervals, 
but  to  the  declarations  publicly  set  forth  by  them. 

58 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

Canning,  on  the  other  hand,  objected  to  the  declara- 
tions and  to  the  conferences  themselves,  "  meetings  for 
the  government  of  the  world,"  as  he  somewhat  con- 
temptuously termed  them. 

It  had  been  generally  supposed  that  the  question  of 
the  Spanish  colonies  would  come  up  for  discussion 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  Castlereagh  assured  the  United 
States,  through  Bagot,  the  British  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, that  while  England  would  act  with  the  allied 
powers  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  in  mediation  between  Spain 
and  her  colonies,  her  mediation  would  be  limited  en- 
tirely to  the  employment  of  her  influence  and  good 
offices  and  that  she  would  not  take  any  measures  that 
might  assume  a  character  of  force.^' 

The  revolutions  that  took  place  in  Spain,  Naples, 
and  Portugal  in  1820  presented  an  occasion  for  another 
meeting  of  the  allies.  In  November  the  representa- 
tives of  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  met  in  conference 
at  Troppau,  and  issued  a  circular  setting  forth  what 
they  had  already  done  for  Europe  in  overthrowing  the 
military  tyranny  of  Napoleon  and  expressing  the  de- 
termination "  to  put  a  curb  on  a  force  no  less  tyran- 
nical and  no  less  detestable,  that  of  revolt  and  crime." 
The  conference  then  adjourned  to  Laybach,  where 
they  could,  with  greater  dispatch,  order  the  move- 
ments they  had  decided  to  take  against  the  revolution- 
ists of  Naples.  Austria,  being  more  intimately  con- 
cerned with  the  political  condition  of  the  Italian  pen- 
insula than  either  of  the  other  two  powers,  was  en- 
trusted with  the  task  of  suppressing  the  Neapolitan 
revolution.      The    Austrian    army    entered    Naples 


*»  Bagot    to    Castlereagh,    October    31,    1818.      Mem.    of    a    Conversation 
with  Aoama.    "  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.  XII,  p.  66. 

59 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

March  23,  182 1,  overthrew  the  constitutional  gov- 
ernment that  had  been  inaugurated,  and  restored  Fer- 
dinand II  to  absolute  power.  The  revolution  which 
had  broken  out  in  Piedmont  was  also  suppressed  by 
a  detachment  of  the  Austrian  army. 

England  held  aloof  from  all  participation  in  the  pro- 
ceedings at  Troppau  and  Laybach — though  Sir  Charles 
Stuart  was  present  to  watch  the  proceedings.  In  a 
circular  dispatch  of  January  21,  1821,  the  British 
government  expressed  its  dissent  from  the  principles 
set  forth  in  the  Troppau  circular. 

The  next  meeting  of  the  allied  powers  was  arranged 
for  October,  1822,  at  Verona.  Here  the  affairs  of 
Greece,  Italy,  and,  in  particular,  Spain  came  up  for 
consideration.  At  this  Congress  all  five  powers  of 
the  alliance  were  represented.  France  was  uneasy 
about  the  condition  of  Spain,  and  England  had  to  send 
a  delegate  out  of  self-defense,  as  her  interests  were 
largely  involved.  Castlereagh  was  preparing  to  de- 
part for  the  congress,  when  his  mind  gave  way  under 
the  stress  of  work  and  more  remotely  of  dissipation, 
and  he  committed  suicide.  Canning  then  became  sec- 
retary for  foreign  affairs,  and  Wellington  was  sent 
to  Verona. 

The  congress  which  now  assembled  at  Verona  was 
devoted  largely  to  a  discussion  of  Spanish  affairs. 
Wellington  had  been  instructed  to  use  all  his  influence 
against  the  adoption  of  measures  of  intervention  in 
Spain.  When  he  found  that  the  other  powers  were 
bent  upon  this  step  and  that  his  protest  would  be  un- 
heeded, he  withdrew  from  the  congress.  The  four  re- 
maining powers  signed  the  secret  treaty  of  Verona, 
November  22,  1822,  as  a  revision,  so  they  declared  in 

60 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

the  preamble,  of  the  "  Treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance." 
This  treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  signed  at  Paris, 
September  26,  181 5,  by  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia, 
is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  political  documents 
extant.  It  sprang  from  the  erratic  brain  of  the  Czar 
Alexander  under  the  influence  of  Madame  Crudner, 
who  was  both  an  adventuress  and  a  religious  enthusi- 
ast. Its  object  was  to  uphold  the  divine  right  of 
kings  and  to  counteract  the  spirit  of  French  revolu- 
tionary ideas  by  introducing  "  the  precepts  of  justice, 
of  charity,  and  of  peace  "  into  the  internal  affairs  of 
states  and  into  their  relations  with  one  another.  No 
one  had  taken  it  seriously  except  the  Czar  himself  and 
it  had  been  without  influence  upon  the  politics  of 
Europe.  The  agreement  reached  at  Verona  gave 
retrospective  importance  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  and 
revived  the  name,  so  that  it  became  the  usual  designa- 
tion of  the  combined  powers.  The  following  alleged 
text  of  the  secret  treaty  of  Verona  soon  became  cur- 
rent in  the  press  of  Europe  and  America.  Although' 
it  has  never  been  officially  acknowledged  and  its 
authenticity  has  been  called  in  question,  it  states  pretty 
accurately  the  motives  and  aims  of  the  powers.  The 
first  four  articles  are  as  follows : 

The  undersigned,  specially  authorized  to  make  some  ad- 
ditions to  the  Treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  after  having 
exchanged  their  respective  credentials,  have  agreed  as 
follows : 

Article  I.  The  high  contracting  parties  being  convinced 
that  the  system  of  representative  government  is  equally 
incompatible  with  the  monarchical  principles  as  the  maxim 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  with  the  divine  right, 
engage  mutually,  and  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  to  use 
all  their  efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  representative 

61 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

governments,  in  whatever  country  it  may  exist  in  Europe, 
and  to  prevent  its  being  introduced  in  those  countries  where 
it  is  not  yet  known. 

Art.  II.  As  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  liberty  of  the 
press  is  the  most  powerful  means  used  by  the  pretended 
supporters  of  the  rights  of  nations,  to  the  detriment  of  those 
of  Princes,  the  high  contracting  parties  promise  reciprocally 
to  adopt  all  proper  measures  to  suppress  it  not  only  in  their 
own  states,  but  also,  in  the  rest  of  Europe. 

Art.  III.  Convinced  that  the  principles  of  religion  con- 
tribute most  powerfully  to  keep  nations  in  the  state  of 
passive  obedience  which  they  owe  to  their  Princes,  the  high 
contracting  parties  declare  it  to  be  their  intention  to  sustain, 
in  their  respective  states,  these  measures  which  the  clergy 
may  adopt,  with  the  aim  of  ameliorating  their  own  interests, 
so  intimately  connected  with  the  preservation  of  the  author- 
ity of  Princes;  and  the  contracting  powers  join  in  ofifering 
their  thanks  to  the  Pope,  for  what  he  has  already  done  for 
them,  and  solicit  his  constant  cooperation  in  their  views  of 
submitting  the  nations. 

Art.  IV.  The  situation  of  Spain  and  Portugal  unites  un- 
happily all  the  circumstances  to  which  this  treaty  has  par- 
ticular reference.  The  high  contracting  parties,  in  confiding 
to  France  the  care  of  putting  an  end  to  them,  engage  to 
assist  her  in  the  manner  which  may  the  least  compromise 
them  with  their  own  people  and  the  people  of  France,  by 
means  of  a  subsidy  on  the  part  of  the  two  empires,  of 
twenty  millions  of  francs  every  year,  from  the  date  of  the 
signature  of  this  treaty  to  the  end  of  the  war. 

Signed  by  Metternich  for  Austria,  Chateaubriand  for 
France,  Bernstet  for  Prussia,  and  Nesselrode  for  Russia.** 

Such  was  the  code  of  absolutism  against  which 
England  protested  and  against  which  President  Mon- 
roe delivered  his  declaration. 


**  For  the  Congresses  of  Aix-la-Chape1Ie.  Troppau,  Laybach,  and  Verona, 
eee  "Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,"  Vol.  XII;  "Life  of  Lord 
Liverpool,"  Vol.  Ill;  "Political  Life  and  Official  Correspondence  of 
Canning";  Chateaubriand's  "  Congres  de  Verone,"  and  W.  A.  Phillips, 
"The  Confederation  of  Europe,  1813-1823."  The  text  of  the  treaty  of 
Verona  is  published  in  Niles'  Register,  August  2,  1823,  Vol.  24,  p.  347, 
and  in  Elliot's  "  American  Diplomatic  Code,"   Vol.  II,  p.   179. 

62 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

The  Congress  broke  up  about  the  middle  of  Decem- 
ber, and  the  following  April,  the  Due  d'Angouleme 
led  a  French  army  across  the  Pyrenees.  By  October 
the  constitutional  party  had  been  overthrown  and 
absolutism  reigned  supreme  once  more  in  western 
Europe,  In  England  alone  was  there  still  any  sem- 
blance of  constitutional  government. 

The  Congress  of  Verona  was  the  last  of  the  joint- 
meetings  of  the  powers  for  the  discussion  of  the 
internal  affairs  of  states.  It  marked  the  final  with- 
drawal of  England  from  the  European  alliance. 
Henceforth  she  took  up  a  position  distinctly  hostile 
to  the  principles  advocated  by  her  former  allies  and 
her  policy  in  relation  to  Spanish  America  practically 
coincided  with  that  of  the  United  States. 

The  great  majority  of  the  English  people  sympa- 
thized deeply  with  the  constitutional  movement  in 
Spain  and  were  ready  to  take  up  arms  in  support  of 
the  Spanish  people.  The  protest  of  England  having 
been  disregarded  by  the  powers  at  Verona,  it  became 
necessary  for  the  cabinet,  in  view  of  the  preparations 
going  on  in  France  for  the  invasion  of  the  Peninsula, 
to  say  what  they  contemplated  doing.  In  February, 
1823,  Lord  Liverpool  circulated  among  his  colleagues 
a  minute  prepared  by  Canning,  which  gave  at  length 
the  reasons,  military  and  other,  why  it  would  be 
unwise  for  England  to  undertake  the  defense  of 
Spain.  In  the  first  place,  the  war  against  Spain  was 
unpopular  in  France,  and  if  Great  Britain  should 
take  part  in  the  war,  the  French  government  would 
avail  itself  of  the  fact  to  convert  it  into  an  English 
war  and  thus  render  it  popular.  Second,  England 
would  have  to  undertake  the  defense  of  Spain  against 

63 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

invasion  by  land,  and  her  naval  superiority  would 
not  materially  aid  the  Spaniards  or  baffle  the  French. 
Third,  the  continental  powers  were  committed  to  the 
support  of  France.  Fourth,  there  was  a  possibility 
that  the  invasion  of  Spain  would  be  unsuccessful. 
Fifth,  on  the  other  hand,  it  might  meet  with  success, 
in  which  event  France  might  assist  Spain  to  recover 
her  American  colonies.  Here,  he  says,  England's 
naval  superiority  would  tell,  "  and  I  should  have  no 
difficulty  in  deciding  that  we  ought  to  prevent,  by 
every  means  in  our  power,  perhaps  Spain  from  send- 
ing a  single  Spanish  regiment  to  South  America,  after 
the  supposed  termination  of  the  war  in  Spain,  but 
certainly  France  from  affording  to  Spain  any  aid  or 
assistance  for  that  purpose."  Sixth,  in  case  of  the 
invasion  of  Portugal  by  France  and  Spain,  he  thought 
England  would  be  in  honor  bound  to  defend  her,  in 
case  she  asked  for  aid.  The  military  defense  of  Port- 
ugal would  not  be  so  difficult  as  a  land  war  in  Spain.^® 
In  accordance  with  this  determination  Canning  dis- 
patched a  letter  to  Sir  Charles  Stuart,  British  ambassa- 
dor at  Paris,  March  31,  1823,  in  which  he  spoke  of 
recognition  of  the  colonies  as  a  matter  to  be  deter- 
mined by  time  and  circumstances,  and,  disclaiming 
all  designs  on  the  part  of  the  British  government  on 
the  late  Spanish  provinces,  intimated  that  England, 
although  abstaining  from  interference  in  Spain,  would 
not  allow  France  to  acquire  any  of  the  colonies  by 
conquest  or  cession.  To  this  note  the  French  gov- 
ernment made  no  reply  and  England  took  this  silence 
as  a  tacit  agreement  not  to  interfere  with  the  colonies. 


»»  "  Life  of   Lord   Liverpool,"  Vol.    Ill,   p.   231.     "  Official   Correspond* 
ence  of  Canning,"  Vol.  I,  p.  85. 


64 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

The  British  government  continued,  however,  to  watch 
closely  the  movements  of  France/® 

As  the  invasion  of  Spain  drew  near  to  a  successful 
termination,  the  British  government  had  reason  to 
suspect  that  the  allied  powers  would  next  direct  their 
attention  to  the  Spanish  colonies  with  a  view  to  forc- 
ing them  back  to  their  allegiance  or  of  otherwise  dis- 
posing of  them,  that  is,  by  cession  to  some  other  Euro- 
pean power.  It  was  already  in  contemplation  to  call 
another  European  congress  for  the  discussion  and  set- 
tlement of  this  question.  As  this  was  a  subject  of 
vital  interest  to  the  United  States,  Canning  invited  the 
American  minister,  Mr.  Rush,  to  a  conference,  August 
i6,  1823,  in  which  he  suggested  the  expediency  of  an 
understanding  on  this  question  between  England  and 
the  United  States.  He  communicated  to  Mr.  Rush 
the  substance  of  his  dispatch  of  March  31  to  Sir 
Charles  Stuart.  Mr,  Rush  said  he  understood  the 
import  of  this  note  to  be  that  England  would  not  re- 
main passive  to  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  France  to 
acquire  territory  in  Spanish  America.  Mr.  Canning 
then  asked  what  the  United  States  would  say  to  going 
hand  in  hand  with  England  in  such  a  policy,  Mr, 
Rush  replied  that  his  instructions  did  not  authorize 
him  to  give  an  answer,  but  that  he  would  communi- 
cate the  suggestion  informally  to  his  government.  At 
the  same  time  he  requested  to  be  enlightened  as  to 
England's  policy  in  the  matter  of  recognizing  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  colonies.  Mr.  Canning  replied  that 
England  had  taken  no  steps  in  the  matter  of  recogni- 
tion whatever,  but  was  considering  the  question  of 
sending  commissioners  to  the  colonies  to  inquire  into 

••  StapletoD,   "  Political   Life  of   Canning,"    Vol     II,   p.    i8. 

65 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  condition  of  affairs.  For  the  present  these  com- 
missioners would  be  sent  to  Mexico  alone." 

Mr.  Stapleton  in  his  "  Life  of  Canning "  simply 
says  that  as  Mr.  Rush  was  not  authorized  to  enter 
into  any  formal  agreement,  Canning  thought  the  de- 
lay of  communicating  with  Washington  would  render 
such  proceeding  of  no  effect,  and  so  the  matter  was 
dropped."  This,  however,  we  learn  from  Mr.  Rush's 
dispatches,  is  not  the  whole  truth.  Several  communi- 
cations passed  between  them  after  the  conversation 
above  given,  which  throw  a  totally  different  light 
upon  the  affair. 

In  an  unofficial  and  confidential  letter  to  Mr.  Rush, 
dated  August  20,  1823,  Canning  asked  again  if  the 
moment  had  not  arrived  when  the  two  governments 
might  come  to  an  understanding  in  regard  to  the 
Spanish-American  colonies.  He  stated  the  views  of 
England  as  follows:  (i)  That  the  recovery  of  the 
colonies  by  Spain  was  hopeless;  (2)  That  the  question 
of  their  recognition  as  independent  states  was  one  of 
time  and  circumstances;  (3)  That  England  was  not 
disposed,  however,  to  throw  any  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  an  arrangement  between  the  colonies  and  the 
mother-country  by  amicable  negotiation;  (4)  That 
she  aimed  at  the  possession  of  no  portion  of  the  colo- 
nies for  herself;  and  (5)  That  she  could  not  see  the 
transfer  of  any  portion  of  them  to  any  other  power 
with  indifference.  He  added  "  that  if  the  United 
States  acceded  to  such  views,  a  declaration  to  that 
effect  on  their  part,  concurrently  with  England,  would 
be  the  most  effectual  and  least  offensive  mode  of 


•'  Rush's  "  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,"  p.  406. 
*•"  Political  Life  of  Canning,"  Vol.   II,  p.  24. 

66 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

making  known  their  joint  disapprobation  of  contrary 
projects;  that  it  would  at  the  same  time  put  an  end 
to  all  jealousies  of  Spain  as  to  her  remaining  colonies, 
and  to  the  agitation  prevailing  in  the  colonies  them- 
selves by  showing  that  England  and  the  United  States 
were  determined  not  to  profit  by  encouraging  it."  ^* 

Prior  to  the  formal  recognition  of  South  America, 
the  United  States  had  repeatedly  expressed  the  wish 
to  proceed  in  the  matter  hand  in  hand  with  Great 
Britain,^"  but  that  act  placed  the  United  States  on  an 
altogether  different  footing  from  England.  Canning 
seemed  to  forget  in  the  wording  of  his  proposal  that 
the  United  States  had  already,  in  the  most  formal 
manner,  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  Span- 
ish colonies.  In  reply  Mr.  Rush  reminded  him  of 
this  fact  and  of  the  desire  of  the  United  States  to 
see  the  colonies  recognized  by  England,  In  other  re- 
spects, he  believed  that  the  views  unfolded  by  Mr. 
Canning  in  his  note  were  shared  by  the  United  States, 
but  he  added  that  he  had  no  authority  to  avow  these 
principles  publicly  in  the  manner  suggested. 

As  soon  as  Rush's  first  dispatch  was  received  Pres- 
ident Monroe  realized  fully  the  magnitude  of  the  issue 
presented  by  the  proposal  of  an  Anglo-American  alli- 
ance. Before  submitting  the  matter  to  his  cabinet  he 
transmitted  copies  of  the  dispatch  to  ex-Presidents 
Jefferson  and  Madison  and  the  following  interesting 
correspondence  took  place.  In  his  letter  to  Jefferson, 
of  October  17th,  the  President  said: 

I  transmit  to  you  two   despatches  which  were  receiv'd 
from  Mr.  Rush,  while  I  was  lately  in  Washington,  which 

*"  Rush's  "  Reeidence  at  the  Court  of  London,"  p.  412, 
'"  "  Letters   and    Despatches   of   Castlcreagh,"    VoL   XI,  p,   4S8.      Bagofs 
reports  of  iaterviews  with  Adams, 

67 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

involve  interests  of  the  highest  importance.  They  contain 
two  letters  from  Mr.  Canning,  suggesting  designs  of  the 
holy  alliance,  against  the  Independence  of  S°.  America,  & 
proposing  a  co-operation,  between  G.  Britain  &  the  U 
States,  in  support  of  it,  against  the  members  of  that  alliance. 
The  project  aims,  in  the  first  instance,  at  a  mere  expression 
of  opinion,  somewhat  in  the  abstract,  but  which,  it  is  ex- 
pected by  Mr.  Canning,  will  have  a  great  political  effect, 
by  defeating  the  combination.  By  Mr.  Rush's  answers, 
which  are  also  enclosed,  you  will  see  the  light  in  which  he 
views  the  subject,  &  the  extent  to  which  he  may  have  gone. 
Many  important  considerations  are  involved  in  this  proposi- 
tion, i^*^  Shall  we  entangle  ourselves,  at  all,  in  European 
politicks,  &  wars,  on  the  side  of  any  power,  against  others, 
presuming  that  a  concert,  by  agreement,  of  the  kind  pro- 
posed, may  lead  to  that  result?  2^  If  a  case  can  exist  in 
which  a  sound  maxim  may,  &  ought  to  be  departed  from,  is 
not  the  present  instance,  precisely  that  case?  3''  Has  not 
the  epoch  arriv'd  when  G.  Britain  must  take  her  stand, 
either  on  the  side  of  the  monarchs  of  Europe,  or  of  the 
U  States,  &  in  consequence,  either  in  favor  of  Despotism 
or  of  liberty  &  may  it  not  be  presum'd  that,  aware  of  that 
necessity,  her  government  has  seiz'd  on  the  present  occur- 
rence, as  that,  which  it  deems,  the  most  suitable,  to  announce 
&  mark  the  commenc'ment  of  that  career. 

My  own  impression  is  that  we  ought  to  meet  the  proposal 
of  the  British  govt.  &  to  make  it  known,  that  we  would 
view  an  interference  on  the  part  of  the  European  powers, 
and  especially  an  attack  on  the  Colonies,  by  them,  as  an 
attack  on  ourselves,  presuming  that,  if  they  succeeded  with 
them,  they  would  extend  it  to  us.  I  am  sensible  however 
of  the  extent  &  difficulty  of  the  question,  &  shall  be  happy 
to  have  yours,  &  Mr.  Madison's  opinions  on  it.^^ 

Jefferson's  reply  dated  Monticello,  October  24th, 
displays  not  only  a  profound  insight  into  the  inter- 
national situation,  but  a  wide  vision  of  the  possibili- 
ties involved.     He  said : 


*•  Hamilton,    "  Writings    of   James   Monroe,"    Vol.    VI,    pp.    323-325. 

68 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have  sent  me, 
is  the  most  momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to  my 
contemplation  since  that  of  Independence.  That  made  us  a 
nation,  this  sets  our  compass  and  points  the  course  which 
we  are  to  steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us. 
And  never  could  we  embark  on  it  under  circumstances 
more  auspicious.  Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should 
be,  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe. 
Our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with 
cis-Atlantic  affairs.  America,  North  and  South,  has  a  set 
of  interests  distinct  from  those  of  Europe,  and  peculiarly 
her  own.  She  should  therefore  have  a  system  of  her  own, 
separate  and  apart  from  that  of  Europe.  While  the  last 
is  laboring  to  become  the  domicil  of  despotism,  our  en- 
deavor should  surely  be,  to  make  our  hemisphere  that  of 
freedom.  One  nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  this 
pursuit ;  she  now  offers  to  lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us  in 
it.  By  acceding  to  her  proposition,  we  detach  her  from  the 
bands,  bring  her  mighty  weight  into  the  scale  of  free  gov- 
ernment, and  emancipate  a  continent  at  one  stroke,  which 
might  otherwise  linger  long  in  doubt  and  difficulty.  Great 
Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the  most  harm  of 
any  one,  or  all  on  earth ,  and  with  her  on  our  side  we  need 
not  fear  the  whole  world.  With  her  then,  we  should  most 
sedulously  cherish  a  cordial  friendship;  and  nothing  would 
tend  more  to  knit  our  affections  than  to  be  fighting  once 
more,  side  by  side,  in  the  same  cause.  Not  that  I  would 
purchase  even  her  amity  at  the  price  of  taking  part  in  her 
wars.  But  the  war  in  which  the  present  proposition  might 
engage  us,  should  that  be  its  consequence,  is  not  her  war, 
but  ours.  Its  object  is  to  introduce  and  establish  the 
American  system,  of  keeping  out  of  our  land  all  foreign 
powers,  of  never  permitting  those  of  Europe  to  intermeddle 
•with  the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is  to  maintain  our  own 
principle,  not  to  depart  from  it.  And  if,  to  facilitate  this, 
we  can  effect  a  division  in  the  body  of  the  European  powers, 
and  draw  over  to  our  side  its  most  powerful  member,  surely 
we  should  do  it.  But  I  am  clearly  of  Mr.  Canning's  opinion, 
that  it  will  prevent  instead  of  provoking  war.  With  Great 
Britain  withdrawn  from  their  scale  and  shifted  into  that  of 

69 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

our  two  continents,  all  Europe  combined  would  not  under- 
take such  a  war.  For  how  would  they  propose  to  get  at 
either  enemy  without  superior  fleets?  Nor  is  the  occasion 
to  be  slighted  which  this  proposition  offers,  of  declaring  our 
protest  against  the  atrocious  violations  of  the  rights  of 
nations,  by  the  interference  of  any  one  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  another,  so  flagitiously  begun  by  Bonaparte,  and  now 
continued  by  the  equally  lawless  Alliance,  calling  itself 
Holy.22 

Madison  not  only  agreed  with  Jefiferson  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  accepting  the  British  proposal  of  some 
form  of  joint  action,  but  he  went  even  further  and 
suggested  that  the  declaration  should  not  be  limited 
to  the  American  republics,  but  that  it  should  express 
disapproval  of  the  late  invasion  of  Spain  and  of  any 
interference  with  the  Greeks,  who  were  then  struggling 
for  independence  from  Turkey."  Monroe,  it  ap- 
pears, was  strongly  inclined  to  act  on  Madison's  sug- 
gestion, but  his  cabinet  took  a  different  view  of  the 
situation.  From  the  diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams, 
Monroe's  secretary  of  state,  it  appears  that  almost  the 
whole  of  November  was  taken  up  by  cabinet  discus- 
sions on  Canning's  proposals  and  on  Russia's  aggres- 
sions in  the  northwest.  Adams  stoutly  opposed  any 
alliance  or  joint  declaration  with  Great  Britain.  The 
composition  of  the  President's  message  remained  in 
doubt  until  the  21st,  when  the  more  conservative  views 
of  Adams  were,  according  to  his  own  statement  of 
the  case,  adopted.  He  advocated  an  independent 
course  of  action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  with- 
out direct  reference  to  Canning's  proposals,  though 
substantially  in  accord  with  them.    Adams  defined  his 

»*  Ford,    "  Writings   of   Thomas   Jefferson,"   Vol.    X,   pp.    277-278. 
'*  Hamilton,  "  Writings  of  James  Madison,"  Vol..  IX,  pp.   161-162. 

70 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

position  as  follows:  "The  ground  that  I  wish  to 
take  is  that  of  earnest  remonstrance  against  the  in- 
terference of  the  European  powers  by  force  with 
South  America,  but  to  disclaim  all  interference  on  our 
part  with  Europe;  to  make  an  American  cause  and 
adhere  inflexibly  to  that."  ^*  Adams's  dissent  from 
Monroe's  position  was,  it  is  claimed,  due  partly  to 
the  influence  of  Clay,  who  advocated  a  Pan  American 
system,  partly  to  the  fact  that  the  proposed  coopera- 
tion with  Great  Britain  would  bind  the  United  States 
not  to  acquire  some  of  the  coveted  parts  of  the  Span- 
ish possessions,  and  partly  to  the  fear  that  the  United 
States  as  the  ally  of  Great  Britain  would  be  com- 
pelled to  play  a  secondary  part.  He  probably  carried 
his  point  by  showing  that  the  same  ends  could  be 
accomplished  by  an  independent  declaration,  since  it 
was  evident  that  the  sea  power  of  Great  Britain  would 
be  used  to  prevent  the  reconquest  of  South  America 
by  the  European  powers.  Monroe,  as  we  have  seen, 
thought  that  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  justified 
a  departure  from  the  sound  maxim  of  political  iso- 
lation, and  in  this  opinion  he  was  supported  by  his 
two  predecessors  in  the  presidency. 

The  opinions  of  Monroe,  Jefiferson,  and  Madison  in 
favor  of  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  a  broad 
declaration  against  the  intervention  of  the  great 
powers  in  the  affairs  of  weaker  states  in  any  part 
of  the  world,  have  been  severely  criticised  by  some 
historians  and  ridiculed  by  others,  but  time  and  cir- 
cumstances often  bring  about  a  complete  change  in 
our  point  of  view.  Since  our  entrance  into  the  great 
world  conflict  several  writers  have  raised  the  question 

»*  W.  C.  Ford,  "  Genesis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  ia  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
Proceedtngs,  second  series,   Vol.  XV,  p.  392. 

7t 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

as  to  whether  the  three  elder  statesmen  were  not  right 
and  Adams  and  Clay  wrong."  If  the  United  States 
and  England  had  come  out  in  favor  of  a  general 
declaration  against  intervention  in  the  concerns  of 
small  states  and  established  it  as  a  world-wide  princi- 
ple, the  course  of  human  history  during  the  next  cen- 
tury might  have  been  very  different,  but  Adams's 
diary  does  not  tell  the  whole  story.  On  his  own 
statement  of  the  case  he  might  be  justly  censured  by 
posterity  for  persuading  the  President  to  take  a  nar- 
row American  view  of  a  question  which  was  world- 
wide in  its  bearing.  An  important  element  in  the 
situation,  however,  was  Canning's  change  of  attitude 
between  the  time  of  his  conference  with  Rush  in 
August  and  the  formulation  of  the  President's  mes- 
sage. Two  days  after  the  delivery  of  his  now  famous 
message  Monroe  wrote  to  Jefferson  in  explanation  of 
the  form  the  declaration  had  taken:  "Mr.  Canning's 
zeal  has  much  abated  of  late."  It  appears  from  Rush's 
correspondence  that  the  only  thing  which  stood  in  the 
way  of  joint  action  by  the  two  powers  was  Canning's 
unwillingness  to  extend  immediate  recognition  to  the 
South  American  republics.  On  August  27th,  Rush 
stated  to  Canning  that  it  would  greatly  facilitate  joint 
action  if  England  would  acknowledge  at  once  the 
full  independence  of  the  South  American  colonies. 
In  communicating  the  account  of  this  interview  to  his 
government  Mr.  Rush  concluded: 

Should  I  be  asked  by  Mr.  Canning,  whether,  in  case  the 
recognition  be  made  by  Great  Britain  without  more  delay,  I 
am  on  my  part  prepared  to  make  a  declaration,  in  the  name 
of  my  government,  that  it  will  not  remain  inactive  under 

*"  See  especially  Gj  L,  Beer,  "  The  English-Speaking  Peoples,"  p.  79. 

72 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

an  attack  upon  the  independence  of  those  states  by  the  Holy 
Alliance,  the  present  determination  of  my  judgment  is  that 
1  will  make  such  a  declaration  explicitly,  and  avow  it  before 
the  world." 

About  three  weeks  later  Canning,  who  was  growing 
restless  at  the  delay  in  hearing  from  Washington,  again 
urged  Rush  to  act  without  waiting  for  specific  instruc- 
tions from  his  government.  He  tried  to  show  that  the 
proposed  joint  declaration  would  not  conflict  with  the 
American  policy  of  avoiding  entangling  alliances,  for 
the  question  at  issue  was  American  as  much  as  Euro- 
pean, if  not  more.  Rush  then  indicated  his  willing- 
ness to  act  provided  England  would  "  immediately 
and  unequivocally  acknowledge  the  independence  of 
the  new  states."  Canning  did  not  care  to  extend  full 
recognition  to  the  South  American  states  until  he 
could  do  so  without  giving  unnecessary  offense  to 
Spain  and  the  allies,  and  he  asked  if  Mr.  Rush  could 
not  give  his  assent  to  the  proposal  on  a  promise  of 
future  recognition.  Mr.  Rush  refused  to  accede  to 
anything  but  immediate  acknowledgment  of  independ- 
ence and  so  the  matter  ended."  As  Canning  could 
not  come  to  a  formal  understanding  with  the  United 
States,  he  determined  to  make  a  frank  avowal  of  the 
views  of  the  British  cabinet  to  France  and  to  this 
end  he  had  an  interview  with  Prince  Polignac,  the 
French  ambassador  at  London,  October  9,  1823,  in 
which  he  declared  that  Great  Britain  had  no  desire 
to  hasten  recognition,  but  that  any  foreign  interfer- 
ence, by  force,  or  by  menace,  would  be  a  motive  for 
immediate  recognition ;  that  England  "  could  not  go 


*•  Rush's  "  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,"   p.   419. 
*'  Ibid.,  pp.  429,  443. 

73 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

into  a  joint  deliberation  upon  the  subject  of  Spanish 
America  upon  an  equal  footing  with  other  powers, 
whose  opinions  were  less  formed  upon  that  question." 
This  declaration  drew  from  Polignac  the  admission 
that  he  considered  the  reduction  of  the  colonies  by 
Spain  as  hopeless  and  that  France  "abjured  in  any 
case,  any  design  of  acting  against  the  colonies  by 
force  of  arms."  ^®  This  admission  was  a  distinct  vic- 
tory for  Canning,  in  that  it  prepared  the  way  for 
ultimate  recognition  by  England,  and  an  account  of 
the  interview  was  communicated  without  delay  to 
the  allied  courts.  The  interview  was  not  communi- 
cated to  Rush  until  the  latter  part  of  November,  and 
therefore  had  no  influence  upon  the  formation  of 
Monroe's  message  of  December  2.^* 

Before  the  close  of  the  year  the  British  government 
appointed  consuls  to  the  South  American  states,  and 
about  the  time  of  their  departure,  an  invitation  was 
sent  to  the  courts  of  St.  Petersburg,  Paris,  and  Vienna 
to  a  conference  to  be  held  at  Paris  to  "  aid  Spain  in 
adjusting  the  affairs  of  the  revolted  colonies."  A  copy 
of  this  invitation  was  also  handed  to  the  British  am- 
bassador at  Madrid,  but  in  such  a  form  as  to  leave 
him  in  doubt  as  to  whether  his  government  was  invited 
to  the  conference  or  not.^°  While  the  discussion  as 
to  the  proposed  conference  was  going  on  and  before 
Canning  had  announced  what  action  his  government 
would  take  in  the  matter.  President  Monroe's  mes- 
sage arrived  in  Europe. 

Spanish  America  was  not  the  only  part  of  the  west- 
ern continent  threatened  at  this  time  by  European 

""Political    Life    of    Canning," .  Vol.    II,    p.    26. 

*•  Rush's  "  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,"  p.  448. 

•  0  "Political  Life  of  Canning,"   Vol.  11,  p.  33. 

74 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

aggression.  On  the  4th  of  September,  182 1,  the  em- 
peror of  Russia  had  issued  an  ukase,  in  which  he 
claimed  the  northwestern  coast  of  North  America 
down  to  the  51st  degree.  This  claim  was  incompatible 
with  the  pretensions  of  both  England  and  the  United 
States,  and  was  stoutly  opposed  by  them.  This  was 
a  part  of  the  territory  known  as  the  Oregon  country, 
which  continued  in  dispute  between  England  and  the 
United  States  until  1846.  In  July,  1823,  Adams  de- 
clared to  Baron  Tuyll,  the  Russian  minister  to  the 
United  States,  "  that  we  should  contest  the  right  of 
Russia  to  any  territorial  establishment  on  this  con- 
tinent, and  that  we  should  assume  distinctly  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  American  continents  are  no  longer  sub- 
jects for  any  new  European  colonial  establishments." 
This  language  was  incorporated  substantially  in  the 
President's  message. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  comprised  in  two  widely 
separated  paragraphs  that  occur  in  the  message  of 
December  2,  1823.  The  first,  relating  to  Russia's 
encroachments  on  the  northwest  coast,  and  occurring 
near  the  beginning  of  the  message,  was  an  assertion 
to  the  effect  that  the  American  continents  had  as- 
sumed an  mdependent  condition  and  were  no  longer 
open  to  European  colonization.  This  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  statement  of  fact.  No  part  of  the  con- 
tinent at  that  time  remained  unclaimed.  The  second 
paragraph  relating  to  Spanish  America  and  occurring 
near  the  close  of  the  message,  was  a  declaration 
against  the  extension  to  the  American  continents  of 
the  system  of  intervention  adopted  by  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance for  the  suppression  of  popular  government  in 
Europe. 

75 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

The  language  used  by  President  Monroe  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

1.  At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Government, 
made  through  the  minister  of  the  emperor  residing  here, 
a  full  power  and  instructions  have  been  transmitted  to  the 
minister  of  the  United  States  at  St.  Petersburg  to  arrange 
by  amicable  negotiation  the  respective  rights  and  interests 
of  the  two  nations  on  the  northwest  coast  of  this  continent. 
A  similar  proposal  had  been  made  by  His  Imperial  Majesty 
to  the  government  of  Great  Britain,  which  has  likewise  been 
acceded  to.  The  government  of  the  United  States  has  been 
desirous  by  this  friendly  proceeding  of  manifesting  the 
great  value  which  they  have  invariably  attached  to  the 
friendship  of  the  emperor  and  their  solicitude  to  cultivate 
the  best  understanding  with  his  government.  In  the  dis- 
cussions to  which  this  interest  has  given  rise  and  in  the 
arrangements  by  which  they  may  terminate,  the  occasion 
has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle  in  which 
the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved, 
that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  independent 
condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  hence- 
forth not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  coloniza- 
tion by  any  European  powers.^^ 

2.  In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers  in  matters  relating 
to  themselves  we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor  does  it 
comport  with  our  policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when  our 
rights  are  invaded  or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent 
injuries  or  make  preparation  for  our  defense.  With  the 
movements  in  this  hemisphere  we  are  of  necessity  more 
immediately  connected,  and  by  causes  which  must  be  obvious 
to  all  enlightened  and  impartial  observers.  The  political 
system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this 
respect  from  that  of  America.  This  difference  proceeds 
from  that  which  exists  in  their  respective  governments;  and 
to  the  defense  of  our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by  the 
loss  of  so  much  blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the 
wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which 


»»  "  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents, '  Vol.  II,  p.  209. 

76 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

we  have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation  is 
devoted.  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amica- 
ble relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and  those 
powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on 
their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With 
the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  power 
we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  governments  who  have  declared  their  independence  and 
maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great 
consideration  and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we 
could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  op- 
pressing them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their 
destiny,  by  any  European  power  in  any  other  light  than  as 
the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the 
United  States.  In  the  war  between  those  new  governments 
and  Spain  we  declared  our  neutrality  at  the  time  of  their 
recognition,  and  to  this  we  have  adhered,  and  shall  con- 
tinue to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall  occur  which,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of  this  govern- 
ment, shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  indispensable  to  their  security.^- 

The  President's  message  reached  England  while  the 
discussion  in  regard  to  the  proposed  congress  at  Paris 
was  still  going  on.  It  was  received  with  enthusiasm 
by  the  liberal  members  of  Parliament.  Lord  Broug- 
ham said: 

The  question  with  regard  to  South  America  is  now,  I 
believe,  disposed  of,  or  nearly  so;  for  an  event  has  recently 
happened  than  which  none  has  ever  dispersed  greater  joy, 
exultation,  and  gratitude  over  all  the  free  men  of  Europe: 
that  event,  which  is  decisive  on  the  subject,  is  the  language 
held  with  respect  to  Spanish  America  in  the  message  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States. 


•*  '*  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  Vol.  II,  p.  aiS. 

71 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 
Sir  James  Mackintosh  said : 

This  coincidence  of  the  two  great  English  commonwealths 
(for  so  I  delight  to  call  them;  and  I  heartily  pray  that  they 
may  be  forever  united  in  the  cause  of  justice  and  liberty) 
cannot  be  contemplated  without  the  utmost  pleasure  by 
every  enlightened  citizen  of  the  earth.'* 

They  evidently  had  reference  to  the  second  clause 
alone,  the  one  relating  to  Spanish  America.  The 
other  clause,  the  one  against  European  colonization 
in  America,  seems  not  to  have  attracted  much  atten- 
tion. Canning,  however,  saw  the  bearing  of  it  and 
objected  to  the  principle  it  set  forth,  which  was 
directed  against  England  as  much  as  against  the 
allies.  He  was  evidently  a  little  taken  aback  at  the 
turn  his  proposal  had  taken.  The  President's  mes- 
sage really  settled  the  question  before  Canning  had 
announced  what  action  his  government  would  take. 
Some  little  chagrin  is  apparent  in  the  tone  of  his 
letter  to  Sir  William  a  Court,  British  minister  at 
Madrid,  December  21,  1823. 

While  I  was  yet  hesitating  [he  says],  what  shape  to  give 
to  the  declaration  and  protest  which  ultimately  was  conveyed 
in  my  conference  with  P.  de  Polignac,  and  while  I  was  more 
doubtful  as  to  the  effect  of  that  protest  and  declaration,  I 
sounded  Mr.  Rush  (the  American  minister  here)  as  to  his 
powers  and  disposition  to  join  in  any  step  which  we  might 
take  to  prevent  a  hostile  enterprise  on  the  part  of  the  Euro- 
pean powers  against  Spanish  America.  He  had  no  powers; 
but  he  would  have  taken  upon  himself  to  join  with  us  if 
we  would  have  begun  by  recognizing  the  Spanish-Ameri- 
can states.  This  we  could  not  do,  and  so  we  went  on  with- 
out. But  I  have  no  doubt  that  his  report  to  his  government 
of  this  sounding,  which  he  probably  represented  as  an  over- 


»»"  Wharton's  Digest,"  Sec.  57,  Vol.  I,  p.   276. 

78 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

ture,  had  a  great  share  in  producing  the  explicit  declaration 
of  the  President.** 

The  conference  with  Prince  Polignac  here  referred 
to  was  that  of  October  9th  quoted  above.  It  was  not 
until  after  the  receipt  of  President  Monroe's  message 
in  Europe  that  Canning  framed  his  answer  to  the 
Spanish  communication  informing  him  of  the  pro- 
posed meeting  in  Paris  for  the  discussion  of  the  South 
American  question.  In  that  reply  he  stated  to  the 
Spanish  government  very  fully  his  views  upon  the 
question  at  issue.  He  said  that  while  England  did 
not  wish  to  precede  Spain  in  the  matter  of  recognition, 
yet  she  reserved  to  herself  the  privilege  of  recogniz- 
ing the  colonies  when  she  deemed  it  best  for  her  in- 
terests and  right  to  them.  He  said  that  these  views 
had  been  communicated  fully  from  time  to  time  to  the 
powers  invited  to  the  congress  and  he  concluded  with 
the  statement :  "  It  does  not  appear  to  the  British 
cabinet  at  all  necessary  to  declare  that  opinion  anew, 
even  if  it  were  perfectly  clear  (from  the  tenor  of  M. 
Ofalia's  instruction)  that  Great  Britain  was  in  fact 
included  in  the  invitation  to  the  conference  at  Paris."  ^^ 

While  Canning  and  Monroe  acted  independendy  of 
each  other,  the  expression  that  each  gave  to  the  views 
of  his  government  was  rendered  more  emphatic  and 
of  more  effect  by  the  knowledge  of  the  other's  atti- 
tude in  the  matter.  Another  point  to  be  noted  is 
that  Monroe's  message  was  made  public,  while  Can- 
ning's answer  was  for  some  time  known  only  to  the 
diplomatic  corps. 

The  determination  of  both  England  and  the  United 


»*  "  Wharton's  Digest,"   Sec.   S7.  Vol.   I,  p.   272. 
"  "  Political  Life  of  Canning,"  Vol.  II,  p.  42- 

79 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

States  to  oppose  the  intervention  of  the  allies  in  South 
America  had  the  desired  effect.  Conferences  in  an- 
swer to  the  invitation  of  Spain  were  held  in  Paris, 
but  they  were  participated  in  only  by  the  ordinary 
representatives  of  the  powers  invited,  resident  in  that 
capital,  and  their  only  result  was  to  advise  Spain 
not  to  listen  to  the  counsels  of  England. 

All  further  discussion  that  took  place  between  Eng- 
land and  Spain  in  reference  to  recognition  of  the  col- 
onies by  Great  Britain  was  confined  to  the  status  of 
the  revolutionary  governments,  and  upon  this  point 
their  views  were  so  divergent  that  Canning  finally 
announced  to  the  Spanish  government  that,  "  His 
Majesty  would,  at  his  own  time,  take  such  steps  as 
he  might  think  proper  in  respect  to  the  several  states 
of  Spanish  America  without  further  reference  to  the 
court  of  Madrid;  but  at  the  same  time  without  any 
feeling  of  alienation  towards  that  court,  or  of  hos- 
tility towards  the  real  interests  of  Spain."  ^® 

The  French  troops  continuing  to  occupy  Spain  after 
the  time  stipulated  by  treaty,  Canning  sought  an  ex- 
planation from  France,  but  without  satisfactory  re- 
sults. He  therefore  determined  at  a  cabinet  meeting 
held  December  14,  1824,  to  recognize  Mexico  and 
Colombia  forthwith.  On  January  i,  1825,  after  the 
ministers  had  left  England  with  instructions  and  full 
powers,  the  fact  of  recognition  was  communicated 
officially  to  the  diplomatic  corps  and  two  days  later 
it  was  made  public.  That  this  recognition  was  a  re- 
taliatory measure  to  compensate  England  for  the 
French  occupation  of  Spain  was  understood  at  the 
time  and  was  distinctly  avowed  by  Canning  two  years 


»•  "  Political   Life  of   Canning,"   Vol.   II,  p.  54. 

80 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

later.^^  In  a  speech  delivered  December  12,  1826, 
in  defense  of  his  position  in  not  having  arrested  the 
French  invasion  of  Spain,  he  said : 

I  looked  another  way — I  sought  for  compensation  in  an- 
other hemisphere.  Contemplating  Spain,  such  as  our  ances- 
tors had  known  her,  I  resolved  that,  if  France  had  Spain, 
it  should  not  be  Spain  with  the  Indies.  I  called  the  New 
World  into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old. 

In  spite  of  the  great  indebtedness  of  South  America 
to  Canning,  this  boast  falls  somewhat  flat  when  we 
remember  that  the  Spanish  colonies  had  won  their 
independence  by  their  own  valor  and  had  been  rec- 
ognized as  independent  governments  by  the  United 
States  two  years  before  Great  Britain  acted  in  the 
matter. 

Mr.  Stapleton,  Canning's  private  secretary  and  biog- 
rapher, says  that  the  recognition  of  Spanish-Ameri- 
can independence  was,  perhaps,  the  most  important 
measure  adopted  by  the  British  cabinet  while  Canning 
was  at  the  head  of  the  foreign  office.  He  sums  up 
the  reasons  and  results  of  the  act  as  follows: 

First,  it  was  a  measure  essentially  advantageous  to  British 
interests;  being  especially  calculated  to  benefit  our  commerce. 
Next,  it  enabled  this  country  to  remain  at  peace,  since  it 
compensated  us  for  .the  continued  occupation  of  Spain  by  a 
French  force,  a  disparagement  to  which,  otherwise,  it  would 
not  have  become  us  to  submit.  Lastly,  it  maintained  the 
balance  between  conflicting  principles;  since  it  gave  just  so 
much  of  a  triumph  to  popular  rights  and  privileges,  as  was 
sufficient  to  soothe  the  irritation  felt  by  their  advocates  at  the 
victory,  which  absolute  principles  had  obtained  by  the  over- 

»'  "  Official  Corresp.  of  Canning,"  Vol.  II,  p.  242.  Letter  to  Granville. 
On  the  general  question  of  recognition,  see  "  Life  of  Lord  Liverpool," 
Vol.  Ill,  pp.  297-304. 

81 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

throw  of  the  constitutions  of  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Naples; 
and  it  dealt  a  death-blow  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  by  disabusing 
its  members  of  the  strange  fancy,  with  which  they  were 
prepossessed,  that  the  differences  between  them  and  the 
British  ministers  (where  they  did  differ)  were  merely  feints 
on  the  part  of  the  latter  to  avoid  a  conflict  with  publLo 
opinion." 

The  United  States  government  did  not  relax  its 
efforts  in  behalf  of  the  South  American  states  with 
the  recognition  of  England,  but  continued  to  exert 
itself  in  order  to  secure  the  acknowledgment  of  their 
independence  by  the  other  powers  of  Europe,  par- 
ticularly Spain. ^^  Mr.  Clay  tried  to  get  the  other 
members  of  the  alliance,  especially  the  emperor  of 
Russia,  to  use  their  good  offices  with  Spain  for  the 
purpose  of  inducing  her  to  recognize  her  late  colonies, 
but  the  emperor  of  Russia,  the  head  of  the  alliance, 
continued  to  preach  to  Spain  "  not  only  no  recognition 
of  their  independence,  but  active  war  for  their  sub- 
jugation." To  the  request  of  the  United  States  he 
replied  that,  out  of  respect  for  "  the  indisputable  titles 
of  sovereignty,"  he  could  not  prejudge  or  anticipate 
the  determination  of  the  king  of  Spain.*"  It  was  some 
ten  years  before  Spain  could  be  persuaded  to  renounce 
her  ancient  claims. 


**  "  Political    Life   of    Canning,"    Vol.    II,    p.    i. 

*•  Am.    St.    Papers,    For.    Rel.,   Vol.    V,   pp.    794-796,   and   Vol.    VI,   pp. 
1006-1014. 
*•  Am.  St.  Papers,  For,  Rel.,  Vol.  V,  p.  850  flf. 


82 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States  in  Regard 
TO  Cuba 

The  Cuban  question  had  its  origin  in  the  series  of 
events  that  have  been  narrated  in  the  two  preceding 
chapters — the  Napoleonic  invasion  of  Spain  and  the 
resulting  paralysis  of  Spanish  power  in  America.  The 
declaration  of  President  Monroe,  enforced  by  the  well- 
known  attitude  of  England,  dealt  the  death-blow  to 
Spanish  hopes  of  recovering  the  Southern  continent. 
Hence  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  which  had 
remained  loyal  to  the  king,  were  clung  to  with  all  the 
greater  tenacity  as  the  sole  remains  of  the  imperial  pos- 
sessions over  which  the  successors  of  Ferdinand  and 
Isabella  had  ruled  for  three  centuries.  The  "  Ever- 
faithful  Island  of  Cuba  "  was  rewarded  for  her  loyalty 
by  the  concession  of  certain  liberties  of  trade  and  in- 
vited to  send  representatives  to  the  Spanish  Cortes — a 
privilege  which  was  subsequently  withdrawn,  Spain 
was  now  too  weak  to  protect  her  two  West  Indian  de- 
pendencies— the  remains  of  her  former  glory,  but  her 
very  weakness  secured  their  possession  to  her.  The 
naval  and  commercial  importance  of  Cuba,  "  the  pearl 
of  the  Antilles,"  made  it  a  prize  too  valuable  to  be  ac- 
quired by  any  one  of  the  great  maritime  powers  with- 
out exciting  the  jealousy  and  opposition  of  the  others. 
Henceforth,  to  borrow  the  figure  of  a  contemporary 
journalist,  Cuba  was  to  be  the  trans-Atlantic  Turkey, 

83 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

trembling  to  its  fall,  but  sustained  by  the  jealousies  of 
those  who  were  eager  to  share  the  spoils. 

The  strategic  importance  of  Cuba,  commanding  to 
a  large  extent  the  commerce  of  the  West  Indies  and  of 
the  Central  American  states,  and,  what  was  of  vital 
interest  to  us,  the  traffic  of  the  Mississippi  valley,  at- 
tracted at  an  early  period  the  attention  of  American 
as  well  as  of  European  statesmen.  In  a  letter  to  Presi- 
dent Madison  in  1809,  Jefferson,  in  speaking  of  Na- 
poleon's policy  in  regard  to  the  Spanish-American 
colonies,  said: 

That  he  would  give  up  the  Floridas  to  withhold  inter- 
course with  the  residue  of  those  colonies  cannot  be  doubted. 
But  that  is  no  price;  because  they  are  ours  in  the  first  mo- 
ment of  the  first  war;  and  until  a  war  they  are  of  no 
particular  necessity  to  us.  But,  although  with  difficulty,  he 
will  consent  to  our  receiving  Cuba  into  our  Union,  to  prevent 
our  aid  to  Mexico  and  the  other  provinces.  That  would  be 
a  price,  and  I  would  immediately  erect  a  column  on  the 
southern-most  limit  of  Cuba,  and  inscribe  on  it  a  ne  plus  ultra 
as  to  us  in  that  direction.* 

President  Madison  expressed  his  views  on  the 
Cuban  question  in  a  letter  to  William  Pinkney,  October 
30,  1810: 

The  position  of  Cuba  gives  the  United  States  so  deep  an 
interest  in  the  destiny,  even,  of  that  island,  that  although 
they  might  be  an  inactive,  they  could  not  be  a  satisfied 
spectator  at  its  falling  under  any  European  government, 
which  might  make  a  fulcrum  of  that  position  against  the 
commerce  and  security  of  the  United  States.^ 


*  H.  A.  Washington,  "  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,"  Vol.  V,  p.  443. 
'"Madison's    Works,"    Vol.    II.    p.    488 


84 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

This  was  the  first  statement  in  the  evolution  of  a 
Cuban  poHcy  consistently  adhered  to  by  the  United 
States  until  the  successes  of  the  Mexican  war  super- 
induced larger  ideas  of  the  mission  and  destiny  of  the 
Union. 

As  early  as  1817  fears  as  to  the  fate  of  Cuba  were 
raised  in  the  minds  of  the  American  public  by  news- 
paper reports  to  the  effect  that  England  had  proposed 
a  relinquishment  of  her  claim  against  Spain  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  British  army  during  the  Peninsular 
campaign,  amounting  to  £15,000,000,  in  return  for  the 
cession  of  the  island.^  Reports  of  this  nature  were 
circulated  for  several  months  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic,  but  the  question  did  not  assume  any  very 
great  importance  until  1819,  when  the  treaty  for  the 
cession  of  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States  was 
being  negotiated  with  Spain.  It  was  then  insisted  by 
the  British  press  that  the  acquisition  of  the  Floridas 
would  give  the  United  States  such  a  preponderating 
influence  in  West  Indian  affairs  as  to  render  necessary 
the  occupation  of  Cuba  by  Great  Britain  as  the  natural 
and  only  off-set.*  The  Florida  treaty  was  ratified 
after  some  delay,  which,  however,  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  caused  by  the  British  government,  as  was 
supposed  at  the  time.  The  British  papers,  neverthe- 
less, continued  to  condemn  in  strong  terms  the  treaty 
as  well  as  the  inaction  of  their  government  in  not  mak- 
ing it  a  pretext  for  the  seizure  of  Cuba. 

As  the  preparations  of  France  for  the  invasion  of 
Spain  in  1823  progressed  the  fate  of  Cuba  became  a 

'  Niles's  "  Register,"  under  date  November  8,   1817. 

*  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  question  see  the  pamphlet  by  I.  Freeman 
Rattenbury.  entitled,  "  The  Cession  of  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  Necessity  of  Acquiring  the  Island  of  Cuba  by  Great 
Britain."      London,    1819. 

85 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

question  of  absorbing  interest  in  America.  There  was 
little  hope  that  the  island  would  continue  a  dependency 
of  Spain.  It  was  rumored  that  Great  Britain  had 
engaged  to  supply  the  constitutional  government  of 
Spain  with  money  in  her  struggle  with  France  and 
would  occupy  Cuba  as  a  pledge  for  its  repayment. 
Both  Spanish  and  French  journals  spoke  of  British 
occupation  of  Cuba  as  a  matter  no  longer  to  be 
doubted,  and  the  presence  in  the  West  Indies  of  a 
large  British  squadron,  sent  nominally  for  the  purpose 
of  suppressing  piracy,  seemed  to  lend  color  to  the 
reports.^  The  British  press  was  clamoring  for  the 
acquisition  of  Cuba.  The  Packet  declared :  "  The 
question  then  comes  to  this,  shall  England  occupy 
Cuba,  or  by  permitting  its  acquisition  by  the  United 
States  (which  they  have  long  desired)  sacrifice  her 
whole  West  India  trade  ?  There  can  be  no  hesitation 
as  to  the  answer." 

The  British  government,  however,  officially  dis- 
claimed all  designs  upon  Cuba,  but  this  disclaimer  did 
not  fully  reassure  the  American  government,  and  our 
representatives  abroad  were  instructed  to  exercise  a 
close  scrutiny  upon  all  negotiations  between  Spain  and 
England.  In  the  spring  of  1823  Mr.  Forsyth  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Mr.  Nelson  at  the  court  of  Madrid.  In  his 
instructions  to  the  new  minister,  which  went  much  be- 
yond the  usual  length  and  were  occupied  almost  ex- 
clusively with  a  discussion  of  the  Cuban  question,  John 
Quincy  Adams  used  the  following  remarkable  words : 

"  In  looking  forward  to  the  probable  course  of 
events  for  the  short  period  of  half  a  century,  it  seems 
scarcely  possible  to  resist  the  conviction  that  the  an- 

»  Niles's  "  Register,"  March  and  April,  1823. 

86 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

nexation  of  Cuba  to  our  Federal  Repubiic  will  be  in- 
dispensable to  the  continuance  and  integrity  of  the 
Union  itself."  We  were  not  then  prepared  for  an- 
nexation, he  continued,  "  but  there  are  laws  of  political 
as  well  as  physical  gravitation;  and  if  an  apple,  severed 
by  the  tempest  from  its  native  tree,  cannot  choose  but 
fall  to  the  ground,  Cuba,  forcibly  disjoined  from  its 
own  unnatural  connection  with  Spain,  and  incapable 
of  self-support,  can  gravitate  only  towards  the  North 
American  Union,  which,  by  the  same  law  of  nature, 
cannot  cast  her  off  from  its  bosom."  ® 

President  Monroe  consulted  Jefferson  on  the  subject 
of  Spanish-American  affairs  and  the  entanglements 
with  European  powers  likely  to  arise  therefrom.  Jef- 
ferson replied,  June  ii,  1823: 

Cuba  alone  seems  at  present  to  hold  up  a  speck  of  war  to 
us.  Its  possession  by  Great  Britain  would  indeed  be  a  great 
calamity  to  us.  Could  we  induce  her  to  join  us  in  guarantee- 
ing its  independence  against  all  the  world,  except  Spain,  it 
would  be  nearly  as  valuable  as  if  it  were  our  own.  But 
should  she  take  it,  I  would  not  immediately  go  to  war  for 
it;  because  the  first  war  on  other  accounts  will  give  it  to  us, 
or  the  island  will  give  itself  to  us  when  able  to  do  so.' 

During  the  summer  of  1825  a  large  French  squad- 
ron visited  the  West  Indies  and  hovered  for  several 
weeks  about  the  coasts  of  Cuba.  This  action  on  the 
part  of  the  French  government,  without  explanation, 
excited  the  alarm  of  both  England  and  the  United 
States  and  drew  forth  strong  protests  from  Mr.  Can- 
ning and  from  Mr.  Clay.     Canning  wrote  to  Gran- 

•  "  H.    Ex.    Doc.    No.    121,   Thirty-second   Cong.,    First   Sess.;    also    Brit. 
and    For.    St.    Pap..   Vol.    XLIV,   pp.    114-236. 
'  H.  A.  Washington,  "  Writings  of  Jefferson,"  Vol.  VII,  p.  288. 

S7 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ville,  the  British  minister  at  Paris,  that  he  could  not 
consent  to  the  occupation  of  Havana  by  France,  even 
as  a  measure  of  protection  against  possible  attacks 
from  Mexico  and  Colombia.®  Again  some  two  months 
later  he  wrote : 

As  to  Cuba  you  cannot  too  soon  nor  too  amicably,  of 
course,  represent  to  Villele  the  impossibility  of  our  allowing 
France  (or  France  us,  I  presume)  to  meddle  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  that  colony.  We  sincerely  wish  it  to  remain  with 
the  mother-country.  Next  to  that  I  wish  it  independent, 
either  singly  or  in  connection  with  Mexico.  But  what 
cannot  or  must  not  be,  is  that  any  great  maritime  power 
should  get  possession  of  it.  The  Americans  (Yankees,  I 
mean)  think  of  this  matter  just  as  I  do.® 

The  expressions  of  the  United  States,  as  to  the  de- 
signs of  France,  were  as  emphatic  as  those  of  England. 
Mr.  Clay  declared  "  that  we  could  not  consent  to  the 
occupation  of  those  islands  by  any  other  European 
power  than  Spain  under  any  contingency  whatever."  " 

In  this  connection  Canning  wished  to  bring  about 
the  signature,  by  England,  France,  and  the  United 
States,  of  "  ministerial  notes,  one  between  France  and 
the  United  States,  and  one  between  France  and  Great 
Britain,  or  one  tripartite  note  signed  by  all,  disclaim- 
ing each  for  themselves,  any  intention  to  occupy  Cuba, 
and  protesting  against  such  occupation  by  either  of 
the  others."  "  The  government  of  the  United  States 
held  this  proposal  under  advisement,  but  on  France 
declining,  it  was  dropped. ^^     In  1826  when  an  attack 


•  "  Official  Corresp.  of  Canning,"  Vol.  I,  p.  265. 

•  Ibid.,  Vol.  I.  p.  275. 

1"  Am.   St.   Pap.,    For.   Rel.,   Vol.   V,   p.   855.      Also   "  Wharton's  Digest, 
Sec.   60. 

•'  Stapleton,    "Political    Life   of   Canning,"    Vol.    Ill,    p.    154. 

*»  Mr.  Clay  to  Mr.  King,  October  25,  "  Wharton's  Digest,"  Sec.  60, 

88 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

upon  Portugal  was  feared  Canning  advised,  in  case  of 
such  an  attack,  the  immediate  seizure  of  Cuba  by  Great 
Britain  as  more  effective  than  half  a  dozen  Peninsular 
campaigns." 

The  Cuban  question  was  involved  in  the  long  debate 
on  the  proposal  of  the  executive  of  the  United  States 
to  send  delegates  to  the  congress  of  Spanish-American 
republics  assembled  at  Panama  in  1826.  This  debate 
occupied  the  attention  of  Congress  during  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1826,  and  was  engaged  in  with  great 
earnestness.  One  of  the  chief  objections  to  the  pro- 
posed mission  was  the  fact  that  the  question  of  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico  would  come  up  and  that  the  United 
States  government  had  already  committed  itself  to  the 
foreign  powers  on  that  subject.  The  report  of  the 
Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations  declared  that. 

The  very  situation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  furnishes  the 
strongest  inducement  to  the  United  States  not  to  take  a 
place  at  the  contemplated  congress,  since,  by  so  doing,  they 
must  be  considered  as  changing  the  attitude  in  which  they 
hitherto  have  stood  as  impartial  spectators  of  the  passing 
scenes,  and  identifying  themselves  with  the  new  republics.** 

The  Southern  members  were  united  in  their  opposi- 
tion to  the  Panama  mission,  and  in  fact  to  any  closer 
alliance  with  the  new  republics,  for  the  reason  that 
the  latter  had  adopted  the  principle  of  emancipation 
and  any  further  extension  of  their  influence  would 
jeopardize  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  United 
States.  For  the  same  reason  they  were  opposed  to 
the  transfer  of  Cuba  to  any  other  European  power.  If 
a  change  from  its  connection  with  Spain  were  neces- 

*•  Canning    to    Earl    of   Liverpool,    October    6,    1826. 
"  Am.    St.    Pap.,    Fox.    Rel.,    Vol.    V,   p.    863. 

89 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

sary  they  favored  annexation  by  the  United  States, 
and  meantime  they  were  strongly  opposed  to  the  gov- 
ernment entering  into  any  engagement  with  foreign 
powers  or  in  any  way  committing  itself  on  the  Cuban 
question." 

The  declaration  of  Mr.  Clay  against  the  interference 
of  England  and  France  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  was 
consistently  adhered  to  under  the  administrations  of 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren. 

In  1838-39,  the  British  government  dispatched  spe- 
cial commissioners  to  Cuba  ?nd  Porto  Rico  to  report 
on  the  condition  of  the  slave  trade.  The  presence  of 
these  agents  in  Cuba  gave  rise  to  reports  that  Great 
Britain  contemplated  revolutionizing  the  island,  or  at 
least  occupying  it  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  the 
slave  trade.  The  United  States  gave  Spain  to  under- 
stand that  we  would  not  consent  to  British  control  in 
whatever  way  it  might  be  brought  about.  Mr.  For- 
syth wrote  to  Mr.  Vail,  our  representative  at  Madrid, 
July  15,  1840: 

You  are  authorized  to  assure  the  Spanish  government,  that 
in  case  of  any  attempt,  from  whatever  quarter,  to  wrest  from 
her  this  portion  of  her  territory,  she  may  securely  depend 
upon  the  military  and  naval  resources  of  the  United  States 
to  aid  her  in  preserving  or  recovering  it." 

Again,  Mr.  Webster  in  January,  1843,  wrote  to  Mr. 
Campbell,  United  States  consul  at  Havana: 

The  Spanish  government  has  long  been  in  possession  of 
the  policy  and  wishes  of  this  government  in  regard  to  Cuba, 

"Benton's  "Abridgment,"  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  427,  428,  and  Vol.  IX, 
pp.  90-218. 

»•  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  121,  Thirty-second  Cong.,  First  Sess.:  also  "Wharton's 
Digest,"  Sec.  60. 

90 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

which  have  never  changed,  and  has  repeatedly  been  told 
that  the  United  States  never  would  permit  the  occupation 
of  that  island  by  British  agents  or  forces  upon  any  pretext 
whatever;  and  that  in  the  event  of  any  attempt  to  wrest 
it  from  her,  she  might  securely  rely  upon  the  whole  naval 
and  military  resources  of  this  country  to  aid  her  in  preserving 
or  recovering  it/^ 

A  copy  of  this  letter  was  also  sent  to  Washington 
Irving,  our  representative  at  Madrid  to  make  such 
use  of  as  circumstances  might  require." 

During  the  first  period  of  our  Cuban  diplomacy  the 
efforts  of  this  government  were  directed  toward  pre- 
venting the  acquisition  of  the  island,  or  the  establish- 
ment of  a  protectorate  over  it,  by  Great  Britain  or 
France.  With  the  Mexican  war,  however,  and  the 
growing  conviction  of  "  manifest  destiny,"  our  foreign 
policy  assumed  a  much  bolder  and  more  aggressive 
character,  and  during  the  next  fifteen  years  all  manner 
of  schemes  for  the  southward  extension  of  our  terri- 
tory were  suggested  and  many  of  them  actually  under- 
taken. Cuba  became  an  object  of  desire,  not  only  in  the 
eyes  of  the  slave-holding  population  of  the  South  as  an 
acquisition  to  slave  territory,  but  of  a  large  part  of 
the  nation,  because  of  its  strategic  importance  in  rela- 
tion to  the  inter-oceanic  transit  routes  of  Central 
America,  which  seemed  the  only  feasible  line  of  com- 
munication with  our  rapidly  developing  interests  in 
California.  Consequently  various  attempts  were 
made  to  annex  the  island  to  the  United  States,  both  by 
purchase  from  Spain  and  forcibly  by  filibustering  ex- 
peditions. 


*'  "  Wharton's  Digest,"  Sec.   60. 

*•  Mr.  Upshur,  who  succeeded  Mr.   Webster  as  secretary  of  state,  wrote 
to  Mr.  Irving  to  the  same  effect,  October  10,   1843. 

91 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

In  June,  1848,  under  the  administration  of  Presi- 
dent Poll<,  Mr.  Buchanan,  secretary  of  state,  wrote 
to  our  minister  at  Madrid,  directing  him  to  open  nego- 
tiations with  the  Spanish  government  for  the  purchase 
of  Cuba.  After  referring  to  the  dangers  of  British 
occupation  and  to  the  advantages  of  annexation,  he 
said :  "  Desirable,  however,  as  this  island  may  be  to  the 
United  States,  we  would  not  acquire  it  except  by  the 
free  will  of  Spain.  Any  acquisition  not  sanctioned  by 
justice  and  honor  would  be  too  dearly  purchased." 
He  stated  that  the  President  would  stipulate  for  the 
payment  of  $100,000,000,  as  a  maximum  price. ^®  This 
offer  was  rejected  by  the  Spanish  government.  The 
minister  of  state  after  several  months'  delay  finally  re- 
plied "  that  it  was  more  than  any  minister  dare  to 
entertain  any  such  proposition;  that  he  believed  such 
to  be  the  feeling  of  the  country,  that  sooner  than  see 
the  island  transferred  to  any  power,  they  would  prefer 
seeing  it  sunk  in  the  ocean." 

Under  the  Whig  administration  of  Taylor  and  Fill- 
more no  effort  was  made  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba. 
On  August  2,  1849,  Mr.  Clayton  wrote  to  Mr.  Bar- 
ringer  that  the  government  did  not  desire  to  renew  the 
negotiation  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba  made  by  the 
late  administration,  since  the  proposition  had  been  con- 
sidered by  the  Spanish  government  as  a  national  in- 
dignity; that  should  Spain  desire  to  part  with  Cuba, 
the  proposal  must  come  from  her. 

About  this  time  active  preparations  were  going  on 
for  the  invasion  of  Cuba  by  an  armed  expedition 
under  the  Cuban  patriot  Narciso  Lopez.     On  August 


*•  Mr.   Buchanan  to  Mr.   Saunders,  June  17,   1848,  H.   Ex.   Doc.   No.   121, 
Thirty  second  Cong.,  First  Sess.;  also  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Pap.,  Vol.  XXVI. 

92 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

II,  1849,  President  Taylor  issued  a  proclamation 
warning  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  against  tak- 
ing part  in  such  expedition  and  saying,  "  No  such  per- 
sons must  expect  the  interference  of  this  government 
in  any  form  on  their  behalf,  no  matter  to  what  ex- 
tremities they  may  be  reduced  in  consequence  of  their 
conduct."  ^°  A  few  days  later  the  entire  force  of 
Lopez  was  arrested  by  the  United  States  marshal  just 
as  it  was  on  the  point  of  leaving  New  York. 

Nothing  daunted,  Lopez  traveled  through  the  south- 
ern and  southwestern  states  secretly  enlisting  men  and 
making  arrangements  for  their  transportation  to  Cuba. 
Many  men  of  prominence  at  the  South  were  in  open 
and  avowed  sympathy  with  the  enterprise.  In  the 
spring  of  1850,  Lopez  called  upon  Gen.  John  A.  Quit- 
man, governor  of  Mississippi,  who  had  served  with 
great  distinction  in  the  Mexican  war,  and  offered  him, 
in  the  name  of  his  compatriots,  the  leadership  of  the 
revolution  and  the  supreme  command  of  the  army. 
Quitman's  sympathies  were  thoroughly  enlisted  in  the 
movement,  but  he  declined  the  honor  on  account  of 
the  serious  aspect  of  political  affairs,  particularly  what 
he  considered  the  encroachments  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment upon  the  rights  of  the  states.  He  made 
liberal  contributions  of  money,  however,  and  gave 
Lopez  sound  advice  about  his  undertaking,  insisting 
that  he  must  have  an  advance  column  of  at  least  2,000 
men  to  maintain  a  footing  on  the  island  until  reinforce- 
ments could  go  to  their  aid.^^ 

*•  "Messages  and   Papers  of   the   Presidents,"   Vol.   V,  p.    7. 

"  J  F  H.  Claiborne,  "  Life  and  Corresp.  of  John  A.  Quitman,"  Vol.  II, 
PP     55-56.    and    Appendix,    p.    385. 

In  June  the  Grand  Jury  of  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  at  New 
Orleans  found  a  bill  against  John  A.  Quitman,  John  Henderson,  Governor 
of  Louisiana,  and  others,  for  setting  on  foot  the  invasion  of  Cuba.     Quitman's 

93 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Unfortunately  for  Lopez  he  did  not  follow  the  ad- 
vice of  Quitman.    A  company  of  volunteers  altogether 
inadequate  for  the  successful  accomplishment  of  the 
enterprise  was  collected  at  New  Orleans.    There  Lopez 
chartered  a  steamer,  the  Creole,  and  two  barks,  the 
Georgiana  and  the  Susan  Loud.    Three-fourths  of  the 
volunteers  had  served  in  the  Mexican  war.    The  first 
detachment  comprising  250  men  left  New  Orleans  in 
the  bark  Georgiana,  April  25,  1850,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Col.  Theodore  O'Hara.    They  proceeded  to 
the  island  of  Contoy  off  the  coast  of  Yucatan  in  the 
territory  of  Mexico.     There  they  were  joined  three 
weeks  later  by  Lopez  and  450  followers  in  the  Creole. 
The  entire  command,  with  the  exception  of  the  crews 
of  the  two  barks  and  a  few  others  to  guard  the  stores, 
embarked  in  the  Creole  and  efifected  a  landing  at  Car- 
denas, but  the  natives  did  not  come  to  the  aid  of  Lopez 
and  after  holding  the  town  for  twelve  hours  he  reluc- 
tantly reembarked  and  headed  for  Key  West.     The 
Creole  was  pursued  by  the  Pizarro,  a  Spanish  war 
vessel,  which  steamed  into  the  harbor  just  as  she  cast 
anchor.    For  a  few  moments  the  Spaniards  seemed  to 
be  on  the  point  of  preparing  to  open  fire  on  the  Creole, 
but  when  they  saw  the  United  States  custom-house  of- 


view  of  state  sovereignty  did  not  admit  the  right  of  the  United 
States  Courts  to  proceed  against  the  chief  executive  of  a  sovereign  state. 
He  sought  the  advice  of  friends  throughout  the  South  as  to  what  course 
he  should  pursue.  None  of  them  admitted  the  fight  of  the  United  States 
Courts  to  indict  him  and  several  of  them  advised  him  that  it  was  his  duty 
to  assert  the  principle  of  state  sovereignty  even  to  the  point  of  calling 
out  the  state  militia  to  protect  him  against  arrest.  Others  advised  him  to 
submit  under  protest  so  as  to  avoid  an  open  breach.  This  course  was 
finally  adopted,  and  when  the  United  States  marshal  appeared  on  the 
3rd  of  February.  1851,  to  take  him  into  custody,  he  yielded,  causing  at 
the  same  time  an  address  to  be  issued  to  the  people  of  Mississippi,  in 
which  he  resigned  the  office  of  governor.  After  proceedings  which  lasted 
two  months.  Henderson  was  acquitted  and  the  charges  against  Quitman 
and   the   others   dismissed. 

94 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

ficers  take  possession  of  her  they  changed  their  minds 
and  left  the  harbor. 

The  two  barks,  which  had  been  left  with  a  small 
guard  at  the  island  of  Contoy,  were  captured  by  Span- 
ish warships,  taken  to  Havana,  condemned  as  prizes 
and  the  men  put  on  trial  for  participation  in  the  Lopez 
expedition.  As  these  men  had  committed  no  act  of 
hostility  against  Spain,  and  had,  moreover,  been  seized 
on  neutral  territory,  the  United  States  government  at 
once  issued  its  protest  and  demanded  their  release. 
The  Spanish  government  replied  that  these  men  had 
been  described  as  pirates  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  in  his  proclamation  warning  citizens 
against  joining  the  expedition  and  were,  therefore, 
beyond  the  pale  of  the  protection  of  the  United  States. 
After  heated  negotiations  which  lasted  several  months 
and  seriously  threatened  the  peace  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, the  prisoners  were  released,  but  it  was  declared 
to  be  an  act  of  grace  on  the  part  of  the  Queen  and  not 
a  concession  to  the  demands  of  the  United  States,^^ 

Lopez  was  prosecuted  by  the  United  States  govern- 
ment for  violation  of  the  neutrality  laws,  but  escaped 
conviction  and  at  once  set  about  organizing  another 
expedition.  On  August  3,  185 1,  the  third  and  last  ex- 
pedition of  Lopez,  consisting  of  over  400  men,  left 
New  Orleans.  After  touching  at  Key  West  the 
steamer  proceeded  to  the  coast  of  Cuba  and  landed  the 
expedition  at  Bahia  Honda.  The  main  body  under 
Lopez  proceeded  into  the  country  where  they  had  been 
led  to  expect  a  general  uprising  of  the  Cubans.  Col. 
W.  S.  Crittenden,  who  had  served  with  bravery  in 
the  Mexican  war,  was  left  in  command  of  a  smaller 

'*  Sen.  Ex.   Doc.  No.  41,  Thirty-first  Cong.,   Second  Sess. 

95 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

body  to  bring  up  the  baggage.  This  detachment  was 
attacked  on  the  13th  and  forced  to  retreat  to  the  place 
where  they  had  landed,  where  about  fifty  of  them  ob- 
tained boats  and  tried  to  escape.  They  were,  however, 
intercepted  off  the  coast,  taken  to  Havana,  sentenced 
before  a  military  court,  and  executed  on  the  i6th. 

The  main  body  under  Lopez  was  overcome  and  dis- 
persed by  Spanish  troops  on  the  24th.  Lopez  was 
taken  prisoner,  tried,  and  executed.  Many  of  his  fol- 
lowers were  killed  or  died  of  hunger  and  fatigue  and 
the  rest  made  prisoners.  Upon  receipt  of  this  news 
Commodore  Parker  was  at  once  ordered  to  proceed  in 
a  frigate  to  Havana  to  inquire  into  the  charges  against 
the  prisoners  executed,  and  the  circumstances  of  their 
capture,  trial,  and  sentence.  To  these  inquiries  the  cap- 
tain-general replied  that  he  considered  those  executed 
as  pirates,  that  they  had  been  so  denounced  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States  in  his  proclamation, 
that  he  was  not  at  liberty  to  furnish  a  copy  of  the 
court  records,  but  would  send  them  to  Madrid  and  to 
the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington." 

When  the  news  of  the  executions  at  Havana  reached 
New  Orleans  the  excitement  was  intense.  The  office 
of  the  Spanish  consul  was  broken  into,  portraits  of 
the  Queen  and  Captain-General  of  Cuba  defaced,  the 
Spanish  flag  torn  in  pieces,  and  the  consul  burned  in 
effigy  in  LaFayette  Square.  The  consul  had  to  flee 
from  the  city  for  safety  and  the  property  of  certain 
Spaniards  residing  in  New  Orleans  was  destroyed.  A 
long  correspondence  ensued  between  the  two  govern- 
ments.   The  United  States  agreed  to  pay  an  indemnity 

"  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  I,  Thirty-second  Cong.,  First  Sess. ;  also  2d  Annual 
Message  of  Fillmore,  December  2,  1851.  "Messages  and  Papers  of  the 
Presidlents"   Vol.    V,   p.    113. 

96 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

for  injuries  to  the  public  property  of  Spain,  but  not 
for  the  destruction  of  property  belonging  to  Spanish 
residents,  who  were  entitled  only  to  the  same  protec- 
tion afforded  our  own  citizens.^* 

A  few  weeks  after  the  last  Lopez  expedition  the 
British  and  French  representatives  at  Washington 
notified  our  government  that  orders  had  been  issued 
to  their  squadrons  in  the  West  Indies  to  repel  by  force 
any  attempts  at  the  invasion  of  Cuba  from  any  quarter. 
Our  government  replied  that  such  action  on  the  part 
of  England  and  France  could  "  not  but  be  regarded  by 
the  United  States  with  grave  disapproval,  as  involving 
on  the  part  of  European  sovereigns  combined  action 
of  protectorship  over  American  waters."  " 

In  order  to  allay  the  uneasiness  caused  by  the  at- 
tempts of  filibusters,  supposed  to  be  encouraged  or  at 
least  connived  at  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  the  Spanish  government  requested  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France,  in  January,  1852,  to  secure  the  sig- 
nature by  the  American  government  in  conjunction 
with  them  of  an  abnegatory  declaration  with  respect 
to  Cuba."*  Accordingly  in  April,  1852,  the  British  and 
French  ministers  at  Washington  brought  the  subject 
to  the  attention  of  this  government  in  notes  of  the 
same  date,  suggesting  a  tripartite  convention  for  the 
guarantee  of  Cuba  to  Spain." 

To  this  proposal  Mr.  Webster  replied  in  part  as 
follows : 


'*  H.   Ex.    Doc.   No.    I,   Thirty-second  Cong.,    First   Sess. 

"  Mr.  Crittenden  to  Comte  de  Sartiges,  October  22,  1851.  Se«  also 
Pres.  Fillmore  to  Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Webster's  reply.  2  Curtis's  "  Life 
of    Webster,  '   p.    551. 

'»  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Pap.,  Vol.  XLIV,  Lord  Howden  to  Earl  Gran- 
ville,  January   9,    1852. 

"  Comte  de  Sartiges  to  Mr.  Webster,  April  23,  1852.  Sen.  Ex.  Doc. 
No,    13,    Thirty-second    Cong.,    Second    Sess. 

97 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

It  has  been  stated  and  often  repeated  to  the  government 
of  Spain  by  this  government,  under  various  administrations, 
not  only  that  the  United  States  have  no  design  upon  Cuba 
themselves,  but  that,  if  Spain  should  refrain  from  a  volun- 
tary cession  of  the  island  to  any  other  European  power,  she 
might  rely  on  the  countenance  and  friendship  of  the  United 
States  to  assist  her  in  the  defense  and  preservation  of  that 
island.  At  the  same  time  it  has  always  been  declared  to 
Spain  that  the  government  of  the  United  States  could  not 
be  expected  to  acquiesce  in  the  cession  of  Cuba  to  an  Euro- 
pean power. 

He  reminded  them,  furthermore,  that  "  the  policy  of 
the  United  States  has  uniformly  been  to  avoid,  as  far 
as  possible,  alliances  or  agreements  with  other  states, 
and  to  keep  itself  free  from  national  obligations,  except 
such  as  affect  directly  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
themselves."  ^* 

The  matter  was  again  urged  upon  the  United  States 
by  the  British  and  French  governments  in  notes  to 
Mr.  Webster,  dated  July  9,  1852,  in  which  the  inde- 
feasibility  of  the  Spanish  title  to  the  island  and  its 
bearings  upon  the  neutrality  of  the  proposed  Central 
American  canals  were  dwelt  upon.  The  death  of  Mr. 
Webster  postponed  for  some  time  the  answer  of  the 
United  States,  but  the  proposal  was  finally  rejected 
in  a  notable  dispatch  prepared  by  Webster's  successor, 
Edward  Everett. 

With  the  growth  of  the  slavery  conflict,  which  had 
now  become  paramount  to  all  other  questions,  the  an- 
nexation of  Cuba  had  become  a  party  issue,  and  the 
return  of  the  Democratic  party  to  power,  in  1853,  was 
hailed  by  the  southern  extremists  as  a  signal  for  the 

"  Mr.  Webster  to  Comte  de  Sartiges,  April  29,  1852.  To  Mr.  Cramp* 
ton,   same  date,  to  same   effect. 

98 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

acquisition  of  the  long  coveted  prize.  This  expecta- 
tion was  further  heightened  by  the  declaration  of 
President  Pierce,  in  his  inaugural  address,  that  the 
policy  of  his  administration  would  "  not  be  controlled 
by  any  timid  forebodings  of  evil  from  expansion,"  and 
that  the  acquisition  of  certain  possessions  not  within 
our  jurisdiction  was  "  eminently  important  for  our 
protection,  if  not  in  the  future  essential  for  the  preser- 
vation of  the  rights  of  commerce  and  the  peace  of 
the  world." 

William  L.  Marcy,  of  New  York,  was  appointed 
secretary  of  state  and  for  the  mission  to  Spain  the 
President  selected  Pierre  Soule  of  Louisiana,  a 
Frenchman  by  birth  and  education,  who  had  been 
exiled  for  political  reasons.  His  appointment  under 
the  circumstances  created  unfavorable  comment  both 
in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  and  his  sojourn  of 
several  days  at  Paris  on  the  way  to  his  post  at  Madrid 
caused  the  French  government  some  annoyance.  Louis 
Napoleon  advised  the  court  of  Madrid  not  to  receive 
him,  as  his  views  on  the  Cuban  question  were  well 
known  to  be  of  a  radical  character. 

In  his  instructions  to  Mr.  Soule,  July  23,  1853.  Mr. 
Marcy  emphasized  the  importance  of  our  relations 
with  Spain  in  view  of  the  rumors  of  contemplated 
changes  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Cuba  and  of  the  re- 
cent interposition  of  England  and  France.  He  di- 
rected him  to  try  to  negotiate  a  commercial  treaty 
with  Spain  favorable  to  our  trade  with  Cuba,  and 
pointed  out  the  urgent  necessity  of  allowing  a  "  quali- 
fied diplomatic  intercourse  between  the  captain-general 
of  that  island  and  our  consul  at  Havana,  in  order  to 
prevent  difficulties  and  preserve  a  good  understanding 

99 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

between  the  two  countries."  ^'  The  difficulty  of  set- 
thng  disputes  arising  in  Cuba  had  been  the  subject  of 
frequent  remonstrances  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  The  captain-general  was  clothed  with  almost 
"  unlimited  powers  for  aggression,  but  with  none  for 
reparation."  He  exercised  no  diplomatic  functions 
and  was  in  no  way  subject  to  the  authority  of  the 
Spanish  minister  at  Washington. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Soule  in  Spain,  he  found 
that  Mr.  Calderon,  the  head  of  the  cabinet,  was 
strongly  opposed  to  any  commercial  treaty  or  agree- 
ment which  would  promote  intercourse  between  the 
United  States  and  the  dependencies  of  Spain,  and 
equally  averse  to  allowing  the  captain-general  any  dip- 
lomatic powers. ^°  Mr.  Soule  was  by  nature  hot- 
headed and  impetuous  and  could  suffer  anything 
sooner  than  enforced  inactivity.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  intentions  of  the  executive  m  sending  him, 
he  had  come  to  Madrid  for  the  purpose  of  consum- 
mating the  long  cherished  scheme  of  acquiring  Cuba. 
Accordingly,  on  February  2t,,  1854,  he  wrote  to  Mr. 
Marcy  that  the  affairs  of  the  Spanish  government  were 
about  to  reach  a  crisis,  that  a  change  of  ministry  was 
imminent,  and  that  contingencies  involving  the  fate  of 
Cuba  were  likely  to  arise  which  might  be  of  great  in- 
terest to  the  United  States.  He,  therefore,  asked  for 
definite  instructions.  Relying  upon  these  representa- 
tions and  upon  Mr.  Soule's  judgment,  Mr.  Marcy 
transmited  in  due  time  the  necessary  powers,  author- 
izing him  to  negotiate  with  Spain  for  the  purchase  of 
Cuba,  or  for  its  independence,  if  such  an  arrange- 

»•  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  93,  Thirty-third  Cong.,  Second  Sess.,  p.  3. 
»»  Mr.   Soule  to  Mr.   Marcy,  November   10,  and  December  23,   1853,  aod 
January   20,    1854. 

100 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

ment  would  be  more  agreeable  to  Spanish  pride,  in 
which  event  the  United  States  would  be  willing  to 
contribute  substantial  aid  to  the  result. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  the  Black  Warrior  affair 
had  strained  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  almost 
to  the  point  of  rupture.  This  case,  involving  the 
seizure  of  an  American  steamer  by  Spanish  officials 
at  Havana  for  an  unintentional  violation  or  neglect 
of  custom-house  regulations,  was  of  an  unusually  ex- 
asperating character. 

As  soon  as  the  department  at  Washington  was  fully 
informed  of  this  outrage,  Mr.  Marcy  forwarded  all 
the  documents  in  the  case  to  Mr.  Soule  and  directed 
him  to  demand  of  the  Spanish  government  a  prompt 
disavowal  of  the  act  and  the  pa\Tnent  of  an  indemnity 
to  the  owners  of  the  vessel  and  of  the  cargo,  the 
extent  of  the  injury  being  estimated  at  $300,000.  On 
April  8  Mr.  Soule  presented  a  formal  demand  on  the 
part  of  his  government.  No  answer  to  this  note  hav- 
ing been  received,  on  the  nth  he  repeated  his  demands 
much  more  emphatically,  calling  for  an  indemnity  of 
$300,000,  insisting  that  all  persons,  whatever  their 
rank  or  importance,  who  were  concerned  in  the  perpe- 
tration of  the  wrong,  be  dismissed  from  her  majesty's 
service,  and  finally  declaring  that  non-compliance  with 
these  demands  within  forty-eight  hours  would  be  con- 
sidered by  the  government  of  the  United  States  as 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  that  her  majesty's  govern- 
ment was  determined  to  uphold  the  conduct  of  its 
officers. 

Mr.  Calderon  replied,  on  the  12th,  that  whenever 
her  majesty's  government  should  have  before  it  the 
authentic  and  complete  data,  which  it  then  lacked,  a 

lOI 

,.^t.^jK.^^.. - 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

reply  would  be  given  to  the  demand  of  the  United 
States  conformable  to  justice  and  right;  that  the  per- 
emptory tone  of  Mr.  Soule's  note  suggested  to  the 
government  of  her  majesty  "  a  suspicion  that  it  was 
not  so  much  the  manifestation  of  a  lively  interest  in 
the  defense  of  pretended  injuries,  as  an  incomprehen- 
sible pretext  for  exciting  estrangement,  if  not  a  quarrel 
between  two  friendly  powers."  To  this  note  Mr. 
Soule  replied  that  the  suggestion  made  as  to  the  mo- 
tives of  the  United  States  in  seeking  redress  was  "  but 
little  creditable  to  the  candor  of  her  Catholic  majesty's 
government,  and  comes  in  very  bad  grace  from  one 
who,  like  your  excellency,  cannot  but  be  aware  that  the 
records  of  this  legation,  as  well  as  those  of  her  Catho- 
lic majesty's  department  of  state,  are  loaded  with 
reclamations  bearing  on  grievances  most  flagrant, 
which  have  never  been  earnestly  attended  to  and  were 
met  at  their  inception  with  precisely  the  same  dilatory 
excuses  through  which  the  present  one  is  sought  to 
be  evaded." 

Meanwhile  the  aspects  of  the  case  were  altogether 
changed  by  a  private  agreement  between  the  Havana  of- 
ficials and  the  owners  of  the  Black  Warrior,  by  which 
the  ship  and  her  cargo  were  released,  Mr.  Soule  con- 
tinued, however,  according  to  instructions  from  Wash- 
ington, to  demand  compensation  for  the  damages  sus- 
tained by  the  owners  and  passengers  not  compensated 
for  by  the  return  of  the  ship  and  cargo,  and  also  repa- 
ration for  the  insult  to  the  United  States  flag.  The 
Spanish  government,  however,  refused  to  recognize 
any  ground  for  reparation  after  the  restitution  of  the 
ship  and  cargo,  and  persisted  in  contradicting,  without 
the  support  of  any  evidence  whatever,  the  facts  as 

102 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

presented  by  the  United  States,  although  they  were  all 
certified  to  in  proper  legal  form. 

On  June  24  Mr.  Marcy  wrote  that  the  President 
was  far  from  satisfied  with  the  manner  in  which  our 
demands  were  treated  by  the  Spanish  government,  but 
that  before  resorting  to  extreme  measures  he  was  de- 
termined to  make  a  final  appeal  to  Spain  for  the  ad- 
justment of  past  difficulties  and  for  the  guarantee  of 
more  friendly  relations  in  the  future.  Although  satis- 
fied with  the  spirited  manner  in  which  Mr.  Soule  had 
performed  the  duties  of  his  mission,  the  President  was 
considering  the  expediency  of  reinforcing  the  demands 
of  the  United  States  by  the  appointment  of  an  ex- 
traordinary commission  of  two  distinguished  citizens 
to  act  in  conjunction  with  him.  He  instructed  him, 
therefore,  not  to  press  the  affair  of  the  Black  Warrior, 
but  to  wait  until  the  question  of  the  special  commis- 
sion could  be  laid  before  Congress. 

During  the  summer  there  was  a  change  of  ministry 
in  the  Spanish  government,  which,  as  was  not  infre- 
quently the  case,  was  attended  with  more  or  less  seri- 
ous disorders.  In  August  Mr.  Marcy  wrote  that  in 
view  of  the  unsettled  condition  of  affairs  in  Spain  and 
for  other  reasons  not  stated,  the  purpose  of  sending 
a  special  mission  had,  for  the  present  at  least,  been 
abandoned.  Without  pressing  matters  Mr.  Soule  was, 
nevertheless,  to  avail  himself  of  any  opportunity 
which  might  be  presented,  of  settling  the  affairs  in 
dispute  and  of  negotiating  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba. 

Under  the  same  date  he  proposed  to  Mr.  Soule  the 
plan  of  consulting  with  Mr,  Mason  and  Mr.  Buchanan, 
our  ministers  at  Paris  and  London,  for  the  purpose  of 
overcoming  any  obstacles  that  England  and  France 

103 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

might  interpose.  This  suggestion  led  to  the  celebrated 
meeting  at  Ostend  and  the  so-called  manifesto. 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  the  President, 
Messrs.  Soule,  Mason,  and  Buchanan  proceeded  to 
make  arrangements  for  the  proposed  conference, 
which  was  held  at  Ostend,  in  Belgium,  October  9,  10, 
II,  1854.  They  then  adjourned  to  Aix-la-Chapelle  for 
a  week,  where  the  reports  of  their  proceedings  were 
prepared. 

The  greater  part  of  the  report  is  taken  up  with  an 
enumeration  of  the  advantages  that  would  accrue  to 
the  United  States  from  tht  acquisition  of  Cuba,  and 
an  elaborate  exposition  of  the  ways  in  which  the  inter- 
ests of  Spain  would  be  promoted  by  the  sale.  The  only, 
specific  recommendation  of  the  report  was  that  a  pro- 
posal should  be  made  through  the  proper  diplomatic 
channel  to  the  Supreme  Constituent  Cortes  about  to 
assemble,  to  purchase  Cuba  from  Spain,  the  maximum 
price  to  be  $120,000,000.  The  report  then  proceeds 
to  discuss  the  question,  what  ought  to  be  the  course  of 
the  American  government  should  Spain  refuse  to  sell 
Cuba?    The  ministers  declared: 

After  we  shall  have  offered  Spain  a  price  for  Cuba  far 
beyond  its  present  value,  and  this  shall  have  been  refused,  it 
will  then  be  time  to  consider  the  question,  does  Cuba,  in  the 
possession  of  Spain,  seriously  endanger  our  internal  peace 
and  the  existence  of  our  cherished  Union? 

Should  this  question  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  then, 
by  every  law,  human  and  divine,  we  shall  be  justified  in 
wresting  it  from  Spain  if  we  possess  the  power;  and  this 
upon  the  very  same  principle  that  would  justify  an  individual 
in  tearing  down  the  burning  house  of  his  neighbor  if  there 
were  no  other  means  of  preventing  the  flames  from  destroy- 
ing his  own  home. 

.104 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

The  report  also  recommended  that  all  proceedings 
in  reference  to  the  negotiations  with  Spain  "  ought  to 
be  open,  frank,  and  public."  This  recommendation, 
together  with  the  general  character  of  the  report,  in- 
dicates that  its  authors  were  rather  bent  on  making 
political  capital  of  the  affair  at  home  than  on  seriously 
furthering  negotiations  at  Madrid.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  the  Ostend  Manifesto  made  Buchanan  an  accept- 
able presidential  candidate  to  the  southern  wing  of  the 
Democratic  party  and  played  no  small  part  in  securing 
for  him  the  nomination  in  1856.^^ 

The  objectionable  features  of  the  report  were 
politely  but  firmly  repudiated  by  the  administration  in 
Marcy's  reply  to  Soule  and  Soule  promptly  resigned 
his  mission.  This  fact  was  generally  overlooked  at 
the  time,  while  the  unfortunate  publicity  given  to  the 
proceedings  at  Ostend  brought  endless  censure  upon 
President  Pierce  and  Secretary  Marcy. 

In  spite  of  the  "  jingo  "  policy  attributed  to  the 
Pierce  administration,  the  complications  arising  out  of 
the  seizure  of  the  Black  Warrior  were  not  made  a 
casus  belli,  as  might  easily  have  been  done.  After 
Mr.  Soule's  return  to  the  United  States  the  negotia- 
tions were  continued  by  his  successor.  The  conduct 
of  the  officials  concerned  in  the  seizure  was  disavowed, 
and  the  indemnity  claimed  by  the  American  citizens 
concerned  was  paid.  The  administration  closed  on 
terms  of  comparative  friendship  with  Spain,  although 
there  were  numbers  of  claims  still  unadjusted.  The 
Cuban  question  figured  conspicuously  in  the  campaign 
of  1856.     The  platform  of  the  Democratic  party  was 

"  The  correspondence  relating  to  the  Black  Warrior  case  and  to  the 
Ostend  conterence  is  contained  in  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  93,  Tbirtythird  Cong., 
Second  Sess, 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

strongly  in  favor  of  acquisition,  while  the  new  Repub- 
lican platform  stigmatized  the  Ostend  manifesto  as  the 
highwayman's  plea. 

Until  the  Buchanan  administration  all  negotiations 
for  the  purchase  of  Cuba  had  been  undertaken  on  the 
authority  of  the  executive  alone.  An  effort  was  now 
made  to  get  the  two  houses  of  Congress  to  concur  in 
an  appropriation  for  this  purpose.  It  was  thought  that 
united  action  on  the  part  of  the  legislative  and  execu- 
tive branches  of  the  government  would  produce  some 
impression  on  Spain.  Accordingly,  in  his  second, 
third  and  fourth  annual  messages,  President  Buchanan 
brought  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  Congress,  but 
his  appeal  met  with  little  encouragement.  In  January, 
1859,  Senator  Slidell,  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations,  reported  a  bill  carrying 
$30,000,000,  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Presi- 
dent as  a  preliminary  sum  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba.^^ 

This  report  created  violent  opposition,  and  in  Feb- 
ruary the  bill  was  withdrawn  by  Mr.  Slidell  at  the 
urgent  request  of  his  friends. 

The  annexationist  and  filibustering  schemes  of  the 
decade  immediately  preceding  the  War  of  Secession 
were  prompted  by  two  motives.  The  one  was  the 
extension  of  slave  territory,  or  at  least  the  thwarting 
of  the  schemes  of  emancipation  for  Cuba  which  Great 
Britain  was  urging  upon  the  Spanish  government. 
The  other  was  to  secure,  by  the  occupation  of  this 
strong  strategic  position,  undisputed  control  over  the 
proposed  interoceanic  canal  routes  of  Central  America 
and  communication  by  this  means  with  the  new  states 
on  the  Pacific  coast.     These  motives  for  annexation 

•»Sen.  Report  No.  351,  Thirty-fifth  Cong.,  Second  Sess.,  Vol.  I. 

106 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

were  removed,  the  one  by  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
the  United  States,  and  the  other  by  the  construction 
of  the  great  transcontinental  railroads  which  estab- 
lished direct  overland  communication  with  the  Pacific 
states.  During  the  period  following  the  civil  war, 
therefore,  our  policy  was  mainly  concerned  in  urging 
upon  the  Spanish  government  the  abolition  of  slavery 
in  Cuba,  the  estabhshment  of  a  more  liberal  form  of 
government  through  independence  or  autonomy,  and 
the  promotion  of  more  untrammelled  commercial  in- 
tercourse with  the  United  States, 

The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  southern  states  left 
the  Spanish  Antilles  in  the  enjoyment  of  a  monopoly 
of  slave  labor,  which  in  the  production  of  sugar,  espe- 
cially, gave  them  advantages  which  overcame  all  com- 
petition. This  led  to  the  formation  of  a  strong  Span- 
ish party,  for  whom  the  cause  of  slavery  and  that  of 
Spanish  dominion  were  identical.  These  were  known 
as  Peninsulars  on  Spanish  immigrants.  They  were  the 
official  class,  the  wealthy  planters  and  slave-owners 
and  the  real  rulers  of  Cuba.  On  the  other  hand  there 
was  a  party  composed  of  Creoles,  or  native  Cubans, 
whose  cry  was  "  Cuba  for  the  Cubans ! "  and  who 
hoped  to  effect  the  complete  separation  of  the  island 
from  Spain,  either  through  their  own  efforts  or 
through  the  assistance  of  the  United  States.  Not  in- 
frequently in  the  same  family,  the  father,  born  and 
brought  up  in  the  Peninsula,  was  an  ardent  loyalist, 
while  the  son,  born  in  Cuba,  was  an  insurgent  at  heart, 
if  not  actually  enlisted  in  the  ranks. 

The  Spanish  revolution  of  September,  1868,  was  the 
signal  for  an  uprising  of  the  native  or  Creole  party  in 
the  eastern  part  of  the  island.    This  movement  was 

107 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

not  at  first  ostensibly  for  independence,  but  for  the 
revolution  in  Spain,  the  cries  being  "  Hurrah  for 
Prim !  "  "  Hurrah  for  the  Revolution !  "  Its  real 
character  was,  however,  apparent  from  the  first  and 
its  supporters  continued  for  a  period  of  ten  years, 
without  regard  to  the  numerous  vicissitudes  through 
which  the  Spanish  government  passed — the  provis- 
ional government,  the  regency,  the  elective  monarchy, 
the  republic,  and  the  restored  Bourbon  dynasty — to 
wage  a  dogged,  though  desultory  warfare  against  the 
constituted  authorities  of  the  island.  This  struggle 
was  almost  coterminous  with  President  Grant's  ad- 
ministration of  eight  years. 

At  an  early  stage  of  the  contest  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties conceived  it  to  be  necessary  to  issue  certain  decrees 
which  were  contrary  to  public  law  and,  in  so  far  as 
they  affected  citizens  of  the  United  States,  in  violation 
of  treaty  obligations.  On  March  24,  1869,  the  cap- 
tain-general issued  a  decree  authorizing  the  capture  on 
the  high  seas  of  vessels  carrying  men,  arms,  munitions, 
or  effects  in  aid  of  the  insurgents,  and  declaring  that 
"  all  persons  captured  in  such  vessels  without  regard 
to  their  number  will  be  immediately  executed,"  ^^  By 
another  decree  the  estates  of  American  citizens  sus- 
pected of  sympathy  with  the  insurgents  were  confis- 
cated.^* Secretary  Hamilton  Fish  protested  against 
these  decrees  so  far  as  they  affected  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  as  they  were  in  violation  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  of  1795. 

On  July  7,  1869,  the  captain-general  issued  another 
decree  closing  certain  ports,  declaring  voyages  with 


"  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  7,  Forty-first  Cong.,  Second  Sess. 
«*  Ibid. 

108 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

arms,  ammunition,  or  crew  for  the  insurgents  illegal, 
and  directing  cruisers  on  the  high  seas  to  bring  into 
port  all  vessels  found  to  be  enemies.  On  July  i6  Mr. 
Fish  called  the  attention  of  the  Spanish  minister  to  this 
decree,  saying  that  it  assumed  powers  over  the  com- 
merce of  the  United  States  that  could  be  permitted 
only  in  time  of  war;  that  the  United  States  would  not 
yield  the  right  to  carry  contraband  of  war  in  time  of 
peace,  and  would  not  permit  their  vessels  to  be  inter- 
fered with  on  the  high  seas  except  in  time  of  war;  that 
if  Spain  was  at  war  she  should  give  notice  to  the 
United  States  to  that  effect,  and  that  a  continuance  of 
the  decree  or  any  attempt  to  enforce  it  would  be  re- 
garded as  a  recognition  by  Spain  of  a  state  of  war  in 
Cuba.  This  declaration  produced  a  prompt  modifi- 
cation of  the  decree  so  far  as  it  concerned  the  search 
of  vessels  on  the  high  seas. 

As  our  commercial  interests  at  large,  as  well  as  the 
interests  of  individual  citizens,  were  deeply  affected 
by  the  condition  of  the  island,  President  Grant  deter- 
mined at  the  beginning  of  his  administration  to  offer 
to  mediate  between  Spain  and  the  insurgents.  Gen- 
eral Daniel  E.  Sickles  was  appointed  minister  to  Spain 
and  his  instructions,  under  date  of  June  29,  1869,  di- 
rected him  to  offer  to  the  cabinet  at  Madrid  the  good 
offices  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  bring- 
ing to  a  close  the  civil  war  then  ravaging  the  island 
and  establishing  the  independence  of  Cuba.  Mr.  Fish 
instructed  General  Sickles  to  explain  to  the  Spanish 
government  that  he  used  the  term  civil  war  advisedly, 
not  as  implying  any  public  recognition  of  belligerent 
rights,  but  a  condition  of  affairs  that  might  not  justify 
withholding  much  longer  those  rights  from  the  insur- 

109 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

gents.^'  In  reply  Spain  agreed  to  accept  the  good  of- 
fices of  the  United  States,  but  on  conditions  that  were 
impracticable  and  unsatisfactory.  At  the  same  time 
the  Spanish  government  allowed  the  purport  of  Gen- 
eral Sickles's  note  tendering  the  good  offices  of  the 
United  States  to  get  out,  and  it  was  accepted  by  the 
press  as  indicating  the  purpose  of  the  United  States 
to  recognize  the  Cubans  as  belligerents  if  its  offer  of 
mediation  were  refused.  No  Spanish  cabinet  could 
possibly  endure  the  odium  of  having  made  a  concession 
to  the  Cubans  under  a  threat  from  an  outside  power. 
The  Spanish  government  therefore  requested  the  with- 
drawal of  the  American  note. 

After  the  rejection  of  the  offer  of  mediation  Presi- 
dent Grant  decided  to  recognize  the  Cuban  insurgents 
and  in  August,  1869,  while  on  his  way  from  New 
York  to  New  England  on  the  Fall  River  boat  he  signed 
a  proclamation  of  Cuban  belligerency  which  he  for- 
warded to  Washington  with  a  note  to  Secretary  Fish, 
requesting  him  to  sign,  seal,  and  issue  it.  Mr.  Fish  dis- 
approved of  this  step,  and  while  he  affixed  the  seal 
and  signed  the  document,  he  did  not  issue  it,  but  kept 
it  in  a  safe  place  to  await  further  developments. 
Grant's  attention  was  diverted  by  Wall  Street  specu- 
lations in  gold  and  the  crisis  that  followed  on  "  Black 
Friday."  He  failed  to  notice  at  the  time  that  the 
secretary  of  state  did  not  carry  out  his  instructions, 
and  later  he  thanked  Mr.  Fish  for  having  saved  him 
from  a  serious  mistake.^^ 

For  some  time  the  United  States  had  been  urging 
upon  Spain  the  importance  of  abolishing  slavery  in 

•"  House   Ex.   Doc.   No.    160,   Forty-first   Cong.,   Second   Sess. 
•' C.   F.  Adams,  "The  Treaty  of  Washington,"  in  "Lee  at  Appomattox 
and  Other  Papers,"  p.   119. 

no 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

Cuba  as  a  necessary  condition  to  the  complete  pacifica- 
tion of  the  island.  During  the  fall  of  1869  Spain  gave 
repeated  assurances  to  the  United  States  of  her  readi- 
ness to  effect  emancipation  in  Cuba  as  soon  as  hos- 
tilities should  cease,  but  the  Spanish  government  could 
never  be  brought  to  enter  into  any  definite  engagement 
on  the  subject.  In  fact  as  regarded  the  slavery  ques- 
tion the  cabinet  of  Madrid  found  itself  unable  to 
choose  between  the  horns  of  the  dilemma.  The  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  were  urging  the  immediate 
abolition  of  slavery,  while  the  most  influential  up- 
holders of  Spanish  rule  in  Porto  Rico  as  well  as  in 
Cuba  were  the  slaveholders  themselves.  The  insur- 
gents on  the  other  hand  had  abolished  slavery  by  a 
decree  of  the  assembly  of  February  26,  1869,  promis- 
ing indemnity  to  the  owners  in  due  time  and  providing 
for  the  enrolment  of  liberated  slaves  in  the  army.^^ 
On  January  26,  1870,  Mr.  Fish  wrote  to  General 
Sickles : 

It  becomes  more  apparent  every  day  that  this  contest  can- 
not terminate  without  the  abolition  of  slavery.  This  govern- 
ment regards  the  government  at  Madrid  as  committed  to  that 
result.  .  .  .  You  will,  therefore,  if  it  shall  appear  that  the 
insurrection  is  regarded  as  suppressed,  frankly  state  that 
this  government,  relying  upon  the  assurances  so  often  given, 
will  expect  steps  to  be  taken  for  the  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  in  the  Spanish  colonies. 

The  British  representative  at  Madrid,  Mr.  Layard, 
was  instructed  to  second  the  suggestions  of  the  United 
States  minister  in  regard  to  the  aboHtion  of  slavery 
in  the  Spanish  colonies. 


•*  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  113,  Forty-first  Cong.,  Second  Sess. 

Ill 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  insurrection  the  Cuban 
patriots  had  the  sympathy  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
American  people,  and  that  of  the  administration,  al- 
though the  latter  was  kept  within  the  bounds  of  public 
law  and  treaty  obligation,  so  as  to  avoid  giving  of- 
fense to  Spain.  The  government  did  all  that  treaty 
obligations  demanded  of  it  to  prevent  the  violation  of 
the  neutrality  laws.  Numbers  of  filibustering  expedi- 
tions did,  however,  escape  from  American  ports,  and 
those  that  were  arrested  at  the  instance  of  the  Spanish 
government  through  its  representatives  in  this  country 
usually  escaped  conviction  in  our  courts  for  want  of 
evidence. 

In  June,  1870,  the  question  of  granting  belligerent 
rights  to  the  Cubans  was  brought  before  Congress  in 
the  form  of  a  joint  resolution  introduced  into  the 
House.  Personally  General  Grant  sympathized  with 
the  Cubans  and  was  disposed  to  grant  them  the  rights 
of  belligerents,  but  his  judgment  was  again  overruled 
by  the  counsels  of  Mr.  Fish.  On  June  13,  during  the 
heat  of  the  debate  on  the  question  of  belligerency,  the 
President  sent  to  Congress  a  message  embodying 
the  views  of  the  executive.  At  Mr.  Fish's  instance  the 
message  took  the  ground  that  the  facts  did  not  justify 
the  recognition  of  a  state  of  war,  although  Mr.  Fish 
himself  had  made  use  of  the  term  civil  war  in  his 
instructions  to  General  Sickles.  The  Secretary  had 
almost  to  force  the  President  to  sign  this  message, 
though  General  Grant  was  afterwards  satisfied  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  the  measure.^®  The  message  said  in 
part: 


"  Private   journal    of   Mr.    Fish,    quoted   by   Prof.    J.    B.    Moore    in   the 
Forum,   May,    1896. 

112 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

The  question  of  belligerency  is  one  of  fact  not  to  be 
decided  by  sympathies  with  or  prejudices  against  either 
party.  The  relations  between  the  parent  state  and  the 
insurgents  must  amount,  in  fact,  to  war  in  the  sense  of 
international  law.  Fighting,  though  fierce  and  protracted, 
does  not  alone  constitute  war;  there  must  be  military  forces 
acting  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  customs  of  war — 
f^ags  of  truce,  cartels,  exchange  of  prisoners,  etc., — and  to 
justify  belligerency  there  must  be,  above  all,  a  de  facto 
political  organization  of  the  insurgents  sufficient  in  char- 
acter and  resources  to  constitute  it,  if  left  to  itself,  a  state 
among  nations  capable  of  discharging  the  duties  of  a  state, 
and  of  meeting  the  just  responsibilities  it  may  incur  as  such 
toward  other  powers  in  the  discharge  of  its  international 
duties. 

This  message  provoked  a  long  and  animated  discus- 
sion in  the  House  next  day  and  sharp  criticism  on  the 
part  of  the  Cuban  sympathizers  of  the  President's  con- 
duct in  thus  "  intruding  himself  into  the  House  for 
the  purpose  of  controlling  their  deliberations."  The 
debate  continued  until  June  i6,  when  the  resolution 
passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  80  to  68.^^  It  was  taken 
up  by  the  Senate,  discussed  and  amended,  but  finally 
lost. 

The  conclusion  of  an  agreement  on  February  12, 
1871,  for  the  submission  to  a  mixed  commission  of 
claims  of  American  citizens  arising  in  Cuba,"  took 
away  all  our  pressing  grievances  against  Spain  and 
for  more  than  two  years  our  diplomatic  relations  were 
on  a  comparatively  friendly  basis.  Good  feeling  be- 
tween the  two  countries  was  further  promoted  by  the 
proclamation  of  the  Spanish  republic  in  1873  and  by 


••  Congressional   Globe,    Forty-first   Cong.,    Second    Sess.,   p.    4438. 
*""  Treaties    and    Conventions   of    the    United    States"    (Malloy's    Ed,). 
Vol.   II,  p.   1661. 

"3 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  prompt  action  of  General  Sickles  in  extending  to 
it  the  recognition  of  the  United  States,  After  striving 
in  vain  for  more  than  two  years  to  reconcile  and  unite 
the  contending  factions  of  Spain,  King  Amadeus  on 
February  ii,  1873,  abdicated  the  royal  authority  and 
returned  to  the  nation  the  powers  with  which  he  had 
been  intrusted.  The  Cortes  at  once  proclaimed  a 
republic.  General  Sickles  had  on  January  30  tele- 
graphed to  Washington  for  instructions  in  case  the 
republicans  should  succeed  in  their  efforts.  On  the 
day  after  the  abdication,  he  received  directions  to  rec- 
ognize the  republican  government  when  it  was  fully 
established  and  in  possession  of  the  power  of  the  na- 
tion. Three  days  later,  in  the  uniform  of  a  major- 
general  of  the  United  States  army  he  was  given  an 
audience  by  the  president  of  the  assembly  and  formally 
recognized  the  republic. 

On  March  6,  Congress  by  joint  resolution,  in  behalf 
of  the  American  people,  tendered  its  congratulations  to 
the  people  of  Spain,  It  seemed  at  last  as  if  our  rela- 
tions with  Spain  were  on  a  good  footing.  General 
Sickles  urged  upon  the  new  republican  government  the 
abolition  of  slavery  and  the  concession  of  self-govern- 
ment to  Cuba. 

But  such  cordial  relations  did  not  long  continue. 
On  October  31,  1873,  the  steamer  Virginius,  sailing 
under  American  colors  and  carrying  a  United  States 
registry,  was  captured  on  the  high  seas  by  the  Tor- 
nado, a  Spanish  war  vessel,  and  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  first  of  November  taken  into  the  port  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba.  The  men  and  supplies  she  bore  were  bound 
for  the  insurgents,  but  the  capture  did  not  occur  in 
Cuban  waters.     General  Burriel,  the  commandant  of 

114 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

the  city,  summoned  a  court-martial,  and  in  spite  of  the 
protests  of  the  American  consul,  condemned  to  death 
at  the  first  sitting  four  of  the  passengers,  General  W. 
A.  C.  Ryan,  an  Irish  patriot  and  three  Cubans,  They 
were  shot  on  the  morning  of  November  4.  On  the 
7th  twelve  other  passengers  were  executed  and  on  the 
8th,  Captain  Fry  and  his  entire  crew,  numbering 
thirty—six,  making  the  total  number  of  executions 
fifty-three.  As  soon  as  news  of  the  capture  reached 
Madrid,  General  Sickles  called  upon  President  Castelar 
and  represented  to  him  the  difficulties  that  might  arise 
in  case  the  ship  had  been  taken,  on  the  high  seas  bear- 
ing United  States  colors.  Upon  General  Sickles's  sug- 
gestion the  President  of  the  Spanish  republic  at  once 
telegraphed  to  the  captain-general  to  await  orders  be- 
fore taking  any  steps  in  regard  to  the  captured  vessel 
and  crew. 

In  accordance  with  instructions  from  Mr.  Fish, 
General  Sickles  on  November  14  protested  by  note 
against  these  executions  as  brutal  and  barbarous  and 
stated  that  ample  reparation  would  be  demanded.  The 
next  day  he  received  from  the  minister  of  state  an 
ill-tempered  reply,  rejecting  the  protest  as  inadmissible 
when  neither  the  cabinet  at  Washington  nor  that  of 
Madrid  had  sufficient  data  upon  which  to  ground  a 
complaint.  On  the  day  this  reply  was  received  General 
Sickles,  following  out  telegraphic  instructions  from 
Washington,  made  a  formal  demand  by  note  for  the 
restoration  of  the  Virginius,  the  surrender  of  the  sur- 
vivors, a  salute  to  the  United  States  flag,  and  the  pun- 
ishment of  the  guilty  officials.  In  case  of  a  refusal 
of  satisfactory  reparation  within  twelve  days,  General 
Sickles  was  instructed  by  his  government,  at  the  expi- 

115 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ration  of  that  period,  to  close  the  legation  and  leave 
Madrid. 

The  formal  reply  to  General  Sickles's  demand  for 
reparation  was  received  November  i8.  The  Spanish 
government  declared  that  it  would  make  no  reparation 
until  satisfied  that  an  offense  had  been  committed 
against  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  and  that  when  so 
convinced  through  her  own  sources  of  information  or 
by  the  showing  of  the  United  States,  due  reparation 
would  be  made. 

The  representations  maci<^  at  Washington  by  the 
Spanish  minister  were  of  a  much  more  satisfactory 
character  than  those  made  to  General  Sickles  at 
Madrid.  Mr.  Fish,  therefore,  instructed  General 
Sickles  to  remain  at  his  post  until  the  26th,  and  if 
no  accommodation  were  reached  by  that  time  he  could 
demand  his  passports.  By  the  time  this  dispatch 
reached  Madrid  General  Sickles  had  already  asked  for 
his  passports,  but  had  not  received  the  reply  of  the 
Spanish  government.  On  the  26th  he  received  a  note 
from  the  Spanish  minister  asking  for  a  postponement 
to  December  25  and  promising  that  if  by  that  time 
Spain  could  not  show  that  she  had  the  right  on  her 
side — i.e.,  that  the  Virginius  was  not  entitled  to  sail 
under  the  United  States  flag — she  would  comply  with 
the  demands  of  the  United  States.  General  Sickles 
replied  that  he  could  not  accept  such  a  proposal,  but 
that  he  would  inform  his  government  of  it  and  take 
the  responsibility  of  deferring  his  departure. 

Meanwhile  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  had 
proposed  arbitration,  but  Mr.  Fish  declined  to  submit 
to  arbitration  the  question  of  an  indignity  to  the 
United  States  flag.     The  minister  then  asked  for  a 

116 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

delay,  but  Mr.  Fish  told  him  that  delay  was  impossible 
in  view  of  the  approaching  meeting  of  Congress. 
Unless  settled  beforehand  the  question  would  have  to 
be  referred  to  Congress.  This  firm  stand  brought  the 
Spanish  minister  to  time  and  on  November  27  a  propo- 
sition was  submitted  and  accepted  by  Mr.  Fish,  by  the 
terms  of  which  Spain  stipulated  to  restore  the  vessel 
forthwith,  to  surrender  the  survivors  of  her  passengers 
and  crew,  and  on  the  25th  of  December  to  salute  the 
flag  of  the  United  States.  If,  however,  before  that 
date  Spain  should  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
United  States  that  the  Virginius  was  not  entitled  to 
carry  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  the  salute  should 
be  dispensed  with,  but  in  such  case  the  United  States 
would  expect  a  disclaimer  of  intent  of  indignity  to  its 
flag. 

The  Spanish  envoy  submitted  to  the  state  depart- 
ment a  large  number  of  documents  and  depositions  to 
show  that  the  Virginivis  had  no  right  to  sail  under  the 
United  States  flag.  These  were  referred  to  the  at- 
torney-general, and  on  December  17  he  gave  his  opin- 
ion that  the  evidence  was  conclusive  that  the  Virginius, 
although  registered  in  New  York  on  September  26, 
1870,  in  the  name  of  one  Patterson,  who  made  oath 
as  required  by  law  that  he  was  the  owner,  was  in  fact 
the  property  of  certain  Cubans  and  was  controlled  by 
them.       In    conclusion    the    attorney-general     said: 

Spain,  no  doubt,  has  a  right  to  capture  a  vessel,  with  an 
American  register,  and  carrying  the  American  flag,  found  in 
her  own  waters  assisting,  or  endeavoring  to  assist,  the  insur- 
rection in  Cuba,  but  she  has  no  right  to  capture  such  a  vessel 
on  the  high  seas  upon  an  apprehension  that,  in  violation  of 
the  neutrality  or  navigation  laws  of  the  United  State-s,  she 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

was  on  her  way  to  assist  said  rebellion.  Spain  may  defend 
her  territory  and  people  from  the  hostile  attacks  of  what  is, 
or  appears  to  be,  an  American  vessel;  but  she  has  no  juris- 
diction whatever  over  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not 
such  vessel  is  on  the  high  seas  in  violation  of  any  law  of 
the  United  States.  Spain  cannot  rightfully  raise  that  ques- 
tion as  to  the  Virginius,  but  the  United  States  may,  and,  as  I 
understand  the  protocol,  they  have  agreed  to  do  it,  and, 
governed  by  that  agreement  and  without  admitting  that  Spain 
would  otherwise  have  any  interest  in  the  question,  I  decide 
that  the  Virginius,  at  the  time  of  her  capture,  was  without 
right,  and  improperly  carrying  the  American  flag." 

This  decision  was  commuiiicated  to  the  Spanish  au- 
thorities and,  according  to  the  agreement,  the  salute 
to  the  United  States  flag  was  dispensed  with,  and  on 
January  3,  1874,  the  Spanish  minister,  on  behalf  of 
his  government,  expressed  a  disclaimer  of  an  intent  of 
indignity  to  the  flag  of  the  United  States.  Spain  later 
paid  indemnities  to  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  for  the  families  of  those  who  had  been  executed. 

Meanwhile  General  Sickles  offered  his  resignation 
by  cable  in  consequence  of  certain  reports  that  his  con- 
duct had  been  disapproved.  Mr.  Fish  replied  that  such 
reports  were  unauthorized,  that  no  dissatisfaction  had 
been  expressed  or  intimated  and  that  it  was  deemed 
important  that  he  remain  at  his  post.  Ten  days  later. 
General  Sickles  requested  that  the  telegram  tendering 
his  resignation  and  the  reply  be  published.  Mr.  Fish 
declined  to  do  so,  as  the  resignation  was  hypothetical. 
On  December  20,  General  Sickles  again  tendered  his 
resignation  and  it  was  accepted. 

After  the  settlement  of  the  Virginius  affair  the  gov- 


^'The  correspondence  relating  to  the  case  of  the  Virginius  is  in  Foreign 
Relations  for  the  years  1874,  1875,  and  1876. 

228 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

ernment  of  the  United  States  addressed  itself  once 
more  to  the  task  of  forcing  a  settlement  of  the  Cuban 
question  in  general.  In  his  instructions  to  Mr.  Cush- 
ing,  who  succeeded  General  Sickles,  Secretary  Fish 
expressed  the  policy  of  the  administration  at  consid- 
erable length.  After  reviewing  the  main  facts  of  the 
insurrection  which  had  then  lasted  more  than  five 
years,  with  little  or  no  change  in  the  military  situation, 
and  after  referring  to  the  rejection  by  Spain  of  the 
offers  of  mediation  made  by  the  United  States  at  an 
early  day  of  the  trouble,  he  said : 

In  these  circumstances,  the  question  what  decision  the 
United  States  shall  take  is  a  serious  and  difficult  one,  not  to 
be  determined  without  careful  consideration  of  its  complex 
elements  of  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  but  the  determina- 
tion of  which  may  at  any  moment  be  forced  upon  us  by 
occurrences  either  in  Spain  or  in  Cuba. 

Withal  the  President  cannot  but  regard  independence,  and 
emancipation,  of  course,  as  the  only  certain,  and  even  the 
necessary,  solution  of  the  question  of  Cuba.  And,  in  his 
mind,  all  incidental  questions  are  quite  subordinate  to  those, 
the  larger  objects  of  the  United  States  in  this  respect. 

It  requires  to  be  borne  in  mind  that,  in  so  far  as  we  may 
contribute  to  the  solution  of  these  questions,  this  government 
is  not  actuated  by  any  selfish  or  interested  motive.  The 
President  does  not  meditate  or  desire  the  annexation  of 
Cuba  to  the  United  States,  but  its  elevation  into  an  inde- 
pendent republic  of  freemen,  in  harmony  with  ourselves  and 
with  the  other  republics  of  America.** 

For  some  months  Mr.  Cushing  was  occupied  with 
the  settlement  of  the  indemnities  in  the  Virginius  case. 
After  nearly  two  years  had  elapsed  since  the  instruc- 
tions above  quoted,  the  Grant  administration  deter- 

t*  Foreign  Relations,  i874-75,  p.  859, 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

mined,  in  view  of  the  unchanged  condition  of  the 
Cuban  struggle,  to  bring  matters  to  an  issue  and  to 
force,  if  need  be,  the  hand  of  the  Spanish  government. 
On  November  5,  1875,  Mr.  Fish  addressed  a  long 
letter  of  instruction  to  Mr.  Cushing.  After  reviewing 
the  course  of  the  insurrection,  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  affected  thereby,  the  numerous  claims 
arising  therefrom,  many  of  them  still  unsettled,  the 
persistent  refusal  of  Spain  to  redress  these  grievances 
and  the  general  neglect  on  her  part  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions, he  concluded : 

In  the  absence  of  any  prospect  of  a  termination  of  the 
war,  or  of  any  change  in  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been 
conducted  on  either  side,  he  (the  President)  feels  that  the 
time  is  at  hand  when  it  may  be  the  duty  of  other  governments 
to  intervene,  solely  with  a  view  to  bringing  to  an  end  a 
disastrous  and  destructive  conflict,  and  of  restoring  peace 
in  the  island  of  Cuba.  No  government  is  more  deeply  in- 
terested in  the  order  and  peaceful  administration  of  this 
island  than  is  that  of  the  United  States,  and  none  has  suf- 
fered as  the  United  States  from  the  condition  which  has  ob- 
tained there  during  the  past  six  or  seven  years.  He  will, 
therefore,  feel  it  his  duty  at  an  early  day  to  submit  the 
subject  in  this  light,  and  accompanied  by  an  expression  of  the 
views  above  presented,  for  the  consideration  of  Congress. 

Mr.  Cushing  was  instructed  to  read  this  note  to  the 
Spanish  minister  of  state.  At  the  same  time  a  copy 
was  sent  to  General  Robert  C.  Schenck,  United  States 
minister  at  London,  with  instructions  to  read  the  same 
to  Lord  Derby,  and  to  suggest  to  him  that  it  would 
be  agreeable  to  the  United  States  if  the  British  gov- 
ernment would  support  by  its  influence  the  position 
assumed  by  the  Grant  administration.     In  the  course 

120 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

of  a  few  days  copies  of  this  note  were  sent  to  our  rep- 
resentatives at  Paris,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  Lisbon, 
and  St.  Petersburg,  with  instructions  to  communicate 
its  purport  orally,  or  by  reading  the  note,  to  the  gov- 
ernments to  which  they  were  accredited  and  to  ask 
their  intervention  with  Spain  in  the  interests  of  ter- 
minating the  state  of  affairs  existing  in  Cuba. 

As  the  result  of  Mr.  Cushing's  friendly  representa- 
tions and  in  view  of  the  President's  message  discounte- 
nancing recognition  of  either  independence  or  bellig- 
erency, the  Spanish  minister,  Mr.  Calderon,  received 
the  communication  of  November  5  threatening  inter- 
vention, in  good  part,  and  expressed  his  intention  of 
answering  it  after  he  should  have  had  time  to  con- 
sider it  carefully. 

The  reply  of  Great  Britain  was  given  to  General 
Schenck  in  an  interview  with  Lord  Derby  on  January 
25,  1876.  It  was  in  substance  that  he  was  convinced 
that  Spain  would  not  listen  to  mediation,  and  that  the 
British  government  was  not  prepared  to  bring  pres- 
sure to  bear  upon  her  in  case  she  refused;  that  the 
Spanish  government  hoped  to  finish  the  Carlist  war 
in  the  spring  and  would  then  be  in  a  position  to  put 
forth  its  whole  military  strength  for  the  reduction  of 
Cuba;  in  conclusion,  therefore,  Lord  Derby  thought 
"  that  if  nothing  were  contemplated  beyond  an  ami- 
cable interposition,  having  peace  for  its  object,  the 
time  was  ill-chosen  and  the  move  premature."  The 
answers  of  the  other  powers  were  unsatisfactory  or 
evasive,  none  of  them  being  willing  to  bring  pressure 
to  bear  upon  the  government  of  young  Alfonso,  while 
the  Carlist  war  was  on  his  hands. 

The  answer  of  Spain  was  finally  given  in  the  form 

121, 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  a  note  dated  February  3,  1876,  addressed  to  the 
representatives  of  Spain  in  other  countries,  including 
the  United  States,  communicated  to  Mr.  Gushing  Feb- 
ruary 19.  This  answer,  written  by  Mr.  Calderon  was 
in  good  temper.  He  stated  that  the  insurrection  was 
supported  and  carried  on  largely  by  negroes,  mulat- 
toes,  Chinese,  deserters,  and  adventurers;  that  they 
carried  on  a  guerrilla  warfare  from  their  mountain  re- 
treats, that  Spain  had  sufficient  forces  in  the  island  to 
defeat  them  in  the  field;  that  the  triumph  of  Spain 
would  soon  be  followed  by  the  total  abolition  of  slav- 
ery and  the  introduction  of  administrative  reforms. 
The  number  of  vessels  of  war  and  troops  in  Cuba  was 
enumerated  to  show  that  Spain  was  putting  forth  a 
reasonable  effort  to  bring  the  rebellion  to  a  close,  and 
statistics  were  quoted  to  show  that  the  trade  between 
Cuba  and  the  United  States,  as  well  as  the  general 
trade  of  the  island,  had  actually  increased  largely  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  insurrection.  Finally  he  declared 
that  while  individual  foreigners  had  suffered,  Spain 
had  done  justice  to  all  claims  presented. 

In  conversation  with  Mr.  Cushing,  Mr.  Calderon  in- 
timated that  Spain,  although  she  would  resist  to  the 
uttermost  armed  intervention,  might  be  willing  under 
certain  circumstances  to  accept  the  mediation  of  the 
United  States  in  Cuba,  and  he  invited  a  frank  state- 
ment of  what  the  United  States  would  advise  or  wish 
Spain  to  do  with  regard  to  Cuba.  In  reply  to  this 
suggestion,  Mr.  Fish,  after  disclaiming  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  all  intention  of  annexing  Cuba, 
stated  the  following  points  as  the  wish  of  his  govern- 
ment: 

(i)  The  mutual  and  reciprocal  observance  of  treaty 
122 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

obligations,  and  a  full,  friendly,  and  liberal  under- 
standing and  interpretation  of  all  doubtful  treaty  pro- 
visions, wherever  doubt  or  question  might  exist. 

(2)  Peace,  order,  and  good  government  in  Cuba, 
which  involved  prompt  and  effective  measures  to  re- 
store peace,  and  the  establishment  of  a  government 
suited  to  the  spirit  and  necessities  of  the  age. 

(3)  Gradual  but  effectual  emancipation  of  slaves. 

(4)  Improvement  of  commercial  facilities  and  the 
removal  of  the  obstructions  then  existing  in  the  way 
of  trade  and  commerce. 

In  reply  to  these  suggestions  Mr.  Calderon  handed 
Mr.  Gushing  a  note,  dated  April  16,  1876,  in  which 
he  represented  that  his  majesty's  government  was  in 
full  accord  with  Mr.  Fish's  suggestions. 

This  assurance  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment completely  thwarted  Mr.  Fish's  plans,  and,  to- 
gether with  Lord  Derby's  reply,  put  all  further  at- 
tempts at  intervention  out  of  the  question. 

The  substance  of  Mr.  Fish's  note  threatening  inter- 
vention appeared  unofficially  in  the  press  of  Europe 
and  America  in  December,  1875,  and  attracted  such 
general  attention  that  in  January  the  House  asked  for 
the  correspondence.  In  reply  Mr.  Fish  submitted  to 
the  President  for  transmission  the  note  of  November 
5,  together  with  a  few  carefully  chosen  extracts  from 
the  correspondence  between  himself  and  Mr.  Gush- 
ing,*' but  nothing  was  given  that  might  indicate  that 
the  United  States  had  appealed  to  the  powers  of 
Europe  to  countenance  intervention.  As  rumors  to 
this  effect  had,  however,  appeared  in  the  press,  the 
House  called  the  next  day  for  whatever  correspon- 

**  House  Ex.  Doo.  No.  90,  Forty-fourtb  Coag.,  First  Sess. 

123 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

dence  had  taken  place  with  foreign  powers  in  regard 
to  Cuba.  Mr.  Fish  replied  that  "  no  correspondence 
has  taken  place  during  the  past  year  with  any  Euro- 
pean government,  other  than  Spain,  in  regard  to  the 
island  of  Cuba,"  but  that  the  note  of  November  5  had 
been  orally  communicated  to  several  European  gov- 
ernments by  reading  the  same."  This  was  putting  a 
very  strict  and  a  very  unusual  construction  upon  the 
term  "  correspondence,"  to  say  the  least.  The  dis- 
patches, notes,  and  telegrams  that  pass  between  a  gov- 
ernment and  its  representatives  abroad  are  the  gener- 
ally recognized  means  of  communicating  with  foreign 
powers,  and  are  always  spoken  of  as  the  correspon- 
dence with  those  powers.  The  whole  affair  reveals  a 
curious  lack  of  candor  and  of  courage  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Fish.  He  was  trying  to  shield  either  the  admin- 
istration or  himself,  and  did  not  wish  the  American 
public  to  know  that  he  had  reversed  the  time-honored 
policy  of  the  state  department  by  appealing  to  the 
powers  of  Europe  to  intervene  in  what  had  been  uni- 
formly treated,  from  the  days  of  John  Quincy  Adams 
and  Henry  Clay,  as  a  purely  American  question. 

This  correspondence  was  suppressed  for  twenty 
years.  On  March  24,  1896,  the  Senate  called  for 
"  copies  of  all  dispatches,  notes,  and  telegrams  in  the 
department  of  state,  from  and  after  the  note  from 
Secretary  Fish  to  Mr.  Cushing  of  November  5,  1875, 
and  including  that  note,  until  the  pacification  of  Cuba 
in  1878,  which  relate  to  mediation  or  intervention  by 
the  United  States  in  the  affairs  of  that  island,  together 
with  all  correspondence  with  foreign  governments  re- 
lating to  the  same  topic."     On  April   15   President 

**  House  Ex.  Doc.   No.   loo.   Forty-fourth  Cong.,   First   Sess. 

124 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

Cleveland  transmitted  the  "  correspondence "  called 
for,  which  forms  a  document  of  137  pages.*^ 

The  Cuban  struggle  continued  for  two  years  longer. 
In  October,  1877,  several  leaders  surrendered  to  the 
Spanish  authorities  and  undertook  the  task  of  bring- 
ing over  the  few  remaining  ones.  Some  of  these  paid 
for  their  efforts  with  their  lives,  being  taken  and  con- 
demned by  court-martial  by  order  of  the  commander 
of  the  Cuban  forces.  Finally,  in  February,  1878,  the 
terms  of  pacification  were  made  known.  They  em- 
braced representation  in  the  Spanish  Cortes,  oblivion 
of  the  past  in  respect  of  political  offenses  committed 
since  the  year  1868,  and  the  freedom  of  slaves  in  the 
insurgent  ranks.**  In  practice,  however,  the  Cuban 
deputies  were  never  truly  representative,  but  were  men 
of  Spanish  birth  designated  usually  by  the  captain- 
general.  By  gradual  emancipation  slavery  ceased  to 
exist  in  the  island  in  1885.  The  powers  of  the  captain- 
general,  the  most  objectionable  feature  of  Spanish 
rule,  continued  uncurtailed. 

In  February,  1895,  the  final  insurrection  against 
Spanish  rule  in  Cuba  began,  and  soon  developed  the 
same  features  as  the  "  Ten  Years'  War."  The  policy 
of  Maximo  Gomez,  the  insurrectionary  chief,  was  to 
fight  no  pitched  battles  but  to  keep  up  incessant  skir- 
mishes, to  destroy  sugar  plantations  and  every  other 
source  of  revenue  with  the  end  in  view  of  either  ex- 
hausting Spain  or  forcing  the  intervention  of  the 
United  States.  With  the  opening  of  the  second  year 
of  the  struggle.  General  Weyler  arrived  in  Havana  as 
governor   and   captain-general,    and   immediately   in- 

*»  Sen.   Ex.   Doc.  No.  213,   Fifty-fourth  Cong.,   First  Sess. 
*•  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.   79,   Forty-fifth  Cong.,   Second  Sess. 

125, 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

augurated  his  famous  "  Reconcentration  "  policy.  The 
inhabitants  of  the  island  were  directed  by  proclama- 
tion to  assemble  within  a  week  in  the  towns  occupied 
by  Spanish  troops  under  penalty,  if  they  refused,  of 
being  treated  as  rebels.  The  majority  of  those  who 
obeyed  the  proclamation  were  women  and  children 
who,  as  a  result  of  being  cooped  up  in  crowded  vil- 
lages under  miserable  sanitary  conditions  and  without 
adequate  food,  died  by  the  thousands.*^  In  the  prov- 
ince of  Havana  alone  52,000  perished. 

Public  opinion  in  the  United  States  was  thoroughly 
aroused  by  the  execution  01  policies  which  not  only 
excited  sympathy  for  the  unfortunate  inhabitants  of 
Cuba,  but  which  paralyzed  the  industries  of  the  island 
and  destroyed  its  commerce.  American  citizens  owned 
at  least  fifty  millions  of  property  in  the  island,  and 
American  commerce  at  the  beginning  of  the  insurrec- 
tion amounted  to  one  hundred  millions  annually. 
Furthermore,  numbers  of  persons  claiming  American 
citizenship  were  thrown  into  prison  by  Weyler's  orders. 
Some  of  them  were  native  Americans,  but  the  ma- 
jority were  Cubans  who  had  sought  naturalization  in 
the  United  States  in  order  to  return  to  Cuba  and  claim 
American  protection. 

Other  Cubans,  including  many  who  were  still  Span- 
ish subjects,  established  themselves  in  American  ports 
and  furnished  the  insurgents  with  arms  and  supplies. 
On  June  12,  1895,  President  Cleveland  issued  a  proc- 
lamation calling  attention  to  the  Cuban  insurrection 
and  warning  all  persons  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States  against  doing  any  of  the  acts  prohibited 
by  the  American  neutrality  laws.     Notwithstanding 

♦*  Sen.  Doc.  No.  2$,  p.  125,  Fifty-eighth  Cong.,  Second  Scsa. 

126 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

all  the  efforts  of  the  administration,  illegal  expeditions 
were  continually  being  fitted  out  in  the  United  States, 
and  while  the  great  majority  of  them  were  stopped  by 
port  officials  or  intercepted  by  the  navy,  some  of  them 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  coasts  of  Cuba.  President 
Cleveland's  proclamation  recognized  insurgency  as  a 
status  distinct  from  belligerency.  It  merely  put  into 
effect  the  neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States.  It  did 
not  recognize  a  state  of  belligerency  and  therefore  did 
not  bring  into  operation  any  of  the  rules  of  neutrality 
under  international  law.  President  Cleveland  con- 
sistently refused  to  recognize  the  Cubans  as  belliger- 
ents. In  February,  1896,  Congress  passed  a  joint 
resolution,  by  a  vote  of  64  to  6  in  the  Senate  and 
246  to  27  in  the  House,  recognizing  a  state  of  war 
in  Cuba,  and  offering  Spain  the  good  offices  of  the 
United  States  for  the  establishment  of  Cuban  inde- 
pendence. Notwithstanding  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority which  this  resolution  had  received,  the  Presi- 
dent ignored  it,  for  it  is  a  well  recognized  principle 
that  Congress  has  no  right  to  force  the  hand  of  the 
President  in  a  matter  of  this  kind.  It  amounted 
merely  to  an  expression  of  opinion  by  Congress. 

In  April,  1896,  Secretary  Olney  addressed  a  note 
to  the  Spanish  minister  in  which  the  United  States  of- 
fered to  mediate  between  Spain  and  the  insurgents  for 
the  restoration  of  peace  on  the  basis  of  autonomy. 
Spain  rejected  this  offer,  claiming  that  Cuba  already 
enjoyed  "  one  of  the  most  liberal  political  systems  in 
the  world,"  and  suggesting  that  the  United  States 
could  contribute  greatly  to  the  pacification  of  the  island 
by  prosecuting  "  the  unlawful  expeditions  of  some  of 
its  citizens  to  Cuba  with  more  vigor  than   in  the 

127 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

past."**  In  his  last  annual  message  to  Congress, 
President  Cleveland  reviewed  the  Cuban  situation  at 
length  and,  in  conclusion,  declared: 

When  the  inability  of  Spain  to  deal  successfully  with  the 
insurgents  has  become  manifest  and  it  is  demonstrated  that 
her  sovereignty  is  extinct  in  Cuba  for  all  purposes  of  its 
rightful  existence,  and  when  a  hopeless  struggle  for  its 
reestablishment  has  degenerated  into  a  strife  which  means 
nothing  more  than  the  useless  sacrifice  of  human  life  and 
the  utter  destruction  of  the  very  subject-matter  of  the  con- 
flict, a  situation  will  be  presented  in  which  our  obligations 
to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  wiU  be  superseded  by  higher 
obligations,  which  we  can  hardly  hesitate  to  recognize  and 
discharge. 

The  McKinley  administration,  which  began  MarcK 
4,  1897,  soon  directed  its  attention  to  the  Cuban  ques- 
tion. It  was  unfortunate  that  with  this  question 
rapidly  approaching  a  crisis  the  State  Department  was 
in  feeble  hands.  John  Sherman,  the  veteran  senator 
from  Ohio,  was  appointed  secretary  of  state  by 
McKinley  in  order  to  make  a  place  in  the  Senate  for 
Mark  Hanna,  who  had  so  successfully  conducted  Mc- 
Kinley's  campaign.  General  Woodford  was  sent  to 
Madrid  to  succeed  Hannis  Taylor,  and  he  was  in- 
structed to  tender  again  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States,  to  remind  Spain  of  the  resolution  passed  by 
the  previous  Congress,  and  to  warn  her  that  another 
Congress  was  soon  to  assemble."  Six  days  after  the 
receipt  of  General  Woodford's  note  the  Spanish  min- 
istry resigned,  and  on  October  14  the  liberal  ministry 
of  Sagasta  assumed  office.     Its  first  act  was  to  recall 

*'  Spanish  Dipl.  Corresp.  and  Docs,  (translation,  Washington,  1905)0 
pp.  7.  8. 

*»  Foreign    Relations,    1898,  p.   568. 

128 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

General  Weyler,  and  to  appoint  General  Blanco  to  suc- 
ceed him  as  governor  and  captain-general  of  Cuba. 
The  new  ministry  promised  to  grant  autonomy  to 
Cuba,  and  President  McKinley  in  his  message  of 
December  6,  1897,  declared  his  intention  of  allowing 
time  for  the  new  policy  to  be  tested. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  the  grant  of  autonomy  had 
come  too  late.  The  Cubans  would  no  longer  be  satis- 
fied with  anything  short  of  independence.  On  Jan- 
uary 13,  1898,  there  was  serious  rioting  in  Havana, 
deliberately  planned  as  a  demonstration  against  the 
autonomy  scheme,  and  Consul-General  Fitzhugh  Lee 
cabled  his  government  that  it  was  evident  that  auton- 
omy would  prove  a  failure,  that  he  doubted  whether 
Blanco  could  control  the  situation,  and  that  it  might 
be  necessary  to  send  warships  for  the  protection  of 
Americans  in  Havana.  The  suggestion  as  to  warships 
met  with  a  prompter  response  than  General  Lee  had 
expected.  The  United  States  battleship  Maine  was 
immediately  dispatched  to  Havana,  where  she  arrived 
January  25  and  was  assigned  an  anchorage  by  the  port 
officials.^"  While  she  was  lying  quietly  at  anchor  in 
Havana  harbor,  attention  was  suddenly  diverted  from 
Cuba  to  Washington  by  the  Dupuy  de  Lome  incident. 
On  February  9,  1898,  the  New  York  Journal  published 
in  facsimile  a  letter  from  the  Spanish  minister  at 
Washington  to  a  friend  in  Cuba  which  severely  criti- 
cized President  McKinley's  policy  and  referred  to  him 
as  "  a  would-be  politician  who  tries  to  leave  a  door 
open  behind  him  while  keeping  on  good  terms  with  the 
jingoes  of  his  party."  The  letter  was  genuine,  though 
surreptitiously  acquired,  and  was  of  such  a  character 

••  Foreign   Relations,   1898,   p.    1025. 

129 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

that  it  could  not  be  overlooked.  When  called  on  for 
an  explanation,  Sefior  de  Lome  admitted  having  writ- 
ten the  letter  but  questioned  the  accuracy  of  the  trans- 
lation. He  claimed  that  the  language  which  he  had 
used  was  permissible  under  the  seal  of  private  corre- 
spondence. When  General  Woodford,  acting  under 
instructions  from  Washington,  informed  the  Spanish 
minister  of  foreign  affairs  that  the  President  expected 
the  immediate  recall  of  Sefior  de  Lome,  he  was  in- 
formed that  the  latter's  resignation  had  already  been 
accepted  by  cable.^^ 

Before  the  excitement  over  this  incident  had  sub- 
sided, the  battleship  Maine  was  suddenly  blown  up  in 
Havana  harbor  on  the  night  of  February  15,  and  two 
of  her  officers  and  two  hundred  and  fifty-eight  of  her 
crew  were  killed.  After  a  careful  examination  of  wit- 
nesses and  of  the  wreck,  an  American  naval  court  of 
inquiry  reported  that  the  destruction  of  the  ship  was 
due  to  a  submarine  mine."  A  Spanish  board  of  in- 
quiry, after  examining  a  number  of  witnesses  who 
had  seen  or  heard  the  explosion,  made  a  brief  report 
the  following  day  to  the  effect  that  the  ship  had  been 
destroyed  by  an  explosion  in  the  forward  magazine. 
It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  American  report  was 
correct,  but  the  responsibility  for  the  mine  has  never 
been  disclosed. 

As  soon  as  the  report  of  the  court  of  inquiry  was 
made  public,  the  American  people,  who  had  displayed 
great  self-control,  threw  aside  all  restraint  and  the 
country  witnessed  an  outburst  of  patriotic  fervor  such 
as  had  not  been  seen  since  1861.     "Remember  the 


•'  Foreign    Relations,    1898,   pp.    1007-1020. 

•'  Sea.   Doc.   No.   207,    Fifty-fifth   Cong.,    Second   Sesa. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

Maine  "  became  a  watchword,  and  the  demand  for 
war  was  overwhelming.  President  McKinley  decided, 
however,  to  make  one  more  effort  at  a  diplomatic  set- 
tlement. He  proposed  an  armistice  between  Spain  and 
the  insurgents  pending  negotiations  for  a  permanent 
adjustment  through  the  friendly  offices  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  In  reply  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment made  counter-propositions  to  the  effect  that 
the  questions  arising  out  of  the  destruction  of  the 
Maine  be  submitted  to  arbitration  and  that  the  pacifi- 
cation of  the  island  be  left  to  a  Cuban  parliament. 
Meanwhile,  the  governor-general  would  be  authorized 
to  accept  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  provided  the  in- 
surgents should  ask  for  it  and  agree  to  disarm.  This 
was  simply  an  invitation  to  the  insurgents  to  submit, 
in  which  case  Spain  would  consider  what  degree  of 
autonomy  was  needed  or  practicable.  The  President 
considered  the  Spanish  reply  as  a  rejection  of  his  pro- 
posal and  determined  to  submit  the  entire  question  to 
Congress."  This  meant  war,  for  public  feeling  in 
America  was  at  the  highest  pitch  of  excitement,  the 
"  yellow  "  press  was  clamoring  for  war,  and  it  was 
with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  the  President,  who 
really  wanted  peace,  had  held  Congress  in  check.  The 
message  to  Congress  was  held  back  a  few  days  in 
consequence  of  a  telegram  from  General  Lee,  who 
urged  that  he  be  given  time  to  get  Americans  safely 
out  of  Havana.  During  this  period  of  delay  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Russia  made  a  formal  appeal 
to  the  President  for  peace,  and  the  Pope  persuaded  the 
Queen  of  Spain  to  authorize  General  Blanco  to  sus- 

•»  Foreign  Relations,    1898,   p.    731. 

131. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

pend  hostilities.  This  concession  did  not  meet  fully 
the  American  ultimatum  and  seemed  too  much  like 
another  play  for  time.  The  Spanish  minister  was, 
therefore,  simply  informed  that  the  President  would 
notify  Congress  of  this  latest  communication.  Presi- 
dent McKinley  was  later  severely  criticized  for  not 
giving  greater  consideration  to  this  note  and  for 
merely  alluding  to  it  in  his  message  instead  of  trans- 
mitting it  in  full.  Had  he  given  it  greater  considera- 
tion, war  might  have  been  delayed  a  few  months,  but 
it  would  not  have  been  averted,  for  Spain  was  not 
willing  to  make  concessions  that  the  Cubans  at  this 
late  date  would  have  regarded  as  satisfactory. 

In  his  message  to  Congress  of  April  ii,  1898,  Presi- 
dent McKinley  referred  to  the  Maine  only  incidentally 
as  "  a  patent  and  impressive  proof  of  a  state  of  things 
in  Cuba  that  is  intolerable."  He  suggested  forcible 
intervention  as  the  only  solution  of  the  question  and 
declared  that  it  was  justified,  not  only  on  grounds  of 
humanity,  but  as  a  measure  for  the  protection  of  the 
lives  and  property  of  American  citizens  in  Cuba,  and 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  a  stop  to  a  conflict  which 
was  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace."  Two  days  later 
the  House  passed  a  resolution  by  vote  of  324  to  19, 
directing  the  President  to  intervene  at  once  to  stop  the 
war  in  Cuba  with  the  purpose  of  "  establishing  by  the 
free  action  of  the  people  thereof  a  stable  and  indepen- 
dent government  of  their  own  in  the  island."  On  the 
same  day  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
reported  a  resolution  demanding  the  immediate  with- 
drawal of  Spain  from  the  Island  of  Cuba,  but  the 
minority  report  urging  in  addition  the  immediate  rec- 

'*  Richardson,  "  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  Vol.  X,  p.  147, 

132 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

ognition  of  the  Cuban  republic  as  then  organized  was 
at  first  embodied  in  the  Senate  resolution  by  a  vote  of 
67  to  21.  It  was  feared  by  members  of  the  Senate 
that  if  we  liberated  Cuba  without  first  recognizing  the 
so-called  republic  of  Cuba,  the  island  would  inevitably 
be  annexed  by  the  United  States.  After  two  days  of 
hot  debate,  the  Senate  reconsidered,  and  the  House  res- 
olution prevailed.  On  April  19,  the  anniversary  of  the 
battle  of  Lexington  and  of  the  first  bloodshed  of  the 
Civil  War  in  the  streets  of  Baltimore,  the  fateful  reso- 
lutions were  adopted  in  the  following  terms : 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled, 

First,  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of 
right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

Second,  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  de- 
mand, and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby 
demand,  that  the  Government  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its 
authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  with- 
draw its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuban  waters. 

Third,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he 
hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several  States 
to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolu- 
tions into  effect. 

Fourth,  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  dis- 
position or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or 
control  over  said  island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof, 
and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is  accomplished,  to 
leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its 
people."** 

As  soon  as  these  resolutions  were  approved  by  the 
President,  the  Spanish  minister  asked  for  his  pass- 

"  "  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,"  Vol.  XXX,  p,  738, 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ports,  thus  severing  diplomatic  relations,  and  Wood- 
ford was  directed  to  leave  Madrid.  The  North  At- 
lantic Squadron,  then  at  Key  West  under  command 
of  Rear-Admiral  William  T.  Sampson,  was  immedi- 
ately ordered  to  blockade  the  northern  coast  of  Cuba, 
and  Commodore  George  Dewey  was  ordered  from 
Hong  Kong  to  Manila  Bay  for  the  purpose  of  cap- 
turing or  destroying  the  Spanish  fleet.  During  the 
war  that  followed,  foreign  public  opinion,  outside  of 
England,  was  decidedly  hostile  to  the  United  States, 
but  in  the  face  of  the  victories  of  Santiago  and  Manila 
Bay  this  sentiment  underwent  a  marked  change,  and 
Spain  abandoned  whatever  hopes  she  had  cherished  of 
European  intervention.  By  the  end  of  July,  1898,  the 
American  as  well  as  the  European  press  was  beginning 
to  ask  why  the  war  should  not  be  brought  to  a  close. 

After  the  surrender  of  Santiago  General  Miles  em- 
barked for  Porto  Rico  with  a  force  of  16,000  men, 
and  in  a  two-weeks'  campaign  overran  most  of  that 
island  with  the  loss  of  three  killed  and  forty  wounded, 
A  large  number  of  troops  had  also  been  sent  to  the 
Philippines.  It  was  evident,  therefore,  that  while  the 
war  had  been  undertaken  for  the  liberation  of  Cuba, 
the  United  States  did  not  feel  under  any  obligation  to 
confine  its  military  operations  to  that  island.  Having 
met  all  the  demands  of  honor,  Spain  asked  the  French 
government  to  authorize  the  French  ambassador  at 
Washington  to  arrange  with  the  President  of  the 
United  States  the  preliminary  terms  of  peace.  The 
negotiations  begun  on  July  26  resulted  in  the  protocol 
of  August  12,  in  which  Spain  agreed  to  the  following 
demands:  first,  the  immediate  evacuation  of  Cuba  and 
the  relinquishment  of  Spanish  sovereignty;  second, 

134 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

the  cession  of  Porto  Rico  and  one  of  the  Ladrones  by 
way  of  indemnity;  and  third,  the  occupation  by  the 
United  States  of  "  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila 
pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  shall 
determine  the  control,  disposition,  and  government  of 
the  Philippines."  " 

By  the  terms  of  the  protocol  Paris  was  selected  as 
the  place  of  meeting  for  the  peace  commissioners, 
and  here  negotiations  were  opened  on  October  i.  The 
United  States  delegation  was  composed  of  William 
R.  Day,  who  resigned  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State 
to  head  the  mission;  Cushman  K.  Davis,  Chairman  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations;  William 
P.  Frye,  President  pro  tern  of  the  Senate;  Senator 
George  Gray  of  Delaware;  and  Whitelaw  Reid,  editor 
of  the  New  York  Tribune;  with  John  Bassett  Moore, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  as  Secretary.  An  entire 
month  was  taken  up  with  the  Cuban  question,  the 
Spanish  commissioners  striving  in  vain  to  saddle  the 
Cuban  debt  either  on  the  United  States  or  on  the 
people  of  Cuba.  The  Philippine  question  occupied 
most  of  the  next  month.  When  the  commissioners 
were  appointed,  President  McKinley  had  not  fully 
made  up  his  mind  on  this  important  question.  His 
first  intention  seems  to  have  been  to  retain  the  bay 
and  city  of  Manila  as  a  naval  base  and  a  part  or  pos- 
sibly the  whole  of  Luzon.  Public  sentiment  in  the 
United  States  in  favor  of  acquiring  the  whole  group 
made  rapid  headway,  and  after  an  extended  trip 
through  the  South  and  West,  during  which  he  sounded 
opinion  on  this  question,  the  President  instructed  the 


*'  Spanish   Dipl.   Corresp.   and   Docs.,   p.   206;    Foreign   Relatione,    1896, 
p.   819. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

commissioners  to  demand  the  entire  group.  The  com- 
missioners were  later  authorized  to  offer  $20,000,000 
for  the  cession.  This  offer,  which  was  recognized  by 
the  Spanish  commissioners  as  an  ultimatum,  was 
finally  accepted  under  protest.  On  other  points  the 
United  States  secured  what  had  been  demanded  in 
the  protocol,  and  the  treaty  was  signed  December  10, 
1898." 

The  treaty  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  January  4, 
1899,  and  precipitated  a  memorable  debate  which 
lasted  until  February  6.  The  principal  opposition 
came  from  Senator  Hoar  of  Massachusetts,  who  de- 
clared that  the  proposal  to  acquire  and  govern  the 
Philippine  Islands  was  in  violation  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  the  Constitution,  and  the  whole 
spirit  of  American  institutions.  The  treaty  could  not 
be  ratified  without  the  aid  of  Democrats,  and  the  re- 
sult was  in  doubt  when  Br}'an  went  to  Washington 
and  advised  his  friends  in  the  Senate  to  vote  for  rati- 
fication, saying  that  the  status  of  the  Philippines  could 
be  determined  in  the  next  presidential  campaign.  The 
outbreak  of  hostilities  between  the  Filipinos  and  the 
American  troops  occupying  Manila  put  an  end  to  the 
debate,  and  on  February  6  the  treaty  was  ratified. 

When  the  United  States  demanded  the  withdrawal 
of  Spain  from  Cuba,  it  was  with  the  declaration  that 
"  The  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition 
or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or 
control  over  said  island  except  for  the  pacification 
thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is 
accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of 
the  island  to  its  people."    Never  has  a  pledge  made  by 

^    »'  Senate  Doc.  No.  62,  Fifty-Fifth  Cong.,  Third  Sess. 

J36 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

a  nation  under  such  circumstances  been  more  faith- 
fully carried  out.  The  administration  of  Cuba  during 
the  period  of  American  military  occupation  was  a 
model  of  its  kind.  General  Leonard  Wood,  the  mili- 
tary governor,  and  his  associates  found  the  cities  and 
towns  crowded  with  refugees  and  reconcentrados,  and 
governmental  affairs  in  a  state  of  the  utmost  con- 
fusion. They  established  order,  relieved  distress,  or- 
ganized hospitals  and  charitable  institutions,  undertook 
extensive  public  works,  reorganized  the  system  of  pub- 
lic schools,  and  put  Havana,  Santiago,  and  other  cities 
in  a  sanitary  condition.  In  a  hospital  near  Havana 
Major  Walter  Reed,  a  surgeon  in  the  United  States 
army,  demonstrated  the  fact  that  yellow  fever  is  trans- 
mitted by  the  bite  of  a  mosquito.  This  discovery  was 
at  once  put  to  the  test  in  Havana,  and  the  city  was 
rendered  free  from  yellow  fever  for  the  first  time  in 
one  hundred  and  forty  years." 

In  the  organization  of  a  government  for  the  island, 
the  first  step  was  to  take  a  census  of  the  inhabitants, 
determine  the  proper  basis  of  sufifrage,  and  hold 
municipal  elections  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  local 
government.  This  work  having  been  successfully  ac- 
complished, a  constitutional  convention,  summoned  by 
General  Wood,  convened  in  the  city  of  Havana, 
November  5,  1900.  By  February  21,  1901,  the  con- 
vention had  agreed  upon  a  constitution  modelled  in 
general  after  that  of  the  United  States.  The  new  con- 
stitution provided  for  the  recognition  of  the  public 
debts  contracted  by  the  insurgent  government,  but  was 
silent  on  the  subject  of  future  relations  with  the 
United  States.     This  subject  had  been  brought  to  the 

•»  Report  of  the  Military  Governor   of   Cuba,   8  vols.,    1901. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

attention  of  the  convention  early  in  February  by  Gen- 
eral Wood,  who  had  submitted  for  incorporation  in 
the  constitution  certain  provisions  which  had  been 
drafted  in  Washington.  The  convention  objected  to 
these  proposals  on  the  ground  that  they  impaired  the 
independence  and  sovereignty  of  the  island,  and  that 
it  was  their  duty  to  make  Cuba  "  independent  of  every 
other  nation,  the  great  and  noble  American  nation 
included," 

The  United  States,  however,  had  no  intention  of 
withdrawing  from  the  island  nntil  this  matter  was  sat- 
isfactorily adjusted.  A  provision,  known  as  the  Piatt 
Amendment,  was  therefore  inserted  in  the  army  ap- 
propriation bill  of  March  2,  1901,  directing  the  Presi- 
dent to  leave  the  control  of  the  island  to  its  people  so 
soon  as  a  government  should  be  established  under  a 
constitution  which  defined  the  future  relations  with  the 
United  States  substantially  as  follows : 

I.  That  the  government  of  Cuba  shall  never  enter  into 
any  treaty  or  other  compact  with  any  foreign  power  or 
powers  which  will  impair  or  tend  to  impair  the  independence 
of  Cuba,  nor  in  any  manner  authorize  or  permit  any  foreign 
power  or  powers  to  obtain  by  colonization  or  for  military 
or  naval  purposes  or  otherwise,  lodgment  in  or  control  over 
any  portion  of  said  island. 

II.  That  said  government  shall  not  assume  or  con- 
tract any  public  debt,  to  pay  the  interest  upon  which,  and 
to  make  reasonable  sinking  fund  provision  for  the  ultimate 
discharge  of  which,  the  ordinary  revenues  of  the  island, 
after  defraying  the  current  expenses  of  government  shall 
be  inadequate. 

III.  That  the  government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the 
United  States  may  exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the 
preservation  of  Cuban  independence,  the  maintenance  of  a 
government  adequate  for  the  protection  of  life,  property, 

138 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

and  individual  liberty,  and  for  discharging  the  obligations 
with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed  by  the  treaty  of  Paris  on  the 
United  States,  now  to  be  assumed  and  undertaken  by  the 
government  of  Cuba. 

IV.  That  all  acts  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  during  its 
military  occupancy  thereof  are  ratified  and  validated,  and 
all  lawful  rights  acquired  thereunder  shall  be  maintained 
and  protected. 

V.  That  the  government  of  Cuba  will  execute,  and  as  far 
as  necessary  extend,  the  plans  already  devised  or  other 
plans  to  be  mutually  agreed  upon,  for  the  sanitation  of  the 
cities  of  the  island,  .    .    . 

VI.  That  the  Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  omitted  from  the  pro- 
posed constitutional  boundaries  of  Cuba,  the  title  thereto 
being  left  to  future  adjustment  by  treaty. 

VII.  That  to  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the 
independence  of  Cuba,  and  to  protect  the  people  thereof,  as 
well  as  for  its  own  defense,  the  government  of  Cuba  will 
sell  or  lease  to  the  United  States  lands  necessary  for  coaling 
or  naval  stations  at  certain  specified  points,  to  be  agreed 
upon  with  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

VIII.  That  by  way  of  further  assurance  the  government 
of  Cuba  will  embody  the  foregoing  provisions  in  a  permanent 
treaty  with  the  United  States.^^ 

These  articles,  with  the  exception  of  the  fifth,  which 
was  proposed  by  General  Leonard  Wood,  were  care- 
fully drafted  by  Elihu  Root,  at  that  time  Secretary  of 
War,  discussed  at  length  by  President  McKinley's 
cabinet,  and  entrusted  to  Senator  Piatt  of  Connecticut, 
who  offered  them  as  an  amendment  to  the  army  ap- 
propriation bill.  In  order  to  allay  doubts  expressed 
by  members  of  the  convention  in  regard  to  the  third 
article.  General  Wood  was  authorized  by  Secretary 
Root  to  state  officially  that  the  intervention  described 
in  this  article  did  not  mean  intermeddling  in  the  af- 

••  U.  S.  Statues  at  Large,  Vol.  XXXI,  p.  897. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

fairs  of  the  Cuban  government,  but  formal  action  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States,  based  upon  just  and 
substantial  grounds.  With  this  assurance  the  conven- 
tion adopted  the  Piatt  amendment  June  12,  1901,  and 
added  it  as  an  appendix  to  the  constitution. 

On  May  20,  1902,  Tomas  Estrada  Palma  was  in- 
augurated as  first  president  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba, 
and  General  Wood  handed  over  to  him  the  government 
of  the  island.®"  The  Americans  left  a  substantial 
balance  in  the  Cuban  treasury.  The  total  receipts  for 
the  entire  period  were  $57,197,140.80,  and  the  expen- 
ditures $55,405,031.28.  The  customs  service,  which 
furnished  the  principal  part  of  the  revenues  during  the 
period  of  military  occupation,  was  ably  administered 
by  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss. ®^ 

While  the  Piatt  amendment  determined  the  political 
relations  that  were  to  exist  between  Cuba  and  the 
United  States,  there  had  been  no  agreement  on  the 
subject  of  commercial  relations.  The  sugar  industry, 
which  had  been  almost  destroyed  by  the  insurrection, 
was  dependent  upon  the  willingness  of  the  United 
States  to  arrange  for  a  reduction  of  its  tariff  in  favor 
of  the  Cuban  product.  Otherwise  Cuban  sugar  could 
not  compete  with  the  bounty-fed  beet  sugar  of  Europe 
or  with  the  sugars  of  Porto  Rico  and  Hawaii,  which 
were  now  admitted  to  the  American  market  free  of 
duty.  President  Roosevelt  had  hoped  to  settle  this 
question  before  the  withdrawal  of  American  troops, 
and  he  had  urged  upon  Congress  the  expediency  of 
providing  for  a  substantial  reduction  in  tariff  duties  on 


••  Documentary  History  of  the   Inaugruration   of  the   Cuban   Government, 
in  Annual  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,   1902,  Appendix  A. 

•'  Documentary  History  of  the   Inauguration  of  the  Cuban  Government, 
in  Annual   Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,   1902,  Appendix  B. 

II4O 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

Cuban  imports  into  the  United  States,  but  a  powerful 
opposition,  composed  of  the  beet-sugar  growers  of  the 
North  and  West  and  of  the  cane-sugar  planters  of 
Louisiana,  succeeded  in  thwarting  for  two  years  the 
efforts  of  the  administration  to  do  justice  to  Cuba. 
All  attempts  to  get  a  bill  through  Congress  failed.*'' 
In  the  meantime  a  reciprocity  convention  was  agreed 
upon  in  the  ordinary  diplomatic  way  December  ii, 
1902,  under  which  Cuban  products  were  to  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  United  States  at  a  reduction  of  twenty 
per  cent.  As  the  Senate  failed  to  act  on  this  treaty 
before  the  4th  of  March,  1903,  President  Roosevelt 
convened  an  extra  session  of  the  Senate  which  rati- 
fied the  treaty  with  amendments,  and  with  the  very 
unusual  provision  that  it  should  not  go  into  effect  until 
approved  by  Congress.  As  the  House  was  not  then  in 
session,  this  meant  that  the  treaty  had  to  go  over  until 
the  fall.  The  Cuban  situation  grew  so  bad  that  the 
President  finally  convened  Congress  in  extra  session 
November  9,  1903.  In  a  special  message  he  urged 
prompt  action  on  the  treaty  on  the  ground  that  the 
Piatt  amendment  had  brought  the  island  of  Cuba 
within  our  system  of  international  policy,  and  that  it 
necessarily  followed  that  it  must  also  to  a  certain 
degree  come  within  the  lines  of  our  economic  policy. 
The  House  passed  the  bill  approving  the  treaty  No- 
vember 19  by  the  overwhelming  vote  of  335  to  21, 
but  the  Senate,  although  it  had  already  ratified  the 
treaty,  permitted  the  extra  session  to  expire  without 
passing  the  measure  which  was  to  give  the  treaty  ef- 
fect. When  the  new  session  began  December  7,  the 
Cuban  treaty  bill  was  made  the  special  order  in  the 

•*  Senate  Docs.   Nos.  405  and  679,  Fifty-Seventh  Cong.,   First  Sess, 
141 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Senate  until  December  i6,  when  the  final  vote  was 
taken  and  it  passed.  Under  the  reciprocity  treaty  com- 
mercial relations  with  Cuba  were  established  on  a  firm 
basis  and  the  volume  of  trade  increased  rapidly. 

In  August,  1906,  President  Palma  was  reelected 
for  another  term,  but  the  Cubans  had  not  learned  the 
primary  lesson  of  democracy,  submission  to  the  will 
of  the  majority,  and  his  opponents  at  once  began  an 
insurrectionary  movement  which  had  for  its  object 
the  overthrow  of  his  government.  About  the  middle 
of  September  President  Roosevelt  sent  Secretary  Taft 
to  Havana  for  the  purpose  of  reconciling  the  con- 
tending factions,  but  Mr,  Taft's  efforts  proved  un- 
availing and  President  Palma  resigned.  When  the 
Cuban  Congress  assembled,  it  was  found  impossible  to 
command  a  quorum.  Under  these  circumstances  Sec- 
retary Taft  assumed  control  of  affairs  on  September 
29  and  proclaimed  a  provisional  government  for  the 
restoration  of  order  and  the  protection  of  life  and 
property.  A  body  of  United  States  troops  under  com- 
mand of  General  Franklin  Bell  was  sent  to  Cuba  to 
preserve  order  and  to  uphold  the  provisional  govern- 
ment. On  October  3,  1906,  Secretary  Taft  was  re- 
lieved of  the  duties  of  provisional  governor  in  order 
that  he  might  resume  his  duties  in  Washington,  and 
Charles  E.  Magoon  was  appointed  to  take  his  place 
at  Havana.®^  In  his  message  to  Congress  December  3, 
1906,  President  Roosevelt  declared  that  while  the 
United  States  had  no  desire  to  annex  Cuba,  it  was 
"  absolutely  out  of  the  question  that  the  island  should 
continue  independent  "  if  the  "  insurrectionary  habit  " 


•"  Secretary  Taft's  report  on  the  Cuban  situation  was  sent  to  Congress 
December   17,    1906. 

142 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CUBA 

should  become  "  confirmed."  The  second  period  of 
American  occupation  lasted  a  little  over  two  years, 
when  the  control  of  the  government  was  again  re- 
stored to  the  people  of  the  island  and  the  American 
troops  were  withdrawn. 


543 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  Panama  Canal 

The  cutting  of  the  isthmus  between  North  and 
South  America  was  the  dream  of  navigators  and  en- 
gineers from  the  time  when  the  first  discoverers  ascer- 
tained that  nature  had  neglected  to  provide  a  passage. 
Yet  the  new  continent  which  30  unexpectedly  blocked 
the  way  of  Columbus  in  his  search  for  the  Indies 
opposed  for  centuries  an  insurmountable  barrier  to 
the  commerce  of  the  East  and  the  West.  The  piercing 
of  the  isthmus  always  seemed  a  perfectly  feasible 
undertaking,  but  the  difficulties  in  the  way  proved 
greater  than  at  first  sight  appeared.  There  were 
( I )  the  physical  or  engineering  problems  to  be  solved, 
and  (2)  the  diplomatic  complications  regarding  the 
control  of  the  canal  in  peace  and  its  use  in  war.  The 
weakness  of  the  Spanish-American  states,  whose  terri- 
tories embraced  the  available  routes,  and  their  rec- 
ognized inability  either  to  construct  or  protect  a  canal 
made  what  might  otherwise  have  been  merely  a  ques- 
tion of  domestic  economy  one  of  grave  international 
import.  In  this  respect,  as  in  others,  the  problem 
presented  the  same  features  as  the  Suez  canal.  To 
meet  these  difficulties  three  plans  were  successively 
developed  during  the  nineteenth  century :  ( i )  a  canal 
constructed  by  a  private  corporation  under  interna- 
tional control,  (2)  a  canal  constructed  by  a  private 
corporation  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  United 
States,  and  (3)  a  canal  constructed,  owned,  operated, 

144 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

and  controlled  by  the  United  States  as  a  government 
enterprise.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  provided  for 
the  construction  of  a  canal  in  accordance  with  the 
first  plan;  several  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made 
to  raise  the  necessary  capital  under  the  second  plan; 
while  the  third  plan  was  the  one  under  which  the 
gigantic  task  was  actually  accomplished. 

The  comparative  merits  of  the  Nicaragua  and 
Panama  routes  long  divided  the  opinion  of  experts. 
American  engineers  generally  favored  that  through 
Nicaragua.  The  length  of  the  Nicaragua  route,  from 
Greytown  on  the  Atlantic  to  Brito  on  the  Pacific  by 
way  of  the  San  Juan  river  and  through  Lake  Nica- 
ragua, is  about  170  miles.  The  elevation  of  the  lake 
above  the  sea  is  about  no  feet.  Its  western  shore 
is  only  twelve  miles  from  the  Pacific,  with  an  inter- 
vening divide  154  feet  above  the  sea.  From  the  south- 
east corner  of  the  lake  flows  the  San  Juan  river, 
120  miles  to  the  Atlantic,  with  an  average  fall  of 
about  10  inches  to  the  mile.  The  serious  objections 
to  this  route  are :  ( i )  the  lack  of  harbors  at  the 
terminals,  Brito  being  a  mere  indentation  on  the  coast, 
rendering  the  construction  of  immense  breakwaters 
necessary,  while  at  Greytown  the  San  Juan  broadens 
out  into  a  delta  that  would  require  extensive  dredging; 
and  (2)  the  enormous  rainfall  at  Greytown,  exceed- 
ing that  known  anywhere  else  on  the  western  conti- 
nent— nearly  25  feet. 

The  Panama  route  from  Colon  on  the  Atlantic  to 
Panama  on  the  Pacific  is  about  50  miles  in  length, 
with  a  natural  elevation  nearly  double  that  of  Nica- 
ragua. There  are  natural  harbors  at  each  end  which 
are  capacious  and  able  to  accommodate  the  heaviest 

145 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

shipping.  The  Panama  Railroad,  built  along  the  line 
of  the  proposed  canal,  in  1850-55,  gave  this  route  an 
additional  advantage.  There  were,  however,  certain 
disadvantages:  (i)  the  unhealthfulness  of  the  vicinity, 
rendering  labor  scarce  and  inefficient;  (2)  the  heavy 
rainfall,  10  to  12  feet  at  Colon;  and  (3)  the  treacher- 
ous character  of  the  geologic  structure,  due  to  its 
volcanic  origin,  through  which  the  cut  had  to  be  made. 
The  impossibility  of  making  even  approximate  esti- 
mates of  the  cost  of  the  work  in  such  a  deadly  climate 
and  through  such  an  uncertain  geologic  formation 
was  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties  to  be  overcome. 
The  De  Lesseps  plan  provided  for  an  open  cut  through- 
out at  the  sea-level,  at  an  estimated  cost  of  $170,000,- 
000.  The  work  was  begun  in  1884  and  prosecuted 
until  1888,  when  the  gigantic  scheme  collapsed,  after 
the  cxDmpany  had  expended  about  $300,000,000  and 
accomplished  less  than  one-third  of  the  work. 

Great  as  the  engineering  problems  of  the  various 
canal  schemes  have  been  shown  to  be,  the  importance 
to  the  world's  commerce  of  the  object  in  view  would, 
in  all  probability,  have  led  to  their  solution  and  to 
the  construction  of  a  canal  long  before  the  United 
States  undertook  the  Panama  enterprise,  had  it  not 
been  for  difficulties  of  an  altogether  different  char- 
acter, complications  arising  out  of  the  question  as  to 
the  status  of  the  canal  in  international  law.  The 
diplomatic  difficulties  in  the  case  of  an  interoceanic 
canal  are  very  great.  It  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
natural  strait,  like  the  Dardanelles,  the  Danish  Belts, 
or  the  Straits  of  Magellan,  which  were  for  a  long 
time  held  under  exclusive  jurisdiction,  but  are  now 
free  to  all  nations.    Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  could  an 

146 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

isthmian  canal  be  compared  to  the  Kiel  canal,  whicK 
is  within  the  territory  of  Germany,  and  which,  al- 
though open  to  commerce,  was  specially  designed  to 
meet  the  needs  of  the  German  navy.  Such  canals  as 
this  are  built  by  the  capital  of  the  country  through 
which  they  pass,  and  are  protected  and  controlled  by 
its  government. 

No  one  of  the  republics  to  the  south  of  us,  through 
whose  territory  it  was  proposed  to  build  a  canal,  could 
raise  the  capital  for  its  construction  or  insure  its 
protection  when  completed.  No  company  chartered 
by  one  of  these  governments  could  have  raised  the 
necessary  capital  without  some  further  guarantee. 
Hence  it  was  that  all  companies  organized  for  this 
purpose  had  to  secure  their  charters  from  some  more 
powerful  nation,  such  as  the  United  States  or  France, 
and  their  concessions  from  one  of  the  Central  Ameri- 
can states.  This  rendered  necessary  a  treaty  between 
the  state  granting  the  concession  or  right  to  construct 
a  canal  through  its  territory  and  the  state  chartering 
the  company.  The  claims  of  other  states  to  equality 
of  treatment  in  the  use  of  such  a  canal  constituted 
another  element  that  had  to  be  considered. 

With  the  establishment  of  the  independence  of  the 
Spanish-American  republics  the  question  of  the  con- 
struction of  a  ship  canal  across  the  isthmus  became 
a  matter  of  general  interest,  and  it  was  one  of  the 
proposed  subjects  of  discussion  at  the  Congress  of 
American  Republics  summoned  by  Bolivar  to  meet 
at  Panama  in  1826.  In  the  instructions  to  the  United 
States  commissioners  to  that  congress,  Mr.  Clay 
authorized  them  to  enter  into  the  consideration  of  that 
subject,  suggesting  that  the  best  routes  would  likely. 

147 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

be  found  in  the  territory  of  Mexico  or  of  the  Central 
RepubHc.  As  to  the  diplomatic  status  of  the  canal, 
he  said : 

If  the  work  should  ever  be  executed  so  as  to  admit  of  the 
passage  of  sea  vessels  from  ocean  to  ocean,  the  benefits  of  it 
ought  not  to  be  exclusively  appropriated  to  any  one  nation, 
but  should  be  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  globe  upon  the 
payment  of  a  just  compensation  or  reasonable  tolls.* 

In  1835,  and  again  in  1839,  the  United  States  Sen- 
ate passed  resolutions  authorizing  the  President  to 
enter  into  negotiations  with  ether  nations,  particularly 
Central  America  and  New  Granada,  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  by  treaty  either  individuals  or  companies 
who  might  undertake  to  open  communication  between 
the  two  oceans,  and  of  insuring  "  the  free  and  equal 
navigation  of  the  canal  by  all  nations."  Presidents 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren  both  commissioned  agents 
with  a  view  to  carrying  out  these  resolutions,  but  with- 
out success. 

While  a  prisoner  at  Ham  in  1845,  Prince  Louis 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  secured  from  the  government  of 
Nicaragua  a  concession  granting  him  power  to  organize 
a  company  for  the  construction  of  a  waterway  to  be 
known  as  "  Le  Canale  Napoleon  de  Nicaragua."  After 
his  escape  from  Ham,  he  published  in  London  a 
pamphlet  entitled  "  The  Canal  of  Nicaragua,  or  a 
Project  for  the  Junction  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Oceans  by  means  of  a  Canal."  ^ 

Although  the  United  States  government  was  a  party 
to  endless  negotiations  in  regard  to  an  inter-oceanic 
canal,  there  were  only  three  treaties  of  any  practical 


»  Report   of   International    American    Conference,    Vol.    IV    (Hist.    App.), 
p.    143- 

'  Snow:  "  Treaties  and  Topics  in  American  Diplomacy,"  p.  328. 


148 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

importance  prior  to  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, by  which  it  acquired  rights  and  assumed  obli- 
gations on  that  account.^  These  were  ( i )  the  treaty 
with  New  Granada  (Colombia)  of  1846;  (2)  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with  England  of  1850;  and 
(3)  the  treaty  with  Nicaragua  of  1867.  We  shall 
proceed  to  examine  these  in  detail. 

The  treaty  with  New  Granada  was  signed  at  Bo- 
gota, December  12,  1846,  and  ratified  by  both  govern- 
ments in  1848.  It  did  not  differ  materially  from  the 
general  draft  of  treaties,  except  in  the  thirty-fifth 
article,  which  was  of  a  special  character  and  related 
to  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  By  this  article  "  the  gov- 
ernment of  New  Granada  guarantees  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  that  the  right-of-way  or 
transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  upon  any  modes 
of  communication  that  now  exist  or  that  may  be  here- 
after constructed,  shall  be  open  and  free  to  the  gov- 
ernment and  citizens  of  the  United  States,"  for  the 
transportation  of  all  articles  of  lawful  commerce  upon 
the  same  terms  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  New 
Granada. 

And  in  order  to  secure  to  themselves  the  tranquil  and  con- 
stant enjoyment  of  these  advantages,  and  for  the  favors  they 
have  acquired  by  the  4th,  5th,  and  6th  articles  of  this  treaty, 
the  United  States  guarantee  positively  and  efficaciously  to 
New  Granada,  by  the  present  stipulation,  the  perfect  neu- 
trality of  the  before-mentioned  isthmus,  with  the  view  that 
the  free  transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may  not  be 
interrupted  or  embarrassed  in  any  future  time  while  this 
treaty  exists;  and,  in  consequence,  the  United  States  also 
guarantee,  in  the  same  manner,  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and 

*  Our  treaties  with  Mexico  and  Honduras,  although  covering  the  case 
of  canal  constructions,  were  of  no  practical  importance,  as  the  routes 
through   these   countries  were  not   feasible. 

149 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

property  which  New  Granada  has  and  possesses  over  the 
said  territory.* 

This  treaty  was  to  remain  in  force  for  twenty  years, 
and  then,  if  neither  party  gave  notice  of  intended  ter- 
mination, it  was  to  continue  in  force,  terminable  by 
either  party  at  twelve  months'  notice.  This  treaty 
was  in  full  force  when  the  Panama  revolution  of  1903 
took  place.  Under  the  protection  of  this  treaty  the 
Panama  Railroad  Company,  composed  mainly  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  secured  a  charter  from  New 
Granada,  and  between  1850  and  1855  constructed  a 
failroad  across  the  isthmus  along  the  line  of  the  pro- 
posed Panama  canal.  In  consequence  of  the  riot  at 
Panama  in  1856,  efforts  were  made  by  the  United 
States  to  modify  this  treaty  so  as  to  give  the  United 
States  greater  control  and  power  to  protect  the  means 
of  transit,  but  without  success.^  Other  attempts  to 
modify  it  in  1868  and  1870  likewise  failed,^  ( 

In  1862  the  Granadian  government,  through  its  rep- 
resentative at  Washington,  notified  the  United  States 
that  a  revolutionary  chief,  who  was  then  trying  to 
subvert  the  Granadian  confederation,  had  sent  an 
armed  force  to  occupy  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and 
the  government  of  Granada  called  upon  the  United 
States  to  enforce  its  guarantee.  Simultaneously  the 
same  information  was  received  from  the  United  States 
consul  at  Panama,  and  the  President  instructed  the 
United  States  naval  commander  at  that  port  to  pro- 
tect at  all  hazards  and  at  whatever  cost  the  safety  of 
the  railroad  transit  across  the  isthmus. 


*  Correspondence  in  relation  to  the  Proposed  Interoceanic  Canal,  the 
Gayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Government  Printing 
Office,   1885,  p.   5.     Referred  to  hereafter  as  "  Collected  Correspondence." 

*  Ibtd.,  pp.  23-27. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  27  and  40. 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  Granadian  government,  however,  was  not  satis- 
fied with  this  action,  and  urged  the  United  States  to 
land  a  body  of  troops  at  Panama,  suggesting  that  it 
consist  of  300  cavalry.  Under  the  circumstances, 
President  Lincoln  hesitated  to  take  such  action  with- 
out consulting  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  Mr. 
Seward  instructed  our  representatives  at  London  and 
Paris  to  seek  an  understanding  with  those  govern- 
ments in  regard  to  the  matter.    He  declared; 

This  government  has  no  interest  in  the  matter  different: 
from  that  of  other  maritime  powers.  It  is  willing  to  inter- 
pose its  aid  in  execution  of  its  treaty  and  for  the  benefit  of  all 
nations.  But  if  it  should  do  so  it  would  incur  some  hazard 
of  becoming  involved  in  the  revolutionary  strife  which  is 
going  on  in  that  country.  It  would  also  incur  danger  of 
misapprehension  of  its  object  by  other  maritime  powers  if  it 
should  act  without  previous  consultation  with  them.^ 

In  a  conference  between  Mr.  Adams  and  Lord  John 
Russell,  the  latter  declared  that  he  did  not  consider 
that  the  contingency  had  arisen  which  called  for  inter- 
vention; that  so  far  as  he  could  learn,  no  attempt  had 
been  made  to  obstruct  the  free  transit  across  the 
isthmus.  The  French  government  took  substantially 
the  same  view,*  In  questions  of  a  similar  nature  that 
arose  later,  the  attorney-general  of  the  United  States 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  guarantee  by  the 
United  States  of  Granadian  sovereignty  and  property 
in  the  territory  of  the  isthmus  was  only  against  for- 
eign governments,  and  did  not  authorize  the  United 
States  to  take  sides  with  one  or  the  other  party  in  the 
intestine  troubles  of  that  nation. 


^  Seward  to   Adams,  July   11,   1862. 

•  "  Collected  Correspondence,"  pp.   7  and  8 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

In  April,  1885,  the  Colombian  government,  which 
was  embarrassed  by  civil  war,  called  upon  the  United 
States  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  treaty  of  1846,  to 
secure  the  neutrality  and  sovereignty  of  the  isthmus. 
President  Cleveland  at  once  sent  a  body  of  troops  to 
the  isthmus  with  instructions  to  confine  their  action 
to  preventing  the  transit  and  its  accessories  from  be- 
ing interrupted  or  embarrassed.  As  soon  as  peace 
was  reestablished,  the  troops  of  the  United  States  were 
withdrawn.® 

Four  years  after  the  signature  of  the  above  treaty 
with  Colombia,  and  two  years  after  its  ratification  by 
the  Senate,  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  exe- 
cuted what  is  popularly  known  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  It  is  of  great  importance  to  understand  clearly 
the  circumstances  under  which  this  treaty  was  nego- 
tiated. 

For  very  obvious  reasons,  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
was  for  many  years  the  objective  point  of  all  canal 
schemes,  but  as  the  engineering  difficulties  of  this 
route  began  to  be  fully  appreciated,  attention  was 
directed  more  and  more  to  that  through  Nicaragua. 
The  occupation  by  Great  Britain,  under  the  assump- 
tion of  a  protectorate,  of  the  territory  about  the  mouth 
of  the  San  Juan  river,  which  belonged  to  Nicaragua 
and  Costa  Rica,  and  in  which  the  Atlantic  terminus 
of  the  canal  would  fall,  was  a  source  of  no  little  un- 
easiness and  perplexity  to  the  United  States.  In  June, 
1849,  Mr.  Hise,  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States 
in  Central  America,  negotiated  without  the  authoriza- 
tion or  knowledge  of  his  government,  a  treaty  with 


»  Mr.  Scruggs  to  Mr.  Bayard,  April  i6,  1885,  For.  Rel.,  also  "  Messages 
and  Papers  of  the  Presidents/'   Vol.    VIII,   p.   326. 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

Nicaragua  which  gave  the  United  States  exclusive 
rights  in  the  construction  of  a  canal  through  the  terri- 
tory of  that  state."  This  treaty  was  not  submitted 
"to  the  Senate,  but  was  made  use  of  in  the  negotia- 
tions that  were  opened  shortly  thereafter  with  Great 
Britain  for  the  purpose  of  ousting  her  from  her  posi- 
tion of  control  over  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan.  A 
few  months  later,  September  28,  1849,  ^^-  Squier 
signed  with  Honduras  a  treaty  which  ceded  Tiger 
Island,  in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  to  the  United  States, 
thus  giving  us  a  naval  station  on  the  Pacific  side  of 
the  isthmus.  This  treaty,  like  that  negotiated  by  Mr. 
Hise,  was  unauthorized  and  never  submitted  to  the 
Senate.^^  Both  treaties  were  used,  however,  in  bring- 
ing England  to  the  signature  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  This  activity  in  treaty-making  was  occasioned 
by  the  acquisition  of  California  and  the  rush  to  the 
gold  fields  by  way  of  the  isthmus. 

During  the  period  that  elapsed  between  Mr.  Ban- 
croft's withdrawal  from  London  and  Mr.  Lawrence's 
arrival  as  the  representative  of  the  United  States,  Mr. 
Clayton  instructed  Mr.  Rives,  who  was  on  his  way  to 
Paris,  to  stop  in  London  and  hold  a  conference  with 
Lord  Palmerston  on  the  Central  American  question. 
At  this  date  the  United  States  was  striving  simply 
for  equal  rights  in  any  waterway  that  might  be  opened 
through  the  isthmus  and  not  for  any  exclusive  rights. 
Mr.  Rives  declared  to  Lord  Palmerston  "  that  citizens 
of  the  United  States  had  entered  into  a  contract  with 
the  state  of  Nicaragua  to  open,  on  certain  conditions, 
a  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and   Pacific 


*•  "  Collected   Correspondence,"  p.   04. 
•Wfcjd.,  p.  14. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

oceans  by  the  river  San  Juan  and  the  Nicaragua  lake; 
that  the  government  of  the  United  States,  after  the 
most  careful  investigation  of  the  subject,  had  come 
undoubtedly  to  the  conclusion  that  upon  both  legal 
and  historical  grounds  the  state  of  Nicaragua  was  the 
true  territorial  sovereign  of  the  river  San  Juan  as 
well  as  of  the  Nicaragua  lake,  and  that  it  was,  there- 
fore, bound  to  give  its  countenance  and  support,  by 
all  proper  and  reasonable  means,  to  rights  lawfully 
derived  by  their  citizens  under  a  grant  from  that 
sovereign."    He  further  said  : 

That  the  United  States  would  not,  if  they  could,  obtain  any 
exclusive  right  or  privilege  in  a  great  highway,  which 
naturally  belonged  to  all  mankind,  for  they  well  knew  that 
the  possession  of  any  such  privilege  would  expose  them  to 
inevitable  jealousies  and  probable  controversies  which  would 
make  it  infinitely  more  costly  than  advantageous;  that  while 
they  aimed  at  no  exclusive  privilege  for  themselves,  they 
could  never  consent  to  see  so  important  a  communication 
fall  under  the  exclusive  control  of  any  other  great  commer- 
cial power;  that  we  were  far  from  imputing  to  Her  Britannic 
Majesty's  government  any  views  of  that  kind,  but  Mosquito 
possession  at  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  could  be  considered 
in  no  other  light  than  British  possession,  and  his  lordship 
would  readily  comprehend  that  such  a  state  of  things,  so  long 
as  it  was  continued,  must  necessarily  give  rise  to  dissatisfac- 
tion and  distrust  on  the  part  of  other  commercial  powers." 

The  negotiations  thus  opened  by  Mr.  Rives  were 
continued  by  Mr.  Lawrence  upon  his  arrival  in  Eng- 
land, but  were  shortly  thereafter  transferred  to  Wash- 
ington, where  Mr.  Clayton  succeeded  in  arranging 
with  Sir  Henry  Lytton  Bulwer  the  terms  of  a  con- 
vention which  was  signed  April  19,  1850.    The  inten- 

*'"  Collected  Correspondence,"  pp.   ii  and  12. 

154 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

tion  of  the  two  governments,  as  declared  in  the  pre- 
amble, was  to  set  forth  "  their  views  and  intentions 
with  reference  to  any  means  of  communication  by 
ship  canal  which  may  be  constructed  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  by  the  way  of  the  river 
San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  and  either  or  both  of  the  lakes 
of  Nicaragua  or  Managua,  to  any  port  or  place  on 
the  Pacific  ocean." 

By  the  first  article  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  bound  themselves  never  to  obtain  or  maintain 
any  exclusive  control  over  the  said  ship  canal;  never 
to  erect  or  maintain  any  fortifications  commanding 
the  same  or  in  the  vicinity  thereof,  or  to  colonize  or 
exercise  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the 
Mosquito  coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America;  and 
never  to  make  use  of  any  alliance,  connection  or  in- 
fluence with  any  of  these  states  to  obtain  any  unequal 
advantages  in  regard  to  commerce  or  navigation 
through  the  said  canal. 

The  second  article  provided  for  the  neutralization 
of  the  canal  in  the  event  of  war  between  the  contract- 
ing parties.  The  third  guaranteed  protection  for  the 
persons  and  property  of  the  parties  legally  undertak- 
ing the  construction  of  the  canal.  The  fourth  related 
to  gaining  the  consent  of  the  states  whose  territory 
the  canal  should  traverse.  The  fifth  article  provided 
for  the  neutralization  and  protection  of  the  canal  so 
long  as  it  was  managed  without  discrimination  against 
either  of  the  contracting  parties,  and  stipulated  that 
neither  of  them  would  withdraw  its  protection  with- 
out giving  the  other  six  months'  notice.  In  the  sixth 
article  the  contracting  parties  promised  to  invite  every 
state  with  which  they  were  on  terms  of  friendly  in- 

155 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

tercourse  to  accede  to  this  convention.  In  the  seventh 
article  the  contracting  parties  agreed  to  lend  their  sup- 
port and  encouragement  to  the  first  company  offering 
to  construct  the  canal  in  accordance  with  the  spirit 
and  intention  of  this  convention.  The  eighth  article 
was  of  special  importance.  It  declared  that  "  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  hav- 
ing not  only  desired,  in  entering  into  this  convention, 
to  accomplish  a  particular  object,  but  also  to  establish 
a  general  principle,  they  hereby  agree  to  extend  their 
protection,  by  treaty  stipulations,  to  any  other  prac- 
ticable communication,  whether  by  canal  or  railway, 
across  the  isthmus  which  connects  North  and  South 
America,  and  especially  to  the  interoceanic  communi- 
cations, should  the  same  prove  practicable,  whether  by 
canal  or  railway,  which  are  now  proposed  to  be  es- 
tablished by  the  way  of  Tehuantepec  or  Panama."  ^* 

Such  are  the  main  stipulations  of  the  celebrated 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  remained  in  force  until 
1901,  and  which  during  that  period  probably  called 
forth  more  discussion  than  any  treaty  which  the 
United  States  had  ever  signed. 

In  after  years  a  large  number  of  people  on  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic,  forgetting  the  object  and  aim  of 
the  treaty  and  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was 
negotiated,  thought  that  the  United  States  conceded 
too  much  and  violated  the  principle  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  giving  England  a  position  and  interest 
in  America  which  she  did  not  before  possess.  This 
opinion  was  held  by  some  prominent  statesmen  at  the 
time  the  treaty  was  negotiated,  notably  by  Buchanan, 
who  poured  forth  severe  criticism  and  ridicule  upon 

**"  Collected   Correspondence,"   p.  99. 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

it.     While  it  was  before  the  Senate  for  ratification, 
he  wrote  to  a  friend: 

If  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  can  succeed  in  having  the  two  first 
provisions  of  this  treaty  ratified  by  the  Senate,  he  will  de- 
serve a  British  peerage.  The  consideration  for  our  conces- 
sions is  the  relinquishment  of  the  claim  to  the  protectorate 
of  the  Mosquito  shore — so  absurd  and  unfounded  that  it  has 
been  ridiculed  even  by  the  London  Times.  Truly  Sir  Henry 
has  brought  this  claim  to  a  good  market  when  he  found  a 
purchaser  in  Mr.  Clayton.  The  treaty  altogether  reverses 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  establishes  it  against  ourselves 
rather  than  European  governments/* 

Let  us  see  what  the  interests  o«f  the  two  signatory 
powers  were  at  that  time  in  Central  America.  The 
United  States  had  recently  acquired  California  by 
the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  and  the  rapid  de- 
velopment of  the  Pacific  states  made  the  canal  a  ques- 
tion of  greater  importance  to  the  United  States  than 
ever  before.  The  great  transcontinental  railroads, 
which  some  fifteen  years  later  established  direct  over- 
land communication  with  the  Pacific  states,  were  then 
hardly  thought  of. 

England's  interest  in  the  canal,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  rather  a  prospective  one,  but  farsighted  as  usual, 
she  had  provided  for  future  contingencies  by  occupy- 
ing several  years  before,  under  the  guise  of  a  pro- 
tectorate over  the  Mosquito  Indians,  Greytown  at  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Juan  river,  the  Atlantic  terminus 
of  the  canal.  In  addition  to  the  Mosquito  coast,  Eng- 
land at  this  time  held  the  Bay  Islands  and  Belize,  or 
British  Honduras.    The  United  States,  it  is  true,  had 

**  Mr.  Buchanan  to  Hon.  John  A.  McClernand,  April  2,  1850,  "  American 
Hist.  Rev.,"  Oct.,  1899. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

never  recognized  the  claims  of  Great  Britain  to  domin- 
ion over  the  Mosquito  coast.  These  claims,  which 
dated  back  to  the  eighteenth  century,  when  British 
wood-cutters  in  search  of  mahogany,  and  smugglers 
entered  the  territory  occupied  by  the  Mosquito  Indians 
and  established  cordial  relations  with  them,  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  treaty  of  1786  with  Spain,  but  were 
revived  in  1841,  when  a  ship  of  war  was  sent  to  San 
Juan  del  Norte  to  announce  the  protection  of  England 
over  the  lands  of  the  Mosquito  king  and  to  raise  the 
Mosquito  flag."  In  1848  the  English  and  Indians 
drove  the  Nicaraguans  out  of  the  town  and  changed 
the  name  to  Greytown. 

The  United  States  uniformly  denied  the  rights  of 
the  Mosquito  king  to  sovereignty  over  the  district, 
and  consequently  the  pretensions  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Greytown  to  political  organization  or  power  derived  in 
any  way  from  the  Mosquitos.  In  his  instructions  to 
Mr.  Hise  soon  after  the  occupation  of  Greytown,  Sec- 
retary Buchanan  said: 

The  object  of  Great  Britain  in  this  seizure  is  evident  from 
the  policy  which  she  has  uniformly  pursued  throughout  her 
history,  of  seizing  upon  every  available  commercial  point  in 
the  world  whenever  circumstances  have  placed  it  in  her 
power.  Her  purpose  probably  is  to  obtain  control  of  the 
route  for  a  railroad  or  canal  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans  by  way  of  Lake  Nicaragua.  .  .  .  The  government 
of  the  United  States  has  not  yet  determined  what  course  it 
will  pursue  in  regard  to  the  encroachment  of  the  British 
government.  .  .  .  The  independence  as  well  as  the  inter- 
ests of  the  nations  on  this  continent  require  that  they  should 
maintain  an  American  system  of  policy  entirely  distinct 
from  that  which  prevails  in  Europe.  To  suffer  any  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  the  European  governments  with  the 

»•  "  Wharton's  Digest,"  Sec.  295- 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

domestic  concerns  of  the  American  republics,  and  to  permit 
them  to  establish  new  colonies  upon  this  continent,  would  be 
to  jeopard  their  independence  and  ruin  their  interests.  These 
truths  ought  everywhere  throughout  this  continent  to  be 
impressed  upon  the  public  mind;  but  what  can  the  United 
States  do  to  resist  such  European  interference  whilst  the 
Spanish-American  republics  continue  to  weaken  themselves 
by  civil  divisions  and  civil  war,  and  deprive  themselves  of 
doing  anything  for  their  own  protection. 

Whatever  the  rights  of  the  case,  Great  Britain  was 
in  actual  possession  of  the  Atlantic  terminus  of  the 
proposed  canal,  and  the  United  States  was  not  pre- 
pared forcibly  to  oust  her,  even  if  such  a  course  had 
been  deemed  advisable.  The  United  States  had  no 
rights  in  the  case  at  this  time  by  treaty  with  Nica- 
ragua or  otherwise,  none  of  the  statesmen  of  that  day 
having  been  broad  enough  in  their  views  or  bold 
enough  to  consider  the  territory  of  Nicaragua  as  "a 
part  of  the  coast-line  of  the  United  States."  All  that 
could  be  opposed  to  England's  de  facto  possession 
was  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  England  held  that  her 
claim  antedated  the  declaration  of  that  principle  of 
American  diplomacy.  Mr.  Clayton  cannot,  therefore, 
be  justly  charged  with  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, for  the  effect  of  the  treaty  was  to  leave  Eng- 
land weaker  territorially  on  this  continent  than  she  was 
before. 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  left  open  several  minor 
questions  that  required  adjustment  before  the  canal 
enterprise  could  be  pushed  forward  with  success. 
Chief  among  these  were  the  dispute  between  Nica- 
ragua and  Costa  Rica  in  regard  to  their  boundary 
line  and  the  controversy  between  Great  Britain  and 
Nicaragua  in  regard  to  the  territory  claimed  by  the 

159 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Mosquito  Indians,  In  April,  1852,  Mr.  "Webster  and 
Sir  John  Crampton  agreed  upon  a  basis  for  the  set- 
tlement of  Central  American  affairs,  and  drew  up  and 
signed  a  proposal  to  be  submitted  to  Nicaragua  and 
Costa  Rica.^*  This  proposed  basis  for  a  treaty  was 
rejected  by  Nicaragua,  which  left  the  questions  in- 
volved in  the  same  unsettled  position. 

A  much  more  serious  obstacle  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  objects  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  than 
the  failure  of  the  above  proposal  arose  from  the  wide 
divergence  of  opinion  between  the  British  and  Ameri- 
can governments  in  regard  to  its  interpretation.  The 
discussion  involved  two  principal  points  :  ( i )  Whether 
the  abnegatory  clauses  of  the  first  article  were  merely 
prospective  in  character  and  directed  against  future 
acquisitions  in  Central  America,  or  whether  they  re- 
quired Great  Britain  to  abandon  her  protectorate  over 
the  Mosquito  coast  at  once;  and  (2)  whether  the  Bay 
Islands  came  within  the  purview  of  the  treaty.  It 
was  expressly  stipulated  that  Belize  or  British  Hon- 
duras was  not  included  in  Central  America  and  there- 
fore not  affected  by  the  treaty  one  way  or  the  other. 
A  declaration  to  this  effect  was  filed  at  the  state  de- 
partment by  the  British  minister.  Sir  Henry  Bulwer. 
In  reply,  Mr.  Clayton,  after  conference  with  the  chair- 
man of  the  Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations, 
acknowledged  that  British  Honduras  did  not  come 
within  the  scope  of  the  treaty,  but  at  the  same  time 
carefully  refrained  from  affirming  or  denying  the 
British  title  to  that  settlement  or  its  alleged  dependen- 
cies.^^    This  left  open  the  question  as  to  whether  the 


•*  "  Collected   Correspondence,"   p    102. 

*''  Ibid.,  p.  234,  also  Wharton's  Digest,  Vol.   II,  p.   190. 

160 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

Bay  Islands  were  dependencies  of  Belize  or  of  the 
Republic  of  Honduras. 

Shortly  after  the  failure  of  the  Crampton-Webster 
proposals,  Great  Britain  took  advantage  of  the  un- 
certainty that  existed  in  regard  to  the  status  of  the 
Bay  Islands  and  by  a  formal  proclamation,  issued 
July  17,  1852,  converted  her  settlements  on  those 
islands  into  "  The  Colony  of  the  Bay  Islands."  When 
the  United  States  government  expressed  its  surprise 
at  this  proceeding,  the  British  government  replied  that 
the  Bay  Islands  were  dependencies  of  Her  Majesty's 
settlement  at  Belize  and  therefore,  by  explicit  agree- 
ment, not  within  the  scope  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty." 

In  1856  an  effort  was  made  to  terminate  the  diffi- 
culties arising  out  of  the  different  constructions  put 
upon  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by  the  negotiation 
of  a  supplementary  convention.  On  October  17  of 
that  year  a  treaty  was  signed  in  London  by  the  Ameri- 
can minister  and  Lord  Clarendon,  known  as  the  Dal- 
las-Clarendon treaty.  It  provided  (i)  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  British  protectorate  over  the  Mosquito 
Indians;  (2)  it  regulated  the  boundaries  of  the  Belize 
settlements  on  the  basis  of  a  compromise;  and  (3)  it 
provided  for  a  cession  of  the  Bay  Islands  to  Hon- 
duras, upon  condition  of  the  ratification  of  a  treaty 
already  negotiated  between  Great  Britain  and  Hon- 
duras, which  virtually  erected  an  independent  state 
of  the  islands,  exempt  in  many  particulars  from  the 
sovereignty  of  Honduras,  and  under  the  protectorate 
of  Great  Britain. 

The  first  two  clauses  were  acceptable  to  the  United 

**  "  Collected   Correspondence,"   p.   248. 

161 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

States  Senate,  but  it  was  deemed  proper  to  amend 
the  third  by  striking  out  all  that  part  of  it  which 
contemplated  the  concurrence  of  the  United  States  in 
the  British  treaty  with  Honduras,  and  simply  to  pro- 
vide for  a  recognition  by  the  two  governments  of 
the  sovereignty  of  Honduras  over  the  islands  in  ques- 
tion,^^  Great  Britain  rejected  this  amendment  and 
the  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty  fell  through.  Great  Bri- 
tain and  the  United  States  were  thus  thrown  back 
upon  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with  its  conflicting 
interpretations. 

In  October,  1857,  the  Piesident  was  notified  in- 
formally that  the  British  government  had  decided  to 
dispatch  Sir  Wm.  Ouseley,  a  diplomatist  of  well-rec- 
ognized authority  and  experience,  to  Central  America 
to  make  a  definite  settlement  of  all  matters  in  dispute 
between  the  United  States  and  England;  that  the 
efforts  of  the  new  plenipotentiary  would  be  directed 
to  those  objects  which  had  been  dealt  with  in  the 
Dallas-Clarendon  treaty  of  1856,  viz.,  the  cession 
of  the  Bay  Islands  to  Honduras,  the  substitution  of 
the  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua  for  the  protectorate  of 
England  over  the  Mosquitos  and  the  regulation  of  the 
frontiers  of  Belize;  that  it  was  the  intention  of  Her 
Majesty's  government  to  carry  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  into  execution  according  to  the  general  tenor 
of  the  interpretation  put  upon  it  by  the  United  States, 
but  to  do  so  by  separate  negotiation  with  the  Central 
American  republics,  in  lieu  of  a  direct  engagement 
with  the  federal  government.*" 

President  Buchanan  replied  that  he  would  be  satis- 


'"  "  Collected   Correspondence,"  p.   286. 
*"  Ibid.,  p.  262-263. 

162 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

fied  with  this  course  and  that  upon  receiving  an  offi- 
cial assurance  to  that  effect,  he  would  change  the 
character  of  the  message  he  had  already  prepared  for 
Congress.  On  the  30th  of  November,  1857,  the  Brit- 
ish government  submitted  to  the  United  States  the 
alternative  of  referring  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  to 
the  arbitration  of  any  European  power  which  the 
United  States  might  prefer  to  select  or  of  adjusting 
matters  by  negotiations  with  the  Central  American 
republics,  as  already  outlined  in  Sir  William  Ouseley's 
prospective  mission. ^^ 

At  this  stage  of  the  negotiations  matters  were  fur- 
ther complicated  (i)  by  the  negotiation  of  the  Cass- 
Yrissari  treaty  of  November  16,  1857,  between  the 
United  States  and  Nicaragua  for  protection  of  the 
transit  route  and  (2)  by  the  invasion  of  Nicaraguan 
territory  by  a  band  of  filibusters  under  General 
Walker,  bent  on  the  subversion  of  the  lawful  govern- 
ment of  the  country.  The  treaty  was  not  ratified, 
however,  and  the  Walker  expedition  was  arrested  by 
the  interposition  of  the  United  States  navy. 

The  United  States  government  not  having  given 
any  definite  answer  to  the  British  proposal  to  sub- 
mit the  treaty  to  arbitration,  the  British  government 
delayed  dispatching  Sir  William  Ouseley  on  his  mis- 
sion. In  the  negotiations  which  took  place  during 
this  delay  the  question  of  the  abrogation  of  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty  was  discussed  between  the  two  gov- 
ernments. In  his  message  of  December  8,  1857,  Pres- 
ident Buchanan  had  suggested  the  abrogation  of  the 
treaty  by  mutual  consent  as  the  wisest  course  that 
could  be  pursued  in  view  of  the  increasing  complica- 

**  Ibid.,  p.  276. 

J63 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERIM 

tions  to  which  the  varying  constructions  of  it  were 
giving  rise.  The  British  government  took  up  this 
suggestion  and  expressed  its  willingness  to  concur  in 
such  a  course,  but  also  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  initiative  should  be  taken  by  the  government  which 
was  dissatisfied  with  its  provisions. 

The  British  minister  was,  however,  directed  by  his 
government  to  make  it  perfectly  clear  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  that  to  abrogate  the  treaty 
was  to  return  to  the  status  quo  ante  its  conclusion  in 
1850;  that  Great  Britain  had  no  kind  of  jealousy  re- 
specting American  colonization  in  Central  America, 
and  did  not  ask  or  wish  for  any  exclusive  privileges 
whatever  in  that  quarter."  Finally,  Sir  William 
Ouseley  was  dispatched  on  his  mission  and  during 
the  years  1859  and  i860  succeeded  in  negotiating 
treaties  with  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and  Nicaragua, 
the  provisions  of  which  were  in  substantial  accord 
with  the  rejected  Dallas-Clarendon  treaty. ^^ 

The  treaty  with  Nicaragua  signed  at  Managua,  Jan- 
uary 28,  i860,  though  restoring  to  that  republic  nom- 
inal sovereignty  over  the  Mosquito  territory,  reserved 
to  the  Indians  the  right  of  retaining  their  own  cus- 
toms, assigned  boundaries  to  that  reservation  in  all 
probability  greatly  beyond  its  true  limits,  and  con- 
firmed grants  of  land  previously  made  in  that  terri- 
tory. Notwithstanding  these  facts,  in  his  annual  mes- 
sage of  December  3,  i860.  President  Buchanan  de- 
clared that  the  United  States  government  was  satis- 
fied with  the  final  settlement.    His  words  were  ; 


**  "  Collected   Correspondence,"  p.   a8o, 
'•  Ibid.,  pp.  294-302. 


164 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  discordant  constructions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
between  the  two  governments,  which  at  different  periods  of 
the  discussion  bore  a  threatening  aspect,  have  resulted  in  a 
final  settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to  this  government.** 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  negotiated  with  the 
expectation  that  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal  would 
rapidly  follow,  but  the  unfortunate  entanglements  that 
grew  out  of  the  variant  constructions  put  upon  that 
treaty  by  the  contracting  powers  deferred  to  an  in- 
definite period  the  accomplishment  of  the  object  it 
was  designed  to  promote.  By  the  time  these  differ- 
ences were  adjusted  the  attention  of  the  American 
public  was  centered  upon  the  first  throes  of  the  gigantic 
struggle  of  the  war  of  secession  and  the  canal  ques- 
tion was  for  several  years  completely  overshadowed. 
The  government  of  the  United  States  emerged  from 
that  struggle  with  larger  ideas  of  its  position  among 
the  powers  of  the  world  and  with  broader  views  of 
national  policy.  Mr.  Seward  gave  expression  to  that 
feeling  in  the  purchase  of  Alaska,  in  his  interposition 
in  Mexico  and  in  his  efforts  to  secure  a  position  for 
the  United  States  in  the  West  Indies.  In  order  to 
strengthen  the  position  of  the  United  States  he  wished 
to  purchase  Tiger  Island,  a  possession  of  Honduras 
in  Fonseca  bay  on  the  Pacific  coast.  As  this  island 
lay  in  Central  America,  Mr.  Seward  could  not  take 
any  steps  in  the  matter  without  the  consent  of  Great 
Britain,  on  account  of  the  renunciatory  clause  with 
respect  to  that  territory  in  the  Clayon-Bulwer  treaty. 
He,  therefore,  directed  Mr.  Adams,  April  25,  1866, 
to  sound  Lord  Clarendon  as  to  the  disposition  of  the 
British  government  toward  the  United  States  acquir- 

«i  "  M«^sages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  .Vol.  V,  P,  639i 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ing  a  coaling  station  in  Central  America.  In  this 
dispatch  we  find  the  first  suggestion  of  a  repudiation 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  a  special  and  not  a  general  contract,  and  that  the 
work  for  which  it  had  been  negotiated  had  never  been 
undertaken.    Mr.  Seward  uses  these  words : 

At  the  time  the  treaty  was  concluded  there  was  every 
prospect  that  that  work  would  not  only  soon  be  begun,  but 
that  it  would  be  carried  to  a  successful  conclusion.  For 
reasons,  however,  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  specify,  it 
never  was  even  commenced,  and  at  present  there  does  not 
appear  to  be  a  likelihood  of  its  being  undertaken.  It  may 
be  a  question,  therefore,  supposing  that  the  canal  should 
never  be  begun,  whether  the  renunciatory  clauses  of  the 
treaty  are  to  have  perpetual  operation.  Technically  speak- 
ing, this  question  might  be  decided  in  the  negative.  Still,  so 
long  as  it  should  remain  a  question,  it  would  not  comport 
with  good  faith  for  either  party  to  do  anything  which  might 
be  deemed  contrary  to  even  the  spirit  of  the  treaty." 

The  subject  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  Lord 
Clarendon  in  a  casual  way  by  Mr.  Adams,  but  it  was 
not  pressed  and  Mr.  Seward  refrained  from  disre- 
garding the  renunciatory  clause  of  the  treaty. 

In  1867,  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Nicaragua,  covering  the  case  of  an  interoceanic  canal, 
was  negotiated  and  ratified  by  both  parties.  It  granted 
to  the  United  States  the  right  of  transit  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  on  any  lines  of  communi- 
cation, natural  or  artificial,  by  land  or  by  water,  then 
existing,  or  that  might  thereafter  be  constructed,  upon 
equal  terms  with  the  citizens  of  Nicaragua,  and  the 
United  States  agreed  to  extend  its  protection  to  all 

*•  "  Collected  Correspondence,"  p.  303. 

166 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

such  routes  of  communication,  and  "  to  guarantee  the 
neutrality  and  innocent  use  of  the  same."  The  United 
States  further  agreed  to  employ  its  influence  with 
other  nations  to  induce  them  to  guarantee  such  neu- 
trality and  protection.^* 

This  treaty,  like  the  treaty  with  Colombia  of  1846 
and  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  contemplated  the  neu- 
tralization of  the  canal.  It  in  no  way  infringed  our  en- 
gagements with  England  under  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  but  in  providing  for  the  joint  guarantee  of 
other  powers,  was  in  accord  with  the  provisions  of 
that  treaty. 

In  1873,  Mr.  Hamilton  Fish  directed  General 
Schenck  to  remonstrate,  if  upon  investigation  he  found 
it  to  be  necessary,  against  British  encroachments  upon 
the  territory  of  Guatemala  as  an  infringement  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.^^ 

In  spite  of  the  doubts  expressed  by  Mr.  Seward  in 
the  dispatch  to  Mr.  Adams  above  quoted,  as  to  the 
perpetual  character  of  the  obligations  imposed  by  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  obligatory  force  of  that 
instrument  after  the  readjustment  of  i860  was  not 
seriously  questioned  until  interest  in  the  canal  ques- 
tion was  suddenly  aroused  anew  by  the  concession 
granted  by  Colombia  to  Lieutenant  Wyse  in  1878,  and 
the  subsequent  organization  of  a  French  construction 
company  under  the  presidency  of  Ferdinand  de  Les- 
seps,  the  promoter  of  the  Suez  canal. 

The  prospect  of  the  speedy  construction  of  a  canal 
under  French  control,  for  which  De  Lesseps'  name 
seemed  a  sufficient  guarantee,  produced  a  sudden  and 


*•  "  Collected  Correspondence,"  p.  132. 
*'  Ibid.,  pp.  310-12. 


167 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

radical  change  of  policy  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  In  a  special  message  to  Congress,  March  8, 
1880,  President  Hayes  made  the  following  statement 
of  what  he  conceived  to  be  the  true  policy  of  this 
country  in  regard  to  a  Central  American  canal: 

The  policy  of  this  country  is  a  canal  under  American 
control.  The  United  States  cannot  consent  to  the  sur- 
render of  this  control  to  any  European  power,  or  to  any 
combination  of  European  powers.  If  existing  treaties  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  other  nations,  or  if  the  rights 
of  sovereignty  or  property  of  other  nations  stand  in  the  way 
of  this  poUcy — a  contingency  which  is  not  apprehended — 
suitable  steps  should  be  taken  by  just  and  liberal  negotiations 
to  promote  and  establish  the  American  policy  on  this  sub- 
ject, consistently  with  the  rights  of  the  nations  to  be  affected 
by  it. 

The  capital  invested  by  corporations  or  citizens  of  other 
countries  in  such  an  enterprise  must,  in  a  great  degree,  look 
for  protection  to  one  or  more  of  the  great  powers  of  the 
world.  No  European  power  can  intervene  for  such  pro- 
tection without  adopting  measures  on  this  continent  which 
the  United  States  would  deem  wholly  inadmissible.  If  the 
protection  of  the  United  States  is  relied  upon,  the  United 
States  must  exercise  such  control  as  will  enable  this  country 
to  protect  its  national  interests  and  maintain  the  rights  of 
those  whose  private  capital  is  embarked  in  the  work. 

An  interoceanic  canal  across  the  American  isthmus  will 
essentially  change  the  geographical  relations  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  of  the  United  States,  and  between 
the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  will  be  the 
great  ocean  thoroughfare  between  our  Atlantic  and  our 
Pacific  shores,  and  virtually  a  part  of  the  coast-line  of  the 
United  States.  Our  merely  commercial  interest  in  it  is 
greater  than  that  of  all  other  countries,  while  its  relation 
to  our  power  and  prosperity  as  a  nation,  to  our  means  of 
defense,  our  unity,  peace,  and  safety,  are  matters  of  para- 
mount concern  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  No  other 
great   power    would,   under   similar    circumstances,    fail   to 

168 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

assert  a  rightful  control  over  a  work  so  closely  and  vitally 
affecting  its  interests  and  welfare. 

Without  urging  further  the  grounds  of  my  opinion,  I 
repeat,  in  conclusion,  that  it  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of 
the  United  States  to  assert  and  maintain  such  supervision 
and  authority  over  any  interoceanic  canal  across  the  isthmus 
that  connects  North  and  South  America  as  will  protect  our 
national  interests.  This  I  am  quite  sure  will  be  found  not 
only  compatible  with,  but  promotive  of,  the  widest  and  most 
permanent  advantage  to  commerce  and  civilization.^* 


The  message  itself  was  accompanied  by  a  report 
from  the  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Evarts,  in  which  he 
called  attention  to  the  mutual  engagements  entered 
into  between  the  United  States  and  Colombia  by  the 
treaty  of  1846  in  reference  to  a  transit  route  across 
the  isthmus  and  declared  that  the  guarantee  of  the 
neutrality  of  the  isthmus  and  of  the  sovereignty  of 
Colombia  over  the  same  would  be  a  very  different 
thing  when  the  isthmus  should  be  opened  to  the  in- 
terests and  ambitions  of  the  great  commercial  na- 
tions.^^ 

President  Garfield,  in  his  inaugural  address,  ap- 
proved the  position  taken  by  his  predecessor  on  the 
canal  question,^"  and  very  soon  after  assuming  the 
portfolio  of  state,  Mr.  Blaine  outlined  the  new  policy 
to  our  representatives  in  Europe,  cautioning  them, 
however,  against  representing  it  as  the  development 
of  a  new  policy  and  affirming  that  it  was  "  nothing 
more  than  the  pronounced  adherence  of  the  United 
States  to  principles  long  since  enunciated  by  the  high- 
est authority  of  the  government." 


*'  "  Messages  and   Papers  of  the  Presidents,"   Vol.   VII,  p.   s8S- 

*'"  Collected  Correspondence,"   p.   313. 

«'  "Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  Vol.  VIII,  p.  ii. 


169 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

This  dispatch  of  Mr.  Blaine  is  remarkable  for  sev- 
eral reasons,  but  chiefly  for  the  fact  that  it  com- 
pletely ignores  the  existence  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  there  being  no  allusion  to  that  celebrated  con- 
vention either  open  or  implied.  Aside  from  this  there 
are  three  points  to  be  noted.  In  the  first  place  Mr. 
Blaine  calls  attention  to  the  rights  and  duties  devolv- 
ing upon  the  United  States  from  the  treaty  with 
Colombia  of  1846,  and  states  that  in  the  judgment  of 
the  President  the  guarantee  there  given  by  the  United 
States  requires  no  reenforcement,  or  accession,  or 
assent  from  any  other  power;  that  the  United  States 
in  more  than  one  instance  had  been  called  upon  to 
vindicate  the  neutrality  thus  guaranteed;  and  that 
there  was  no  contingency,  then  foreseen  or  appre- 
hended, in  which  such  vindication  would  not  be  within 
the  power  of  the  nation. 

In  the  second  place,  Mr.  Blaine  declared  with  em- 
phasis that  during  any  war  to  which  the  United  Stages 
of  America  or  the  United  States  of  Colombia  might 
be  a  party,  the  passage  of  armed  vessels  of  a  hostile 
nation  through  the  canal  of  Panama  would  be  no 
more  admissible  than  would  the  passage  of  the  armed 
forces  of  a  hostile  nation  over  the  railway  lines  join- 
ing the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  shores  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  Colombia.  This  declaration  was  in  direct 
opposition  to  the  second  article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  Mr.  Blaine  then  proceeded  to  expatiate  upon 
the  remarkable  development  of  our  Pacific  slope  and 
the  importance  of  the  canal  in  facilitating  communica- 
tion between  our  Atlantic  and  Pacific  states,  alluding 
to  the  canal  in  this  connection,  in  the  very  apt  phrase 
of  President  Hayes,  as  forming  a  part  of  the  coast' 

170 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

line  of  the  United  States.  It  does  not  appear  to  have 
occurred  to  Mr.  Blaine  that  the  same  arguments  ap- 
plied with  equal  force  to  Great  Britain's  American 
possessions  to  the  north  of  us,  which  likewise  ex- 
tended from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  and  were  like- 
wise entering  upon  a  period  of  unusual  development. 

The  third  point  to  be  noted  in  the  dispatch  is  the 
statement  that  the  United  States  would  object  to  any 
concerted  action  of  the  European  powers  for  the  pur- 
pose of  guaranteeing  the  canal  or  determining  its 
status.^^  This  declaration  was  supposed  to  be  nothing 
more  than  a  reaffirmation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

A  copy  of  this  document  was  left  by  Mr.  Lowell  at 
the  British  foreign  office  on  the  12th  of  July,  1881. 
No  formal  notice  of  the  dispatch  was  taken  by  the 
British  government  until  November,  when  Lord  Gran- 
ville replied  that,  as  Mr.  Blaine  had  made  the  state- 
ment that  the  government  of  the  United  States  had 
no  intention  of  initiating  any  discussion  upon  this 
subject,  he  did  not  propose  to  enter  into  a  detailed 
argument  in  reply  to  Mr.  Blaine's  observations.  He 
wished,  however,  merely  to  point  out  that  the  position 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  with  reference 
to  the  canal,  irrespective  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
commercial  relations  of  the  former  power,  was  de- 
termined by  a  convention  signed  between  them  at 
Washington  on  the  19th  of  April,  1850,  commonly 
known  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  her  majes- 
ty's government  relied  with  confidence  upon  the  ob- 
servance of  all  the  engagements  of  that  treaty.'^ 

Before  this  reply  reached  Washington,  Mr.  Blaine 


•*  *'  Collected   Correspondence,"   pp.    322-326. 
•'Ibid.,   p.   326. 

171 


tJNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

had  again  taken  up  the  question  of  the  canal  in  a 
special  dispatch  of  November  19,  1881.  In  this  dis- 
patch he  addressed  himself  specifically  to  a  considera- 
tion of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  urged  upon  the 
consideration  of  the  British  government  modifications 
of  such  a  radical  character  as  to  amount  to  a  complete 
abrogation  of  the  treaty.  The  grounds  of  objection 
to  the  treaty  were  stated  in  full.  In  the  first  place 
it  was  declared  that  the  treaty  had  been  made  more 
than  thirty  years  before  under  exceptional  and  ex- 
traordinary conditions,  which  were  at  least  temporary 
in  their  nature  and  had  long  since  ceased  to  exist. 
The  remarkable  development  of  the  United  States  on 
the  Pacific  coast  since  that  time  had  created  new 
duties  and  responsibilities  for  the  American  govern- 
ment which  required,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Presi- 
dent, some  essential  modifications  in  the  treaty.  The 
objections  to  the  perpetuity  of  the  treaty  were  then 
stated  in  full.  First  and  foremost  was  the  objection 
that  the  treaty  by  forbidding  the  military  fortification 
of  the  proposed  canal  practically  conceded  its  control 
to  Great  Britain  by  reason  of  her  naval  superiority. 
The  military  power  of  the  United  States  in  any  con- 
flict on  the  American  continent  was  irresistible,  yet 
the  United  States  was  restrained  from  using  this 
power  for  the  protection  of  the  canal,  while  no  re- 
strictions could  be  placed  upon  the  natural  advantages 
that  England  enjoyed  in  this  regard  as  a  great  naval 
power.  A  more  serious  objection  to  the  treaty,  how- 
ever, was  urged  in  the  statement  that  it  embodied  a 
misconception  of  the  relative  positions  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  with  respect  to  interests  on  this 
continent.     The  United  States  would  not  consent  to 

172 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

perpetuate  any  treaty  that  impeached  *'  our  right  and 
long-established  claim  to  priority  on  the  American 
continent." 

In  the  third  place,  at  the  time  the  convention  was 
agreed  upon,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  were 
the  only  nations  prominent  in  the  commerce  of  Cen- 
tral and  South  America.  Since  that  time  other  nations 
not  bound  by  the  prohibitions  of  that  treaty  had  be- 
come interested  in  Central  America,  and  the  republic 
of  France  had  become  sponsor  for  a  new  canal  scheme. 
Yet  by  the  treaty  with  England  the  United  States  was 
prevented  from  asserting  its  rights  and  the  privileges 
acquired  through  treaty  with  Colombia  anterior  to  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  treaty  had  been  made  with 
the  implied  understanding  that  British  capital  would 
be  available  for  the  construction  of  a  canal.  That 
expectation  had  never  been  realized,  and  the  United 
States  was  now  able  to  construct  a  canal  without  aid 
from  outside  resources. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Blaine  proposed  several  modifi- 
cations of  the  treaty  which  would  leave  the  United 
States  free  to  fortify  the  canal  and  to  hold  political 
control  of  it  in  conjunction  with  the  country  in  which 
it  might  be  located. ^^ 

A  few  days  after  the  dispatch  was  written,  Lord 
Granville's  answer  to  Mr.  Blaine's  first  dispatch 
reached  Washington,  and  on  the  29th  of  November, 
Mr.  Blaine  wrote  a  second  dispatch  equally  volumin- 
ous with  the  one  of  November  19.  In  this  he  re- 
viewed the  discussions  which  had  taken  place  between 
1850  and  i860  in  regard  to  the  treaty  with  a  view  to 

••  "  Collected  Correspondence,"   pp.   327-332. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

showing  that  it  had  never  been  satisfactory  to  the 
United  States  and  had  been  the  cause  of  serious  mis- 
understanding. He  failed,  however,  to  make  mention 
of  the  settlement  of  i860  and  the  declaration  of  Presi- 
dent Buchanan  that  the  United  States  was  satisfied 
with  that  adjustment. 

The  full  reply  of  the  British  government  to  Mr. 
Blaine's  arguments  was  given  in  two  dispatches  dated 
respectively  January  7  and  14,  1882.  Lord  Granville 
took  exception  to  certain  conclusions  which  Mr.  Blaine 
had  sought  to  establish  by  analogy  with  the  conduct 
of  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  the  Suez  canal.  His 
lordship  fully  concurred  in  what  Mr.  Blaine  had  said 
as  to  the  unexampled  development  of  the  United  States 
on  the  Pacific  coast,  but  reminded  him  that  the  de- 
velopment of  her  majesty's  possessions  to  the  north 
of  the  United  States,  while  less  rapid,  had  been,  never- 
theless, on  a  scale  that  bore  some  relation  even  to 
that  of  the  Pacific  states.  In  the  view  of  her  majes- 
ty's government,  the  changes  desired  by  the  United 
States  would  not  improve  the  situation  as  regarded 
the  canal,  while  the  declaration  that  the  United  States 
would  always  treat  the  waterway  connecting  the  two 
oceans  "  as  part  of  her  coast-line  "  threatened  the  in- 
dependence of  the  territory  lying  between  that  water- 
way and  the  United  States. 

Her  majesty's  government  believed  that  the  only 
way  to  relieve  the  situation  was  to  extend  the  invita- 
tion to  all  maritime  states  to  participate  in  an  agree- 
ment based  on  the  stipulations  of  the  convention  of 
1850.''' 

The  task  of  replying  to  Lord  Granville's  two  dis- 

•*  "  Collected   Correspondence,"   pp.   340-352. 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

patches  fell  upon  Mr.  Blaine's  successor  in  the  State 
Department,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen.  Mr.  Frelinghuy- 
sen's  voluminous  dispatch  of  May  8,  1882,  reiterated 
in  the  main  the  arguments  advanced  by  Mr.  Blaine. 
He  adduced  evidence  at  great  length  to  try  to  show 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  a  special  contract 
for  the  accomplishment  of  a  specific  object,  which  had 
never  been  achieved,  and  was  no  longer  binding;  that 
Great  Britain  had  violated  the  treaty  by  converting 
her  settlement  of  British  Honduras  into  a  possession 
without  ever  receiving  the  assent  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  such  act  would  entitle  the  United  States  to 
renounce  the  treaty.  The  dispatch  was  further  char- 
acterized by  a  direct  appeal  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  these  words : 

The  President  believes  that  the  formation  of  a  protectorate 
by  European  nations  over  the  isthmus  transit  would  be  in 
conflict  with  a  doctrine  which  has  been  for  many  years 
asserted  by  the  United  States.  This  sentiment  is  properly 
termed  a  doctrine,  as  it  has  no  prescribed  sanction  and  its 
assertion  is  left  to  the  exigency  which  may  invoke  it.  It  has 
been  repeatedly  announced  by  the  executive  department  of 
this  government,  and  through  the  utterances  of  distinguished 
citizens ;  it  is  cherished  by  the  American  people,  and  has 
been  approved  by  the  government  of  Great  Britain. 

After  quoting  a  part  of  President  Monroe's  message 
of  December  2,  1823,  and  reviewing  the  circumstances 
under  which  it  was  delivered,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  said : 

Thus  the  doctrine  of  non-intervention  by  European  powers 
in  American  affairs  arose  from  complications  in  South 
America,  and  was  announced  by  Mr.  Monroe  on  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  official  representative  of  Great  Britain." 

""Collected    Correspondence,"    pp.    160-161. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

In  his  reply  of  December  30,  1882,  Lord  Granville 
proved  conclusively  that  Article  VIII.  of  the  treaty 
was  understood  by  the  American  government  during 
the  discussions  of  1850-1860  as  establishing  a  general 
principle  applicable  to  all  waterways  connecting  the 
two  oceans.  In  answer  to  the  second  point,  Lord 
Granville  adduced  the  notes  exchanged  between  Mr. 
Clayton  and  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  in  July,  1850,  which 
made  it  perfectly  clear  that,  in  the  understanding  of 
both  governments  at  that  time,  the  claims  of  Great 
Britain  to  Belize  or  British  Honduras  were  not  affected 
one  way  or  the  other  by  the  treaty.^^ 

In  a  later  dispatch,  August  17,  1883,  Lord  Gran- 
ville briefly  touched  upon  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's  ap- 
peal to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  reminding  him  very 
pertinently  that  neither  the  American  administration 
which  negotiated  the  treaty  nor  the  Senate  which 
ratified  it  considered  that  they  were  precluded  by  the 
utterances  of  President  Monroe  from  entering  into 
such  a  treaty  with  one  or  more  of  the  European 
powers.^' 

The  correspondence  on  the  treaty  closed  with  Mr. 
Frelinghuysen's  dispatch  of  November  22,  1883,  in 
which  he  reiterated  with  no  small  degree  of  bluntness 
and  pertinacity  the  arguments  of  his  earlier  dispatches. 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  designed  at  the  time 
of  its  execution  to  establish  a  permanent  principle  of 
control  over  interoceanic  communication  in  Central 
America.  No  provision  was  made,  as  in  most  treaties, 
for  its  abrogation,  and  the  American  government  could 
not  terminate  it  without  the  consent  of  Great  Britain 


»•  "  Collected   Correspondence,"  pp.   3S3-359- 
*^  Ibid.,  p.   364. 

176 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

for  fear  that  she  would  return  to  her  position  of 
vantage  at  the  time  the  treaty  was  made.  For  this 
reason,  while  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  claimed  that  the 
treaty  was  voidable,  he  did  not  actually  declare  it  void. 

Mr.  Blaine's  efforts  to  secure  a  modification  were 
the  result  of  the  development  of  a  new  policy  by  the 
United  States  and  the  arguments  presented  by  Mr. 
Blaine  and  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  in  support  of  this  policy 
were  disingenuous  and  flimsy.  It  may  be  safely  said 
that  no  state  papers  have  ever  emanated  from  our 
government  on  so  serious  a  question  equally  lacking 
in  logical  consistency  and  moral  force. 

The  result  was  that  Great  Britain  refused  to  consent 
to  a  modification  of  the  treaty  and  the  United  States 
saw  before  her  the  alternative  of  abiding  by  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  or  ultimately  resorting  to  war  with 
England. 

In  December,  1884,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  negotiated 
a  treaty  with  Nicaragua  providing  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  canal  by  the  United  States  to  be  under  the 
joint  ownership  and  protection  of  the  United  States 
and  Nicaragua.  The  United  States  also  guaranteed 
the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  Nicaragua.  When  Mr. 
Cleveland  became  president  this  treaty  was  still  be- 
fore the  Senate  for  consideration.  Mr.  Cleveland 
withdrew  the  treaty,  and  in  his  first  annual  message, 
December  8,  1885,  reverted  to  our  traditional  policy. 
He  declared  himself  opposed  to  entangling  alliances 
with  foreign  states  and  declared : 

Whatever  highway  may  be  constructed  across  the  barrier 
dividing  the  two  greatest  maritime  areas  of  the  world,  must 
be  for  the  world's  benefit,  a  trust  for  mankind,  to  be  removed 
from  the  chance  of  domination  by  any  single  power,  nor 

177 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

become  a  point  of  invitation  for  hostilities  or  a  prize  for 
warlike  ambition.'* 


No  discussion  as  to  the  validity  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulvver  treaty  took  place  between  the  two  govern- 
ments after  the  close  of  President  Arthur's  adminis- 
tration. Mr.  Cleveland's  message  above  quoted  was 
accepted  as  a  reaffirmation  of  the  treaty  on  the  part 
of  the  American  government. 

Upon  two  occasions  subsequently  questions  arose 
between  the  two  governments  involving  the  stipula- 
tions of  the  treaty.  In  1888,  and  again  in  1894, 
the  United  States  felt  called  upon  to  protest  against 
British  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  Mosquito 
coast.^^  The  ground  of  interposition  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain  was  alleged  to  be  found  in  the  treaty  of 
Managua,  signed  between  Great  Britain  and  Nica- 
ragua on  the  28th  of  January,  i860.  This  convention, 
it  will  be  remembered,  was  one  of  the  three  treaties 
entered  into  by  Great  Britain  with  Central  American 
republics  with  a  view  to  removing  the  causes  of  dis- 
pute in  the  construction  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  treaty  of  Managua  assigned  a  district  to  the 
Mosquito  Indians  within  the  limits  of  the  republic 
of  Nicaragua.  The  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua  over  the 
district  was  recognized,  but  the  Indians  were  secured 
in  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  their  own  domestic 
customs  and  regulations.  It  was  agreed,  however, 
that  nothing  in  the  treaty  should  prevent  the  Mos- 
quitos  at  any  subsequent  date  from  voluntarily  agree- 
ing  to   absolute   incorporation   with   the   republic   of 


"  "  Messages  and   Papers  of  the  Presidents,"   Vol.    VIII,  p.   327. 
»»  See  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  Phelps,  Nov.  23.  1888.     For.  Rel.,  1888,  Pt.  I, 
pp.   759-768. 


178 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

Nicaragua.  By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  the  protec- 
torate of  Great  Britain  over  the  Mosquito  coast  was 
to  cease  three  months  after  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions. 

In  reply  to  the  protest  of  1888,  Lord  Sahsbury  said 
that  her  majesty's  government  had  no  intention  to 
assert  a  protectorate  in  substance  or  in  form  over  the 
Mosquito  nation,  but  that  according  to  the  convention 
with  Nicaragua  of  i860,  Great  Britain  undertook  "to 
secure  certain  rights  and  privileges  to  the  Mosquito 
Indians,  and  in  the  event,  which  has  arisen,  of  the 
Mosquito  Indians  complaining  that  their  rights  are 
infringed  by  Nicaragua,  by  whom  is  remonstrance 
to  be  made  to  Nicaragua  unless  by  Great  Britain,  with 
whom  she  has  concluded  the  convention  in  ques- 
tion?"*" 

In  the  spring  of  1894,  yet  more  serious  trouble 
arose.  The  Mosquito  territory  was  invaded  by  the 
troops  of  Nicaragua  and  Bluefields  was  surrounded. 
The  British  consul  at  that  point  protested  against  this 
act  as  contrary  to  the  treaty  of  Managua.  The  pro- 
test being  unheeded,  a  force  of  troops  was  landed 
from  the  British  ship  Cleopatra  and  on  March  9,  the 
Nicaraguans  were  forced  to  retire.  Mr.  Bayard  was 
instructed  by  telegraph  "  to  ascertain  and  report  fully 
by  cable  the  occasion  for  this  action."  The  British 
government  disavowed  all  intention  of  violating  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  it  recognized  "  as  ex- 
tant and  in  full  force." 

In  July,  1894,  United  States  marines  were  landed 
at  Bluefields  to  protect  American  interests  and  to 
restore  order.     Later  the  British  government  assured 

*•  For.  Rel.,   1889,  P-  468. 

179 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Mr.  Bayard  that  its  action  had  been  wholly  uncon- 
nected with  any  political  or  conventional  question 
touching  the  Mosquito  reservation,  but  simply  to  pro- 
tect British  interests. 

By  a  convention  signed  November  20,  1894,  the 
Mosquito  Indians  surrendered  their  rights  under  the 
treaty  of  i860  and  were  incorporated  with  Nicaragua. 
This  voluntary  incorporation  took  away  all  further 
occasion  for  interposition  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
and  Mr.  Bayard  reported  that  it  was  received  with 
"  the  most  open  expression  of  satisfaction  at  the  for- 
eign office."  *^ 

The  attempts  of  Blaine  and  Frelinghuysen  to  bring 
about  a  modification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
were,  as  we  have  seen,  unsuccessful.  In  fact,  their 
only  effect  was  to  strengthen  the  British  government 
for  the  time  being  in  the  determination  to  hold  us 
more  strictly  to  the  terms  of  that  convention.  In  1896 
Secretary  Olney  in  a  review  of  the  situation  declared: 

Upon  every  principle  which  governs  the  relations  to  each 
other,  either  of  nations  or  of  individuals,  the  United  States  is 
completely  estopped  from  denying  that  the  treaty  is  in  full 
force  and  vigor.  If  changed  conditions  now  make  stipula- 
tions, which  were  once  deemed  advantageous,  either  inappli- 
cable or  injurious,  the  true  remedy  is  not  in  ingenious  at- 
tempts to  deny  the  existence  of  the  treaty  or  to  explain  away 
its  provisions,  but  in  a  direct  and  straightforward  application 
to  Great  Britain  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  whole  matter.** 

It  was  precisely  in  this  spirit  that  Secretary  Hay 
undertook  in  1899  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty  with  Eng- 
land.     The   original    draft   of   the   Hay-Pauncefote 

*' See  Foreign  Relations,  1894,  App.  i.  "Affairs  at  Bluefields,"  pp. 
S34-363- 

**  Senate   Doc.   No.    160,    Fifty-sixth    Cong.,   First   Sess. 

180 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

treaty,  signed  February  5,  1900,  provided  for  a  neu- 
tralized canal  and  drafted  for  its  control  rules  sub- 
stantially in  accord  with  the  Constantinople  conven- 
tion of  1888,  providing  for  the  regulation  of  the 
Suez  canal.  The  most  important  provision  of  the  new 
treaty  was  that  authorizing  the  United  States  to  con- 
struct and  to  assume  the  management  of  an  isthmian 
canal,  either  directly  or  through  a  company.  The 
United  States  Senate,  however,  amended  the  treaty 
in  three  important  particulars :  ( i )  by  declaring  that 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  thereby  superseded ; 
(2)  by  providing  that  the  restrictions  in  the  regula- 
tions governing  the  use  of  the  canal  should  not  apply 
to  measures  which  the  United  States  might  adopt 
for  its  own  defense  and  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
order  along  the  canal;  and  (3)  by  cutting  out  entirely 
the  article  providing  for  the  adherence  of  other 
powers.  The  British  government  refused  to  accept 
these  amendments,  and  a  year  elapsed  before  an  agree- 
ment was  finally  reached.^^  The  revised  treaty  which 
was  ratified  by  the  Senate  December  16,  1901,  was 
a  compromise  between  the  original  draft  and  the  Sen- 
ate amendments.  The  new  treaty  abrogated  in  ex- 
press terms  the  Clayton-Bulwer  convention,  and  pro- 
vided that  the  United  States  might  construct  a  canal 
under  its  direct  auspices,  to  be  under  its  exclusive 
management.  The  principle  of  neutralization  was 
nominally  retained,  but  under  the  sole  guarantee  of 
the  United  States,  with  power  to  police  the  canal, 
and  the  clause  of  the  first  draft  forbidding  fortifica- 
tions was  omitted.** 


*•  Moore,  "Digest  of  Int.   Law,"   Vol.   Ill,  p.  211. 
*•  Foreign    Relations,    1901,   p.    245- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  L-\TIN  AMERICA 

This  cx">n\'>endon  reino\ievi  the  principal  diplonutic 
obstacles  which  stoovi  in  the  way  of  constructing  a 
canal  through  the  isthmus.  For  sevenil  years  the 
United  Slates  had  been  in\-estigating  the  cc»st  of  con- 
structing a  canal  through  Nicaragua,  that  route  being 
the  one  which  had  always  been  considered  most  feasi- 
ble by  the  great  maiorit>-  of  American  engineers.  Two 
commissions,  one  in  1S05  and  another  in  iSo".  had 
reported  favorably  on  the  practicability  of  that  route. 
A  third  commission,  headed  by  Admiral  John  G. 
Walker,  was  appointed  under  act  of  March  3,  1S90, 
which  authorized  an  expendiaire  of  $i.cv\>.ooo  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  thorough  investigation  of  all 
available  routes.  \\*hile  the  Walker  commission  was 
carrying  on  investigations  in  Nicaragua,  at  Panama, 
and  along  the  Atrato  river,  the  \-arious  financial  in- 
terests concerned  in  the  choice  of  routes  were  actiN^ely 
at  work  in  \\"ashington,  each  tr^-ing  to  inrluence  Con- 
gress in  fa\x>r  of  its  particular  project.  The  New 
Panama  Canal  Company  had  secured,  at  the  time  of 
the  reorganization,  an  extension  of  its  concession  to 
October,  19CV4.  and  subsequently  another  concession 
to  October.  loio.  but  the  \-alidity  of  the  latter  arrange- 
ment was  in  doubt.  The  company  could  not  raise  the 
necessary  funds  to  continue  the  work  at  Panama  and 
was  therefore  threatened  with  the  forfeiture  of  its 
franchise  and  property.  It  concluded,  therefore,  that 
its  only  hope  lay  in  transferring  its  concession  and 
property  to  the  American  govenmient.  With  this  end 
in  view,  an  active  lobby  was  maintained  at  Washing- 
ton for  the  purpose  of  influencing  public  opinion  in 
favor  of  the  Panama  route. 

But  the  Panama  Compviny  had  a  powerful  rival 

1S2 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

in  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  which  held  a  charter 
from  Congress  and  had  secured  a  concession  from 
Nicaragua.  This  company  had  started  work  at  Grey- 
town  in  1890,  but  having  been  forced  from  lack  of 
funds  to  stop  work  in  1893,  was  now  urging  Con- 
gress to  make  its  enterprise  a  national  one.  It  found 
a  ready  champion  in  Senator  Morgan  of  Alabama, 
who  had  for  years  taken  a  lively  interest  in  the  canal 
question  and  who  had  strong  convictions  as  to  the 
superiority  of  the  Nicaragua  route.  In  1900  Nica- 
ragua declared  the  concession  of  the  Maritime  Canal 
Company  null  and  void,  and  granted  a  new  con- 
eession  to  a  group  of  New  York  capitalists  known 
as  the  Grace-Eyre-Cragin  Syndicate.  The  Maritime 
Canal  Company,  however,  refused  to  abandon  its 
claims,  and  a  contest  between  the  two  concerns  was 
carried  to  the  lobbies  of  Congress.  The  opposition  of 
the  transcontinental  railroads  to  a  canal  at  either  point 
brought  into  play  another  set  of  powerful  interests, 
usually  arrayed  against  the  plan  which  appeared  for 
the  time  being  most  likely  to  succeed.*^ 

On  November  16,  1901,  the  Walker  commission 
after  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  Nicaragua  and 
Panama  routes  made  its  report.  It  estimated  the  cost 
of  construction  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  at  $189,864,062, 
and  the  cost  of  completing  the  Panama  canal  at  $144,- 
233,358.  To  this  latter  sum  had  to  be  added  the  cost 
of  acquiring  the  rights  and  property  of  the  French 
company,  which  had  stated  to  the  commission  that  it 
estimated  its  interests  at  $109,141,500,  making  the 
total  cost  of  the  Panama  canal  $253,374,858.  The 
commission  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  interests  of 

*•  Joha»on,  "  Four  Centuries  of  the  PaiunM  Canal,"  Chap.  VIII, 

183 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  French  company  were  not  worth  over  $40,000,000. 
In  conclusion  the  report  stated: 

After  considering  all  the  facts  developed  by  the  investiga- 
tions made  by  the  commission  and  the  actual  situation  as  it 
now  stands,  and  having  in  view  the  terms  offered  by  the  New 
Panama  Company,  this  commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  the 
most  practicable  and  feasible  route  for  an  isthmian  canal,  to 
be  under  the  control,  management,  and  ownership  of  the 
United  States,  is  that  known  as  the  Nicaragua  route.** 

A  bill  was  promptly  introduced  into  the  House  of 
Representatives  by  Mr.  Hepburn  providing  for  the 
construction  of  the  canal  through  Nicaragua,  and  on 
January  9,  1902,  this  bill  passed  the  House  by  the 
almost  unanimous  vote  of  308  to  2.  The  report  of 
the  commission  had  meanwhile  created  great  conster- 
nation among  the  stockholders  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company,  and  on  January  4,  1902,  a  definite 
offer  to  sell  out  to  the  United  States  at  $40,000,000 
was  made  to  the  commission  by  cable.  On  January  18, 
the  commission  filed  a  supplementary  report  which 
recommended  the  adoption  of  the  Panama  route  in- 
stead of  that  through  Nicaragua. 

When  the  Hepburn  bill  came  up  for  discussion  in 
the  Senate,  the  situation  had  thus  been  radically 
changed,  and  a  long  debate  ensued  as  to  the  relative 
merits  of  the  two  routes.  Senator  Morgan  continued 
to  fight  for  Nicaragua  as  the  traditional  American 
route,  declaring  that  the  Panama  Company  could  not 
give  a  valid  transfer  of  its  property  and  interests. 
But  this  objection  was  cleverly  met  by  Senator 
Spooner,  who  offered  an  amendment,  which  was  vir- 

*«  Report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  (Sen.  Doc.  No.  54,  Fifty- 
seventH  CoQg.,  First  Sess.). 

184 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

tually  a  substitute,  authorizing  the  President  to  ac- 
quire the  rights  and  property  of  the  French  company 
at  a  cost  not  exceeding  $40,000,000;  to  acquire  from 
the  RepubHc  of  Colombia,  upon  such  terms  as  he 
might  deem  reasonable,  perpetual  control  of  a  strip 
of  land,  not  less  than  six  miles  in  width,  extending 
from  the  Caribbean  Sea  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  with 
jurisdiction  over  said  strip;  and  to  proceed  as  soon 
as  these  rights  were  acquired,  to  construct  a  canal. 
But  should  the  President  be  unable  to  obtain  a  satis- 
factory title  to  the  property  of  the  French  company 
and  the  control  of  the  necessary  strip  of  land  from 
the  Republic  of  Colombia  "  within  a  reasonable  time 
and  upon  reasonable  terms,"  then  he  was  instructed 
to  secure  control  of  the  necessary  strip  through  Nica- 
ragua and  to  proceed  to  construct  a  canal  there.  The 
bill  as  amended  passed  the  Senate  June  19,  1902,  by 
a  vote  of  6y  to  6.  The  House  at  first  refused  to  con- 
cur in  the  Spooner  amendment,  but  after  a  conference 
it  finally  gave  way  and  the  measure  was  adopted  by 
a  vote  of  260  to  8.  The  act  was  signed  by  President 
Roosevelt  June  28.*^ 

Attorney-General  Knox  was  sent  to  Paris  to  make 
a  thorough  investigation  of  the  affairs  of  the  Panama 
Company.  He  reported  that  it  could  give  a  clear  title. 
The  next  step  was  to  secure  a  right  of  way  through 
Colombia.  After  considerable  delay  Secretary  Hay 
and  Mr.  Herran,  the  Colombian  charge  d'affaires, 
signed,  January  22,  1903,  a  canal  convention,  by  the 
terms  of  which  the  United  States  agreed  to  pay  Colom- 
bia $10,000,000  in  cash  and  an  annuity  of  $250,000 
for  the  lease  of  a  strip  of  land  six  miles  wide  across 

*'  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol.  XXXII,  Pt  I,  p.  481. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  isthmus.  Objection  was  raised  to  this  treaty 
because  it  failed  to  secure  for  the  United  States  full 
governmental  control  over  the  canal  zone,  but  it  was 
considered  the  best  that  could  be  gotten  and  it  was 
ratified  by  the  United  States  Senate  March  17,  1903. 

The  Colombian  Senate,  however,  did  not  regard  the 
treaty  with  favor.  They  felt  that  Panama  was  their 
greatest  national  asset,  and  they  knew  perfectly  well 
that  in  spite  of  threats  to  the  contrary  President  Roose- 
velt was  determined  not  to  adopt  the  alternative  of 
the  Spooner  amendment  and  go  to  Nicaragua.  After 
discussing  the  treaty  for  nearly  two  months,  they 
finally  rejected  it  August  12  by  the  unanimous  vote 
of  all  the  senators  present.*^  They  probably  thought 
that  they  could  get  better  terms  from  the  United  States 
and  particularly  that  they  might  reserve  a  fuller 
measure  of  sovereignty  over  the  isthmus.  President 
Roosevelt  declared  that  the  action  of  the  Colombian 
Senate  was  due  to  an  "  anti-social  spirit "  and  to  the 
cupidity  of  the  government  leaders,  who  merely 
wished  to  wait  until  they  could  confiscate  the  $40,000,- 
000  worth  of  property  belonging  to  the  French  com- 
pany and  then  sell  out  to  the  United  States.  This  view 
is  not  borne  out  by  the  dispatches  of  Mr.  Beaupre, 
the  American  minister,  who  repeatedly  warned  Sec- 
retary Hay  that  there  was  a  "  tremendous  tide  of 
public  opinion  against  the  canal  treaty,"  which  even 
the  Colombian  government  could  not  ignore.  The 
charge  of  bad  faith  against  Colombia  does  not  come 
in  good  grace  from  a  country  whose  constitution  also 
requires  the  ratification  of  treaties  by  the  Senate. 

As  soon  as  the  Hay-Herran  convention  was  rejected 

i*  Senate  Doc.  No.  51,  Fifty-eighth  Cong.,  Second  Sess.,  p.  56. 

186 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

by  the  Colombian  Senate,  the  advocates  of  the  Nica- 
ragua route  began  to  take  courage  and  to  demand 
that  as  the  "  reasonable  time  "  allowed  in  the  Spooner 
act  for  the  President  to  acquire  the  right  of  way 
through  Panama  had  expired,  it  was  now  his  duty  to 
adopt  the  Nicaragua  route.  The  directors  of  the 
French  company  were  again  in  a  state  of  consterna- 
tion. If  they  could  not  sell  to  the  United  States 
they  would  have  to  sacrifice  their  property  entirely, 
or  sell  to  some  other  purchaser  at  a  lower  figure.  It 
was  rumored  that  Germany  was  willing  to  buy  their 
interests.  The  directors  of  the  company  were  so 
completely  demoralized  that  William  Nelson  Cromwell, 
their  American  attorney,  hastened  to  Paris  to  dissuade 
them  from  taking  any  rash  step.  The  rejection  of 
the  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  a  great  disappointment 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  isthmus,  who  considered  this 
action  a  sacrifice  of  their  interests,  and  some  of  the 
foremost  citizens  conferred  with  the  American  agent 
of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  as  to  the  advisa- 
bility of  organizing  a  revolution.  Before  taking  any 
step  in  this  direction,  it  was  considered  advisable  to 
send  one  of  their  number  to  the  United  States,  and 
Dr.  Amador  was  selected  for  this  mission.  He  had 
conferences  with  William  Nelson  Cromwell  and  with 
Secretary  Hay.  The  latter  merely  outlined  what  he 
considered  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  United  States 
under  the  treaty  of  1846,  but  refused  of  course  to 
commit  the  government  to  a  definite  support  of  the 
revolutionary  project.  Amador  was  somewhat  dis- 
couraged at  the  result  of  his  conference  with  Hay, 
but  his  hopes  were  revived  by  the  •  sudden  arrival 
of  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla,  the  former  chief  engineer 

187 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  the  French  company,  who  entered  with  enthusiasm 
into  the  revolutionary  scheme.** 

The  Colombian  Congress  adjourned  October  30 
without  any  reconsideration  of  the  treaty,  and  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  at  once  ordered  the  Boston,  Dixie,  At- 
lanta, and  Nashville  to  proceed  within  easy  reach  of 
the  isthmus.  Their  commanders  received  orders  to 
keep  the  transit  open  and  to  "  prevent  the  landing  of 
any  armed  force  with  hostile  intent,  either  govern- 
ment or  insurgent,  at  any  point  within  fifty  miles  of 
Panama."  The  Nashznlle  arrived  off  Colon  Novem- 
ber 2.  It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  these  measures 
created  a  situation  very  favorable  to  revolution. ^° 

The  revolutionists  had  been  greatly  disappointed 
at  Dr.  Amador's  failure  to  get  a  definite  promise  of 
support  from  the  American  government,  but  their 
spirits  revived  when  they  learned  of  the  presence 
of  American  war  vessels.  Still  they  were  slow  in 
taking  advantage  of  their  opportunities  and  the  gov- 
ernment at  Washington  was  growing  impatient.  At 
3.40  p.  M.  November  3  the  following  dispatch  was 
sent  to  the  American  consuls  at  Panama  and  Colon : 
"  Uprising  on  isthmus  reported.  Keep  Department 
promptly  and  fully  informed,  Loomis,  Acting."  At 
8.15  a  reply  was  received  from  the  consul  at  Panama: 
"  No  uprising  yet.  Reported  will  be  in  the  night. 
Situation  is  critical."  At  9  p.m.  a  second  dispatch 
was  received  from  the  same  source :  "  Uprising  oc- 
curred to-night,  6;  no  bloodshed.  Army  and  navy 
officials  taken  prisoners.  Government  will  be  organ- 
ized to-night."  " 

*•  Johnson,   "  Four  Centuries  of  the  Panama  Canal,"  pp.   162-171. 
••  Senate  Doc.   No.   53,   Fifty-eighth  Cong.,   Second  Sesfi. 
"■  House  Doc.   No.  8,   Fifty-eighth   Cong.,   First  Sess. 

188 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

Before  the  Nashville  received  the  order  to  prevent 
the  landing  of  armed  forces,  450  Colombian  troops 
arrived  at  Colon.  The  principal  officers  were  pro- 
vided with  a  special  train  to  take  them  across  the 
isthmus  to  Panama.  When  they  arrived  they  were 
seized  by  the  revolutionary  leaders  and  locked  up  for 
safe-keeping,  while  the  railroad  officials  saw  to  it 
that  there  were  no  trains  for  their  troops  to  use. 
The  next  day  Commander  Hubbard  landed  fifty  ma- 
rines from  the  Nashville  at  Colon,  and  a  day  later 
the  officer  in  charge  of  the  Colombian  forces  was 
persuaded  by  a  generous  bribe  to  reembark  his  troops 
and  leave.  Events  continued  to  follow  one  another 
with  startling  rapidity.  On  the  6th  the  de  facto 
government  was  recognized  and  a  week  later  Bunau- 
Varilla  was  received  by  President  Roosevelt  as  envoy 
extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama.  Such  hasty  recognition  of  a  new 
government  was  of  course  without  precedent  in  the 
annals  of  American  diplomacy,  and  it  naturally  con- 
firmed the  rumor  that  the  whole  affair  had  been 
prearranged.  On  October  10  President  Roosevelt 
had  written  a  personal  letter  to  Dr.  Albert  Shaw,  edi- 
tor of  the  Review  of  Reviews,  who  was  a  strong  ad- 
vocate of  the  Panama  route,  in  which  he  said : 

Privately,  I  freely  say  to  you  that  I  should  be  delighted  if 
Panama  were  an  independent  state,  or  if  it  made  itself  so  at 
this  moment ;  but  for  me  to  say  so  publicly  would  amount  to 
an  instigation  of  a  revolt,  and  therefore  I  cannot  say  it." 

This  letter  throws  an  interesting  light  on  an  article 
in  the  Review  of  Reviews  for  November  of  the  same 

'^  Literary   Digest,   October   29,    1904. 

189 


^UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

year  in  which  Dr.  Shaw  discussed  the  question, 
"  What  if  Panama  should  Revolt?  "  and  outlined  with 
remarkable  prophetic  insight  the  future  course  of 
events. 

In  his  annual  message  of  December  7,  1903,  the 
President  discussed  the  Panama  revolution  and  under- 
took to  justify  his  course  under  the  treaty  of  1846. 
This  message  failed  to  allay  public  criticism,  and  on 
January  4,  1904,  he  sent  a  special  message  to  Con- 
gress in  defense  of  his  action.  He  held  that  Colombia 
was  not  entitled  "  to  bar  the  transit  of  the  world's 
traffic  across  the  isthmus,"  and  that  the  intervention 
of  the  United  States  was  justified,  (i)  by  our  treaty 
rights,  (2)  by  our  international  interests,  and  (3)  by 
the  interests  of  "  collective  civiUzation."  The  "  legal  " 
argument  in  this  message,  if  we  may  dignify  it  by 
that  name,  is  reported  to  have  been  prepared  by  Root 
and  Knox,  both  at  that  time  members  of  the  Cabinet. 
Several  years  later,  after  Mr.  Roosevelt  had  retired 
from  the  presidency,  he  expressed  the  real  truth  in  a 
public  speech  when  he  said : 

If  I  had  followed  traditional  conservative  methods  I  should 
have  submitted  a  dignified  state  paper  of  probably  two 
hundred  pages  to  the  Congress  and  the  debate  would  be 
going  on  yet,  but  I  took  the  Canal  zone  and  let  Congress  de- 
bate, and  while  the  debate  goes  on  the  canal  does  also. 

The  reason  why  the  President  did  not  wish  the 
matter  to  go  before  Congress  again  was  that  he 
had  decided  upon  the  Panama  route,  and  he  knew 
that  when  Congress  convened  in  December,  the  situ- 
ation remaining  unchanged,  action  would  be  taken 
to  compel  him  to  adopt  the  alternative  of  the  Spooner 

190 


HISTORY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

amendment  and  go  to  the  Nicaragua  route.  His  oth 
ject  in  the  hasty  recognition  of  the  Panama  revolu- 
tion was  therefore  to  make  the  Panama  route  an  ac- 
complished fact  before  Congress  should  meet.  This 
was  the  attitude  definitely  assumed  in  the  message 
of  January  4,  1904,  in  the  course  of  which  he  said: 

The  only  question  now  before  us  is  that  of  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty.  For  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  a  failure  to 
ratify  the  treaty  will  not  undo  what  has  been  done,  will  not 
restore  Panama  to  Colombia,  and  will  not  alter  our  obliga- 
tion to  keep  the  transit  open  across  the  Isthmus,  and  to  pre- 
vent any  outside  power  from  menacing  this  transit. 

The  treaty  referred  to  was  the  convention  with 
Panama  which  had  been  signed  November  18,  1903, 
and  which  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  February  23, 
1904,  by  a  vote  of  66  to  14.  By  the  terms  of  this 
agreement  the  United  States  guaranteed  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Panama  Republic,  and  agreed  to  pay  the 
Panama  Republic  a  sum  of  $10,000,000  upon  the  ex- 
change of  ratifications  and  an  annual  rental  of  $250,- 
000  a  year  beginning  nine  years  thereafter.  Panama 
on  her  part  granted  to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity 
a  zone  of  land  ten  miles  wide  for  the  construction 
of  a  canal,  the  United  States  receiving  as  full  power 
and  authority  over  this  strip  and  the  waters  adjacent 
as  if  it  were  the  sovereign  of  the  said  territory.®'  The 
construction  of  the  canal  was  at  once  undertaken  and 
the  work  was  carried  through  successfully  by  General 
Goethals  and  a  corps  of  army  engineers.  It  was 
opened  to  commerce  August  15,  1914,  though  it  was 
not  completed  at  that  time  and  trafific  was  subsequently 
interrupted  by  landslides. 

'*  Foreign  Relations,  1904,  p.  543. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Colombia  naturally  felt  aggrieved  at  the  course 
pursued  by  President  Roosevelt  and  refused  to  rec- 
ognize the  Republic  of  Panama.  She  objected  to  his 
interpretation  of  the  convention  of  1846.  In  this 
convention  the  United  States  pledged  itself  to  keep 
the  isthmian  transit  open  and  guaranteed  Colombia's 
sovereignty  over  the  same.  This  treaty  established 
an  obligation  to  Colombia  alone,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
accept  the  President's  view  that  it  established  an 
obligation  to  the  world  at  large  against  Colombia. 
Colombia  demanded  that  the  whole  question  be  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration.  As  the  United  States  had  al- 
ways held  the  ground  that  disputes  arising  out  of  the 
interpretation  of  treaties  should  be  settled  by  arbitra- 
tion, it  was  inconsistent  for  the  United  States  to  re- 
fuse to  arbitrate.  But  President  Roosevelt  did  refuse. 
The  Panama  episode  created  strained  relations  with 
Colombia  and  made  a  very  bad  impression  throughout 
Latin  America.  The  United  States  has  since  been 
eyed  with  suspicion  by  its  weaker  Southern  neighbors. 
The  Taft  and  Wilson  administrations  both  tried  to 
appease  Colombia  by  a  money  payment,  but  this  sub- 
ject will  be  discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 


192 


CHAPTER  V 

French  Intervention  in  Mexico 

The  attempt  of  Louis  Napoleon  to  establish  a  Euro- 
pean monarchy  in  Mexico  under  the  tutelage  of  France 
was  the  most  serious  menace  that  republican  institu- 
tions in  the  new  world  have  had  to  face  since  the 
schemes  of  the  Holy  Alliance  were  checked  by  Monroe 
and  Canning.  The  thwarting  of  that  attempt  may  be 
accounted  one  of  the  greatest  triumphs  of  American 
diplomacy.  The  internal  disorders  common  to  South 
and  Central  American  republics  have  always  been  a 
fruitful  source  of  embarrassment  to  the  United  States, 
on  account  of  the  liability  to  European  intervention  to 
which  these  governments  continually  subject  themselves 
in  such  periods  by  their  open  and  flagrant  disregard 
of  international  obligations.  Of  no  country  is  this 
statement  truer  than  of  Mexico,  where  the  well-nigh 
interminable  strife  of  parties  gave  rise  between  the 
years  1821  and  1857  to  thirty-six  different  govern- 
ments. In  1857  a  favorable  change  occurred  in  the 
affairs  of  the  republic.  A  constituent  congress,  elected 
by  the  people  of  the  different  states,  framed  and 
adopted  a  republican  constitution  which  promised 
better  things  for  the  future.  Under  the  provisions  of 
this  constitution  an  election  was  held  in  July  (1857) 
and  General  Comonfort  chosen  president  almost  with- 
out opjiosition.  His  term  of  office  was  to  begin  De- 
cember I,  1857,  and  to  continue  four  years.     Within 

193 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

one  brief  month,  however,  President  Comonfort  was 
driven  from  the  capital,  and  ultimately  from  the  coun- 
try, by  an  uprising  headed  by  General  Zuloaga.  As 
soon  as  Comonfort  abandoned  the  presidency,  General 
Benito  Juarez,  the  president  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Justice,  became  according  to  the  constitution,  the  presi- 
dent de  jure  of  the  republic  for  the  remainder  of  the 
unexpired  term,  that  is,  until  December  i,  1861.  Gen- 
eral Zuloaga  had,  however,  assumed  the  name  of  presi- 
dent, with  indefinite  powers,  and  the  entire  diplomatic 
corps,  including  the  minister  of  the  United  States,  had 
recognized  his  government.  But  Zuloaga  was  speedily 
expelled,  and  the  supreme  power  seized  by  General 
Miramon,  the  head  of  the  church  party,  whom  the  dip- 
lomatic corps  likewise  recognized.  Meanwhile  Juarez, 
the  constitutional  president,  had  proceeded  to  Vera 
Cruz,  where  he  put  his  administration  into  successful 
operation. 

For  several  months,  Mr.  John  Forsyth,  the  Ameri- 
can minister,  continued  at  the  city  of  Mexico  in  the 
discharge  of  his  duties.  In  June,  1858,  however,  he 
suspended  his  diplomatic  connection  with  the  Mira- 
mon government.  Our  relations,  which  had  been  bad 
under  former  governments,  were  now  rendered  almost 
intolerable  under  that  of  Miramon  by  outrages  towards 
American  citizens  and  personal  indignities  to  Mr.  For- 
syth himself.  His  action  was  approved  by  President 
Buchanan,  and  he  was  directed  to  return  to  the  United 
States.  All  diplomatic  intercourse  was  thus  termi- 
nated with  the  government  of  Miramon,  but  as  yet 
none  was  established  with  the  Juarez  government.  The 
ultimate  success  of  the  latter  became,  however,  so 
probable  that  the  following  year  the  President  sent 

194 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

a  confidential  agent  to  Mexico  to  inquire  into  and  re- 
port upon  the  actual  condition  of  the  belligerents,  and 
in  consequence  of  his  report,  Mr.  Robert  M.  McLane 
was  dispatched  to  Mexico,  March  8,  1859,  "  with  dis- 
cretionary authority  to  recognize  the  government  of 
President  Juarez,  if  on  his  arrival  in  Mexico  he  should 
find  it  entitled  to  such  recognition  according  to  the 
established  practice  of  the  United  States."  On  the 
7th  of  April,  Mr.  McLane  presented  his  credentials 
to  President  Juarez,  having  no  hesitation,  he  said,  "  in 
pronouncing  the  government  of  Juarez  to  be  the  only 
existing  government  of  the  republic."  He  was  cor- 
dially received  by  the  authorities  at  Vera  Cruz,  and 
during  all  the  vicissitudes  of  the  next  eight  years  the 
United  States  government  continued  to  extend  its  sym- 
pathy and  moral  support  to  the  government  of  Juarez 
as  the  only  one  entitled  to  the  allegiance  of  the  people 
of  Mexico. 

Juarez  thus  came  forward,  in  the  role  of  reformer, 
as  the  champion  of  constitutionalism  and  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  state  against  the  overreaching  power,  in- 
fluence, and  wealth  of  the  church  party.  He  was  a 
full-blooded  Indian,  without  the  slightest  admixture 
of  Spanish  blood.  In  December,  i860,  he  finally  suc- 
ceeded in  overthrowing  the  party  of  Miramon  and, 
driving  the  latter  into  exile.  Immediately,  on  reoccu- 
pying  the  city  of  Mexico,  the  Constitutionalists  pro- 
ceeded to  execute  with  severity  the  decree  issued  at 
Vera  Cruz  nationalizing  or  sequestrating  the  property 
of  the  church. 

The  most  difficult  question  which  the  new  govern- 
ment had  to  face  was  that  of  international  obligations 
recklessly   contracted    by    the   various    revolutionary 

195 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

leaders  who  had  successively  been  recognized  as  con- 
stituting the  government  of  Mexico.  In  consequence 
of  debts  contracted  and  outrages  and  enormities  per- 
petrated, for  the  most  part  during  the  regime  of  Mira- 
mon  and  the  church  party,  the  governments  of  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Spain  determined  to  intervene  in 
Mexico. 

The  grievances  of  the  British  government  were 
based  on  the  following  facts :  non-settlement  of  claims 
of  British  bondholders;  the  murder  of  the  British 
vice-consul  at  Tasco;  the  breaking  into  the  British 
legation  and  the  carrying  oflf  £152,000  in  bonds  be- 
longing to  British  subjects,  besides  numerous  other 
outrages  committed  on  the  persons  and  property  of 
individuals/ 

The  claims  of  the  British  bondholders  referred  to 
had  been  recognized  by  the  Pakenham  convention  of 
October  15,  1842,  and  formed  into  a  consolidated  fund 
of  $250,000,  which  was  to  be  paid  off,  principal  and 
interest,  by  a  percentage  on  import  duties  at  the 
custom-houses  of  Vera  Cruz  and  Tampico.  This  con- 
vention was  not  carried  out  by  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment, and  on  December  4,  185 1,  Mr.  Doyle  signed  on 
behalf  of  Great  Britain  a  new  convention,  in  which  not 
only  the  claims  under  the  Pakenham  convention,  but 
others,  recognized  by  both  governments,  were  likewise 
formed  into  a  consolidated  fund,  on  which  the  Mexi- 
can government  bound  itself  to  pay  five  per  cent,  as  a 
sinking  fund  and  three  per  cent,  as  interest  until  the 
debt  should  be  paid  off.  This  five  and  three  per  cent, 
were  to  be  met  by  a  percentage  of  customs  receipts. 


>  Brit,   and    For.   St.   Pap.,   1861-62,   Vol.    LII.      Also   House    Exec.    Doc 
No.   100,  Thirty-seventh  Cong.,   Second   Sess. 


196 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

In  1857  the  sinking  fund  was  to  be  raised  to  six  per 
cent,  and  the  interest  to  four  per  cent. 

Two  days  after  the  signing  of  this  Doyle  convention 
the  Spanish  minister  in  Mexico  also  signed  a  conven- 
tion on  behalf  of  some  Philippine  missionaries,  known 
as  the  "  Padre  Moran "  convention,  on  almost  the 
same  basis  as  the  British.  The  consolidated  fund  in 
this  case  was  $983,000,  the  sinking  fund  five  per  cent., 
and  the  interest  three  per  cent. 

The  interest  was  paid  on  both  funds  in  almost  the 
whole  amount,  but  the  sinking  fund  was  not  kept  up. 
Succeeding  agreements  were  made  in  1858,  in  1859, 
and  in  i860,  by  which  the  custom-house  assignments 
to  satisfy  both  conventions  (British  and  Spanish) 
were  raised  from  twelve  per  cent,  in  1851,  to  twenty- 
nine  per  cent,  in  1860.^ 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  British  and  Spanish 
claims  were  perfectly  legitimate.  The  French  claims, 
however,  were  of  a  somewhat  different  character. 
During  Miramon's  administration  arrangements  were 
made  through  the  agency  of  Jecker,  a  Swiss  banker, 
by  which  $750,000  were  to  be  raised  through  an  issue 
of  $15,000,000  of  bonds.  These  bonds  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Jecker's  French  creditors  and  were  pressed 
by  the  French  government,  which  thus  demanded  the 
repayment  of  twenty  times  the  original  sum  advanced. 
A  claim  was  made  also  for  $12,000,000  for  torts  on 
French  subjects.^ 

When  the  Liberal  party  came  into  power  again  in 
i860,  they  were  unable  to  meet  the  situation  and 
showed  a  disposition  to  question  the  obligatory  force 


»  Brit,   and   For.   St.    Pap.,   Vol.   LIT,   p.    359- 
»  Wharton's   Digest,   Sec.    58,    Vol.    I.   p.   iiz. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  engagements  entered  into  by  their  various  revolu- 
tionary predecessors.  The  British  government  had 
undertaken  to  provide  against  this  contingency  upon 
the  occasion  of  extending  recognition  to  the  Juarez 
administration.  Under  date  of  March  30,  1861,  Lord 
John  Russell  wrote  to  Sir  Charles  Wyke,  recently  ap- 
pointed minister  to  Mexico,  as  follows : 

The  instructions  addressed  to  Mr.  Mathew,  both  before 
and  since  the  final  triumph  of  the  Liberal  party,  made  the 
recognition  by  Great  Britain  of  the  constitutional  govern- 
ment contingent  upon  the  acknowledgment  by  that  govern- 
ment of  the  liability  of  Mexico  for  the  claims  of  British 
subjects  who,  either  in  their  persons  or  in  their  property, 
for  a  long  series  of  years,  can  be  proved  to  have  suffered 
wrong  at  the  hands  of  successive  governments  in  Mexico.* 

And  further  on  in  the  same  communication  the 
attitude  of  the  British  government  is  expressed  yet 
more  strongly : 

Her  majesty's  government  will  not  admit  as  an  excuse  for 
hesitation  in  this  respect  the  plea  that  the  robbery  was 
committed  by  the  late  government.  For,  as  regards  this,  as 
indeed  all  other  claims,  her  majesty's  government  cannot 
admit  that  the  party  who  committed  the  wrong  is  alone 
responsible.  Great  Britain  does  not  recognize  any  party  as 
constituting  the  republic  in  its  dealing  with  foreign  nations, 
but  holds  the  entire  republic,  by  whatever  party  the  govern- 
ment of  it  may  from  time  to  time  be  administered,  to  be 
responsible  for  wrongs  done  to  British  subjects  by  any  party 
or  persons  at  any  time  administering  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment. 

Mexico,  however,  was  slow  to  admit  this  principle 
of  international  law.     In  a  letter  to  Lord  John  Rus- 

•  Brit,  and  For.  St,  Pap.,  Vol.  LII,  p.  237. 

198 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

sell,  June  25,  1861,  and  in  other  communications,  Sir 
Charles  Wyke  urged  the  necessity  of  a  naval  demon- 
stration against  Mexico.  His  plan  was  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  custom-houses  of  Vera  Cruz,  Tampico, 
and  Matamoros  on  the  Atlantic,  and  of  one  or  two 
on  the  Pacific,  lower  the  duties  so  as  to  attract  the 
great  bulk  of  trade  from  other  ports,  and  pay  them- 
selves by  the  percentage  to  which  they  were  entitled 
by  treaty  stipulation. 

On  the  17th  of  July,  1861,  President  Juarez  brought 
matters  to  a  crisis  by  the  publication  of  a  decree,  the 
first  article  of  which  declared  that  "  all  payments  are 
suspended  for  two  years,  including  the  assignments 
for  the  loan  made  in  London  and  for  the  foreign  con- 
ventions." ^ 

On  the  23rd,  Sir  Charles  Wyke,  the  British  min- 
ister, demanded  the  repeal  of  this  law  within  forty- 
eight  hours.  On  the  24th,  the  French  minister  de- 
manded its  repeal  within  twenty-four  hours.  These 
demands  were  not  complied  with  and  diplomatic  rela- 
tions were  immediately  broken  off  by  the  British  and 
French  representatives. 

The  Spanish  government  had  acted  somewhat  in  ad- 
vance of  the  other  governments  and  was  already  pre- 
paring to  back  its  claims  by  an  armed  expedition 
against  Mexico.  The  rupture  with  the  British  and 
French  governments  very  naturally  pointed  to  joint 
action  with  Spain  as  the  best  means  of  securing  their 
interests.  The  United  States  government,  which  had 
just  entered  upon  one  of  the  greatest  struggles  of 
modern  times  and  had  its  hands  practically  tied  as 
far  as  Mexico  was  concerned,  regarded  the  contem- 

'  Brit  and  For.  St.  Pap..  Vol,  LI  I,  p.  294, 

ff99 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

plated  intervention  of  European  powers  in  Mexico 
with  grave  apprehension,  not  to  say  suspicion.  So 
great  was  the  uneasiness  occasioned  in  the  United 
States  by  the  measures  in  contemplation  and  so 
strong  was  the  desire  to  ward  off  the  threatened 
danger  to  republican  institutions  on  this  continent, 
that  Mr.  Seward  authorized  (September  2,  1861)  the 
negotiation  of  a  treaty  with  Mexico  for  the  assump- 
tion by  the  United  States  of  the  payment  of  the  in- 
terest, at  three  per  cent.,  upon  the  funded  debt  of 
Mexico  (the  principal  of  which  was  about  $62,000,- 
000)  for  the  term  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  the 
decree  of  the  Mexican  government  suspending  such 
payment,  "  provided  that  the  government  of  Mexico 
will  pledge  to  the  United  States  its  faith  for  the  reim- 
bursement of  the  money  so  to  be  paid,  with  six  per 
cent,  interest  thereon,  to  be  secured  by  a  specific  lien 
upon  all  the  public  lands  and  mineral  rights  in  the  sev- 
eral Mexican  states  of  Lower  California,  Chihuahua, 
Sonora,  and  Sinaloa,  the  property  so  pledged  to  become 
absolute  in  the  United  States  at  the  expiration  of  the 
term  of  six  years  from  the  time  when  the  treaty  shall 
go  into  effect,  if  such  reimbursement  shall  not  have 
been  made  before  that  time." "  All  this,  of  course, 
was  subject  to  the  confirmation  of  the  Senate. 

This  step  was  communicated  informally  to  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  governments,  and  the  validity  of  the 
convention  was  to  be  conditioned  upon  those  govern- 
ments engaging  not  to  take  any  measures  against 
Mexico  to  enforce  the  payment  of  the  interest  of  the 
loan  until  time  should  have  been  given  to  submit  the 

•  Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  Corwin,  Sept.  2,  1861.  House  Exec.  Doc.  No.  100, 
p,  22,   Thirty-seventh   Cong..    Second    Sess. 

200 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

convention  to  the  ratification  of  the  United  States 
Senate  at  its  approaching  session.  It  was  also  to  be 
a  condition  that,  if  the  convention  should  be  ratified, 
Great  Britain  and  France  should  engage,  on  their  part, 
not  to  make  any  demand  upon  Mexico  for  the  interest, 
except  upon  its  failing  to  be  punctually  paid  by  the 
United  States/ 

Grave  objections  to  Mr.  Seward's  plan  of  paying  the 
interest  on  the  Mexican  debt  were  entertained  both 
in  Paris  and  in  London.  The  French  minister  of 
state,  M.  Thouvenel,  said  to  the  British  minister  at 
Paris : 

It  might  not  be  possible  to  prevent  the  United  States  offer- 
ing money  to  Mexico,  or  to  prevent  Mexico  receiving  money 
from  the  United  States,  but  neither  England  nor  France 
ought  in  any  way  to  recognize  the  transaction.' 

Lord  Lyons  declared  to  Mr.  Seward : 

That  her  majesty's  government  were  as  apprehensive  as 
Mr.  Seward  himself  could  be,  of  an  attempt  to  build  upon  a 
foundation  of  debts  due,  and  injuries  inflicted,  by  Mexico,  a 
pretension  to  establish  a  new  government  in  that  country. 
Her  majesty's  government  thought,  however,  that  the  most 
effectual  mode  of  guarding  against  this  danger  would  be 
for  Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  and  France  to  join 
Spain  in  a  course  of  action,  the  objects  and  limits  of  which 
should  be  distinctly  defined  beforehand.  This  certainly  ap- 
peared more  prudent  than  to  allow  Spain  to  act  alone  now, 
and  afterwards  to  oppose  the  results  of  her  operations,  if  she 
should  go  too  far.' 


■'  Brit,   and   For.   St.   Pap..   Vol.   LII,  p.  325. 

•  Earl  Cowley  to  Earl  Russell,  Sept.  24,  1861.  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Pap., 
Vol.   LII.  p.   329. 

•  Earl  Lyons  to  Earl  Russell,  Oct.  14,  1861.  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Pap., 
Vol  LII,  p.  375.  >; 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA  ' 

The  British  government  avoided  beforehand  the 
necessity  of  a  point-blank  refusal  of  the  plan  of  Mr. 
Seward,  in  case  the  treaty  should  go  through,  by 
declaring  that  the  interest  on  the  funded  debt  was  not 
the  only  cause  of  complaint,  but  that  there  remained 
over  and  above  that  the  outrages  perpetrated  upon 
British  subjects  still  unredressed. 

Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the  United  States  min- 
ister to  England,  did  not  approve  the  plan  of  guar- 
anteeing the  Mexican  interest,  and  in  his  dispatch  to 
Mr.  Seward  of  November  j,  1861,  he  expressed  his 
opinion  rather  more  frankly  than  is  usual  for  a  min- 
ister to  do  in  discussing  an  instruction  from  the  state 
department. 

You  will  permit  me  here,  however,  to  make  a  single  remark 
in  this  connection  upon  the  importance  of  appearing  to  divest 
the  United  States  of  any  personal  and  selfish  interest  in  the 
action  it  may  think  proper  to  adopt.  The  view  customarily 
taken  in  Europe  is  that  their  government  is  disposed  to  resist 
all  foreign  intervention  in  Mexico,  not  upon  any  principle, 
but  simply  because  it  is  itself  expecting,  in  due  course  of 
time,  to  absorb  the  whole  country  for  its  own  benefit.  Hence 
any  proposal  like  that  which  I  had  the  honor  to  receive, 
based  upon  the  mortgage  of  portions  of  Mexican  territory  as 
security  for  engagements  entered  into  by  the  United  States, 
naturally  becomes  the  ground  of  an  outcry  that  this  is  but  the 
preliminary  to  an  entry  for  inevitable  foreclosure.  And 
then  follows  the  argument  that  if  this  process  be  legitimate 
in  one  case,  why  not  equally  in  all.  As  against  Great  Britain 
and  France,  it  would  be  difficult  to  oppose  to  this  the  abstract 
principle  contained  in  what  has  been  denominated  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  however  just  in  substance." 

While  Mr.  Corwin  was  still  in  negotiation  with  the 


*o  Thirty-Seventh  Cong.,  Second  Sess.,  House  Exec.  Doc.  No.  xoo,  p.  20Z. 
202 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

Mexican  government  in  reference  to  some  method  of 
releasing  Mexico  from  her  compHcations  with  the  al- 
lied governments  of  Europe,  the  United  States  Senate, 
in  reply  to  two  successive  messages  of  the  President, 
passed  a  resolution,  February  25,  1862,  declaring  the 
opinion  "  that  it  is  not  advisable  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
that  will  require  the  United  States  to  assume  any  por- 
tion of  the  principle  or  interest  of  the  debt  of  Mexico, 
or  that  will  require  the  concurrence  of  European 
powers."  This  effectually  put  an  end  to  Mr.  Seward's 
plan. 

Meanwhile  Sir  Charles  Wyke  had  reopened  nego^ 
tiations  with  the  Mexican  government  and  negotiated 
a  treaty  which  might  have  satisfied  British  claims,  but 
the  treaty  was  thrown  out  by  the  Mexican  congress  by 
a  large  majority,  and  also  disapproved  by  the  British 
government  in  view  of  an  agreement  entered  into  with 
France  and  Spain  unknown  to  Sir  Charles  Wyke." 

The  agreement  referred  to  was  the  convention 
signed  at  London,  October  31,  1861,  between  Spain, 
France,  and  Great  Britain,  in  reference  to  the  situation 
of  affairs  in  Mexico  and  looking  to  armed  interven- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  securing  their  rights.  The 
preamble  of  the  convention  recites  that  the  three  con- 
tracting parties  "  being  placed  by  the  arbitrary  and 
vexatious  conduct  of  the  authorities  of  the  republic 
of  Mexico  under  the  necessity  of  exacting  from  those 
authorities  a  more  efficient  protection  for  the  persons 
and  property  of  their  subjects,  as  well  as  the  perform- 
ance of  the  obligations  contracted  toward  them  by  the 
republic  of  Mexico,  have  arranged  to  conclude  a  con- 


"  Sir   C.    Wyke   to   Earl    Russell,   Nov.    23,    1861.      Brit,   and    For.    St. 
Pap.,  Vol.  LII,  p.  398. 

203 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

vention  between  each  other  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
bining their  common  action."  The  most  important 
article  of  the  convention  in  view  of  its  subsequent  vio- 
lation by  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  was  the  second, 
which  declared  that : 

The  high  contracting  parties  bind  themselves  not  to  seek 
for  themselves,  in  the  employment  of  coercive  measures 
foreseen  by  the  present  convention,  any  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory, or  any  peculiar  advantage,  and  not  to  exercise  in  the 
subsequent  affairs  of  Mexico  any  influence  of  a  character 
to  impair  the  right  of  the  Mexican  nation  to  choose  and 
freely  to  constitute  the  form  of  its  own  government. 

The  fourth  article,  recognizing  that  the  United 
States  also  had  claims  against  Mexico,  provided : 

that  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  present  convention, 
a  copy  of  it  shall  be  communicated  to  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  that  that  government  shall  be  invited  to 
accede  to  it.  ...  But.  as  the  high  contracting  parties 
would  expose  themselves,  in  making  any  delay  in  carrying 
into  effect  articles  one  and  two  of  the  present  convention,  to 
fail  in  the  end  which  they  wish  to  attain,  they  have  agreed 
not  to  defer,  with  a  view  of  obtaining  the  accession  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  the  commencement  of  the 
above-mentioned  operations  beyond  the  period  at  which  their 
combined  forces  may  be  united  in  the  vicinity  of  Vera  Cruz." 

The  advisability  of  inviting  the  cooperation  of  the 
United  States  had  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
discussion  and  difference  of  opinion  among  the  three 
European  governments.  England  and  France  had 
urged  the  cooperation  of  the  United  States,  while 
Spain  had  opposed  it. 

**  Thirty-Seventh    Cong.,     Second     Sess.,    House    Exec.     Doc.    No.     loo, 
pp.   186-7. 

204 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

In  compliance  with  tne  fourth  article  the  conven- 
tion was  submitted  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States  by  a  note  dated  November  30,  186 1,  signed 
jointly  by  the  representatives  of  Spain,  France,  and 
Great  Britain  at  Washington, 

Mr.  Seward's  reply  conveying  the  declination  of  the 
United  States  to  the  invitation  to  cooperate  with  the 
three  allied  European  powers  in  the  demonstration 
against  Mexico  was  dated  December  4,  1861.  After 
reviewing  the  substance  of  the  convention,  he  said : 

First.  As  the  undersigned  has  heretofore  had  the  honor 
to  inform  each  of  the  plenipotentiaries  now  addressed,  the 
President  does  not  feel  himself  at  liberty  to  question,  and 
he  does  not  question,  that  the  sovereigns  represented  have 
undoubted  right  to  decide  for  themselves  the  fact  whether 
they  have  sustained  grievances,  and  to  resort  to  war  against 
Mexico  for  the  redress  thereof,  and  have  a  right  also  to  levy 
the  war  severally  or  jointly. 

In  the  second  place,  Mr.  Seward  expressed  the  sat- 
isfaction of  his  government  that  the  allied  powers  had 
clearly  repudiated  in  the  convention  all  idea  of  carry- 
ing on  the  war  for  their  own  ambitious  ends  and  all 
intention  of  exercising  in  the  subsequent  affairs  of 
Mexico  any  influence  of  a  character  to  impair  the  right 
of  the  Mexican  people  to  choose  and  freely  to  consti- 
tute the  form  of  their  own  government. 

It  is  true,  as  the  high  contracting  parties  assume,  that  the 
United  States  have,  on  their  part,  claims  to  urge  against 
Mexico.  Upon  due  consideration,  however,  the  President 
is  of  opinion  that  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  seek  satisfac- 
tion of  their  claims  at  this  time  through  an  act  of  accession 
to  the  convention.  Among  the  reasons  for  this  decision 
which  the  undersigned   is   authorized   to   assign,   are,    first, 

205 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

that  the  United  States,  so  far  as  it  is  practicable,  prefer  tc 
adhere  to  a  traditional  policy  recommended  to  them  by  the 
father  of  their  country  and  confirmed  by  a  happy  experience, 
which  forbids  them  from  making  alliances  with  foreign  na- 
tions; second,  Mexico  being  a  neighbor  of  the  United  States 
on  this  continent,  and  possessing  a  system  of  government 
similar  to  our  own  in  many  of  its  important  features,  the 
United  States  habitually  cherish  a  decided  good-will  toward 
that  republic,  and  a  lively  interest  in  its  security,  prosperity, 
and  welfare.  Animated  by  these  sentiments,  the  United 
States  do  not  feel  inclined  to  resort  to  forcible  remedies  for 
their  claims  at  the  present  moment,  when  the  government 
of  Mexico  is  deeply  disturbed  by  factions  within,  and  ex- 
posed to  war  with  foreign  nations.  And  of  course,  the  same 
sentiments  render  them  still  more  disinclined  to  allied  war 
against  Mexico,  than  to  war  to  be  waged  against  her  by 
themselves  alone. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Seward  referred  to  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  government  had  authorized  their 
representative  in  Mexico  to  enter  into  a  treaty  con- 
ceding to  the  Mexican  government  material  aid,  which 
might,  he  hoped,  enable  that  government  to  satisfy 
the  just  claims  and  demands  of  the  allied  sovereigns 
and  so  to  avert  the  war  which  they  have  agreed 
among  each  other  to  levy  against  Mexico." 

As  already  related,  the  efforts  of  the  executive  in 
this  direction  were  not  approved  by  the  Senate  and 
the  negotiations  in  regard  to  guaranteeing  the  interest 
on  the  Mexican  loan  were  broken  off.  The  treaty 
negotiated  by  Mr.  Corwin  was  in  fact  never  sub- 
mitted to  the  Senate,  for  by  the  time  it  was  ready 
the  French  forces  occupied  a  part  of  Mexican  terri- 
tory, and  it  was  feared  that  a  loan  to  Mexico  under 

"  House  Exec.   Doc.  No.   loo,  pp.   187190,  Thirty-seventh   Cong.,   Second 
Sess.     Brit,  and  For.   St.  Pap.,  Vol.  LII,  p.   394. 

206 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

such  conditions  would  be  considered  a  breach  of 
neutrahty. 

In  pursuance  of  the  London  convention,  Vera  Cruz 
was  occupied  in  the  early  part  of  1862  by  a  Spanish 
force  of  6,000  men  under  command  of  Marshal  Prim; 
a  French  force  of  2,500,  which  was  largely  reinforced 
soon  afterward;  and  a  force  of  700  British  marines. 

The  first  intimation  of  the  real  purposes  of  the  Em- 
peror Louis  Napoleon  was  given  in  the  letter  of  in- 
structions of  M.  Thouvenel  to  the  admiral  command- 
ing the  French  expedition  to  Mexico,  dated  November 
II,  1861.  He  said  that  in  case  of  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Mexican  forces  from  the  coast  into  the  interior  of 
the  country,  an  advance  upon  the  capital  might  become 
necessary.  He  reminded  the  admiral  of  the  self-ab- 
negatory  character  of  the  second  article  of  the  conven- 
tion, but  continued : 

There  are,  however,  certain  hypotheses  which  present 
themselves  to  our  foresight  and  which  it  was  our  duty  to 
examine.  It  might  happen  that  the  pressure  of  the  allied 
forces  upon  the  soil  of  Mexico  might  induce  the  sane  por- 
tion of  the  people,  tired  of  anarchy,  anxious  for  order  and 
repose,  to  attempt  an  effort  to  constitute  in  the  country  a 
government  presenting  the  guarantees  of  strength  and 
stability  which  have  been  wanting  to  all  those  which  have 
succeeded  each  other  since  the  emancipation. 

To  such  efforts  the  admiral  was  expressly  told  that 
he  was  not  to  refuse  his  encouragement.^* 

In  view  of  this  order,  the  British  government  at 
once  instructed  its  agent,  Sir  Charles  Wyke,  that, 
while  there  was  nothing  to  be  said  against  the  reason- 
ing of  the  French  government  in  reference  to  the  prob- 

**  House  Exec.  Doc.  No.  loo,  p.  174,  Thirty-seventh  Cong.,  Second  Sess, 

207 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

able  necessity  of  marching  against  the  city  of  Mexico, 
he  was  to  decline  to  take  part  in  the  advance  into  the 
interior,  and  that  the  fact,  that  the  whole  available 
British  force  was  only  700  marines,  would  be  suf- 
ficient reason  for  declining/^ 

The  seriousness  of  the  situation  was  fully  appre- 
ciated by  the  United  States  government.  Shortly  after 
the  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz  by  the  Spanish  forces  and 
the  announcement  of  the  outfit  of  a  French  force  to 
follow  up  the  advantage,  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams 
wrote  to  his  government  from  London : 

It  is  no  longer  concealed  that  the  intention  is  to  advance 
to  the  capital,  and  to  establish  a  firm  government,  with  the 
consent  of  the  people,  at  that  place.  But  who  are  meant  by 
that  term  does  not  appear.  This  issue  is  by  no  means  palat- 
able to  the  government  here,  though  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
that  they  could  have  been  blind  to  it.  Feeble  murmurs  of 
discontent  are  heard,  but  they  will  scarcely  be  likely  to  count 
for  much  in  the  face  of  the  obligation  under  which  the  action 
of  the  emperor  in  the  Trent  case  has  placed  them.  The 
military  occupation  will  go  on,  and  will  not  cease  with  the 
limits  now  assigned  to  it.  It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  the 
nature  of  the  fulcrum  thus  obtained  for  operations  in  a  new 
and  a  different  quarter,  should  the  occasion  be  made  to  use 
it.  The  expedition  to  the  city  of  Mexico  may  not  stop  until 
it  shows  Itself  in  the  heart  of  the  Louisiana  purchase." 

About  this  time  reports  began  to  be  circulated  that 
the  Archduke  Ferdinand  Maximilian  of  Austria  would 
be  invited  by  a  large  body  of  Mexicans  to  place  him- 
self on  the  throne  of  Mexico,  and  that  the  Mexican 
people  would  gladly  hail  such  a  change.     To  what- 

>•  Brit,  and  For.   St.  Pap.,  Vol.  LII,  p.  381. 

*'  Adams  to  Seward,  January  24,  1862.  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  100  p.  206, 
Thirty-seventh  Cong.,  Second  Sess. 

208 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

ever  extent  such  reports  might  be  credited,  the  United 
States  could  not  call  into  question  the  good  faith  of 
the  parties  to  the  London  convention.  The  British 
government,  as  the  issue  showed,  acted  with  perfect 
sincerity  in  the  matter;  and  the  Spanish  government, 
whatever  may  have  been  its  original  intentions,  fol- 
lowed the  lead  of  Great  Britain,  When  the  reports 
in  regard  to  Maximilian  were  first  circulated,  the  Brit- 
ish government  declared  to  its  agent,  Sir  Charles 
Wyke,  that: 

If  the  Mexican  people,  by  a  spontaneous  movement,  place 
the  Austrian  Archduke  on  the  throne  of  Mexico,  there  is 
nothing  in  the  convention  to  prevent  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  could  be  no  parties  to  a  forcible  intervention  for  this 
purpose.     The  Mexicans  must  consult  their  own  interests." 

At  the  time,  however,  the  attitude  of  the  British 
government  was  not  at  all  understood.  Mr.  Adams 
wrote : 

Great  Britain  occupies  the  post  of  holding  the  door,  whilst 
her  two  associates,  with  her  knowledge,  go  in,  fully  pre- 
pared, if  they  can,  to  perpetrate  the  act  which  she,  at  the 
outset,  made  them  denounce,  at  the  same  time  that  she  dis- 
avowed every  idea  of  being  made  to  participate  in  it." 

In  the  face  of  armed  invasion,  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment assumed  a  more  reasonable  attitude,  and  on  the 
19th  day  of  February,  1862,  the  plenipotentiaries  of 
Spain,  Great  Britain,  and  France  signed,  at  Soledad, 
with  the  secretary  of  state  of  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment a  preliminary  agreement  or  convention,  in  which 


»T  Brit,  and  For.  St.  Pap.,  Vol.   LII.  p.  418. 

*'  H.   Ex.   Doc.  No.   100,  p.  209,  Thirty-seventh   Cong.,  Second  Sess. 

209 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

they  recognized  the  constitutional  government  as  then 
organized.  Declaring  that  they  had  "  no  designs 
against  the  independence,  sovereignty  and  integrity  of 
the  Mexican  republic,"  they  agreed  to  open  negotia- 
tions for  the  settlement  of  all  the  demands  which  they 
had  to  make  at  Orizaba.  During  the  negotiations  the 
forces  of  the  allies  were  to  be  allowed  to  leave  the 
unhealthy  locality  of  Vera  Cruz  and  occupy  the  three 
towns  of  Cordova,  Orizaba,  and  Tehuacan,  with  their 
natural  approaches.  In  the  event  of  negotiations  be- 
ing broken  off,  the  allies  agreed  to  abandon  the  towns 
above  named  before  reopening  hostilities.^^ 

The  convention  of  Soledad  proved,  however,  of 
short  duration.  On  the  9th  of  April,  1862,  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  allies  announced  in  a  formal  note 
to  the  Mexican  government,  "  that  not  having  been 
able  to  agree  about  the  interpretation  which  ought  to 
be  given  in  the  present  circumstances  to  the  conven- 
tion of  the  31st  of  October,  1861  (the  convention  of 
London),  they  have  resolved  to  adopt  for  the  future 
an  entirely  separate  and  independent  line  of  action. 
In  consequence,  the  commander  of  the  Spanish  forces 
will  immediately  take  the  necessary  measures  to  re- 
imbark  his  troops.  The  French  army  will  concentrate 
in  Paso  Aucho  as  soon  as  the  Spanish  troops  have 
passed  from  this  position,  that  is  to  say,  probably  about 
the  20th  of  April,  thereupon  beginning  their  opera- 
tions." ^°  According  to  instructions  already  alluded 
to,  the  British  force,  which  was  limited  to  700  marines, 
had  declined  to  advance  into  the  interior,  and  hence 
was  not  present  when  the  breach  occurred. 

"  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  54,  p.  46,  Thirty-seventh  Cong.,  Third  Sesi. 
'"  Ibid.,  p.  48. 

210 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

In  spite  of  all  appearances  to  the  contrary,  the 
Trench  government  still  persisted  in  disavowing  to  the 
United  States  government,  in  the  most  emphatic  terms, 
all  designs  upon  the  independence  of  the  Mexican  re- 
public. Even  after  the  rupture  at  Orizaba,  M.  Thou- 
venel  assured  Mr.  Dayton,  the  United  States  minister 
at  Paris,  that  all  that  France  wanted  was  that  there 
should  be  a  stable  government  in  Mexico,  not  an 
anarchy  with  which  other  nations  could  have  no  rela^ 
tions. 

That  if  the  people  of  that  country  chose  to  establish  a 
republic  it  was  all  well;  France  would  make  no  objection. 
If  they  chose  to  establish  a  monarchy,  as  that  was  the  form 
of  government  here,  it  would  be  charming  (charmant),  but 
they  did  not  mean  to  do  anything  to  induce  such  a  course  of 
action.  That  all  the  rumors  that  France  intended  to  establish 
the  Archduke  Maximilian  on  the  throne  of  Mexico  were 
utterly  without  foundation." 

M,  Thouvenel's  disclaimer  to  the  British  government 
was  equally  emphatic.^^ 

To  return  to  the  situation  of  affairs  at  Orizaba,  the 
disagreement  between  the  allies  requires  some  explana- 
tion. The  immediate  cause  of  the  rupture  and  of  the 
withdrawal  from  the  convention  of  London  was  the 
protection  extended  by  the  French  agents  to  General 
Almonte,  Padre  Miranda,  and  other  leading  men  of 
the  reactionary  or  church  party  who  had  been  banished 
from  the  country  and  who  now  from  the  French  camp 
maintained  an  active  correspondence  with  Marquez, 
Cobos,  and  other  notorious  chiefs  of  the  armed  bands 


'*  Dayton  to  Seward,   April   22,    1862. 

"'  Earl    Cowley   to    Earl    Russell,    May    15,    1862,    H.    Ex.    Doc.    No.    54, 
p.    746,   Thirty-seventh   Cong.,   Third    Sess. 

211 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

then  in  open  rebellion  against  the  constituted  govern- 
ment of  the  country.  Almonte  and  his  associates 
openly  favored  the  scheme  of  placing  Maximilian  on 
the  throne. 

The  Mexican  government  demanded  the  removal  of 
General  Almonte  and  his  associates  from  the  camp  of 
the  allies,  and  in  this  demand  the  British  and  Spanish 
representatives  concurred.  A  somewhat  stormy  con- 
ference was  held  between  the  commissioners  of  the 
allied  powers  at  Orizaba,  April  2,  1862,  at  which  the 
French  agents  virtually  said  that  they  did  not  regard 
the  convention  of  London  or  the  preliminaries  of  Sole- 
dad  as  binding  upon  them.  Specifically  then  the  two 
causes  of  the  rupture  were  (i)  the  persistency  of  the 
French  commissioners  in  opposing  the  removal  of  the 
Mexican  exiles,  and  (2)  their  refusal  to  take  part  in 
the  conferences  which  had  been  arranged  by  the  con- 
vention of  Soledad  to  be  held  with  the  Juarez  govern- 
ment at  Orizaba,  April  15,  1862.  The  British  govern- 
ment heartily  approved  of  the  action  of  its  agent,  Sir 
Charles  Wyke,  in  breaking  up  the  conference  and  put- 
ting an  end  to  the  joint  action  of  the  three  powers.^' 
The  policy  of  Spain  was  completely  in  accord  with  that 
of  England. 

The  French  government  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
convention  of  Soledad,  but  did  not  dispute  its  validity, 
and  declared  that  if  the  negotiations  should  be  broken 
off,  its  provisions  in  regard  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  from  their  vantage  ground  must  be  observed. 
The  French  government  further  assumed  that,  when 
negotiations  with  the  Mexican  government  should  be 
broken  ofif,  the  allied   forces  would  proceed  to  act 

a»  Earl    Russell   to  Sir   C.   Wyke,   May   22,    1862. 

212 


i 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

jointly  under  the  convention  of  London.^*  The  Brit- 
ish and  Spanish  governments,  however,  having  become 
convinced  of  the  duplicity  of  the  French  government 
in  the  matter,  terminated  the  London  convention  with- 
out further  discussion  and  ordered  the  immediate 
withdrawal  of  their  forces  and  agents  from  Mexican 
territory. 

The  government  of  Louis  Napoleon,  thus  left  to  its 
own  devices  by  the  withdrawal  of  Great  Britain  and 
Spain,  and  by  the  helpless  condition,  for  the  time  be- 
ing, to  which  the  war  of  secession  had  reduced  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  greatly  reinforced 
its  Mexican  expedition  and  placed  General  Forey  in 
command.  Soon  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  British 
and  Spanish  contingents.  General  Almonte  instituted  a 
government  in  the  territory  occupied  by  the  French 
and  assumed  the  title  of  "  Supreme  Chief  of  the  Na- 
tion," but  it  soon  became  evident,  as  Mr.  Dayton  ex- 
pressed it,  that  instead  of  the  emperor  having  availed 
himself  of  the  services  of  General  Almonte,  Almonte 
had  availed  himself  of  the  services  of  the  emperor. 
Accordingly,  shortly  after  General  Forey  assumed 
command,  he  issued  an  order  dissolving  the  ministry 
of  Almonte,  depriving  him  of  his  title  and  limiting  him 
thereafter  "  in  the  most  exact  manner  to  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  emperor,  which  are  to  proceed  as  far  as 
possible,  with  other  Mexican  generals  placed  under 
the  protection  of  our  flag,  to  the  organization  of  the 
Mexican  army." 

The  misfortunes  which  had  overtaken  Mexico  and 
the  dangers  that  threatened  the  permanence  of  her  re- 


»*  Earl    Cowley   to   Earl    Russell,    April    25,    1862,   H.    Ex.   Doc   No.   54, 
p.  694,  Thirty-seventh  Cong.,  Third  Sess. 

2IS 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

publican  institutions,  had  now  thoroughly  alarmed  her 
sister  republics  of  Central  and  South  America,  and  a 
correspondence  began  between  them  relative  to  organ- 
izing an  international  American  conference  to  oppose 
European  aggression. 

During  the  remarkable  series  of  events  that  took 
place  in  Mexico  in  the  spring  of  1862,  Mr.  Seward 
consistently  held  to  the  opinion  well  expressed  in  a 
dispatch  to  Mr.  Dayton,  June  21,  1862  : 

France  has  a  right  to  make  war  against  Mexico,  and  to 
determine  for  herself  the  cause.  We  have  a  right  and 
interest  to  insist  that  France  shall  not  improve  the  war  she 
makes  to  raise  up  in  Mexico  an  anti-republican  and  anti- 
American  government,  or  to  maintain  such  a  government 
)there.  France  has  disclaimed  such  designs,  and  we,  besides 
reposing  faith  in  the  assurances  given  in  a  frank,  honorable 
manner,  would,  in  any  case,  be  bound  to  wait  for,  and  not 
anticipate  a  violation  of  them.^^ 

For  some  months  the  French  troops  gradually  ex- 
tended their  military  operations  and  occupied  a  greater 
extent  of  territory  without,  however,  any  material 
change  in  the  situation.  The  Juarez  government  still 
held  the  capital.  In  the  spring  of  1863,  however,  mili- 
tary operations  were  pushed  forward  with  greater  ac- 
tivity, and  in  June,  General  Forey  organized  a  junta  of 
government  composed  of  thirty-five  Mexican  citizens 
designated  by  decree  of  the  French  emperor's  minister. 
The  members  of  this  supreme  junta  were  to  associate 
with  them  two  hundred  and  fifteen  citizens  of  Mexico 
to  form  an  assembly  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
notables.     This  assembly  was  to  occupy  itself  with 

"H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  S4i  P.  S30,  Thirty-seventh  Cong.,  Third  Sess. 

214 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

the  form  of  the  permanent  government  of  Mexico. 
The  junta  appointed  an  executive  body  of  three,  of 
whom  General  Almonte  was  the  head. 

On  the  loth  of  July,  1863,  the  capital  of  Mexico 
was  occupied  by  the  French  army,  and  on  the  follow- 
ing day  the  Assembly  of  Notables  declared: 

1.  The  Mexican  nation  adopts  as  its  form  of  government 
a  limited  hereditary  monarchy,  with  a  Catholic  prince. 

2.  The  sovereign  shall  take  the  title  of  Emperor  of 
Mexico. 

3.  The  imperial  crov^n  of  Mexico  is  offered  to  his  im- 
perial and  royal  highness  the  Prince  Ferdinand  Maximilian, 
Archduke  of  Austria,  for  himself  and  his  descendants. 

4.  If,  under  circumstances  which  cannot  be  foreseen,  the 
Archduke  of  Austria,  Ferdinand  Maximilian,  should  not  take 
possession  of  the  throne  which  is  offered  to  him,  the  Mexican 
nation  relies  on  the  good  will  of  his  majesty,  Napoleon  III, 
Emperor  of  the  French,  to  indicate  for  it  another  Catholic 
prince."* 

The  crown  of  Mexico  was  formally  offered  to  Maxi- 
milian by  a  deputation  of  Mexicans  headed  by  Seiior 
Estrada,  October  3,  1863;  but  Maximilian  replied  that 
he  could  not  accept  the  proffered  throne  until  the 
whole  nation  should  "  confirm  by  a  free  manifestation 
of  its  will  the  wishes  of  the  capital."  This  was  a  wise 
decision,  had  it  been  given  in  good  faith  and  had  it 
been  wisely  adhered  to,  but  the  sequel  shows  that  the 
archduke  was  either  not  sincere  in  his  protestations  or 
else  was  woefully  deceived  by  representations  subse- 
quently made  to  him.  Six  months  later  he  accepted 
the  crown  without  the  question  having  been  submitted 

**  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  ii,  pp.  254-268,  Thirty-eighth  Cong.,  First  Sess. 
21S 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

to  the  wishes  of  any  but  a  very  small  portion  of  the 
Mexican  people. 

In  spite  of  the  declaration  of  the  Mexican  Assembly, 
which  showed  so  unmistakably  the  hand  of  Napoleon, 
the  French  government  continued  to  repudiate  the 
designs  imputed  to  it  against  the  independence  of 
Mexico,  and  Mr.  Seward  continued  to  express,  offi- 
cially at  least,  the  satisfaction  of  the  American  gov- 
ernment at  the  explanations  vouchsafed  by  France. 
September  ii,  1863,  he  stated  the  case  as  follows: 

When  France  made  war  against  Mexico,  we  asked  of 
France  explanations  of  her  objects  and  purposes.  She 
answered,  that  it  was  a  war  for  the  redress  of  grievances; 
that  she  did  not  intend  to  permanently  occupy  or  dominate 
in  Mexico,  and  that  she  should  leave  to  the  people  of 
Mexico  a  free  choice  of  institutions  of  government.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  United  States  adopted,  and  they  have 
since  maintained  entire  neutrality  between  the  belligerents, 
in  harmony  with  the  traditional  policy  in  regard  to  foreign 
wars.  The  war  has  continued  longer  than  was  anticipated. 
At  different  stages  of  it  France  has,  in  her  intercourse  with 
us,  renewed  the  explanations  before  mentioned.  The  French 
army  has  now  captured  Pueblo  and  the  capital,  while  the 
Mexican  government,  with  its  principal  forces,  is  under- 
stood to  have  retired  to  San  Luis  Potosi,  and  a  provisional 
government  has  been  instituted  under  French  auspices  in  the 
city  of  Mexico,  which  being  supported  by  arms,  divides  the 
actual  dominion  of  the  country  with  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment, also  maintained  by  armed  power.  That  provisional 
government  has  neither  made  nor  sought  to  make  any  com- 
munication to  the  government  of  the  United  States,  nor  has 
it  been  in  any  way  recognized  by  this  government.  France 
has  made  no  communication  to  the  United  States  concerning 
the  provisional  government  which  has  been  established  in 
Mexico,  nor  has  she  announced  any  actual  or  intended  de- 
*»arture  from  the  policy  in  regard  to  that  country  which  her 

216 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

before-mentioned  explanations  have  authorized  us  to  expect 
her  to  pursue." 

The  probable  acceptance  of  the  crown  by  Maxi- 
milian was,  however,  the  subject  of  frequent  communi- 
cations between  the  governments  of  France  and  the 
United  States.  In  the  course  of  a  somewhat  familiar 
conversation  with  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  the  French 
minister  of  state,  in  August,  1863,  Mr.  Dayton  ex- 
pressed the  fear  that  in  quitting  Mexico  France  might 
leave  a  puppet  behind  her.  De  Lhuys  replied:  "  No; 
the  strings  would  be  too  long  to  work," 

The  chances  of  Maximilian's  success  in  Mexico  had 
been  from  the  first  deliberately  calculated  on  the  basis 
of  the  probable  success  of  the  Southern  Confederacy; 
and,  therefore,  the  cause  of  the  Juarez  government  and 
the  cause  of  the  Union  were  considered  the  same.  The 
active  sympathy  of  the  Unionists  with  the  Mexican 
republic  made  it  difficult  for  the  administration  to 
maintain  neutrality.  This  difficulty  was  further  en- 
hanced by  the  doubt  entertained  in  the  United  States 
as  to  the  intentions  of  France.  In  this  connection  Mr. 
Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  Dayton,  September  21,  1863,  as 
follows : 

The  President  thinks  it  desirable  that  you  should  seek  an 
opportunity  to  mention  these  facts  to  Mr.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys, 
and  to  suggest  to  him  that  the  interests  of  the  United  States, 
and,  as  it  seems  to  us,  the  interests  of  France  herself,  re- 
quire that  a  solution  of  the  present  complications  in  Mexico 
be  made,  as  early  as  may  be  convenient,  upon  the  basis  of 
the  unity  and  independence  of  Mexico.^^ 


"Seward   to  Motley,   Sept.    ii,    1863,   Dipl.   Corr.,    1863;    Sen.   Ex.   Doc. 
No.  II,  p.  479,  Thirty-eighth  Cong.,  First  Sess. 

**  Sen,   Ex.   Doc.   Nov   11,  p.   464,   Thirty-eighth   Cong,,   First  Sess. 

217 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

In  reply,  the  French  minister  declared  that  the  ques- 
tion of  the  establishment  of  Maximilian  on  the  Mexi- 
can throne  was  to  be  decided  by  a  majority  vote  of  the 
entire  nation;  that  the  dangers  of  the  government  of 
the  archduke  would  come  principally  from  the  United 
States,  and  the  sooner  the  United  States  showed  itself 
satisfied,  and  manifested  a  willingness  to  enter  into 
peaceful  relations  with  that  government,  the  sooner 
would  France  be  ready  to  leave  Mexico  and  the  new 
government  to  take  care  of  itself,  which  France  would, 
in  any  event,  do  as  soon  as  she  with  propriety  could; 
but  that  she  would  not  lead  or  tempt  the  archduke 
into  difficulty,  and  then  desert  him  before  his  govern- 
ment was  settled.  He  said  that  the  early  acknowl- 
edgment of  that  government  by  the  United  States 
would  tend  to  shorten,  or  perhaps  to  end,  all  the 
troublesome  complications  of  France  in  that  country; 
that  they  would  thereupon  quit  Mexico. ^° 

To  this  communication,  Mr.  Seward  replied  that  the 
French  government  had  not  been  left  uninformed  of 
the  opinion  of  the  United  States  that  the  permanent 
establishment  of  a  foreign  and  monarchical  govern- 
ment in  Mexico  would  be  found  neither  easy  nor  de- 
sirable ;  that  the  United  States  could  not  anticipate  the 
action  of  the  Mexican  people;  and  that  the  United 
States  still  regarded  Mexico  as  the  scene  of  a  war 
which  had  not  yet  ended  in  the  subversion  of  the 
government  long  existing  there,  with  which  the  United 
States  remained  in  the  relation  of  peace  and  friend- 
ship.^" 


'•  Dayton  to  Seward,  Oct.  9,  1863,  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No,  11,  p,  471,  Thirty- 
eighth    Cong.,    First   Sess. 

•"  Seward  to  Dayton,  Oct.  23,  1863,     Ibid. 

2T8 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

Before  formally  accepting  the  crown,  the  archduke 
visited  England  v/ith  a  view  to  securing  a  promise  of 
recognition  for  his  new  position.  He  was,  of  course, 
to  pass  through  Paris,  and  in  view  of  his  approaching 
visit,  Mr.  Dayton  asked  for  instructions  as  to  his  con- 
duct on  the  occasion.  Mr.  Seward  replied,  February 
2.y,  1864: 

I  have  taken  the  President's  direction  upon  the  question. 
If  the  Archduke  Maximilian  appears  in  Paris  only  in  his 
character  as  an  imperial  prince  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg, 
you  will  be  expected  to  be  neither  demonstrative  nor  reserved 
in  your  deportment  toward  him.  If  he  appears  there  with 
any  assumption  of  political  authority  or  title  in  Mexico,  you 
will  entirely  refrain  from  intercourse  with  him.  Should 
your  proceeding  be  a  subject  of  inquiry  or  remark,  you  will 
be  at  liberty,  in  the  exercise  of  your  own  discretion,  to  say 
that  this  government,  in  view  of  its  rights  and  duties  in  the 
present  conjuncture  of  its  affairs,  has  prescribed  fixed  rules 
to  be  observed,  not  only  by  this  department,  but  by  its  repre- 
sentatives in  foreign  countries.  We  acknowledge  revolutions 
only  by  direction  of  the  President,  upon  full  and  mature  con- 
sideration." 

The  archduke  visited  London  in  company  with  his 
father-in-law,  Leopold  of  Belgium.  The  British  gov- 
ernment declined  to  act  on  the  subject  at  that  juncture, 
"  but  gave  them  reason  to  hope  that,  so  soon  as  the 
action  in  Mexico  would  appear  to  justify  it,  they  would 
acknowledge  him."  ^^  Spain  and  Belgium  were  ready 
to  follow  in  the  wake  of  France. 

About  the  time  of  this  visit  of  Maximilian  to  Eng- 
land, Mr.  McDougall,  of  California,  introduced  in 
the  Senate  a  resolution  declaring  *'  that  the  movements 

»'  Dip.    Corr.,    1864. 

**  Adams  to   Seward,   March   24,    1864. 

219 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  the  government  of  France,  and  the  threatened 
movement  of  an  emperor,  improvised  by  the  Emperor 
of  France,  demand  by  this  republic,  if  insisted  upon, 
war."  This  resolution  was  not  carried,  but  some  days 
later,  on  the  4th  of  April,  1864,  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives passed  by  a  unanimous  vote  a  resolution 
declaring  its  opposition  to  the  recognition  of  a  mon- 
archy in  Mexico.  Mr.  Seward,  fearing  a  rupture  with 
France  on  this  account,  took  pains  to  inform  the  gov- 
ernment of  that  country,  through  Mr.  Dayton,  that 
this  action  of  the  House  was  in  no  way  binding  on  the 
executive,  even  if  concurred  in  by  the  Senate. 

The  formal  acceptance  of  the  crown  of  Mexico  by 
Maximilian  took  place  April  10,  1864,  at  Miramar,  the 
palace  he  had  built  near  Trieste,  in  the  presence  of  the 
Mexican  deputation.  The  next  day  the  Emperor  and 
Empress  of  Mexico,  as  they  styled  themselves,  set  out 
for  their  new  dominions  by  way  of  Rome,  where  they 
received  the  blessing  of  the  Pope.  Before  leaving 
Europe  Maximilian  signed  with  the  Emperor  of  the 
French  a  convention  in  the  following  terms : 

The  French  troops  in  Mexico  were  to  be  reduced 
as  soon  as  possible  to  25,000  men. 

The  French  troops  were  to  evacuate  Mexico  in  pro- 
portion as  the  Emperor  of  Mexico  could  organize 
troops  to  replace  them. 

The  "  foreign  legion,"  composed  of  8,000  men,  was 
to  remain  in  Mexico  six  years  after  all  the  other 
French  troops  should  have  been  recalled. 

The  expenses  of  the  French  expedition  to  Mexico, 
to  be  paid  by  the  Mexican  government,  were  fixed  at 
the  sum  of  two  hundred  and  seventy  million  francs 
for  the  whole  duration  of  the   expedition  down  to 

220 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

July  I,  1864.  From  July  ist  all  expenses  of  the  Mexi- 
can army  were  to  be  met  by  Mexico. ^^ 

The  resolution  of  the  House  referred  to  above  came 
very  near  producing  the  rupture  that  Mr.  Seward  was 
striving  to  avert,  or  at  least  to  postpone,  during  the 
continuance  of  the  war  of  secession.  When  Mr.  Day- 
ton visited  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  just  after  the  resolu- 
tion reached  Europe,  the  remark  which  greeted  Mr. 
Dayton  when  he  entered  the  room  was :  "  Do  you 
bring  us  peace,  or  bring  us  war?"  Mr.  Dayton  re- 
plied that  he  did  not  think  France  had  a  right  to 
think  that  the  United  States  was  about  to  make  war 
against  her  on  account  of  anything  contained  in  that 
resolution;  that  it  embodied  nothing  more  than  the 
principles  which  the  United  States  had  constantly  held 
out  to  France  from  the  beginning. 

The  Confederate  agents  were  taking  advantage  of 
the  resolution  to  stir  up  trouble  between  the  United 
States  and  France.  In  fact  they  had  long  caused 
reports  to  be  spread  in  Europe,  and  had  succeeded 
in  gaining  credence  for  them,  to  the  effect  that  the 
United  States  government  was  only  awaiting  the  ter- 
mination of  domestic  troubles  to  drive  the  French 
from  Mexico.  The  French  naturally  concluded  that 
if  they  were  to  have  trouble  with  the  United  States, 
it  was  safest  for  them  to  choose  their  own  time." 
Napoleon  was  all  the  while  coquetting  with  the  Con- 
federate government,  and  holding  above  Mr.  Seward's 
head  a  veiled  threat  of  recognition  of  Confederate  in- 
dependence. The  Confederate  government  quickly 
caught  at  the  suggestion  of  an  alliance  between  Maxi- 

•»  Dipl.   Corr.,    1865,   Part   III,  pp.   356-849. 

»*  Dipl.   Corr.,    1864;   also  Sen.   Ex.   Doc.   No.    11,   Thirty-eighth   Cong., 
First  Sess. 

221 


,    UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

milian  and  the  South  with  the  power  of  France  to 
back  them.  A  Confederate  agent  was  actually  ac- 
credited to  the  government  of  Maximilian,  but  did  not 
reach  his  destination.  Although  Napoleon's  calcula- 
tions were  based  on  the  overthrow  of  the  Union,  and 
although  he  had  assumed  at  the  outset,  with  England 
and  Spain,  an  attitude  decidedly  unfriendly  to  the  Fed- 
eral government,  nevertheless  he  was  not  willing  to 
go  the  full  length  of  recognizing  the  Confederacy  as 
an  independent  power  while  the  issue  of  the  conflict 
was  still  in  doubt. 

In  speaking  of  Slidell's  movements  in  Europe  and 
the  encouragement  given  him  in  France,  Mr.  Bigelow 
wrote  to  Mr.  Seward,  February  14,  1865 : 

I  am  strongly  impressed  with  the  conviction  that,  but  for 
the  Mexican  entanglement,  the  insurgents  would  receive  very 
little  further  countenance  from  the  imperial  government,  and 
that  a  reconciliation  of  the  national  policies  of  the  two 
countries  on  that  question  would  speedily  dispose  of  all  other 
sources  of  dissatisfaction. 

As  the  war  of  secession  seemed  nearing  its  end,  the 
French  papers  became  uneasy  in  view  of  possible  inter- 
vention in  Mexico  by  the  United  States  on  the  ground 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  This  principle  of  American 
diplomacy,  which  was  Hkened  to  the  sword  of  Damo- 
cles suspended  over  the  head  of  Maximilian,  was 
discussed  in  aJl  its  bearings  on  the  present  case  by  the 
journals  of  Europe.^' 

Throughout  all  this  period  of  turmoil,  the  United 
States  recognized  no  authority  in  Mexico  but  that  of 
the  Juarez  government.     In  April,  1864,  the  French 

•»  Dipl.   Corr.,   1865,  Part  III,  pp.   380-385. 

222 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

minister  at  Washington  complained  that  serious  com- 
plications with  France  were  likely  to  arise  out  of 
grants  of  land  made  by  "ex-President  Juarez"  in 
Sonora  to  emigrants  from  California.  The  French 
government  regarded  these  grants  as  illegal  and  pro- 
posed to  send  forces  there  to  prevent  the  parties  from 
taking  "  illicit  possession." 

In  May,  1864,  the  French  government  sought  ex- 
planations in  regard  to  a  club  formed  in  New  Orleans, 
called  the  "  D.  M.  D.,"  Defenders  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. Mr.  Seward  replied  that  the  object  of  the  club, 
so  far  as  the  government  had  been  able  to  ascertain, 
was  to  bring  moral  influences  to  bear  upon  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  in  favor  of  a  mainte- 
nance of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  not  to  act  in  vio- 
lation of  the  law,  or  of  the  well-understood  govern- 
mental policy  of  neutrality  in  the  war  which  existed 
between  France  and  Mexico.  Members  of  the  associa- 
tion did,  however,  actually  start  on  an  expedition  to 
Brownsville,  but  the  steamer  was  taken  possession  of 
by  United  States  officials.  During  the  year  1864  con- 
stant complaint  was  made  by  the  French  government 
of  shipments  of  arms  to  the  Juarez  government  from 
California  and  from  various  points  along  the  Rio 
Grande,  particularly  Brownsville,  in  violation  of 
American  neutrality. 

Shortly  after  the  surrender  of  General  Lee,  several 
Confederate  officers  of  high  position  and  influence  went 
to  Mexico  and  identified  themselves  with  the  govern- 
ment of  Maximilian.  Dr.  Wm.  M.  Gwin,  a  former 
United  States  Senator  from  California,  organized  a 
plan  for  colonizing  the  states  of  northern  Mexico  with 
ex-Confederates.    This  scheme  was  the  subject  of  sev- 

22Z 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

eral  representations  to  the  French  government  on  the 
part  of  Mr.  Seward.  He  reminded  them  that  the  sym- 
pathies of  the  American  people  were  already  consider- 
ably excited  in  favor  of  the  republic  of  Mexico;  that 
they  were  disposed  to  regard  with  impatience  the  con- 
tinued intervention  of  France  in  that  country;  and 
that  any  favor  shown  to  the  proceedings  of  Dr.  Gwin 
by  the  titular  Emperor  of  Mexico  or  by  the  imperial 
government  of  France  would  tend  greatly  to  increase 
the  popular  impatience.  He  further  requested  an  as- 
surance that  the  pretenses  of  Dr.  Gwin  and  his  asso- 
ciates were  destitute  of  any  sanction  from  the  Emperor 
of  France. 

Among  the  most  prominent  Confederates  connected 
with  this  scheme  were  Matthew  F.  Maury,  the  dis- 
tinguished geographer  and  naval  officer,  who  became 
a  naturalized  Mexican  citizen  and  was  appointed  Im- 
perial Commissioner  of  Immigration  and  an  honorary 
councillor  of  state;  and  General  John  B.  Magruder, 
who  was  charged  with  the  supervision  of  the  survey  of 
lands  for  colonization.  It  was  hoped  that  the  promi- 
nence of  these  men  and  the  high  rank  they  had  held 
under  the  Confederate  government  would,  in  the  gen- 
eral uncertainty  that  prevailed  as  to  the  treatment  of 
the  South  by  the  victorious  Union  party,  induce  many 
persons  to  emigrate  to  Mexico.  Maximilian  issued  a 
special  decree,  September  5,  1865,  regarding  coloniza- 
tion with  a  view  to  inducing  Southern  planters  to  emi- 
grate to  Mexico  with  their  slaves — the  latter  to  be 
reduced  to  a  state  of  peonage,  regular  slavery  being 
prohibited  by  the  laws  of  the  empire.  This  scheme 
was  altogether  impracticable. 

In  July,  1865,  Maximilian  finally  made  an  effort  to 
224 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

secure  recognition  of  his  government  by  the  United 
States.  On  the  17th  of  July,  the  Marquis  de  Mon- 
tholon,  the  French  minister  at  Washington,  called  at 
the  department  of  state  and  informed  Mr.  Seward 
that  a  special  agent  had  arrived  at  Washington,  bear- 
ing a  letter  signed  by  Maximilian  and  addressed  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  a  copy  of  which 
the  marquis  presented  to  the  secretary  of  state.  On 
the  1 8th,  Mr.  Seward  delivered  back  the  copy  of  the 
letter  to  the  Marquis  de  Montholon,  and  said  that,  as 
the  United  States  were  on  friendly  relations  with  the 
republican  government  of  Mexico,  the  President  de- 
clined to  receive  the  letter  or  to  hold  any  intercourse 
with  the  agent  who  brought  it.  The  French  govern- 
ment expressed  to  its  representative  at  Washington 
its  annoyance  and  embarrassment  at  this  step,  and 
said  that  Maximilian  should  have  taken  measures  to 
learn  the  disposition  of  the  United  States  before  send- 
ing the  agent. ^^ 

Mr.  Tucker,  in  his  book  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
makes  the  statement  that  Mr.  Bigelow,  who  succeeded 
Mr.  Dayton  as  minister  to  France,  announced  to  the 
French  government  that  the  United  States  would  rec- 
ognize the  empire  of  Maximilian  upon  the  immediate 
withdrawal  of  the  French  troops  from  the  territory  of 
Mexico,  but  that  this  statement,  made  upon  the  envoy's 
own  authority,  w^as  disavowed  by  the  President.  This 
is  hardly  a  correct  version  of  the  case.  It  seems  that 
Mr.  Bigelow,  in  the  course  of  a  conversation  with  M. 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  asked  him,  "  in  his  own  name,  and 
without  prejudicing  the  opinion  of  his  government,  if 
he  did  not  think  that  the  recognition  of  Maximilian  by 

'•  Dipl.  Corr.  1865,  Part  III. 

225 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  United  States  would  facilitate  and  hasten  the  re- 
call of  the  French  troops."  ^^ 

On  the  3rd  of  October,  1865,  Maximilian  issued  a 
decree  at  the  city  of  Mexico,  the  first  article  of  which 
declared : 

All  persons  belonging  to  armed  bands  or  corps,  not  legally 
authorized,  whether  they  proclaim  or  not  any  political  princi- 
ples, and  whatever  be  the  number  of  those  who  compose  the 
said  bands,  their  organization,  character  and  denomination 
shall  be  tried  militarily  by  the  courts-martial;  and  if  found 
guilty  even  of  the  only  fact  of  belonging  to  the  band,  they 
shall  be  condemned  to  capital  punishment,  within  the  twenty- 
four  hours  following  the  sentence." 

The  United  States,  through  Mr.  Bigelow,  protested 
to  France  against  this  decree,  as  repugnant  to  the 
sentiments  of  modern  civilization  and  the  instincts  of 
humanity.  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  replied  with  a  touch 
of  sarcasm: 

Why  do  you  not  go  to  President  Juarez?  We  are  not  the 
government  of  Mexico  and  you  do  us  too  much  honor  to 
treat  us  as  such.  We  had  to  go  to  Mexico  with  an  army  to 
secure  certain  important  interests,  but  we  are  not  responsible 
for  Maximilian  or  his  government.  He  is  accountable  to  you, 
as  to  any  other  government,  if  he  violated  its  rights,  and  you 
have  the  same  remedies  there  that  we  had.*' 

The  American  government  was  now  relieved  from 
the  burden  of  civil  war,  and  for  several  months  the 
correspondence  of  Mr.  Seward  had  been  assuming  a 
more  decided  tone.  On  September  6,  1865,  he  re- 
minded the  French  government  that  the  attention  of 

»T  Tucker,  p.  104;  Dipl.  Corr.,  1865.  Part  III. 
•»  Sen.   Ex.    Doc   No.   s.   P-    3.   Thirty-ninth   Cong.,   First    Sess. 
••  Mr.    Bigelow   to   Mr.    Seward,   Nov.    30,    1865,    Sen.    Ex.    Doc.    No.   5, 
Thirty-ninth  Cong.,   First  Sessw 

226 


'FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

the  country  was  now  no  longer  occupied  by  the  civil 
war,  and  that  henceforth  both  the  Congress  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States  might  be  expected  to  give 
a  very  large  share  of  their  attention  to  questions  of 
foreign  policy,  chief  among  which  was  likely  to  be 
that  of  their  relations  with  France  in  regard  to  Mexico. 
About  this  time  Major  General  Schofield  was  sent  to 
Paris  on  a  mission,  the  precise  object  of  which  was 
long  a  matter  of  mystery.  It  appears  from  John  Bige- 
low's  memoirs  that  Grant,  Schofield,  and  a  number  of 
other  army  officers  were  bringing  great  pressure  to 
bear  upon  the  government  to  intervene  by  force  and 
drive  Maximilian  from  Mexico.  Seward,  with  his 
usual  political  sagacity,  concluded  that  the  best  method 
of  holding  Grant  and  his  followers  in  check  was  to 
send  Schofield  to  Paris  on  an  informal  mission.  Ac- 
cording to  the  latter,  Seward  said  to  him :  "  I  want 
you  to  get  your  legs  under  Napoleon's  mahogany  and 
tell  him  he  must  get  out  of  Mexico."  Seward  knew 
perfectly  well  that  Schofield  would  not  be  as  belliger- 
ent in  the  presence  of  the  Emperor  as  he  was  in  Wash- 
ington, and  above  all  he  had  confidence  in  Bigelow's 
tact  and  ability  to  handle  Schofield  when  he  arrived  in 
Paris.  The  plan  worked  beautifully.  Neither  Bige- 
low  nor  Schofield  reported  just  what  took  place  at  the 
interview  with  the  Emperor,  but  we  may  be  sure  that 
Schofield  did  not  say  in  Paris  what  he  had  intended 
to  say  when  he  left  Washington.  After  Bigelow  re- 
turned from  Paris  in  1867,  he  had  a  conversation  with 
Seward  in  which  the  latter  said: 

I  sent  General  Schofield  to  Paris  to  parry  a  letter  brought 
to  us  from  Grant  insisting  that  the  French  be  driven  head 

227 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

over  heels  and  at  once  out  of  Mexico.  It  answered  my  pur- 
pose. It  gave  Schofield  something  to  do,  and  converted  him 
to  the  poUcy  of  the  Department  by  convincing  him  that  the 
French  were  going  as  fast  as  they  could.  That  pacified 
Grant  and  made  everythmg  easy.*" 

On  November  6  Seward  wrote : 

The  presence  and  operations  of  a  French  army  in  Mexico, 
and  its  maintenance  of  an  authority  there,  resting  upon  force 
and  not  the  free  will  of  the  people  of  Mexico,  is  a  cause 
of  serious  concern  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
They  still  regard  the  effort  to  establish  permanently  a  foreign 
and  imperial  government  in  Mexico  as  disallowable  and  im- 
practicable. For  these  reasons  they  could  not  now  agree  to 
compromise  the  position  they  have  hitherto  assumed.  They 
are  not  prepared  to  recognize  any  political  institutions  in 
Mexico  which  are  in  opposition  to  the  republican  govern- 
ment with  which  we  have  so  long  and  so  constantly  main- 
tained relations  of  amity  and  friendship. 

Finally,  on  December  i6,  1865,  Seward  addressed 
what  was  practically  an  ultimatum  to  France.  He 
pointed  out  the  likelihood  that  Congress,  then  in  ses- 
sion, would  direct  by  law  the  action  of  the  executive 
on  this  important  subject,  and  stated  that : 

It  has  been  the  President's  purpose  that  France  should  be 
respectfully  informed  upon  two  points,  namely:  First,  that 
the  United  States  earnestly  desire  to  continue  and  to  cultivate 
sincere  friendship  with  France.  Second,  that  this  policy 
would  be  brought  into  imminent  jeopardy,  unless  France 
could  deem  it  consistent  with  her  interest  and  honor  to  desist 
from  the  prosecution  of  armed  intervention  in  Mexico,  to 
overthrow  the  domestic  republican  government  existing  there, 
and  to  establish  upon  its  ruins  the  foreign  monarchy  which 

*"  Bigelow,  "  Retrospections  of  an  Active  Life,"  Vol.  IV,  p.  42;  Bani 
croft,  "  Life  of  Seward,"  Vol.   II,  p.  435. 

228 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

has  been  attempted  to  be  inaugurated  in  the  capital  of  that 
country. 

In  conclusion  he  added  : 

It  remains  now  only  to  make  known  to  M.  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  my  profound  regret  that  he  has  thought  it  his  duty 
to  leave  the  subject,  in  his  conversation  with  you,  in  a 
condition  that  does  not  authorize  an  expectation  on  our  part 
that  a  satisfactory  adjustment  of  the  case  can  be  effected  on 
any  basis  that  thus  far  has  been  discussed. 

As  late  as  November  29,  1865,  the  French  govern- 
ment, through  the  Marquis  de  Montholon,  still  in- 
sisted on  recognition  of  Maximilian  by  the  United 
States  as  the  only  basis  for  an  arrangement  for  the 
recall  of  the  French  troops." 

The  formal  reply  to  Mr.  Seward's  note  of  December 
16  was  received  through  the  Marquis  de  Montholon, 
January  29,  1866.  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  still  insisted 
that  the  French  expedition  had  in  it  nothing  hostile  to 
the  institutions  of  the  new  world,  and  assuredly  still 
less  to  those  of  the  United  States.  He  called  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  United  States  had  acknowledged 
the  right  of  France  to  make  war  on  Mexico,  and  con- 
tinued :  "  On  the  other  part,  we  admit,  as  they  do,  the 
principle  of  non-intervention ;  this  double  postulate  in- 
cludes, as  it  seems  to  me,  the  elements  of  an  agree- 
ment." He  also  contended  that  the  right  to  make 
war  implied  the  right  to  secure  the  results  of  war; 
that  they  had  to  demand  guarantees,  and  these  guar- 
antees they  could  not  look  for  from  a  government 
whose  bad  faith  they  had  proven  on  so  many  occa- 


"  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  6,  p.  98,  Thirty-ninth  Cong.,   First  Sess. 

229; 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

sions;  that  they  found  themselves  engaged  in  the 
establishment  of  a  regular  government,  which  showed 
itself  disposed  to  keep  its  engagements;  that  the  Mexi- 
can people  had  spoken,  and  that  the  Emperor  Maxi- 
milian had  been  called  to  the  throne  by  the  will  of  the 
people  of  the  country/^ 

Mr.  Seward's  counter-reply  was  dated  February  12, 
1866.  He  declared  that  the  proceedings  in  Mexico 
were  regarded  in  the  United  States  as  having  been 
taken  without  the  authority,  and  prosecuted  against 
the  will  and  opinions  of  the  Mexican  people;  that  the 
United  States  had  not  seen  any  satisfactory  evidence 
that  the  people  of  Mexico  had  spoken  and  called  into 
being  or  accepted  the  so-called  empire,  and  that  the 
withdrawal  of  the  French  troops  was  deemed  neces- 
sary to  allow  such  a  proceeding  to  be  taken.  He 
added,  however,  that : 

France  need  not  for  a  moment  delay  her  proposed  with- 
drawal of  military  forces  from  Mexico,  and  her  putting  the 
principle  of  non-intervention  into  full  and  complete  practice 
in  regard  to  Mexico  through  any  apprehension  that  the 
United  States  will  prove  unfaithful  to  the  principles  and 
policy  in  that  respect  which,  on  their  behalf,  it  has  been  my 
duty  to  maintain  in  this  now  very  lengthened  corre- 
spondence.** 

He  concluded  with  a  virtual  ultimatum : 

We  shall  be  gratified  when  the  Emperor  shall  give  to  us 
.  .  .  definite  information  of  the  time  when  French  military 
operations  may  be  expected  to  cease  in  Mexico. 


**  House  Ex.   Doc.  No.  93,  Thirty-ninth  Cong.,   First   Sess. 
♦»  Dipl.   Corr..   1865,  Part   III;   also  H.   Ex.    Doc.   No.  93,  Thirty-ninth. 
Cong.,  First  Sess. 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

Napoleon  finally  decided  that,  in  view  of  the  Euro- 
pean situation,  he  could  not  risk  a  war  with  the  United 
States,  and  in  the  issue  of  April  5,  1866,  the  Moniteur 
announced  that  the  Emperor  had  decided  that  the 
French  troops  should  evacuate  Mexico  in  three  de- 
tachments :  the  first  to  leave  in  November,  1866 ;  the 
second  in  March,  1867;  and  the  third  in  November, 
1867.  In  the  course  of  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Bige- 
low  the  day  following  M,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  acknowl- 
edged that  this  statement  was  official."  The  decision 
of  the  emperor  was  officially  made  known  to  the 
United  States  in  a  note  of  April  21,  1866.  Seward 
had  very  fortunately  left  a  loophole  in  his  dispatch  of 
February  12,  in  the  statement  that  the  United  States 
would  continue  to  pursue  its  policy  of  neutrahty  after 
the  French  evacuation.    De  Lhuys  said : 

We  receive  this  assurance  with  entire  confidence  and  we 
find  therein  a  sufficient  guarantee  not  any  longer  to  delay 
the  adoption  of  measures  intended  to  prepare  for  the  return 
of  our  army.** 

American  historians  have  usually  attributed  Na- 
poleon's backdown  to  Seward's  diplomacy  supported 
by  the  military  power  of  the  United  States,  which  was, 
of  course,  greater  then  than  at  any  other  time  in  our 
history.  All  this  undoubtedly  had  its  effect  on  Na- 
poleon's mind,  but  it  appears  that  conditions  in  Europe 
just  at  that  particular  moment  had  an  even  greater 
influence  in  causing  him  to  abandon  his  Mexican 
scheme.  Within  a  few  days  of  the  receipt  of  Seward's 
ultimatum  Napoleon  was  informed  of  Bismarck's  de- 

**  H.    Ex.   Doc.   No.   93,   p.   42,   Thirty-ninth   Congr.,    First   Sess. 
«»  Ibid. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

termination  to  force  a  war  with  Austria  over  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  controversy.  Napoleon  realized 
that  the  territorial  aggrandizement  of  Prussia,  without 
any  corresponding  gains  by  France,  would  be  a  serious 
blow  to  his  prestige  and  in  fact  endanger  his  throne. 
He  at  once  entered  upon  a  long  and  hazardous  diplo- 
matic game  in  which  Bismarck  outplayed  him  and 
eventually  forced  him  into  war.  In  order  to  have  a 
free  hand  to  meet  the  European  situation  he  decided 
to  yield  to  the  American  demands. 

About  the  time  that  the  French  government  an- 
nounced its  intention  of  withdrawing  its  forces  from 
Mexico,  it  was  found  that  troops  were  being  enlisted 
in  Austria  for  the  Mexican  "  foreign  legion."  The 
United  States  government  at  once  took  measures  to 
prevent  the  French  troops  from  being  replaced  by 
Austrians  by  declaring  to  the  Austrian  government 
through  Mr.  Motley,  "  that  in  the  event  of  hostilities 
being  carried  on  hereafter  in  Mexico  by  Austrian  sub- 
jects, under  the  command  or  with  the  sanction  of  the 
government  of  Vienna,  the  United  States  will  feel 
themselves  at  liberty  to  regard  those  hostilities  as  con- 
stituting a  state  of  war  by  Austria  against  the  republic 
of  Mexico;  and  in  regard  to  such  war,  waged  at  this 
time  and  under  existing  circumstances,  the  United 
States  could  not  engage  to  remain  as  silent  and  neu- 
tral spectators."  ** 

Mr.  Motley  seems  to  have  been  somewhat  surprised 
and  puzzled  at  the  sudden  and  emphatic  change  of 
tone  in  the  instructions  of  his  government,  and  failed 
to  carry  them  out  in  the  spirit  intended  by  Mr.  Sew- 
ard.    This  brought  forth  a  sharp  reprimand.     Mr. 

♦•  Wharton's   Digest,   Sec.   58,   Vol.   I,  p.   328. 

232 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

Seward  expressed  his  strong  disapproval  of  the  posi- 
tion taken  by  Mr.  Motley  in  his  communication  of 
the  instructions  of  the  department  to  the  Austrian  gov- 
ernment, and  directed  him  to  carry  out  his  instructions 
according  to  the  strict  letter,  adding: 

I  refrain  from  discussing  the  question  you  have  raised, 
"  Whether  the  recent  instructions  of  this  department  harmo- 
nize entirely  with  the  policy  which  it  pursued  at  an  earlier 
period  of  the  European  intervention  in  Mexico," 

Mr.  Motley  was  instructed  to  withdraw  from 
Vienna  in  case  troops  were  sent  from  Austria  to 
Mexico.  The  embarkation  of  troops  for  this  purpose 
was  stopped.  Austria  was  in  a  great  state  of  excite- 
ment over  the  approaching  war  with  Prussia,  and, 
besides  needing  all  her  available  troops  at  home,  did 
not  care  to  antagonize  the  United  States. 

It  was  now  a  question  of  great  interest  in  this  coun- 
try and  in  Europe,  whether  Maximilian  would  with- 
draw from  Mexico  with  the  French  troops  or  attempt 
to  maintain  himself  there  without  foreign  support. 
Napoleon  sent  one  of  his  aides  to  Mexico  to  make 
known  his  intentions  to  Maximilian.  This  fact  was 
communicated  to  the  United  States  government, 
October  i6,  1866: 

Mr.  de  Castelnau  has  for  his  mission  to  make  it  well 
understood  that  the  limit  of  our  sacrifices  is  reached  and 
that  if  the  Emperor  Maximilian,  thinking  to  find  in  the 
country  itself  a  point  of  sufficient  support,  may  wish  to  en- 
deavor to  maintain  himself  there,  he  cannot  for  the  future 
count  on  any  succor  on  the  part  of  France.  But  it  may 
happen  that,  deeming  it  impossible  to  triumph  through  his 
own  resources  over  the  difficulties  which  surround  him,  this 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

sovereign  may  determine  to  abdicate.  We  will  do  nothing 
to  dissuade  him  from  this,  and  we  think  that  on  this  hypothe- 
sis there  would  be  ground  to  proceed,  by  way  of  election,  in 
the  establishment  of  a  new  government.*^ 

When  the  time  came  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  first 
contingent  of  French  troops,  no  action  to  that  end 
was  taken  by  the  French  government,  and  the  United 
States  had  once  more  to  seek  an  explanation.  The 
Emperor  assured  the  American  government,  however, 
that  he  had  decided  from  military  considerations  to 
withdraw  all  his  troops  in  the  spring  in  a  body,  as  the 
recent  successes  of  the  insurgents  would  render  any 
large  reduction  of  his  forces  perilous  to  those  who 
remained.  He  further  stated  that  he  had  counselled 
Ma:ximilian  to  abdicate.*^  To  the  surprise  of  every- 
one, however,  Maximilian  seemed  to  think  that  honor 
demanded  that  he  should  remain  in  Mexico  and  share 
the  fate  of  his  supporters. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  Mr.  Corwin,  owing  to  the 
unsettled  state  of  affairs  in  Mexico,  the  United  States 
had  no  one  accredited  to  that  government  until  May, 
1866,  when  Mr.  Lewis  D.  Campbell,  of  Ohio,  was  ap- 
pointed. He  left  New  York  for  his  post  in  November, 
1866,  accompanied  by  Lieutenant  General  William  T. 
Sherman  of  the  army.  They  proceeded  in  the  U.  S.  S. 
Susquehanna  by  way  of  Havana,  but  as  they  found  the 
principal  Mexican  ports  on  the  Atlantic  still  occupied 
by  the  French,  they  proceeded  to  New  Orleans,  from 
which  point  Mr.  Campbell  tried  to  establish  regular 
communication  with  President  Juarez.  The  President 
had  first  decided  to  dispatch  General  Grant  with  Mr. 

«'  Dipl.   Corr.,   1866,   Part  I.  p.   387. 

•»  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  30,  Fortieth  Cong.,  First  Sess. 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

Campbell,  in  the  hope  "  that  some  disposition  might 
be  made  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United,, 
States  without  interfering  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
Mexico,  or  violating  the  laws  of  neutrality,  which 
would  be  useful  in  favoring  the  restoration  of  law,' 
order  and  republican  government  in  that  country." 
This  demonstration  was  intended  to  insure  the  with- 
drawal of  the  French  army  according  to  the  promises 
of  the  Emperor.  A  hitch  occurred  through  some  ques- 
tion raised  by  General  Grant  and  General  Sherman 
was  substituted.*^ 

The  French  army  was  withdrawn  in  the  spring  of 
1867,  and  it  very  soon  became  evident  that  Maxi- 
milian's cause  would  speedily  collapse.  In  view  of  the 
almost  inevitable  capture  of  Maximilian,  Mr.  Seward 
telegraphed  to  Mr.  Campbell  at  New  Orleans,  April 
6,  1867: 

You  will  communicate  to  President  Juarez,  promptly  and 
by  effectual  means,  the  desire  of  this  government,  that  in  case 
of  capture,  the  prince  and  his  supporters  may  receive  the 
humane  treatment  accorded  by  civilized  nations  to  prisoners 
of  war. 

Some  of  the  prisoners  already  taken  had  been  sum- 
marily executed. 

Mr.  Campbell  at  once  dispatched  a  special  mes- 
senger, who  succeeded  in  getting  through  to  the  head- 
quarters of  Juarez,  and  who  returned  with  an  answer 
from  the  Mexican  government,  dated  April  22,  1867. 
This  answer  not  only  undertook  to  defend  the  execu- 
tion of  prisoners  above  referred  to,  but  also  intimated 
that  similar  severity  would  be  practiced  on  Maximilian 

*•  Dipl.  Corr.,  1866,  Part  III. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

and  his  leading  associates,  if  captured,  on  the  ground 
that,  by  his  harsh  decrees,  he  had  placed  himself  be- 
yond the  pale  of  the  law  of  nations.^" 

Maximilian  and  his  chief  supporters  were  taken 
prisoners,  May  15,  1867.  This  information  was  re- 
ceived in  the  United  States  toward  the  last  of  the 
month,  and  along  with  it  a  report,  not  well  authen- 
ticated and  which  afterward  proved  to  be  false,  that 
they  had  been  executed  on  the  i6th.  As  soon  as  these 
rumors  reached  Washington,  Mr.  Seward  telegraphed 
to  Mr.  Campbell,  then  at  New  Orleans,  June  i,  1867, 
directing  him  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  residence  of 
the  President  of  Mexico  and  enter  on  his  mission,  and 
if  necessary  to  urge  clemency  to  Maximilian  and  the 
other  prisoners  of  war.  Mr.  Campbell  failed  to  act 
under  these  instructions.  He  requested  first  that  a 
public  vessel  of  the  United  States  should  be  detailed 
to  carry  him  to  Mexico.  When  it  was  found  that  no 
ship  was  available  for  this  purpose,  he  was  ordered 
to  proceed  to  Havana  and  thence  by  the  British  or 
French  line  of  steamers  to  Vera  Cruz.  He  replied 
that  under  the  circumstances  he  did  not  think  it  be- 
coming the  dignity  of  the  representative  of  the  United 
States  to  return  to  Mexico  under  the  flag  of  a  nation 
which  had  shown  such  hostility  to  that  country.  He 
thus  remained  at  New  Orleans  from  the  first  to  the 
fifteenth  of  June.  He  was  then  ordered  peremptorily 
to  proceed  at  once  according  to  instructions.  He  re- 
plied that  he  was  ill  and  was  afraid  to  go  by  way  of 
Havana,  where  yellow  fever  was  raging;  that  he  would 
resign,  if  desired.  The  same  day  Mr.  Seward  tele- 
graphed him  that  his  resignation  would  be  accepted. 

•«  Dipl.  Corr.,   1866,  Part  III. 

236 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO 

Mr.  Seward  then  informed  Mr.  Romero,  the  Mexi- 
can minister  at  Washington,  that  Austria,  France,  and 
Great  Britain  had  appealed  to  the  United  States  to  use 
its  good  offices  to  avert  the  execution  of  Prince  Maxi- 
mihan.  He  strongly  recommended  clemency  to  Presi- 
dent Juarez,  as  good  policy,  and  requested  Mr.  Romero 
to  make  the  same  known  to  his  government  at  once. 
This  was  June  15,  the  same  day  that  Mr.  Campbell's 
resignation  was  accepted.  On  the  21st,  Mr.  Seward 
requested  Mr.  Romero  to  inform  President  Juarez  that 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  would  restore  Maximilian  to 
all  his  rights  of  succession  upon  his  release  and  re- 
nouncing forever  all  projects  in  Mexico." 

Meanwhile  Maximilian  of  Hapsburg,  Miguel  Mira- 
mon,  and  Tomas  Mejia  had  been  tried  by  court-martial 
and  sentenced  to  death,  June  14.  The  sentence  was 
confirmed  by  the  government  on  the  15th,  and  the 
execution  fixed  for  the  i6th,  but  at  the  request  of 
Maximilian's  counsel,  it  was  suspended  by  order  of 
President  Juarez  until  the  19th,  in  order  to  allow  the 
prince  to  arrange  certain  business  affairs  of  a  private 
character.  At  seven  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  June 
19  the  prisoners  were  shot. 

»*  Sen.    Ex.    Doc.   N(x   20,    Fortieth    Cong.,    First   Sess. 


237 


CHAPTER  VI 
The  Two  Venezuelan  Episodes 

As  a  result  of  Blaine's  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
force  Great  Britain  to  relinquish  her  rights  under  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  fallen 
somewhat  into  disrepute  when  in  1895  ^^  was  suddenly 
revived  in  a  striking  and  sensational  way  by  President 
Cleveland's  intervention  in  the  Venezuelan  boundary 
controversy.  The  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela  in  regard  to  the  boundary  line  between  the 
latter  and  British  Guiana  was  of  long  standing.  In 
18 1 4,  by  treaty  with  the  Netherlands,  Great  Britain 
acquired  "  the  establishments  of  Demerara,  Essequibo, 
and  Berbice,"  now  known  as  British  Guiana.  From 
that  time  on  the  boundary  line  between  British  Guiana 
and  Venezuela  was  a  matter  of  dispute.  Venezuela 
always  claimed  the  line  of  the  Essequibo  river. 
Ovj  In  1840,  Sir  Robert  Schomburgk,  acting  under  the 
instructions  of  the  British  government,  established  a 
line  some  distance  to  the  west  of  the  Essequibo  river 
and  marked  it  by  monuments  on  the  face  of  the  coun- 
try. Venezuela  at  once  protested.  The  British  gov- 
ernment explained  that  the  line  was  only  tentative 
and  the  monuments  set  up  by  Schomburgk  were  re- 
moved. 

Various  other  lines  were  from  time  to  time  claimed 
by  Great  Britain,  each  one  extending  the  frontier  of 
British  Guiana  farther  and  farther  to  the  west.    The 

238 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

British  Colonial  OfUce  List,  a  government  publication, 
in  the  issue  for  1885,  put  the  area  of  British  Guiana 
at  about  76,000  square  miles.  In  the  issue  of  the 
same  list  for  1886  the  same  statement  occurs  in  ref- 
erence to  British  Guiana  with  the  change  of  area  to 
"  about  109,000  square  miles."  Here  was  a  gain  of 
33,000  square  miles  without  any  statement  whatever 
in  explanation  of  how  this  additional  territory  had 
been  acquired. 

After  the  failure  of  repeated  efforts  on  the  part  of 
&^  Venezuela  to  secure  an  adjustment  with  England,  she 
^  finally  came  to  the  conclusion  in  1882  that  the  only 
course  open  to  her  was  arbitration  of  the  controversy. 
She  persistently  urged  arbitration,  but  Great  Britain 
refused  to  submit  to  arbitration  any  but  a  compara- 
tively small  part  of  the  territory  in  dispute.  In  1887 
Venezuela  suspended  diplomatic  relations  with  Great 
Britain,  protesting  *'  before  her  British  majesty's  gov- 
ernment, before  all  civilized  nations,  and  before  the 
world  in  general,  against  the  acts  of  spoliation  com- 
mitted to  her  detriment  by  the  government  of  Great 
Britain,  which  she  at  no  time  and  on  no  account 
will  recognize  as  capable  of  altering  in  the  least  the 
rights  which  she  has  inherited  from  Spain  and  re- 
specting which  she  will  ever  be  willing  to  submit  to 
the  decision  of  a  third  power." 

After  repeated  efforts  to  promote  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  diplomatic  relations  between  Venezuela  and 
Great  Britain  and  after  repeated  offers  of  its  good 
offices  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  an  adjust- 
ment of  the  controversy,  President  Cleveland  finally 
determined  to  intervene  in  a  more  positive  manner 
with  a  view  to  forcing,  if  need  be,  a  settlement  of 

239 


y 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  controversy.  This  resolution  on  the  part  of  the 
American  executive,  with  a  full  statement  of  its  views 
on  the  general  principles  involved  in  the  dispute,  was 
forwarded  to  Mr.  Bayard  for  transmission  to  the 
British  government  in  Mr.  Olney's  dispatch  of  July  20, 
1895.^  After  reviewing  the  history  of  the  controversy 
Mr.  Olney  stated  in  the  following  concise  form  what 
he  considered  the  important  features  of  the  situation 
as  it  then  existed: 

1.  The  title  to  territory  of  indefinite  but  confessedly  very 
large  extent  is  in  dispute  between  Great  Britain  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  South  American  republic  of  Venezuela  on  the 
other. 

2.  The  disparity  in  the  strength  of  the  claimants  is  such 
that  Venezuela  can  hope  to  establish  her  claim  only  through 
peaceful  methods — through  an  agreement  with  her  adversary 
either  upon  the  subject  itself  or  upon  an  arbitration. 

3.  The  controversy,  with  varying  claims  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain,  has  existed  for  more  than  half  a  century, 
during  which  period  many  earnest  and  persistent  efforts  of 
Venezuela  to  establish  a  boundary  by  agreement  have  proved 
unsuccessful. 

4.  The  futility  of  the  endeavor  to  obtain  a  conventional 
line  being  recognized,  Venezuela  for  a  quarter  of  a  century 
has  asked  and  striven  for  arbitration. 

5.  Great  Britain,  however,  has  always  and  continuously 
refused  to  arbitrate,  except  upon  the  condition  of  a  renun- 
ciation of  a  large  part  of  the  Venezuelan  claim  and  of  a 
concession  to  herself  of  a  large  share  of  the  territory  in 
controversy. 

6.  By  the  frequent  interposition  of  its  good  offices  at  the 
instance  of  Venezuela,  by  constantly  urging  and  promoting 
the  restoration  of  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two 
countries,  by  pressing  for  arbitration  of  the  disputed 
boundary,  by  offering  to  act  as  arbitrator,  by  expressing  its 


»  For,  Rel.,  1895-96,  Part  I,  p.  552. 

240 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

grave  concern  whenever  new  alleged  instances  of  British 
aggression  upon  Venezuelan  territory  have  been  brought  to 
its  notice,  the  government  of  the  United  States  has  made  it 
clear  to  Great  Britain  and  to  the  world  that  the  controversy 
is  one  in  which  both  its  honor  and  its  interests  are  involved 
and  the  continuance  of  which  it  cannot  regard  with  indif- 
ference.    I  \y 

The  greater  part  of  the  dispatch  was  taken  up  with 
a  discussion  of  the  bearing  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
upon  the  case  and  the  most  striking  feature  of  it  was 
that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  appealed  to  by  name. 
Mr.  Olney's  statement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
worthy  of  the  most  careful  consideration  as  it  was  the 
fullest  and  most  definite  official  construction  of  its 
meaning  and  scope  that  had  been  given  to  the  world. 
He  said : 

That  America  is  in  no  part  open  to  colonization,  though 
the  proposition  was  not  universally  admitted  at  the  time  of 
its  first  enunciation,  has  long  been  universally  conceded.  We 
are  now  concerned,  therefore,  only  with  that  other  practical 
application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  disregard  of  which 
by  an  European  power  is  to  be  deemed  an  act  of  unfriendli- 
ness towards  the  United  States.  The  precise  scope  and 
limitations  of  this  rule  cannot  be  too  clearly  apprehended. 
It  does  not  establish  any  general  protectorate  by  the  United 
States  over  other  American  states.  It  does  not  relieve  any 
American  state  from  its  obligations  as  fixed  by  international 
law,  nor  prevent  any  European  power  directly  interested 
from  enforcing  such  obligations  or  from  inflicting  merited 
punishment  for  the  breach  of  them.  It  does  not  contemplate 
any  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any  American  state 
or  in  the  relations  between  it  and  other  American  states.  It 
does  not  justify  any  attempt  on  our  part  to  change  the  estab- 
lished form  of  government  of  any  American  state  or  to  pre- 
vent the  people  of  such  state  from  altering  that  form  accord- 

241 


4 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ing  to  their  own  will  and  pleasure.  The  rule  in  question  has 
but  a  single  purpose  and  object.  It  is  that  no  European 
power  or  combination  of  European  powers  shall  forcibly 
deprive  an  American  state  of  the  right  and  power  of  self- 
government  and  of  shaping  for  itself  its  own  political  for- 
tunes and  destinies. 


^  J  Lord  Salisbury's  reply  to  Mr.  Olney  was  given  in 

vJ^  two  dispatches  of  the  same  date,  November  26,  1895, 
the  one  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, the  other  to  a  discussion  of  the  rights  of  the 
controversy  as  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela. 
In  the  first  dispatch  Lord  Salisbury  argued  that  Mr. 
Olney's  views  went  far  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  that  no  attempt  at  colonization  was  be- 
ing made,  and  that  no  political  system  was  being  im- 
posed upon  any  state  of  South  America.  He  also 
denied  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  part  of  inter- 
national law,  since  it  had  not  received  the  consent  of 
other  nations,  and  he  utterly  repudiated  Mr.  Olney's 
principle  that  "  American  questions  are  for  American 
discussion." 

In  the  second  dispatch  of  the  same  date  Lord  Salis- 
bury enters  fully  into  the  rights  of  the  controversy 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  controverting 
the  arguments  of  the  earlier  part  of  Mr.  Olney's  dis- 
patch, which  he  characterizes  as  ex  parte. 

In  view  of  the  very  positive  character  of  Mr.  Olney's 
dispatch  and  of  the  assertion  that  the  honor  and  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  were  concerned,  the  refusal 
of  Great  Britain  to  arbitrate  placed  the  relations  of 
the  two  countries  in  a  very  critical  position.  The 
American  executive,  however,  had  intervened  for  the 
purpose  of  settling  the  controversy,  peaceably  if  pos- 

242 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

sible,  forcibly  if  need  be,  and  President  Cleveland  did 
not  now  shrink  from  the  logic  of  events.  In  a  mes- 
sage to  Congress,  December  17,  1895,^  he  laid  before 
that  body  Mr.  Olney's  dispatch  of  July  20,  together 
with  Lord  Salisbury's  reply.  He  not  only  reaffirmed 
the  soundness  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  appli- 
cation to  the  case  in  question,  but  claimed  for  that 
principle  of  American  diplomacy  a  place  in  the  code 
of  international  law. 

In  regard  to  the  applicability  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine to  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute  Mr.  Cleve- 
land declared : 

If  a  European  power  by  an  extension  of  its  boundaries 
takes  possession  of  the  territory  of  one  of  our  neighboring 
republics  against  its  will  and  in  derogation  of  its  rights,  it 
is  difficult  to  see  why  to  that  extent  such  European  power 
does  not  thereby  attempt  to  extend  its  system  of  government 
to  that  portion  of  this  continent  which  is  thus  taken.  This 
is  the  precise  action  which  President  Monroe  declared  to  be 
"  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety,"  and  it  can  make  no 
difference  whether  the  European  system  is  extended  by  an 
advance  of  frontier  or  otherwise. 

In  regard  to  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  de- 
mand the  observance  of  this  principle  by  other  nations, 
Mr.  Cleveland  said : 

Practically  the  principle  for  which  we  contend  has  pe- 
culiar, if  not  exclusive,  relation  to  the  United  States.  It  may 
not  have  been  admitted  in  so  many  words  to  the  code  of 
international  law,  but  since  in  international  councils  every 
nation  is  entitled  to  the  rights  belonging  to  it,  if  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  something  we  may  justly 
claim,  it  has  its  place  in  the  code  of  international  law  as 

*  "  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  Vol.  IX,  p.  655. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

certainly  and  as  securely  as  if  it  were  specifically  mentioned; 
and  when  the  United  States  is  a  suitor  before  the  high  tri- 
bunal that  administers  international  law  the  question  to  be 
determined  is  whether  or  not  we  present  claims  which  the 
justice  of  that  code  of  law  can  find  to  be  right  and  valid.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  finds  its  recognition  in  those  principles  ol 
international  law  which  are  based  upon  the  theory  that 
every  nation  shall  have  its  rights  protected  and  its  just  claims 
enforced. 

Mr.  Cleveland  concluded  that  the  dispute  had 
reached  such  a  stage  as  to  make  it  incumbent  upon  the 
United  States  to  take  measures  to  determine  with  suf- 
ficient certainty  for  its  justification  what  was  the  true 
divisional  line  between  the  republic  of  Venezuela  and 
British  Guiana.  He  therefore  recommended  that  Con- 
gress make  an  appropriation  for  the  expenses  of  a 
commission,  to  be  appointed  by  the  executive,  which 
should  make  the  necessary  investigations  and  report 
upon  the  matter  with  the  least  possible  delay.  *'  When 
such  report  is  made  and  accepted,"  he  continued,  "  it 
will,  in  my  opinion,  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
to  resist  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  willful 
aggression  upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appro- 
priation by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exercise 
of  governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which 
after  investigation  we  have  determined  of  right  be- 
longs to  Venezuela."  "  In  making  these  recommenda- 
tions," he  added,  "  I  am  fully  alive  to  the  responsibility 
incurred  and  keenly  realize  all  the  consequences  that 
may  follow." 

The  publication  of  this  message  and  the  accompa- 
nying dispatches  created  the  greatest  excitement  both 
in  the  United  States  and  in  England,  and  called  forth 
the  severest  criticism  of  the  President's  course. 

244 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

The  main  grounds  of  this  criticism  were  the  con- 
tentions : 

( 1 )  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  a  part  of  in- 
ternational law  and  therefore  its  observance  as  such 
could  not  be  urged  upon  other  nations. 

(2)  That  it  was  not  even  an  established  principle  of 
[American  diplomacy,  since  the  original  declaration  was 
merely  a  protest  against  apprehended  aggression  on 
the  part  of  a  combination  of  European  powers  which 
had  long  since  ceased  to  threaten  this  continent. 

(3)  That  even  granting  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  a  declaration  of  American  policy,  it  was  merely 
a  policy  and  imposed  no  obligation  on  the  government 
to  enforce  it  except  where  our  interests  were  directly 
concerned. 

(4)  That  the  occupation  of  a  few  thousand  acres  of 
uninhabited  territory  by  Great  Britain,  even  if  it  did 
rightfully  belong  to  Venezuela,  was  not  a  matter  that 
affected  the  interests  of  the  United  States  one  way  or 
the  other  or  that  threatened  the  permanence  or  stability 
of  American  institutions. 

(5)  That  granting  the  wisdom  and  correctness  of 
the  President's  position,  the  language  of  his  message 
and  of  Mr.  Olney's  dispatch  was  indiscreet  at  best  and 
unnecessarily  offensive  to  British  pride. 

It  may  be  well  to  consider  these  objections  in  de- 
tail. In  regard  to  the  first  point  it  may  be  said  that 
neither  President  Cleveland  nor  Mr.  Olney  asserted 
or  maintained  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  part 
of  international  law  by  virtue  of  its  assertion  by  Presi- 
dent Monroe  and  succeeding  presidents.  The  position 
they  took  was  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  an  Ameri- 
can statement  of  a  well  recognized  principle  of  inter- 

245 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

national  law,  viz.,  the  right  of  a  state  to  intervene  in  a 
controversy  between  other  states,  when  it  deems  its 
own  interests  threatened.  Mr.  Cleveland  declared: 
"  The  Monroe  Doctrine  finds  its  recognition  in  those 
principles  of  international  law  which  are  based  upon 
the  theory  that  every  nation  shall  have  its  rights  pro- 
tected and  its  just  claims  enforced."  Mr.  Olney's 
analysis  of  the  doctrine  was  clearer  and  more  specific. 
He  said :  "  That  there  are  circumstances  under  which 
a  nation  may  justly  intervene  in  a  controversy  to 
which  two  or  more  other  nations  are  the  direct  and 
imrxLediatr^artie^  is  an  admitted  canon  of  international 
law."  After/aiscussing  the  general  principle  of  in- 
tervention/lie  adds :  "  We  are  concerned  at  this  time, 
howevelCnot  so  much  with  the  general  rule  as  with 
afermi  of  it  which  is  peculiarly  and  distinctively  Amer- 
-Tcan."  ^ 

In  answer  to  the  second  objection  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  refer  to  accepted  works  on  public  law  and  to 
the  official  correspondence  of  the  state  department  to 
show  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  for  three-quarters 
of  a  century  been  the  cardinal  principle  of  American 
diplomacy,* 

The  third  point,  namely  as  to  the  expediency  of  en- 
forcing the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  all  cases  of  European 
aggression  on  this  continent,  raises  an  important  ques- 
tion. If,  however,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  wise 
principle  and  one  which  it  is  our  interest  to  maintain, 
it  is  right  that  it  should  be  asserted  on  every  occasion 
of  its  violation.     The  force  of  precedent  is  so  great 


•  Olney  to  Bayard,  July  20,  1895. 

*  Moore's  "  Digest  of  Int.  Law,"  Vol.  VI,  pp.  368604,  especially 
Mr.  Fish's  Report  on  Relations  with  the  Spanish-American  Republics  of 
July    14,    1870,  pp.   429-43I- 


246 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

that  in  the  present  state  of  international  law,  it  would 
be  dangerous  to  do  otherwise. 

In  the  fourth  place  while  it  was  perfectly  true  that 
the  occupation  of  the  disputed  territory  by  Great  Bri- 
tain could  not  in  itself  conceivably  endanger  the  peace 
and  integrity  of  the  United  States,  yet  as  the  open 
violation  of  a  principle  upon  which  we  had  laid  so 
much  stress  we  could  not  in  honor  and  dignity  have 
overlooked  it. 

As  to  the  tone  of  Mr.  Olney's  dispatch  and  of  Mr. 
Cleveland's  message,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
while  the  positions  assumed  were  in  the  main  correct, 
the  language  was  in  some  cases  unfortunate,  either 
from  vagueness  or  generalization.  Thus  Mr.  Olney's 
statement,  that  "  3,000  miles  of  intervening  ocean 
make  any  permanent  political  union  between  a  Euro- 
pean and  an  American  state  unnatural  and  inexpedi- 
ent,"— whatever  he  may  have  meant  by  it — appears 
in  view  of  Great  Britain's  connection  with  Canada,  to 
have  been  both  untrue  and  calculated  to  give  offense. 
Likewise  Mr.  Cleveland's  reference  to  "  the  high  tri- 
bunal that  administers  international  law "  was  too 
rhetorical  a  figure  for  a  state  paper. 

It  has,  indeed,  been  suggested  that  President  Cleve- 
land and  Mr.  Olney  deliberately  undertook  to  play  a 
bluff  game  in  order  to  browbeat  the  British  govern- 
ment. In  any  case,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the 
test  of  a  diplomatic  move  is  its  success,  and  judged 
from  this  standpoint  Mr.  Cleveland's  Venezuelan  pol- 
icy was  vindicated  by  the  results.  The  British  gov- 
ernment at  once  adopted  the  most  friendly  attitude 
and  placed  valuable  information  in  its  archives  at  the 
disposal  of  the  commissioners  appointed  by  President 

247 


/ 

UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  i^'MERICA 

Qeveland  to  determine  the  true  J^undary  line.  On 
November  12,  1896,  before  the  ^inal/ report  of  this 
commission  was  made,  a  complet^'^ccord  was  reached 
between  Great  Britain  and  thp  XJ^iA  States  by  which 
the  terms  of  a  treaty  to  b^  rati^ed  by  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela  were  agreed  oii^'tKe  provisions  of  which 
embraced  a  full  arbitratioK-ofahe  whole  controversy. 
Lord  Salisbury's  sudden  change  of  front  has  been  the 
subject  of  much  interesting  speculation.  How  far  he 
was  influenced  by  the  South  African  situation  has 
4iever  been  revealed.  buf/4t/undoubtedly  had  its  effect. 
iPi^fc^^ientJ^kveland's  mefssage  was  sent  to  Congress 
ember  17.  Bef^re^  the  end  of  the  month  came 
Dr.  Jameson's  rajd/^nto  the  Transvaal,  and  on  the 
3rd  of  January/^  German  Kaiser  sent  his  famous 
telegram  to  P^l  Kruger.  The  attention  of  England 
was  thus^iy^erted  from  America  to  Germany,  and  Lord 
Salisbury  doubtless  thought  it  prudent  to  avoid  a 
ruptufe  with  the  United  States  in  order  to  be  free 
p  deal  with  the  situation  in  South  Africa. 

Tl>e  Anglo-Venezuelan  treaty  provided  that  an  arbi- 
,ttal  tribunal  should  be  immediately  appointed  to  de- 
termine the  true  boundary  line  between  Venezuela 
and  British  Guiana.  This  tribunal  was  to  consist  of 
two  members  nominated  by  the  judges  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  and  two  members  nomi- 
nated by  the  British  Supreme  Court  of  Justice  and 
of  a  fifth  selected  by  the  four  persons  so  nominated, 
or  in  the  event  of  their  failure  to  agree  within  three 
months  of  their  appointment,  selected  by  the  king  of 
Sweden  and  Norway.  The  person  so  selected  was  to 
be  president  of  the  tribunal,  and  it  was  expressly  stip- 
ulated that  the  persons  nominated  by  the  Supreme 

248 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

Court  of  the  United  States  and  England  respectively 
might  be  members  of  said  courts.  Certain  general 
rules  were  also  laid  down  for  the  guidance  of  the 
tribunal.^ 

A  treaty  embodying  substantially  these  proposals 
was  signed  by  the  British  and  Venezuelan  representa- 
tives at  Washington,  February  2,  1897.  The  decision 
of  the  tribunal  which  met  in  Paris  gave  a  large  part 
of  the  disputed  area  to  Great  Britain  and  this  occa- 
sioned further  criticism  of  President  Cleveland's  ac- 
tion in  bringing  the  United  States  and  England  to  the 
verge  of  war  on  what  was  termed  an  academic  issue. 
The  award  was  a  matter  of  secondary  importance. 
The  principle  for  which  the  United  States  contended 
was  vindicated  when  Great  Britain  agreed  to  arbi- 
trate. It  was  a  great  triumph  of  American  diplomacy 
to  force  Great  Britain  just  at  this  time  to  recognize 
in  fact,  if  not  in  words,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for 
it  was  not  long  before  Germany  showed  a  disposition 
to  question  that  principle  of  American  policy,  and  the 
fact  that  we  had  upheld  it  against  England  made  it 
easier  to  deal  with  Germany. 

The  attention  of  Europe  and  America  was  drawn 
to  Venezuela  a  second  time  in  1902  when  Germany 
made  a  carefully  planned  and  determined  effort  to  test 
out  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  see  whether  we  would 
fight  for  it.  In  that  year  Germany,  England,  and  Italy 
made  a  naval  demonstration  against  Venezuela  for 
the  purpose  of  forcing  her  to  recognize  the  validity 
of  certain  claims  of  their  subjects  which  she  had  per- 
sistently refused  to  settle.  How  England  was  led 
into  the  trap  is  still  a  mystery,  but  the  Kaiser  thought 

'  Foreign   Relations,    1896,  p.  254. 


.    UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

that  he  had  her  thoroughly  committed  and  that  if 
she  once  started  in  with  him  she  could  not  turn  against 
him.  But  he  had  evidently  not  profited  by  the  ex- 
perience of  Napoleon  III  in  Mexico  forty  years  earlier 
under  very  similar  circumstances. 

In  the  case  of  Germany,  though  the  facts  were 
somewhat  obscured,  the  real  purpose  of  the  interven- 
tion was  to  collect  claims  which  originated  in  contract 
between  German  subjects  and  the  government  of  Ven- 
ezuela. One  claim  was  for  the  recovery  of  interest 
seven  years  in  arrears  on  five  per  cent,  bonds,  for 
which  Venezuelan  customs  were  pledged  as  security. 
Another  was  for  seven  per  cent,  dividends  guaranteed 
by  the  Venezuelan  government  on  the  capital  stock  of 
a  railroad  built  by  German  subjects  at  a  cost  of  nearly 
$20,000,000.  There  were  still  other  claims  amount- 
ing to  about  $400,000  for  forced  loans  and  military 
requisitions.® 

These  claims  were  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
United  States  government  by  the  German  ambassador 
on  December  11,  1901.  Their  dubious  character,  re- 
garded from  the  standpoint  of  international  law,  led 
Germany  to  make  what  purported  to  be  a  frank  avowal 
of  her  intentions  to  the  United  States,  and  to  secure 
for  her  action  the  acquiescence  of  that  government. 
Her  ambassador  declared  that  the  German  govern- 
ment had  "  no  purpose  or  intention  to  make  even  the 
smallest  acquisition  of  territory  on  the  South  Ameri- 
can continent  or  the  islands  adjacent."  This  precau- 
tion was  taken  in  order  to  prevent  a  subsequent  asser- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  conclusion  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  stated  that  his  government  had  de- 

*  Foreign  Relations,   1901,  p.   193;   1903,  p.  429. 
250 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

cided  to  "  ask  the  Venezuelan  government  to  make  a 
declaration  immediately,  that  it  recognizes  in  principle 
the  correctness  of  these  demands,  and  is  wilHng  to 
accept  the  decision  of  a  mixed  commission,  with  the 
object  of  having  them  determined  and  assured  in  all 
their  details."  At  the  same  time  the  British  govern- 
ment demanded  a  settlement  of  claims  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  property  and  for  the  ill-treatment  and  im- 
prisonment of  British  subjects  in  the  recent  civil  wars, 
as  well  as  a  settlement  of  the  foreign  debt. 

On  December  i6,  1901,  Mr.  Hay  replied  to  the 
German  note,  thanking  the  German  government  for 
its  voluntary  and  frank  declaration,  and  stating  that 
he  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to  discuss  the  claims 
in  question;  but  he  called  attention  to  the  following 
reference  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  President  Roose- 
velt's message  of  December  3,  1901 : 

This  doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  commercial  rela- 
tions of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in  truth  allows 
each  of  them  to  form  such  as  it  desires.  In  other  words, 
it  is  really  a  guarantee  of  the  commercial  independence  of 
the  Americas.  We  do  not  ask  under  this  doctrine  for  any 
exclusive  commercial  dealings  with  any  other  American 
state.  We  do  not  guarantee  any  state  against  punishment 
if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punishment  does  not 
take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  any  non- 
American  power. 

A  year  later,  after  fruitless  negotiations,  the  Ger- 
man government  announced  to  the  United  States  that 
it  proposed,  in  conjunction  with  Great  Britain  and 
Italy,  to  establish  a  pacific  blockade  of  Venezuelan  har- 
bors. The  United  States  replied  that  it  did  not  recog- 
nize a  pacific  blockade  which  adversely  affected  the 

251 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

rights  of  third  parties  as  a  valid  proceeding.  The  pow- 
ers then  proposed  to  establish  a  "  warlike  blockade," 
but  "  without  any  declaration  of  war."  This  device 
was  resorted  to  at  the  suggestion  of  the  German  gov- 
ernment, in  order  to  avoid  a  formal  declaration  of 
war,  which  could  not  be  made  without  the  consent  of 
the  Bundesrath.  Meanwhile,  Venezuela's  gunboats 
had  been  seized  and  her  ports  blockaded,  acts  which 
Mr.  Balfour  admitted  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of 
Commons  constituted  a  state  of  war;  and  on  December 
20  a  formal  blockade  was  announced  in  accordance 
with  the  law  of  nations,  which  created  a  status  of  bel- 
ligerency.'' 

The  hostilities  thus  commenced  were  brought  to 
a  close  by  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  the  United 
States.  Acting  under  instructions  from  Washington, 
the  American  minister  Herbert  W.  Bowen  succeeded 
in  persuading  Venezuela  to  recognize  in  principle  the 
claims  of  the  foreign  powers  and  to  refer  them  to 
mixed  commissions  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
the  amounts.^  Great  Britain  and  Italy  agreed  to  this 
arrangement,  but  the  German  Kaiser  remained  for  a 
time  obdurate.  What  followed  Germany's  refusal  to 
arbitrate  is  described  in  Thayer's  "  Life  and  Letters 
of  John  Hay"  in  the  following  words: 

One  day,  when  the  crisis  was  at  its  height,  [President 
Roosevelt]  summoned  to  the  White  House  Dr.  Holleben, 
the  German  Ambassador,  and  told  him  that  unless  Germany 
consented  to  arbitrate,  the  American  squadron  under  Ad- 
miral Dewey  would  be  given  orders,  by  noon  ten  days  later, 
to  proceed  to  the  Venezuelan  coast  and  prevent  any  taking 

'  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  pp.  419,  454;  Moore,  "Digest  of  Int.  Law," 
Vol.  VII,  p.  140. 

'  Moore,  "  Digest  of  Int.   Law,"  Vol.   VI,  p.   590. 

252 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

possession  of  Venezuelan  territory.  Dr.  Holleben  began  to 
protest  that  his  Imperial  master,  having  once  refused  to 
arbitrate,  could  not  change  his  mind.  The  President  said 
that  he  was  not  arguing  the  question,  because  arguments 
had  already  been  gone  over  until  no  useful  purpose  would 
be  served  by  repeating  them;  he  was  simply  giving  informa- 
tion which  the  Ambassador  might  think  it  important  to 
transmit  to  Berlin.  A  week  passed  in  silence.  Then  Dr. 
Holleben  again  called  on  the  President,  but  said  nothing  of 
the  Venezuelan  matter.  When  he  rose  to  go,  the  President 
asked  him  about  it,  and  when  he  stated  that  he  had  re- 
ceived nothing  from  his  government,  the  President  informed 
him  m  substance  that,  in  view  of  this  fact.  Admiral  Dewey 
would  be  instructed  to  sail  a  day  earlier  than  the  day  he, 
the  President,  had  originally  mentioned.  Much  perturbed, 
the  Ambassador  protested;  the  President  informed  him  that 
not  a  stroke  of  a  pen  had  been  put  on  paper;  that  if  the 
Emperor  would  agree  to  arbitrate,  he,  the  President,  would 
heartily  praise  him  for  such  action,  and  would  treat  it  as 
taken  on  German  initiative;  but  that  within  forty-eight 
hours  there  must  be  an  offer  to  arbitrate  or  Dewey  would 
sail  with  the  orders  indicated.  Within  thirty-six  hours  Dr. 
Holleben  returned  to  the  White  House  and  announced  to 
President  Roosevelt  that  a  dispatch  had  just  come  from 
Berlin,  saying  that  the  Kaiser  would  arbitrate.  Neither 
Admiral  Dewey  (who  with  an  American  fleet  was  then 
manceuvering  in  the  West  Indies)  nor  any  one  else  knew  of 
the  step  that  was  to  be  taken;  the  naval  authorities  were 
merely  required  to  be  in  readiness,  but  were  not  told  what 
for. 

On  the  announcement  that  Germany  had  consented  to 
arbitrate,  the  President  publicly  complimented  the  Kaiser  on 
being  so  stanch  an  advocate  of  arbitration.  The  humor  of 
this  was  probably  relished  more  in  the  White  House  than 
in  the  Palace  at  Berlin.^ 

The  Holleben  incident,  as  narrated  for  the  first 
time  by  Thayer,  was  immediately  called  in  question. 

•  Thayer,  "  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,"   Vol.   II,  pp.  286-288. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

It  will  be  noted  that  Thayer  does  not  in  any  way 
quote  Hay  in  the  matter,  and  in  the  three  volumes 
of  "Diaries  and  Letters"  of  John  Hay,  privately 
printed  by  Mrs.  Hay  in  1908,  there  is  no  reference 
of  any  kind  to  the  incident.  It  is  evident  that  Thayer 
got  his  report  of  the  interview  directly  from  Roose- 
velt himself.  It  is  said  on  good  authority  that  while 
Colonel  Roosevelt  had  no  documentary  evidence  to 
support  his  statements  at  the  time  that  he  gave  them 
to  Thayer,  such  evidence  came  to  hand  in  an  inter- 
esting way  shortly  after  the  appearance  of  the  book. 
Two  German-Americans  who  had  been  intimate  friends 
of  Holleben  promptly  wrote  to  Colonel  Roosevelt  pro- 
testing, not  against  the  facts  as  stated,  but  against 
the  use  that  was  made  of  them.  Both  correspondents 
stated  that  they  had  been  told  of  the  interview  at 
the  time  by  Holleben.  Admiral  Dewey  confirmed  the 
statement  as  to  the  preparedness  of  the  fleet  in  a  letter 
dated  May  23,  19 16,  which  was  published  four  days 
later  in  the  New  York  Times.    In  it  he  said : 

I  was  at  Culebra,  Porto  Rico,  at  the  time  in  command 
of  a  fleet  consisting  of  over  fifty  ships,  including  every 
battleship  and  every  torpedo-boat  we  had,  with  orders  from 
Washington  to  hold  the  fleet  in  hand  and  be  ready  to  move 
at  a  moment's  notice.  Fortunately,  however,  the  whole 
matter  was  amicably  adjusted  and  there  was  no  need  for 
action. 

In  a  speech  delivered  to  several  thousand  Repub- 
lican "  Pilgrims "  at  Oyster  Bay,  May  27,  Colonel 
Roosevelt  made  the  following  interesting  comments 
on  Dewey's  letter: 

Just  today  I  was  very  glad  to  see  published  in  the  papers 
the  letter  of  Admiral  Dewey  describing  an  incident  that 

254 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

took  place  while  I  was  President.  When  we  were  menaced 
with  trouble  I  acted  up  to  my  theory  that  the  proper  way 
of  handling  international  relations  was  by  speaking  softly 
and  carrying  a  big  stick.  And  in  that  particular  case  Dewey 
and  the  American  fleet  represented  the  big  stick.  I  asked, 
on  behalf  of  the  nation,  the  things  to  which  we  were  en- 
titled. I  was  as  courteous  as  possible.  I  not  only  acted 
with  justice,  but  with  courtesy  toward  them.  I  put  every 
battleship  and  every  torpedo-boat  on  the  sea  under  the 
American  flag  and  Dewey,  with  instructions  to  hold  himself 
ready  in  entire  preparedness  to  sail  at  a  moment's  notice. 
That  didn't  mean  that  we  were  to  have  war.  Dewey  was 
the  greatest  possible  provocative  of  peace.^° 

After  the  agreement  to  arbitrate  had  been  made, 
the  situation  was  further  complicated  by  the  demands 
of  the  blockading  powers  that  the  sums  ascertained 
by  the  mixed  commissions  to  be  due  them  should  be 
paid  in  full  before  anything  was  paid  upon  the  claims 
of  the  peace  powers.  Venezuela  insisted  that  all  her 
creditors  should  be  treated  alike.  The  Kaiser,  from 
what  motives  it  is  not  quite  clear,  suggested  that  this 
question  should  be  referred  to  President  Roosevelt, 
but  as  the  United  States  was  an  interested  party,  Sec- 
retary Hay  did  not  think  it  would  be  proper  for  the 
President  to  act,  and  it  was  finally  agreed  that  the 
demands  for  preferential  treatment  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  Hague  Court. 

During  the  summer  of  1903  ten  mixed  commissions 
sat  at  Caracas  to  adjudicate  upon  the  claims  of  as 
many  nations  against  Venezuela.  These  commissions 
simply  determined  the  amount  of  the  claims  in  each 
case.  The  awards  of  these  commissions  are  very  in- 
structive, as  they  show  the  injustice  of  resorting  to 

*•  Washington  Post,  May  28,  1916. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

measures  of  coercion  for  the  collection  of  pecuniary 
claims  which  have  not  been  submitted  to  arbitration. 
Belgian  claimants  demanded  14,921,805  bolivars  and 
were  awarded  10,898,643;  British  claimants  demanded 
14,743,572  and  were  awarded  9,401,267;  German 
claimants  demanded  7,376,685  and  were  awarded  2,- 
091,908;  Italian  claimants  demanded  39,844,258  and 
were  awarded  2,975,906;  Spanish  claimants  demanded 
5,307,626  and  were  awarded  1,974,818;  United  States 
claimants  demanded   81,410,952   and  were   awarded 

2,313711-" 

The  decision  of  the  Hague  Court,  which  was  ren- 
dered February  22,  1904,  held  that  the  three  allied 
powers  were  entided  to  preferential  treatment;  that 
Venezuela  had  recognized  in  principle  the  justice  of 
their  claims  while  she  had  not  recognized  in  principle 
the  justice  of  the  claims  of  the  pacific  powers;  that 
the  neutral  powers  had  profited  to  some  extent  by 
the  operations  of  the  allies,  and  that  their  rights  re- 
mained for  the  future  absolutely  intact."  This  de- 
cision, emanating  from  a  peace  court,  and  indorsing 
the  principle  of  armed  coercion,  was  received  with  no 
small  degree  of  criticism. 

During  the  discussions  on  the  Venezuelan  situation 
that  took  place  in  Parliament  in  December,  1902,  the 
members  of  the  government  repeatedly  repudiated  the 
charge  of  the  opposition  that  they  were  engaged  in 
a  debt-collecting  expedition,  and  tried  to  make  it  ap- 
pear that  they  were  protecting  the  lives  and  liberties 
of  British  subjects.     Lord  Cranborne  declared: 


*'  Venezuelan  Arbitrations  of  1903  (Sen.  Doc.  No.  316,  Fifty-eighth  Cong., 
Second   Sess.);    Foreign    Relations,    1904,   p.    871. 

"  Foreign  Relations,  1904.  p.  506.  For  a  full  report  of  the  case  tee 
Sen.  Doc.  No.  119,  Fifty-eighth  Cong.,  Third  Sess. 


256 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

I  can  frankly  tell  the  House  that  it  is  not  the  claims  of  the 
bondholders  that  bulk  largest  in  the  estimation  of  the  govern- 
ment. I  do  not  believe  the  government  would  ever  have  taken 
the  strong  measures  to  which  they  have  been  driven  if  it  had 
not  been  for  the  attacks  by  Venezuela  upon  the  lives,  the 
liberty,  and  the  property  of  British  subjects. 

During  the  same  discussion,   Mr,    Norman   said: 

This  idea  of  the  British  fleet  being  employed  to  collect  the 
debts  of  foreign  bondholders  is  assuredly  a  mistaken  one.  It 
was  said  by  Wellington  once  that  the  British  army  did  not 
exist  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  certain  debts.  It  is  still 
more  true  of  the  British  fleet  that  it  does  not  exist  for  the 
purpose  of  collecting  debts  of  bondholders.  People  who  lend 
money  to  South  American  republics  know  what  the  security 
is  and  what  they  are  likely  to  get  in  return,  and  they  ought 
not  to  have  the  British  fleet  at  their  backs. 

To  this  Mr,  Balfour,  the  prime  minister,  replied: 

I  do  not  deny — in  fact,  I  freely  admit — that  bondholders 
may  occupy  an  international  position  which  may  require 
international  action ;  but  I  look  upon  such  international  action 
with  the  gravest  doubt  and  suspicion,  and  I  doubt  whether 
we  have  in  the  past  ever  gone  to  war  for  the  bondholders. 
for  those  of  our  countrymen  who  have  lent  money  to  a 
foreign  government;  and  I  confess  that  I  should  be  very 
sorry  to  see  that  made  a  practice  in  this  country. 

Against  President  Roosevelt's  contention  that  the 
coercion  of  an  American  state  was  not  contrary  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  provided  that  it  did  "  not  take  the 
form  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  any  non-American 
power,"  Signor  Drago,  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations 
of  the  Argentine  Republic,  vigorously  protested  in  a 
note  dated  December  29,  1902,"    This  note  contained 

**  Foreign   Relations,  1903,  p.   i. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

a  restatement  of  the  "  Calvo  doctrine,"  which  takes 
its  name  from  a  celebrated  Argentine  publicist.  In 
his  well-known  book  on  international  law,  Calvo  con- 
tends that  a  state  has  no  right  to  resort  to  armed 
intervention  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  the  private 
claims  of  its  citizens  against  another  state.  This  doc- 
trine, which  has  received  the  indorsement  of  most 
of  the  Latin-American  states,  was  applied  to  public 
bonds  in  the  note  above  referred  to  and  is  now  usually- 
known  as  the  *-  Drago  doctrine."  Signor  Drago  held, 
first,  "  that  the  capitalist  who  lends  his  money  to  a 
foreign  state  always  takes  into  account  the  resources 
of  the  country  and  the  probability,  greater  or  less, 
that  the  obligations  contracted  will  be  fulfilled  without 
delay.  All  governments  thus  enjoy  different  credit 
according  to  their  degree  of  civilization  and  culture, 
and  their  conduct  in  business  transactions,"  and  these 
conditions  are  measured  before  making  loans.  Sec- 
ond, a  fundamental  principle  of  international  law  is 
the  entity  and  equality  of  all  states.  Both  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  debt  and  the  payment  must  be  left 
to  the  nation  concerned  "  without  diminution  of  its 
inherent  rights  as  a  sovereign  entity." 
He  said  further: 

As  these  are  the  sentiments  of  justice,  loyalty,  and  honor 
which  animate  the  Argentine  people  and  have  always  inspired 
its  policy,  your  excellency  will  understand  that  it  has  felt 
alarm  at  the  knowledge  that  the  failure  of  Venezuela  to 
meet  the  payment  of  its  public  debt  is  given  as  one  of  the 
determining  causes  of  the  capture  of  its  fleet,  the  bombard- 
ment of  one  of  its  ports  and  the  establishment  of  a  rigorous 
blockade  along  its  shores.  If  such  proceedings  were  to  be 
definitely  adopted  they  would  establish  a  precedent  dangerous 
to  the  security  and  the  peace  of  the  nations  of  this  part  of 

258 


THE  TWO  VENEZUELAN  EPISODES 

America.  The  collection  of  loans  by  military  means  implies 
territorial  occupation  to  make  them  effective,  and  territorial 
occupation  signifies  a  suppression  or  subordination  of  the 
governments  of  the  countries  on  which  it  is  imposed. 


The  doctrine  so  ably  expounded  by  Dr.  Drago 
attracted  much  attention  during  the  next  few  years 
and  was  given  a  place  on  the  program  of  the  Third 
Pan  American  Conference  held  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  in 
July,  1906.  Dr.  Drago  had  made  his  proposal  as 
"  a  statement  of  policy  "  for  the  states  of  the  American 
continents  to  adopt.  After  full  discussion  the  Rio 
Conference  decided  to  recommend  to  the  governments 
represented  "  that  they  consider  the  point  of  inviting 
the  Second  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  the  compulsory  collection  of  pub- 
lic debts;  and,  in  general,  means  tending  to  diminish 
between  nations  conflicts  having  an  exclusively  pecu- 
niary origin"  ^* 

As  a  result  of  this  action  the  United  States  modified 
the  regular  program  prepared  by  Russia  for  the  Sec- 
ond Hague  Conference  by  reserving  the  right  to  in- 
troduce the  question  of  an  "  agreement  to  observe 
certain  limitations  in  the  use  of  force  in  collecting 
public  debts  accruing  from  contracts."  General  Hor- 
ace Porter  presented  to  The  Hague  Conference  a  res- 
olution providing  that  the  use  of  force  for  the  col- 
lection of  contract  debts  should  not  be  permitted  until 
the  justice  of  the  claim  and  the  amount  of  the  debt 
should  have  been  determined  by  arbitration.  A  large 
number  of  reservations  were  introduced,  but  the  fol- 
lowing resolutions  were  finally  adopted  by  the  votes 

5*  Am.  Journal  of  Int.  Lqw,  Vol.  II,  p.  78. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  thirty-nine  states,  with  five  states  abstaining  from 
voting : 

The  contracting  powers  agree  not  to  have  recourse  to 
armed  force  for  the  recovery  of  contract  debts  claimed  from 
the  government  of  one  country  by  the  government  of  another 
country  as  being  due  to  its  nationals. 

This  undertaking  is,  however,  not  applicable  when  the 
debtor  state  refuses  or  neglects  to  reply  to  an  offer  of  arbi- 
tration, or,  after  accepting  the  offer,  prevents  any  "  com- 
promis "  from  being  agreed  on,  or,  after  the  arbitration, 
fails  to  submit  to  the  award. ^^ 


»"  Ant.  Journal  of  Int.  Law,  Vol.  II,  Supplement,  p.  82. 


260 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Advance  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Caribbean 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  Spain 
was  still  in  possession  of  all  the  shores  of  the  Carib- 
bean Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  but  the  downfall 
of  her  vast  colonial  empire  was  rapidly  approaching. 
By  the  secret  treaty  of  San  Ildefonso  she  agreed  to 
cede  Louisiana  back  to  France,  and  in  1803  Napoleon 
sold  the  entire  province  to  the  United  States.  This 
yras  our  first  acquisition  of  territory  on  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  and  it  insured  a  free  outlet  for  the  vast  region 
of  the  Mississippi  valley.  The  boundaries  of  the 
province  were  indefinite,  and  there  ensued  a  long  con- 
troversy with  Spain  as  to  whether  Louisiana  included 
West  Florida  on  the  one  hand  and  Texas  on  the 
other.  These  questions  were  finally  adjusted  by  the 
Florida  treaty  of  1819,  which  ceded  both  East  and 
West  Florida  to  the  United  States  and  fixed  the  west- 
ern boundary  of  Louisiana  on  the  Gulf  at  the  Sabine 
river.  By  this  treaty  the  United  States  gained  un- 
disputed possession  of  the  region  extending  from 
Mobile  bay  to  the  Mississippi,  but  abandoned  the  claim 
to  Texas. 

It  was  not  many  years  before  American  settlers 
began  pouring  into  Texas  and  came  into  conflict  with 
the  government  of  Mexico,  which  had  by  this  time 
become  independent  of  Spain.     There   followed  the 

261 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

war  of  independence  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic  of  Texas  in  i836.^Jrexas  promptly  applied 
for  admission  to  the  United/St/ktes,  bu/mainly  through 
the  opposition  of  the  Abolitionists ^e  was  kept  wait- 
ing for  nine  years.  The'  new  republic  was  recognized 
by  the  United  States  and  by  the  principal  powers  of 
Europe,  but  Mexico  refused  to  concede  independence. 
Texas  was  thus  in  constant  danger  of  attack  from 
Mexico  and  unable  to  seoi^'T^mission  to  the  Ameri- 
can Union.  In  ApriL/jSW  a  treaty  providing  for 
the  annexation  of  T'^xas/w^  submitted  to  the  Senate 
by  President  Tyler,  but/! it/was  rejected  by  that  body. 
Undier  these  circumstj^hces  the  public  men  of  Texas 
lent  a  ready  ear  to  British  and  French  intrigues.  Great 
Britam^ished  to  encourage  the  development  of  Texas 
as-^Ccotton-growing'  country  from  which  she  could 
draw  a  large  enough  supply  to  make  her  independent 
of  the  United  States.  If  Texas  should  thus  devote 
herself  to  die  production  of  cotton  as  her  chief  ex- 
port crop;  she  would  naturally  adopt  a  free  trade 
^\cy^riaA\i\is  create  a  considerable  market  for 
Bj;ius1:i  g6ods.  Great  Britain,  therefore,  consistently 
opposed  the  annexation  of  Texas  by  the  United  States 
x^nd  entered  into  negotiations  with  France,  Mexico, 
and  the  Republic  of  Texas  for  the  express  purpose 
of  preventing  it.  Lord  Aberdeen  proposed  that  the 
four  powers  just  mentioned  should  sign  a  diplomatic 
act,  or  perpetual  treaty,  securing  to  Texas  recognition 
from  Mexico  and  peace,  but  preventing  her  from  ever 
acquiring  territory  beyond  the  Rio  Grande  or  joining 
the  American  Union.  While  the  United  States  would 
be  invited  to  unite  in  this  act,  it  was  not  expected 
that  the  government  of  that  country  would  agree  to 

262 


THE  C 


[BBEAN 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

it.  Despairing  of  being  received  into  the  American 
Union,  Texas  was  apparently  ready  to  accept  the 
British  proposal,  but  Lord  Aberdeen's  plan  was  de- 
feated by  the  refusal  of  Mexico  to  recognize  under 
any  conditions  the  independence  of  Texas.  Aberdeen 
was  willing  to  coerce  Mexico  and,  if  need  be,  to  fight 
the  United  States,  but  Louis  Philippe  was  not  willing 
to  go  that  far.  Meanwhile  the  Texas  question  had 
become  the  leading  political  issue  in  the  United  States. 
The  Democratic  platform  of  1844  demanded  "the  re- 
annexation  of  Texas  at  the  earliest  practicable  period," 
and  on  this  platform  Polk  was  elected  President. 
Tyler,  however,  did  not  wait  for  his  successor  to 
carry  out  this  mandate  of  the  American  people,  but 
in  the  last  days  of  his  administration  pushed  through 
Congress  a  joint  resolution  providing  for  the  admis- 
sion of  Texas.^ 

Mexico  promptly  severed  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  United  States.  As  Mexico  had  never  recognized 
the  independence  of  Texas,  she  had  of  course  never 
agreed  upon  any  boundary  with  the  new  republic. 
This  was  a  matter  which  had  to  be  adjusted  and  there 
were  also  a  number  of  private  claims  of  American 
citizens  against  the  government  of  Mexico  which  that 
government  refused  to  settle.  President  Polk  took 
up  both  questions  with  characteristic  vigor,  and  on 
the  refusal  of  Mexico  to  receive  a  special  minister 
sent  by  him  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  these  ques- 
tions, he  ordered  General  Taylor  to  occupy  the  dis- 
puted  area  between  the  Nueces  river  and  the  Rio 

^  E.  D.  Adams,  "  British  Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas,  1838- 1845  " 
(1910);  JustiL  H.  Smith,  "The  Annexation  of  Texas"  (1911)  and  "The 
War  with  Mexico,"  2  vols.  (1919);  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  R«» 
public  of  Texas,  edited  by  G.  P.  Garrison  (Annual  Reports.  Am.  Hist.  Ass'iu 
1907,  1908)- 

263 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Grande.  Thus  began  the  Mexican  War,  which  es- 
tabHshed  the  boundary  of  the  United  States  on  the 
Rio  Grande  and  added  the  vast  region  of  New  Mex- 
ico and  California  to  the  Union.  Here  the  tide  of 
American  expansion  to  the  South  was  stayed  for  a 
full  half  century. 

With  the  decline  of  the  Spanish  power  Great  Britain 
had  succeeded  to  naval  supremacy  in  the  Caribbean. 
As  has  been  related  in  previous  chapters,  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  long  regarded  Cuba  with 
jealous  eyes  and  had  a  controversy  lasting  for  half 
a  century  over  the  control  of  the  proposed  Isthmian 
canal.  Secretary  Seward  at  the  close  of  the  civil 
war  sought  to  strengthen  the  position  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Caribbean  by  the  acquisition  of  Santo 
Domingo  and  the  Danish  West  Indies.  In  1867  a 
treaty  was  concluded  with  Denmark  providing  for 
the  cession  of  the  islands  of  St.  Thomas  and  St.  John 
for  $7,500,000,  on  condition  that  the  inhabitants 
should  by  popular  vote  give  their  consent.  In  under- 
taking these  negotiations  the  United  States  was  in- 
fluenced on  the  one  hand  by  the  desire  to  acquire  a 
naval  base,  and  on  the  other  by  the  fear  that  these 
islands  might  fall  into  the  hands  of  one  of  the  greater 
European  powers.  The  plebiscite  in  St.  John  and  St. 
Thomas  was  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  the  cession, 
and  the  treaty  was  promptly  ratified  by  the  Danish 
Rigsdag,  but  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  took 
no  action  until  March,  1870,  when  Senator  Sumner 
presented  an  adverse  report  from  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  and  the  treaty  was  rejected. 

In  1867  Admiral  Porter  and  Mr.  F.  W.  Seward, 
the  assistant  secretary  of  state,  were  sent  to  Santo 

264 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

Domingo  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  lease  of 
Samana  bay  as  a  naval  station.  Their  mission  was 
not  successful,  but  the  following  year  the  president 
of  the  Dominican  Republic  sent  an  agent  to  Wash- 
ington proposing  annexation  and  requesting  the  United 
States  to  occupy  Samana  bay  at  once.  In  his  annual 
message  of  December  8,  1868,  President  Johnson  ad- 
vocated the  annexation  of  Santo  Domingo  and  a  joint 
resolution  to  that  effect  was  introduced  into  the  House, 
but  it  was  tabled  without  debate  by  an  overwhelming 
vote.  President  Grant  became  much  interested  in  this 
scheme,  and  soon  after  entering  the  White  House  he 
sent  one  of  his  private  secretaries,  Colonel  Babcock, 
to  the  island  to  report  on  the  condition  of  affairs. 
Babcock  negotiated  a  treaty  for  the  annexation  of 
the  Dominican  Republic,  and  another  for  the  lease 
of  Samana  bay.  As  Colonel  Babcock  was  without 
diplomatic  authority  of  any  kind,  the  Cabinet  re- 
ceived the  treaties  in  silent  amazement,  and  Hamilton 
Fish,  who  was  secretary  of  state,  spoke  of  resigning, 
but  Grant  persuaded  him  to  remain  in  office.  The 
annexation  treaty  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  in  Jan- 
uary, 1870,  but  encountered  violent  opposition,  espe- 
cially from  Sumner,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations.  It  was  finally  rejected  June  30 
by  vote  of  28  to  28. 

The  advance  of  the  United  States  into  the  Caribbean 
was  thus  delayed  until  the  Spanish  War.  As  a  result 
of  that  conflict  the  United  States  acquired  Porto  Rico 
and  a  protectorate  over  Cuba.  The  real  turning-point 
in  the  recent  history  of  the  West  Indies  was  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  of  190 1,  under  the  terms  of  which 
Qreat  Britain  relinquished  her  claim  to  an  equal  voice 

265 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

with  the  United  States  in  the  control  of  an  Isthmian 
canal  on  which  she  had  insisted  for  half  a  century. 
While  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  limited  in  terms 
to  the  canal  question,  it  was  in  reality  of  much  wider 
significance.     It  amounted  in  effect  to  the  transfer- 
ence of  naval  supremacy  in  the  West  Indies  to  the 
TJnited  States,   for  since  its  signature  Great  Britain 
has  withdrawn  her  squadron  from  this  important  stra- 
tegic area.     So  marked  was  Great  Britain's  change 
of  attitude  toward  the  United  States  at  this  time  that 
some  writers  have  concluded  that  a  secret  treaty  of 
alliance  was  made  between  the  two  countries  in  1897. 
The  absurdity  of  such  a  statement  was  pointed  out 
by    Senator   Lodge    several    years    ago.      England's 
change  of  attitude  is  not  difficult  to  understand.    For 
one  hundred  years  after  the  battle  of  Trafalgar  Eng- 
land had  pursued  the  policy  of  maintaining  a  navy 
large  enough  to  meet  all  comers.      With  the   rapid 
growth  of  the  navies  of  Russia,  Japan,  and  Germany 
during  the  closing  years  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
England  realized  that  she  could  no  longer  pursue  a 
policy  of  isolation.     Our  acquisition  of   the   Philip- 
pines, the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  Porto  Rico  and  our 
determination  to  build  an  Isthmian  canal  made  a  large 
American   navy   inevitable.      Great   Britain   realized, 
therefore,   that   she   would   have   to   cast   about    for 
future  allies.     It  was  on  considerations  of  this  kind 
that  she  signed  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  with  the 
United  States  in  1901,  and  the  defensive  alliance  with 
Japan  in  1902.     In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  was  bent  on  carrying  out  the  long  deferred 
canal  scheme,  Great  Britain  realized  that  a   further 
insistence  on  her  rights  under  the  Clayton-Bulwer 

266 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

treaty  would  lead  to  friction  and  possible  conflict. 
She  wisely  decided,  therefore,  to  recede  from  the 
position  which  she  had  held  for  half  a  century  and 
to  give  us  a  free  hand  in  the  acquisition  and  control 
of  the  canal  at  whatever  point  we  might  choose  to 
build  it.  In  signing  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  she 
gracefully  recognized  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
had  paramount  interests  in  the  Caribbean  which  it 
was  unwise  for  her  to  contest.  Since  the  signature 
of  that  treaty  American  supremacy  in  this  area  has 
not  been  seriously  questioned. 

The  determination  to  build  a  canal  not  only  ren- 
dered inevitable  the  adoption  of  a  policy  of  naval 
supremacy  in  the  Caribbean  sea,  but  led  to  the  formu- 
lation of  new  political  policies  to  be  applied  in  the 
zone  of  the  Caribbean — what  Admiral  Chester  calls 
the  larger  Panama  Canal  Zone — that  is,  the  West 
Indies,  Mexico  and  Central  America,  Colombia  and 
Venezuela.  The  policies  referred  to  included  the  es- 
tablishment of  protectorates,  the  supervision  of 
finances,  the  control  of  all  naval  routes,  the  acquisi- 
tion of  naval  stations,  and  the  policing  and  admin- 
istration of  disorderly  countries. 

The  advance  of  the  United  States  in  the  Caribbean 
since  the  Spanish  War  has  been  rapid.  The  acqui- 
sition of  Porto  Rico  and  the  establishment  of  a  pro- 
tectorate over  Cuba  were  the  natural  outcome  of  that 
struggle.  In  1903  we  acquired  the  canal  zone  under 
circumstances  already  described.  The  following  year 
President  Roosevelt  established  financial  supervision 
over  the  Dominican  Republic.  In  191 5  the  United 
States  landed  marines  in  Haiti  and  a  treaty  was  soon 
drafted  under  which  we  assumed  financial  supervision 

267 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

and  administrative  control  over  the  affairs  of  that 
country.  In  1916  we  acquired  by  treaty  from  Nica- 
ragua an  exclusive  right  of  way  for  a  canal  through 
her  territory  and  the  lease  of  a  naval  station  on  Fon- 
seca  bay,  and  in  19 17  we  acquired  by  treaty  from 
Denmark  her  holdings  in  the  West  Indies  known  as 
the  Virgin  Islands.  These  successive  steps  will  be 
considered  in  detail. 

The  methods  employed  by  President  Roosevelt  in 
the  acquisition  of  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  described 
in  a  previous  chapter  caused  indignation  and  alarm 
throughout  Latin  America  and  created  strained  rela- 
tions with  Colombia.  The  Colombian  government 
refused  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama  and  demanded  that  her  claim  to  Panama 
as  well  as  her  interests  in  the  canal  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration.  Colombia  claimed  that  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  had  misinterpreted  the  treaty  of  1846, 
which  established  mutual  obligations  between  the 
United  States  and  Colombia  with  reference  to  the 
isthmus,  by  construing  its  provisions  as  obligations 
to  the  world  at  large  against  Colombia.  As  the  United 
States  had  always  advocated  the  submission  to  arbi- 
tration of  questions  involving  the  construction  of 
treaties,  the  demand  of  Colombia  proved  embarrass- 
ing, but  both  Secretary  Hay  and  his  successor,  Sec- 
retary Root,  rejected  the  demand  for  arbitration  on 
the  ground  that  the  questions  involved  were  of  a 
political  nature.^ 

In  January,  1909,  shortly  before  the  close  of  the 
Roosevelt  administration.   Secretary   Root  undertook 


*  House    Doc.    No.     1444.    Sixty-second    Cong.,    Third    Ses9.,    pp.     2,    3; 
Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.   i,  Sixty-fifth  Cong.,  Special  Sess.,  pp.  47,  48. 

268 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

to  reestablish  friendly  relations  with  Colombia  through 
the  negotiation  in  the  city  of  Washington  of  three 
treaties,  one  between  the  United  States  and  the  Re- 
public of  Colombia,  one  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Republic  of  Panama,  and  one  between  Colom- 
bia and  Panama.  In  the  treaty  between  Colombia 
and  Panama  the  Republic  of  Colombia  recognized 
fully  the  independence  of  Panama,  and  the  Republic 
of  Panama  made  an  assignment  to  Colombia  of  the 
first  ten  installments  of  $250,000,  the  amount  due 
annually  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  from  the  United 
States  as  rental  for  the  canal.  According  to  the  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  the  RepubHc  of  Pan- 
ama, concluded  November  18,  1903,  the  payment  of 
this  annual  sum  was  to  begin  nine  years  from  date. 
It  was  now  agreed  that  the  first  annual  payment 
should  be  regarded  as  due  four  years  from  the  ex- 
change of  ratifications  of  the  said  treaty,  so  that  of 
the  $2,500,000  to  be  paid  to  Colombia,  half  would 
be  paid  by  the  United  States  and  half  by  Panama. 
In  the  new  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Pan- 
ama the  necessary  modification  of  the  treaty  of  1903 
was  made  so  as  to  permit  of  this  assignment  of  the 
first  ten  installments  to  Colombia.  In  the  treaty  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Colombia  the  most  im- 
portant provision  was  as  follows: 

The  Republic  of  Colombia  shall  have  liberty  at  all  times 
to  convey  through  the  ship  canal  now  in  course  of  construc- 
tion by  the  United  States  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  the 
troops,  materials  for  war,  and  ships  of  war  of  the  Republic 
of  Colombia,  without  paying  any  duty  to  the  United  States; 
even  in  the  case  of  an  international  war  between  Colombia 
and  another  country. 

269 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

It  was  further  provided  that  the  products  of  the  soil 
and  industry  of  Colombia  should  be  admitted  to  the 
canal  zone  subject  only  to  such  duty  as  would  be 
payable  on  similar  products  of  the  United  States 
under  similar  conditions,  and  Colombian  mails  were 
to  have  free  passage  through  the  canal  zone  on  pay- 
ment of  such  duties  or  charges  as  were  laid  on  the 
mails  of  the  United  States.^ 

These  tripartite  treaties  were  of  course  to  stand 
or  fall  together.  The  United  States  and  Panama 
promptly  ratified  the  agreements  to  which  they  were 
parties,  but  Colombia  rejected  the  arrangement  with 
indignation.  In  fact,  when  the  terms  of  the  settle- 
ment were  made  public,  the  Colombian  adminstration 
that  urged  their  acceptance  was  overthrown,  and  the 
Colombian  envoy  who  participated  in  the  negotiation 
of  the  treaties  was  forced  to  flee  from  the  country 
with  an  indignant  mob  at  his  heels.  Colombia  was 
not  to  be  appeased  by  the  paltry  sum  of  $2,500,000. 

The  Taft  administration  made  repeated  efforts  to 
placate  Colombia,  but  without  success.  On  Septem- 
ber 30,  1912,  Mr.  Du  Bois,  the  American  minister 
to  Colombia,  submitted  to  Secretary  Knox  an  inter- 
esting review  of  the  whole  question  in  the  course  of 
which,  after  referring  to  the  friendly  relations  that 
had  so  long  subsisted  between  the  two  countries,  he 
said: 

Nine  years  ago  this  was  changed  suddenly  and  unex- 
pectedly when  President  Roosevelt  denied  to  Colombia  the 
right  to  land  her  troops  upon  her  own  soil  to  supress  a 
threatened  revolt  and  maintain  a  sovereignty  guaranteed 
by  treaty  stipulations.     The  breach  came  and  it  has  been 

*  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  i,  Sixty-fifth  Cong.,  Special  Sess.,  pp.  24-34. 

270 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

growing  wider  since  that  hour.  By  refusing  to  allow 
Colombia  to  uphold  her  sovereign  rights  over  a  territory 
where  she  had  held  dominion  for  eighty  years,  the  friendship 
of  nearly  a  century  disappeared,  the  indignation  of  every 
Colombian,  and  millions  of  other  Latin-Americans,  was 
aroused  and  is  still  most  intensely  alive.  The  confidence  and 
trust  in  the  justice  and  fairness  of  the  United  States,  so  long 
manifested,  has  completely  vanished,  and  the  maleficent  in- 
fluence of  this  condition  is  permeating  public  opinion  in  all 
Latin-American  countries,  a  condition  which,  if  remedial 
measures  are  not  invoked,  will  work  inestimable  harm 
throughout  the  Western  Hemisphere.* 

Mr.  Du  Bois  reported  that  on  inquiry  of  promi- 
nent Colombians  of  the  causes  of  the  rejection  of 
the  Root  proposals  he  received  replies  to  the  follow- 
ing effect: 

Five  years  after  President  Roosevelt  had  taken  Panama 
from  us  with  rank  injustice,  your  government,  still  under 
his  chief  magistracy,  offered  us  a  paltry  $2,500,000  if  Co- 
lombia would  recognize  the  independence  of  her  revolted 
province,  fix  our  frontier  at  a  further  loss  of  territory,  open 
all  our  ports  free  to  the  refuge  of  vessels  employed  in  the 
canal  enterprise,  and  exempt  them  from  anchorage  or  ton- 
nage dues,  renounce  our  rights  to  all  of  our  contracts  and 
concessions  relating  to  the  construction  and  operation  of  the 
canal  or  railroad  across  the  isthmus,  release  Panama  from 
obligation  for  the  payment  of  any  part  of  our  external  debt, 
much  of  which  was  incurred  in  the  interest  of  Panama,  and 
enter  into  negotiations  for  the  revision  of  the  treaty  of  1846, 
which  five  years  before  had  been  openly  violated  by  the 
United  States  in  their  failure  to  help  maintain  the  sovereignty 
over  the  rebellious  province  which  they  had  solemnly  guar- 
anteed. The  reply  was  to  this,  banishment  of  our  minister 
who  negotiated  the  treaty,  and  all  South  America  applauded 
our  attitude.* 


*  Sen.   Ex.   Doc.   No.    /,   Sixty-fifth   Cong.,   Special   Sess.,  p.   35. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  41. 

1271 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Mr.  Du  Bois  then  proceeded  to  state  at  length  Co« 
lombia's  claims  which  he  summarized  as  follows: 
"  Panama  Railroad  annuities,  $16,000,000;  value  of 
railroad,  $16,446,942;  Panama  Canal  rights,  $17,500,- 
000;  cost  of  Costa  Rican  boundary  arbitration,  $200,- 
000;  total,  $50,446,942.  [The  total  should  be  $50,- 
146,942.]  Besides  this  sum,  Colombia  has  lost  the 
Province  of  Panama,  whose  value  cannot  be  readily 
estimated."  * 

In  conclusion  he  urged  the  importance  of  a  speedy 
adjustment  of  the  differences  with  Colombia  in  the 
following  words: 

South  America  is  advancing  along  commercial  lines  with 
giant  strides.  The  character  of  the  future  relations  of  the 
United  States  with  that  country  will  be  of  signal  importance. 
Friendly  intercourse  with  all  Latin  America  should  be  care- 
fully developed  and  maintained,  and  especially  is  this  im- 
portant with  Colombia,  which  borders  the  isthmus,  has 
fine  ports  on  both  oceans,  and  is  destined  to  become  an 
influential  factor  in  the  political  and  commercial  life 
of  South  America,  especially  in  all  countries  bordering 
on  the  Caribbean  sea.  To  approach  Colombia  in  a  con- 
ciliatory spirit  and  seek  a  renewal  of  her  ancient  friendship 
would  not  only  be  a  wise  and  just  move  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  but  as  Colombia  and  all  South  and  Central 
America  firmly  believe  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  was  unjust  in  the  Panama  incident,  from  which  has 
come  infinite  distress  to  Colombia,  it  would  be  a  benevolent 
and  fraternal  act,  and  the  time  to  move  is  the  present,  before 
the  canal  opens  and  while  the  public  sentiment  of  both  coun- 
tries is  in  harmony  with  the  movement.' 

At  the  time  that  the  above  report  on  relations  with 
Colombia  was  prepared  by  Mr.  Du  Bois  he  was  in 

•  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  i,  Sixty-fifth  Cong.,  Special  Sess.,  p.  44. 
'  Ibid, 

272 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

this  country,  having  come  home  to  confer  with  the 
Department  of  State  as  to  the  program  to  be  fol- 
lowed in  the  settlement  of  the  differences  with  Colom- 
bia. On  his  return  to  Bogota,  Mr.  Du  Bois  sub- 
mitted the  following  proposals  to  the  Colombian  gov- 
ernment: (i)  ratification  of  the  Root  treaties,  involv- 
ing the  payment  to  Colombia  of  the  first  ten  install- 
ments of  the  annual  rental  of  the  canal  zone  amount- 
ing to  $2,500,000;  (2)  the  payment  of  $10,000,000  by 
the  United  States  to  Colombia  for  the  right  to  build 
an  interoceanic  canal  by  the  Atrato  route  and  for  the 
lease  of  the  islands  of  Old  Providence  and  St.  An- 
drews as  coaling  stations;  (3)  the  good  offices  of  the 
United  States  on  behalf  of  Colombia  in  bringing  about 
an  adjustment  of  the  boundary  line  between  Colombia 
and  Panama;  (4)  the  submission  to  arbitration  of  the 
claims  of  Colombia  to  reversionary  rights  in  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad  assumed  by  the  United  States  under 
Article  XXII  of  the  treaty  of  1903  between  the  United 
States  and  Panama,  estimated  by  Mr,  Taft's  secretary 
of  war  at  over  $16,000,000;  and  (5)  the  granting  of 
preferential  rights  to  Colombia  in  the  use  of  the 
Panama  Canal. 

The  Colombian  government  promptly  rejected  these 
proposals  and  in  reply  demanded  "  arbitration  of  the 
whole  question  of  Panama  or  a  direct  proposition 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  give  Colombia 
compensation  for  all  the  moral,  physical,  and  financial 
losses  which  she  sustained  as  a  result  of  the  separa- 
tion of  Panama."    The  Colombian  minister  declared : 

Should  Colombia  grant  any  territorial  privileges  to  the 
United  States  after  the  wrong  that  country  has  inflicted  upon 
this  republic,  it  would  result  in  intense  agitation  and  possible 

273 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

revolution.  It  seems  as  though  your  people  have  never 
fully  realized  the  enormity  of  the  wrong  the  United  States 
has  perpetrated  against  the  Colombian  people. 

Mr.  Du  Bois  then  asked  whether  Colombia  would 
accept  $10,000,000,  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States  in  settling  the  differences  with  Panama,  arbi- 
tration of  the  reversionary  rights  in  the  Panama  Rail- 
road, and  preferential  rights  in  the  canal,  without 
granting  to  the  United  States  any  privileges  or  con- 
cessions whatever.  Receiving  a  negative  reply  to  this 
proposal,  Mr.  Du  Bois,  acting  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility, then  inquired  informally  whether  $25,000,000 
without  options  of  any  kind  would  satisfy  Colombia. 
The  answer  was  that  Colombia  would  accept  nothing 
but  the  arbitration  of  the  whole  Panama  question. 
Mr.  Du  Bois  was  instructed  February  20,  1913,  to  stop 
negotiations.  In  reporting  the  matter  to  the  President, 
Secretary  Knox  said  that  Colombia  seemed  determined 
to  treat  with  the  incoming  Democratic  administration.' 

When  the  Wilson  administration  came  in,  Secre- 
tary Bryan  took  up  the  negotiations  with  Colombia 
where  Knox  dropped  them,  and  concluded  a  treaty 
according  to  the  terms  of  which  the  United  States 
was  to  express  "  sincere  regret  that  anything  should 
have  occurred  to  interrupt  or  to  mar  the  relations  of 
cordial  friendship  that  had  so  long  subsisted  between 
the  two  nations,"  and  to  pay  Colombia  $25,000,000. 
The  treaty  further  granted  Colombia  the  same  prefer- 
ential rights  in  the  use  of  the  canal  which  the  Taft 
administration  had  proposed,  and  in  return  Colombia 
agreed  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Panama  and 
to  accept  a  boundary  line  laid  down  in  the  treaty. 

•  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  i,  Sixty-fifth  Cong.,  Special  Sess.,  pp.  53-79. 

274 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

This  treaty  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  June  i6, 
1914.  As  soon  as  its  terms  were  made  pubHc  ex- 
President  Roosevelt  denounced  it  as  blackmail,  and 
wrote  a  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Affairs  requesting  to  be  heard  be- 
fore any  action  was  taken  on  the  treaty.  During  the 
first  session  of  the  Sixty-sixth  Congress  in  19 19  the 

I  Colombian  treaty  was  reported  from  the  Committee 

on  Foreign  Relations  with  important  amendments. 
Article  I,  containing  expressions  of  regret  on  the  part 

B  of  the  United  States  for  the  events  that  had  taken 

place  on  the  isthmus,  was  entirely  stricken  out.  The 
clause  giving  Colombia  the  right  to  transport  through 
the  canal  its  troops,  materials  of  war,  and  ships  of 
war,  "  even  in  case  of  war  between  Colombia  and 
another  country,"  was  amended  by  the  elimination 
of  the  words  in  quotations.  The  sum  of  $25,000,000, 
instead  of  being  paid  in  cash,  was  to  be  paid  in  five 
annual  installments.  The  Senate  refused,  however, 
to  give  its  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
even  in  this  form,  and  it  is  understood  that  it  was 
proposed  to  cut  the  payment  to  Colombia  down  to 
$15,000,000. 

A  great  nation  like  the  United  States,  which  has 
always  professed  to  be  guided  in  international  ques- 
tions by  high  standards  of  justice  and  morality,  can- 
not afford  to  delay  indefinitely  the  settlement  of  a 
dispute  of  this  kind  with  a  weak  nation  like  Colombia. 
President  Roosevelt's  action  in  the  Panama  matter 
made  a  bad  impression  throughout  Latin  America  and 
caused  our  policy  in  the  Caribbean  to  be  regarded 
with  grave  suspicion.  As  to  Colombia's  rights  in 
the  matter,  Secretary  Bryan  made  the  following  state- 

275 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ment  in  his  argument  before  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  in  support  of  the  treaty: 

It  is  contended  by  some  that  the  action  taken  by  the  United 
States  was  based  upon  the  necessities  of  the  case,  and  those 
necesshies,  as  stated  by  those  who  take  this  position  are,  that 
Colombia  was  not  able  to  build  the  canal  herself  and  was 
not  willing  to  sell  to  the  United  States  upon  reasonable  terms 
the  right  to  build  the  canal.  Those  who  take  this  position 
put  the  United  States  in  the  attitude  of  exercising  the  right 
of  eminent  domain  in  the  interest  of  the  world's  commerce; 
but  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain  does  not 
relieve  those  who  exercise  it  of  liability  for  actual  damages 
suffered.  Take,  for  illustration,  the  condemning  of  a  block 
of  ground  for  a  public  building.  Suppose  that  every  lot 
owner  excepting  one  is  willing  to  sell  his  land  to  the  govern- 
ment at  its  market  value,  but  that  one  of  the  lot  owners, 
whose  lot  is  necessary  to  the  erection  of  the  building,  asks 
more  than  the  land  is  worth.  The  government  proceeds  to 
condemn  the  property,  but  it  does  not  attempt  to  escape  from 
paying  what  the  land  is  actually  worth,  and  the  actual  value 
of  the  property  is  not  reduced  one  dollar  by  any  effort  that 
the  owner  may  make  to  obtain  for  it  more  than  it  is  worth. 
If  it  is  contended  that  the  price  offered  by  the  United  States 
prior  to  Panama's  separation  was  a  reasonable  one.  and  that 
Colombia  ought  to  have  accepted  it,  that  valuation  cannot  be 
reduced  merely  because  Colombia  was  not  willing  to  accept 
the  offer.  This  illustration  is  based  upon  the  theory  adopted 
by  those  who  say  that  Colombia  was  entirely  in  the  wrong 
in  refusing  to  accept  the  offer  made  by  the  United  States, 
but  this  theory,  it  will  be  remembered,  is  disputed  by  the 
people  of  Colombia,  who  defend  the  position  their  govern- 
ment then  took  and,  as  has  been  said  before,  they  have  ever 
since  asked  that  the  controversy  be  arbitrated  by  some  im- 
partial tribunal.* 

In  T904  President  Roosevelt  made  a  radical  de- 
parture  from   the   traditional  policy   of   the   United 

»  §co.  Ex,  DOQ.  Nq.  Ii  Sixty-fifth  Cong.,  Special  Sess.,  pp.  87'88. 

276 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

States  in  proposing  that  we  should  assume  the  finan- 
cial administration  of  the  Dominican  Republic  in 
order  to  prevent  certain  European  powers  from  re- 
sorting to  the  forcible  collection  of  debts  due  their 
subjects.  On  September  12,  1904,  Minister  Dawson 
reported  to  the  State  Department  that  the  debt  of 
Santo  Domingo  was  $32,280,000,  the  estimated  rev- 
enues from  customs  receipts  $1,850,000,  and  the  pro- 
posed budget  for  current  expenses  $1,300,000,  leav- 
ing only  $550,000  with  which  to  meet  payments  of  in- 
terest, then  accruing  and  in  arrears,  amounting  to 
$2,600,000.  About  $22,000,000  of  this  debt  was  due 
to  European  creditors.  Most  of  this  indebtedness  had 
been  incurred  by  revolutionary  leaders  who  had  at 
various  times  taken  forcible  possession  of  the  govern- 
ment and  hastened  to  raise  all  the  money  they  could 
by  the  sale  of  bonds,  leaving  the  responsibility  with 
their  successors.  The  European  creditors  of  Santo 
Domingo  were  pressing  for  the  recognition  of  their 
claims.  Germany  seemed  especially  determined  to 
force  a  settlement  of  her  demands,  and  it  was  well 
known  that  Germany  had  for  years  regarded  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  as  the  main  hindrance  in  the  way  of 
her  acquiring  a  foothold  in  Latin  America.  The  only 
effective  method  of  collecting  the  interest  on  the  for- 
eign debt  appeared  to  be  the  seizure  and  adminis- 
tration of  the  Dominican  custom-houses  by  some  for- 
eign power  or  group  of  foreign  powers.  President 
Roosevelt  foresaw  that  such  an  occupation  of  the  cus- 
tom-houses would,  in  view  of  the  large  debt,  con- 
stitute the  occupation  of  American  territory  by  Euro- 
pean powers  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time,  and 
would  therefore  be  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 

277 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

trine.  He  had  before  him  also  the  results  of  a  some- 
what similar  financial  administration  of  Egypt  under- 
taken jointly  by  England  and  France  in  1878,  and 
after  Arabi's  revolt  continued  by  England  alone,  with 
the  result  that  Egypt  soon  became  a  possession  of  the 
British  Crown  to  almost  as  great  a  degree  as  if  it 
had  been  formally  annexed.  President  Roosevelt  con- 
cluded, therefore,  that  where  it  was  necessary  to  place 
a  bankrupt  American  republic  in  the  hands  of  a  re- 
ceiver, the  United  States  must  undertake  to  act  as 
receiver  and  take  over  the  administration  of  its 
finances. 

The  policy  that  he  was  about  to  adopt  was  stated 
as  follows  in  his  annual  message  of  December  6, 
1904: 

Any  country  whose  people  conduct  themselves  well  can 
count  upon  our  hearty  friendship.  If  a  nation  shows  that 
it  knows  how  to  act  with  reasonable  efficiency  and  decency 
in  social  and  political  matters,  if  it  keeps  order  and  pays  its 
obligations,  it  need  fear  no  interference  from  the  United 
States.  Chronic  wrongdoing,  or  an  impotence  which  results 
in  a  general  loosening  of  the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may 
in  America,  as  elsewhere,  ultimately  require  intervention 
by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  the 
adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
may  force  the  United  States,  however  reluctantly,  in  flagrant 
cases  of  such  wrongdoing  or  impotence,  to  the  exercise  of  an 
international  police  power. 

About  the  same  time  Minister  Dawson  was  directed 
by  Secretary  Hay  to  suggest  to  the  Dominican  govern- 
ment that  it  request  the  United  States  to  take  charge 
of  its  customs.  As  the  Dominican  government  saw 
no  other  way  out  of  its  difficulties,  it  responded  to 

278 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

this  suggestion,  and  on  February  4,  1905,  a  protocol 
was  signed  by  Mr.  Dawson  and  the  Dominican  for- 
eign minister  which  provided  that  the  United  States 
should  guarantee  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Do- 
minican Republic,  take  charge  of  its  custom-houses, 
administer  its  finances,  and  settle  its  obligations,  for- 
eign as  well  as  domestic.  In  calling  the  new  agree- 
ment a  "  protocol  "  instead  of  a  **  treaty,"  the  Presi- 
dent had  probably  not  intended  to  submit  it  to  the 
Senate,  but  the  proposal  to  depart  so  radically  from 
our  past  policy  created  so  much  criticism  that  the 
Senate  was  finally  asked  to  ratify  the  protocol  in  reg- 
ular form.  This  they  failed  to  do,  but  the  President 
did  not  propose  to  be  thwarted  in  this  way.  As  the 
Senate  would  not  sanction  his  appointment  of  a  re- 
ceiver of  customs  for  Santo  Domingo,  he  drafted  a 
modus  Vivendi,  under  the  terms  of  which  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Dominican  Republic  appointed  a  receiver 
of  customs  named  unofficially  by  President  Roosevelt, 
who  proceeded  to  administer  the  affairs  of  the  re- 
public under  the  protection  of  the  United  States  navy, 
whose  ships  the  President  could  as  commander-in- 
chief  order  wherever  he  pleased.  The  President's 
course  met  with  determined  opposition  both  in  and 
out  of  Congress,  but  as  he  was  bent  on  having  his 
way  and  continued  to  carry  out  his  policy  without 
the  sanction  of  the  Senate,  that  body  finally  decided 
that  it  would  be  best  to  give  the  arrangement  a  definite 
legal  status.  On  February  25,  1907,  the  Senate  agreed 
to  the  ratification  of  a  revised  treaty  which  omitted 
the  territorial-guarantee  clause,  but  provided  that  the 
President  of  the  United  States  should  appoint  a  gen- 
eral receiver  of  Dominican  customs  and  such  assist- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

ants  as  he  might  deem  necessary;  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  should  afiford  them  such 
protection  as  might  be  necessary  for  the  performance 
of  their  duties;  and  that  until  the  bonded  debt  should 
be  paid  in  full,  the  Dominican  government  would  not 
increase  its  debt  except  with  the  consent  of  the  United 
States.  In  the  meantime,  under  the  interim  arrange- 
ment, conditions  in  Santo  Domingo  had  greatly  im- 
proved, the  customs  receipts  had  nearly  doubled,  and 
the  creditors  had  agreed  to  compromise  their  claims, 
so  that  the  total  debt  at  the  time  the  above  treaty 
was  ratified  amounted  to  not  more  than  $17,000,000/** 
In  spite  of  the  criticism  that  President  Roosevelt's 
policy  encountered,  the  Taft  administration  not  only 
continued  it  in  Santo  Domingo,  but  tried  to  extend 
it  to  Nicaragua  and  Honduras.  The  five  republics 
of  Central  America  had  been  for  years  in  a  state 
of  political  and  economic  disorder  as  the  result  of 
wars  and  revolutions.  In  1906  there  was  a  war  be- 
tween Guatemala  and  Salvador,  in  which  Honduras 
became  involved  as  the  ally  of  Salvador.  President 
Roosevelt  invited  President  Diaz  of  Mexico  to  unite 
with  him  in  an  offer  of  mediation,  which  resulted 
in  a  peace  conference  held  aboard  the  U.  S.  S.  Marble- 
head.  At  this  conference  the  belligerents  agreed  to 
suspend  hostilities  and  to  attend  another  conference 
for  the  purpose  of  drafting  a  general  treaty  of  peace. 
The  second  conference  was  held  at  San  Jose,  Costa 
Rica,  but  President  Zelaya  of  Nicaragua  declined  to 
send  a  representative  because  he  was  unwilling  to 
recognize  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  intervene 

*"  Foreign  Relations,  1905,  p.  298;  Moore,  "  Digest  of  Int.  Law,"  Vol.  VI, 
pp.  518529;  Am.  Journal  of  Int.  Law,  Vol.  I,  p.  287,  and  Documentary 
Supplement,  p.   231. 

280 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

in  Central  American  affairs.  At  this  time  Zelaya  was 
systematically  interfering  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
the  other  Central  American  states,  and  exercised  such 
complete  control  over  the  government  of  Honduras 
that  Guatemala  and  Salvador  were  endeavoring  to  stir 
up  revolutions  against  him  in  that  state  and  in  Nica- 
ragua. War  was  about  to  break  out  in  the  summer 
of  1907  when  President  Roosevelt  and  President  Diaz 
again  intervened  diplomatically  and  persuaded  the  Cen- 
tral American  governments  to  suspend  warlike  prepa- 
rations and  to  attend  a  conference  in  the  city  of 
Washington.  In  November  the  delegates  of  the  five 
Central  American  states  met  in  the  Bureau  of  Ameri- 
can Republics  and  were  addressed  by  Secretary  Root 
and  the  Mexican  ambassador.  The  delegates  adopted 
a  general  treaty  of  peace,  providing  for  the  settlement 
of  existing  differences  and  for  the  establishment  of 
a  Central  American  court  of  justice  composed  of  five 
judges,  one  to  be  elected  by  the  legislature  of  each 
state.  The  five  republics  agreed  to  submit  to  this  tri- 
bunal all  controversies  of  whatever  nature  that  might 
arise  between  them  which  could  not  be  settled  through 
ordinary  diplomatic  channels. 

But  President  Zelaya  of  Nicaragua,  who  still  con- 
trolled Honduras,  continued  his  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  the  other  republics  by  encouraging  revolu- 
tionary movements  and  sending  out  filibustering  ex- 
peditions. He  was  also  hostile  to  the  Central  Ameri- 
can court  of  justice,  and  it  became  evident  that  there 
was  little  chance  of  permanent  peace  as  long  as 
Zelaya  remained  in  power.  When,  therefore,  in  Oc- 
tober, 1909,  members  of  the  conservative  party  started 
a  revolution  at  Bluefields  against  Zelaya's  government, 

281 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  movement  was  regarded  with  sympathy  in  the 
other  Central  American  republics  and  in  Washington. 
Conditions  became  so  intolerable  that  many  people 
in  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  appealed  to  the  United 
States  to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  order. 
President  Diaz  of  Mexico  was  friendly  to  Zelaya 
and  informed  the  United  States  that  he  did  not  care 
to  take  any  further  action.  This  brought  to  an  end 
the  cooperative  efforts  of  the  two  governments  and 
thereafter  the  United  States  had  to  act  alone.  Noth- 
ing was  done,  however,  until  two  Americans  were 
executed  by  Zelaya's  order  in  November,  1909.  As 
a  result  of  these  executions,  which  were  without  legal 
excuse  and  attended  by  barbarous  cruelties,  President 
Taft  promptly  severed  diplomatic  relations  with 
Zelaya's  government.  In  a  dispatch  to  the  Nicaraguan 
charge,    December    i,    1909,    Secretary    Knox    said: 

Since  the  Washington  conventions  of  1907,  it  is  notorious 
that  President  Zelaya  has  almost  continuously  kept  Central 
America  in  tension  or  turmoil ;  that  he  has  repeatedly  and 
flagrantly  violated  the  provisions  of  the  conventions,  and, 
by  a  baleful  influence  upon  Honduras,  whose  neutrality  the 
conventions  were  to  assure,  has  sought  to  discredit  those 
sacred  international  obligations,  to  the  great  detriment  of 
Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador,  and  Guatemala,  whose  governments 
meanwhile  appear  to  have  been  able  patiently  to  strive  for 
the  loyal  support  of  the  engagements  so  solemnly  undertaken 
at  Washington  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States  and 
Mexico. 

He  added  that  under  the  regime  of  President  Zelaya 
republican  institutions  had  ceased  to  exist  in  Nicaragua 
except  in  name,  that  public  opinion  and  the  press  had 
been  throttled,  and  that  prison  had  been  the  reward  of 

282 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

any  tendency  to  real  patriotism.  The  government  of 
the  United  States  was  convinced,  he  said,  "  that  the 
revolution  represents  the  ideals  and  the  will  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  Nicaraguan  people  more  faithfully  than 
does  the  government  of  President  Zelaya."  ^^ 

This  note  caused  the  speedy  downfall  of  Zelaya's 
government.  He  tried  to  perpetuate  his  party  in 
power  by  resigning  the  presidency  to  Dr.  Madriz, 
but  President  Taft  refused  to  recognize  the  Madriz 
government,  and  a  few  months  later  it  was  over- 
thrown and  the  revolutionary  party  came  into  power, 
first  under  the  presidency  of  Estrada  and  then  under 
that  of  Adolf o  Diaz. 

The  revolution  had  paralyzed  agriculture  and  com- 
merce and  thrown  the  country  into  financial  chaos. 
In  October,  19 lo,  the  United  States  government  sent 
Thomas  C.  Dawson  to  Managua  to  investigate  con- 
ditions and  to  straighten  out  the  political  and  financial 
affairs  of  Nicaragua.  While  he  was  engaged  in  this 
task,  Secretary  Knox  negotiated  at  Washington  two 
treaties,  one  between  the  United  States  and  Honduras, 
signed  January  10,  191 1,  and  a  similar  treaty  between 
the  United  States  and  Nicaragua,  signed  June  6. 
These  treaties  were  intended  to  place  the  two  countries 
concerned  under  the  financial  supervision  of  the  United 
States.  They  provided  for  the  appointment  in  each 
case  of  a  collector  of  customs  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  and  made  the  customs  re- 
ceipts responsible  for  loans  to  be  advanced  by  Ameri- 
can bankers.  The  collectorship  of  customs  was  im- 
mediately established  in  Nicaragua  without  waiting 
for  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate,  and 

"  Foreign  Relations,   1909,  p.  455. 

283 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

through  the  efforts  of  the  State  Department  American 
bankers  made  prehminary  loans  to  the  Nicaraguan 
government.  When  the  Senate  rejected  the  treaty,  the 
bankers  refused  to  make  further  loans,  and  the  situa- 
tion was  almost  as  bad  as  ever.  In  October,  191 1, 
General  Mena,  minister  of  war  and  head  of  a  fac- 
tion of  his  own,  was  elected  by  the  Assembly  president 
of  the  republic,  but  as  this  was  contrary  to  an  agree- 
ment which  had  been  made  with  Dawson,  it  did  not 
meet  with  the  approval  of  the  United  States,  and 
President  Diaz  removed  Mena  from  office  and  forced 
him  to  flee  from  the  capital.  Shortly  afterwards  Mena 
was  taken  seriously  ill,  and  the  opposition  to  President 
Diaz  fell  again  under  the  control  of  Zelaya's  fol- 
lowers. As  President  Diaz  was  unable  to  guarantee 
protection  to  the  life  and  property  of  foreigners,  he 
asked  the  United  States  for  assistance.  In  answer  to 
this  request  American  marines  were  landed  at  Corinto 
and  assumed  control  of  the  national  railway  which 
connected  that  port  with  the  capital  and  the  principal 
cities.  The  American  minister  made  a  public  an- 
nouncement to  the  effect  that  the  United  States  in- 
tended to  keep  open  the  routes  of  communication  and 
to  protect  American  life  and  property.  This  an- 
nouncement was  a  great  blow  to  the  revolutionists. 
Some  of  their  leaders  surrendered  voluntarily  to  the 
American  marines,  while  others  were  attacked  and 
forced  to  surrender  positions  along  the  railroad  which 
they  insisted  upon  holding.  In  these  operations  seven 
American  marines  lost  their  lives.  Since  1912  a 
legation  guard  of  one  hundred  marines  has  been  main- 
tained at  the  capital  of  Nicaragua  and  a  warship  has 
been  stationed  at  Corinto. 

284 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

After  the  revolutionary  movement  was  thus  over- 
thrown, Secretary  Knox  negotiated  a  new  treaty  for 
the  purpose  of  helping  the  Nicaraguan  government 
out  of  the  financial  straits  in  which  it  found  itself. 
Great  Britain  was  threatening  to  force  the  payment 
of  its  claims  and  certain  German  interests,  which  were 
operating  banana  plantations  in  Costa  Rica,  were  try- 
ing to  secure  from  the  Nicaraguan  government  a  con- 
cession for  the  construction  of  a  canal  irom  the 
Great  Lake  to  the  Atlantic  along  the  San  Juan  river. 
According  to  the  terms  of  the  Knox  treaty  the  United 
States  was  to  pay  Nicaragua  $3,000,000  in  return 
for  an  exclusive  right  of  way  for  a  canal  through 
her  territory,  a  naval  base  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca, 
and  the  lease  for  ninety-nine  years  of  the  Great  Corn 
and  Little  Corn  Islands  in  the  Caribbean.  This  treaty 
was  submitted  to  the  Senate  February  26,  1913,  but 
the  close  of  the  Taft  administration  was  then  at  hand, 
and  no  action  was  taken. 

The  Wilson  administration  followed  the  same  pol- 
icy, however,  and  in  July,  19 13,  Secretary  Bryan  sub- 
mitted a  third  treaty  with  Nicaragua  containing  the 
provisions  of  the  second  Knox  treaty  and  in  addition 
certain  provisions  of  the  Piatt  Amendment  which  de- 
fines our  protectorate  over  Cuba.  This  treaty  aroused 
strong  opposition  in  the  other  Central  American 
States,  and  Costa  Rica,  Salvador,  and  Honduras  filed 
formal  protests  with  the  United  States  government 
against  its  ratification  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
convert  Nicaragua  into  a  protectorate  of  the  United 
States  and  thus  defeat  the  long-cherished  plan  for  a 
union  of  the  Central  American  republics.  They  also 
tlaimed  that  the  treaty  infringed  their  own  rights. 

285 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

In  1858  Costa  Rica  had  been  granted  perpetual  rights 
of  free  navigation  in  the  lower  part  of  the  San  Juan 
river,  and  Nicaragua  had  agreed  to  consult  her  before 
granting  any  concessions  for  the  construction  of  an 
interoceanic  canal.  Salvador  and  Honduras  objected 
to  the  establishment  of  a  naval  base  in  the  Gulf  of 
Fonseca  in  close  proximity  to  their  coasts.  They 
also  asserted  proprietary  rights  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca, 
claiming  that  Salvador,  Honduras,  and  Nicaragua,  as 
successors  of  the  old  Central  American  Federation, 
exercised  joint  ownership  over  the  gulf.  Efforts  were 
made  by  the  United  States  to  arrive  at  a  settlement 
with  Costa  Rica  and  Salvador  on  the  basis  of  a  money 
payment,  but  without  success.  Moreover,  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  objected  to  the  protectorate 
feature  of  the  treaty  and  refused  to  ratify  it,  but  the 
negotiations  were  renewed,  and  on  August  5,  1914, 
a  new  treaty,  which  omits  the  provisions  of  the  Piatt 
Amendment,  was  signed  at  Washington.  This  treaty, 
which  was  finally  ratified  by  the  Senate,  February  18, 
1916,  grants  to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity  the 
exclusive  right  to  construct  a  canal  by  way  of  the 
San  Juan  river  and  Lake  Nicaragua,  and  leases  to 
the  United  States  for  ninety-nine  years  a  naval  base 
on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  and  also  the  Great  Corn 
and  Little  Corn  Islands  as  coaling  stations.  The  con- 
sideration for  these  favors  was  the  sum  of  $3,000,000 
to  be  expended,  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States,  in  paying  the  public 
debt  of  Nicaragua,  and  for  other  purposes  to  be 
agreed  on  by  the  two  contracting  parties. 

In  consenting  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  the 
Senate,  in  order  to  meet  the  objections  raised  by  Costa 

286 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

Rica,  Salvador,  and  Honduras,  attached  to  their  reso- 
lution of  ratification  the  proviso  "  that  nothing  in  said 
convention  is  intended  to  affect  any  existing  right 
of  any  of  the  said  states."  This  reservation  did  not 
satisfy  Costa  Rica  and  Salvador,  who  took  their  cases 
to  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice,  requesting 
that  Nicaragua  be  enjoined  from  carrying  out  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty.  Nicaragua  refused  to  be  a 
party  to  the  action,  but  the  court  nevertheless  as- 
sumed jurisdiction.  Its  decision  in  the  case  of  Costa 
Rica  was  announced  September  30,  1916.  It  declared 
that  Nicaragua  had  violated  Costa  Rica's  rights,  but, 
as  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction  over  the  United  States, 
it  declined  to  declare  the  treaty  void.  A  similar  de- 
cision in  the  case  of  Salvador  was  handed  down  on 
March  2,  1917.^^ 

Neither  Nicaragua  nor  the  United  States  has  paid 
any  attention  to  the  decision  of  the  Central  American 
Court  of  Justice,  which  was  set  up  under  such  favor- 
able auspices  by  the  Washington  conventions.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  court  had  not  fulfilled  the  ex- 
pectations of  those  who  had  been  interested  in  its 
establishment,  but  it  was  unfortunate  that  it  should 
have  received  its  coup  de  grace  from  the  United 
States.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  charged  that  the 
State  Department,  under  the  Knox  regime,  exploited 
the  situation  in  Central  America  for  the  benefit  of 
American  capitalists,  and  that  the  Wilson  adminis- 
tration has  for  years  maintained  a  minority  party 
in  power  through  the  presence  of  a  body  of  American 
marines  at  the  capital  and  a  warship  at  Corinto.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  as  a  result 

**  D.  G.  Munro,  "  The  Five  Republics  of  Central  America,"  p.   257- 

^287 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

of  American  policy,  Central  America  has  been  freer 
from  wars  and  revolutions  for  a  longer  period  than 
at  any  other  time  in  its  history.  The  better  element  of 
the  population  appears  to  be  satisfied  with  the  situa- 
tion." 

The  treaty  with  the  negro  republic  of  Haiti,  rati- 
fied by  the  Senate  February  28,  19 16,  carries  the  new 
Caribbean  policies  of  the  United  States  to  the  farthest 
limits  short  of  actual  annexation.  Shortly  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  war,  Haitian  finances  were 
in  such  bad  shape  as  the  result  of  internal  disorders 
that  there  was  grave  danger  of  European  intervention, 
and  the  United  States  was  considering  the  question 
of  acquiring  supervision  over  the  finances  of  the  re- 
public. In  June,  19 15,  a  crisis  in  the  internal  afifairs 
of  Haiti  seemed  imminent  and,  at  the  request  of  the 
State  Department,  Read-Admiral  Caperton  was  or- 
dered to  Haitian  waters.  Towards  the  latter  part 
of  July  the  government  of  President  Guillaume  was 
overthrown,  and  he  and  members  of  his  cabinet 
took  refuge  in  the  French  and  Dominican  legations. 
These  buildings  were  entered  by  a  mob.  Presi- 
dent Guillaume  was  slain  at  the  gate  of  the  French 
legation,  his  body  cut  in  pieces,  and  dragged  about 
the  town.  Admiral  Caperton  at  once  landed  a  force 
of  marines  at  Port  au  Prince  in  order  to  protect  the 
lives  and  property  of  foreigners.  An  additional  force 
was  brought  from  Guantanamo  and  the  total  number 
raised  to  two  thousand  and  placed  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  Waller.  There  was  but  slight  resistance 
to  the  landing  of  the  marines,  but  a  few  days  later 

^'  For  recent  and  authoritative  information  on  Central  American  affairs, 
see  the  volume  by  Dana  G.  Munro,  "  The  Five  Republics  of  Central 
America."       (Carnegie    Endowment    for    International    Peace,    1918.) 

288 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

a  conflict  occurred  in  which  two  Americans  were 
killed."  On  August  12  a  new  president  was  elected 
who  cooperated  with  the  American  forces  in  their 
efforts  to  establish  peace  and  order,  and  on  September 
16  a  treaty  with  the  United  States  was  signed  at  Port 
au  Prince.  This  treaty  provides  for  the  establishment 
of  a  receivership  of  Haitian  customs  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  United  States  similar  in  most  respects  to 
that  established  over  the  Dominican  Republic.  It  also 
provides  for  the  appointment,  on  the  nomination  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  of  a  financial  ad- 
viser, who  shall  assist  in  the  settlement  of  the  foreign 
debt  and  direct  expenditures  of  the  surplus  for  the 
development  of  the  agricultural,  mineral,  and  commer- 
cial resources  of  the  republic.  It  provides  further 
for  a  native  constabulary  under  American  officers  ap- 
pointed by  the  President  of  Haiti  upon  nomination 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  And  it  ex- 
tends to  Haiti  the  main  provisions  of  the  Piatt  Amend- 
ment. By  controlling  the  internal  financial  adminis- 
tration of  the  government  the  United  States  hopes 
to  remove  all  incentives  for  those  revolutions  which 
have  in  the  past  had  for  their  object  a  raid  on  the 
public  treasury,  and  by  controlling  the  customs  and 
maintaining  order  the  United  States  hopes  to  avoid 
all  possibility  of  foreign  intervention.  The  treaty 
is  to  remain  in  force  for  a  period  of  ten  years  and 
for  another  period  of  ten  years  if  either  party  pre- 
sents specific  reasons  for  continuing  it  on  the  ground 
that  its  purpose  has  not  been  fully  accomplished. 

The  latest  acquisition  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Caribbean  is  that  of  the  Danish  West  Indies,  or  Virgin 

**  Secretary  of  the  Navy,   Annual   Report   1915,  pp.    1517. 

289 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Islands.  Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the 
treaty  negotiated  by  Secretary  Seward  in  1867  for  the 
purchase  of  these  islands,  which  was  unfortunately 
rejected  by  the  Senate.  Another  attempt  at  purchase 
was  made  by  President  Roosevelt  in  1902.  A  treaty 
providing  for  the  cession  of  the  group  to  the  United 
States  was  signed  at  Washington  on  January  24  of 
that  year  and  approved  by  the  Senate  February  17, 
but  this  time  the  Danish  Rigsdag  refused  to  give  its 
approval.  President  Roosevelt  was  moved  by  the  con- 
sideration that  the  Danish  Islands  were  of  great  stra- 
tegic importance  in  connection  with  the  problem  of 
guarding  the  approaches  to  the  Panama  canal.  The 
commercial  value  of  the  islands  is  also  great.  More- 
over, the  United  States  was  confronted  by  the  possi- 
bility of  their  falling  under  the  control  of  Germany 
or  some  other  European  power,  which  might  use  them 
as  a  naval  base.  Had  Germany  been  successful  in 
the  recent  war,  she  might  have  forced  Denmark  to 
sell  or  cede  the  islands  to  her.  In  view  of  this  pos- 
sibility, negotiations  were  taken  up  again  with  Den- 
mark in  19 16,  and  on  August  4  Secretary  Lansing 
concluded  a  treaty  by  which  the  United  States  ac- 
quired the  islands  of  St.  Thomas,  St.  John,  and  St. 
Croix,  together  with  some  adjacent  small  islands  and 
rocks,  for  the  sum  of  $25,000,000.  This  treaty  was 
duly  ratified  by  the  Senate  and  the  ratifications  were 
exchanged   January    17,    191 7. 

The  rapid  advance  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Caribbean,  described  in  the  preceding  pages,  naturally 
aroused  the  fears  of  the  smaller  Latin-American  states 
and  lent  color  to  the  charge  that  the  United  States 
had  converted  the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  a  policy  of 

290 


UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN 

benevolent  protection  to  one  of  imperialistic  aggres- 
sion. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
never  been  regarded  by  the  United  States  as  in  any 
sense  a  self-denying  declaration.  President  Monroe 
said  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  the  part 
of  the  European  powers  "  to  extend  their  system  to 
any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety."  The  primary  object  of  the  policy 
outlined  by  President  Monroe  was,  therefore,  the 
peace  and  safety  of  the  United  States.  The  protec- 
tion of  Latin-American  states  against  European  inter- 
vention was  merely  a  means  of  protecting  ourselves. 
While  the  United  States  thus  undertook  to  prevent 
the  encroachment  of  European  powers  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica, it  has  never  admitted  any  limitation  upon  the  pos- 
sibility of  its  own  expansion  in  this  region.  The 
silence  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  on  this  question  has 
been  remedied  to  some  extent  by  President  Wilson, 
who,  at  the  outset  of  his  administration,  gave  the 
assurance  that  "  the  United  States  will  never  again 
seek  one  additional  foot  of  territory  by  conquest." 
This  declaration,  followed  by  his  refusal  to  be  forced 
into  war  with  Mexico,  has  done  much  to  remove  the 
suspicion  with  which  our  recent  policies  in  the  Carib- 
bean have  been  regarded  by  our  Southern  neighbors. 
His  sincerity  was  further  attested  by  his  ready  ac- 
ceptance of  the  proffered  mediation  of  the  ABC 
powers  in  the  Mexican  embroglio  and  by  the  encour- 
agement which  he  has  given  to  the  Pan  American 
movement. 


291 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Pan  Americanism 

The  Pan  American  movement,  which  has  for  its  ob- 
ject the  promotion  of  closer  social,  economic,  financial, 
and  political  relations  between  the  independent  repub- 
lics of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  has  attracted  much  at- 
tention in  recent  years.  The  Pan  American  ideal  is  an 
old  one,  dating  back,  in  fact,  to  the  Panama  Congress 
of  1826.  The  object  of  this  congress  was  not  very 
definitely  stated  in  the  call  which  was  issued  by  Simon 
Bolivar,  but  his  purpose  was  to  secure  the  independ- 
ence and  peace  of  the  new  Spanish-American  repub- 
lics either  through  a  permanent  confederation  or 
through  a  series  of  diplomatic  congresses.  Henry 
Clay,  who  was  secretary  of  state  at  the  time,  was 
enthusiastically  in  favor  of  accepting  the  invitation  ex- 
tended to  the  United  States  to  participate  in  the  con- 
gress. President  Adams  agreed,  therefore,  to  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  invitation,  but  the  matter  was  debated 
at  great  length  in  both  House  and  Senate.  In  the 
Senate  the  debate  was  particularly  acrimonious.  The 
policy  of  the  administration  was  denounced  as  dan- 
gerous, and  it  was  asserted  that  a  participation  in  the 
congress  at  Panama  could  be  of  no  benefit  to  the 
United  States  and  might  be  the  means  of  involving  us 
in  international  complications.  One  of  the  topics  pro- 
posed for  discussion  was  "  the  manner  in  which  all 
colonization  of  European  powers  on  the  American 

292 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

continent  shall  be  restricted."  The  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Affairs  objected  strenuously  to  the  United 
States  in  any  way  committing  itself  to  guaranteeing 
the  territory  of  any  other  American  state.  The  slav- 
ery question  also  projected  itself  into  the  debate, 
mainly  because  the  negro  Republic  of  Haiti  was  to  be 
represented  and  because  most  of  the  other  states  had 
proclaimed  the  emancipation  of  slaves.  The  Senate 
finally  agreed  to  the  nomination  of  Richard  C.  Ander- 
son, of  Kentucky,  and  John  Sergeant,  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, as  envoys  extraordinary  and  ministers  plenipo- 
tentiary to  the  assembly  of  American  nations  at 
Panama,  and  Congress  made  the  necessary  appropria- 
tion. The  delay  proved  fatal  to  the  plan,  however,  for 
the  American  delegates  did  not  reach  Panama  until 
after  the  congress  had  adjourned. 

In  view  of  the  opposition  which  the  plan  encoun- 
tered in  Congress,  the  instructions  to  the  American 
delegates  were  very  carefully  drawn  by  Secretary  Clay 
and  their  powers  were  strictly  limited.  They  were 
cautioned  against  committing  their  government  in  any 
way  to  the  establishment  of  "  an  amphictyonic  council, 
invested  with  power  finally  to  decide  controversies  be- 
tween the  American  states  or  to  regulate  in  any  re- 
spect their  conduct.  Such  a  council  might  have  been 
well  enough  adapted  to  a  number  of  small  contracted 
states,  whose  united  territory  would  fall  short  of  the 
extent  of  that  of  the  smallest  of  the  American  powers. 
The  complicated  and  various  interests  which  appertain 
to  the  nations  of  this  vast  continent  cannot  be  safely 
confided  to  the  superintendence  of  one  legislative  au- 
thority. We  should  almost  as  soon  expect  to  see  an 
amphictyonic  council  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the 

293 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

whole  globe.  But  even  if  it  were  desirable  to  estab- 
lish such  a  tribunal,  it  is  beyond  the  competency  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States  voluntarily  to 
assent  to  it,  without  a  previous  change  of  their  actual 
constitution." 

The  delegates  were  also  instructed  to  oppose  the 
formation  of  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  be- 
tween the  American  powers,  for,  as  Mr.  Clay  pointed 
out,  the  Holy  Alliance  had  abandoned  all  idea  of  as- 
sisting Spain  in  the  conquest  of  her  late  colonies.  Con- 
tinuing, he  said : 

Other  reasons  concur  to  dissuade  the  United  States  from 
entering  into  such  an  alliance.  From  the  first  establishment 
of  their  present  constitution,  their  illustrious  statesmen  have 
inculcated  the  avoidance  of  foreign  alliances  as  a  leading 
maxim  of  their  foreign  policy.  It  is  true,  that  in  its  adop- 
tion, their  attention  was  directed  to  Europe,  which  having 
a  system  of  connections  and  of  interests  remote  and  different 
from  ours,  it  was  thought  most  advisable  that  we  should  not 
mix  ourselves  up  with  them.  And  it  is  also  true,  that  long 
since  the  origin  of  the  maxim,  the  new  American  powers  have 
arisen,  to  which,  if  at  all,  it  is  less  applicable.  Without, 
therefore,  asserting  that  an  exigency  may  not  occur  in  which 
an  alliance  of  the  most  intimate  kind  between  the  United 
States  and  the  other  American  republics  would  be  highly 
proper  and  expedient,  it  may  be  safely  said  that  the  occasion 
which  would  warrant  a  departure  from  that  established 
maxim  ought  to  be  one  of  great  urgency,  and  that  none  such 
is  believed  now  to  exist.  Among  the  objections  to  such 
alliances,  those  which  at  all  times  have  great  weight  are, 
first,  the  difficulty  of  a  just  and  equal  arrangement  of  the 
contributions  of  force  and  of  other  means  between  the 
respective  parties  to  the  attainment  of  the  common  object; 
and  secondly,  that  of  providing  beforehand,  and  determining 
with  perfect  precision,  when  the  casus  foederis  arises,  and 
thereby  guarding  against  all  controversies  about  it.    There 

294 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

is  less  necessity  for  any  such  alliance  at  this  juncture  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  because  no  compact,  by  whatever 
solemnities  it  might  be  attended,  or  whatever  name  or  char- 
acter it  might  assume,  could  be  more  obligatory  upon  them 
than  the  irresistible  motive  of  self-preservation,  which  would 
be  instantly  called  into  operation,  and  stimulate  them  to  the 
utmost  exertion  in  the  supposed  contingency  of  an  European 
attack  upon  the  liberties  of  America/ 

The  British  government  sent  a  special  envoy  to 
reside  near  the  congress  and  to  place  himself  in  frank 
and  friendly  communication  with  the  delegates.  Can- 
ning's private  instructions  to  this  envoy  declared  that, 

Any  project  for  putting  the  U.  S.  of  North  America 
at  the  head  of  an  American  Confederacy,  as  against  Europe, 
would  be  highly  displeasing  to  your  Government.  It  would 
be  felt  as  an  ill  return  for  the  service  which  has  been  ren- 
dered to  those  States,  and  the  dangers  which  have  been 
averted  from  them,  by  the  countenance  and  friendship,  and 
public  declarations  of  Great  Britain;  and  it  would  probably, 
at  no  distant  period,  endanger  the  peace  both  of  America 
and  of  Europe. 

The  Panama  Congress  was  without  practical  results, 
and  it  possesses  merely  an  historical  interest.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  only  four  republics,  Colombia,  Central 
America,  Peru,  and  Mexico,  were  represented.  Sev- 
eral treaties  and  conventions  were  drafted  with  the 
view  mainly  of  combined  defense  against  Spain,  but 
ratification  was  withheld  by  all  of  the  states  except 
Colombia,  which  gave  only  a  partial  approval  to  what 
had  been  done.  Before  adjourning,  the  Congress  of 
Panama  decided  to  meet  again  at  the  town  of  Tacu- 


•  International    American    Conference,    Vol.    FV    (Historical    Appendix), 
p.   122.     Washington:  Government  Printing  Office,   1890. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

baya,  near  the  city  of  Mexico,  and  to  continue  its  ses- 
sions at  stated  intervals.  But  as  the  result  of  the 
failure  of  the  states  represented  at  the  congress  to 
ratify  the  agreements  arrived  at,  and  as  the  result  of 
internal  disorders,  the  plan  was  not  carried  out,  al- 
though Mexico  issued  invitations  for  another  congress 
in  1831,  1838,  1839,  and  1840. 

In  1847  the  republics  of  Bolivia,  Chile,  Ecuador, 
New  Granada,  and  Peru  held  a  so-called  "  American 
Congress  "  at  Lima,  which  drafted  a  treaty  of  con- 
federation, one  of  commerce  and  navigation,  a  con- 
sular convention,  and  a  postal  convention.  These 
treaties  were  not  ratified  and,  therefore,  the  congress 
was  without  practical  results.  The  preamble  of  the 
proposed  treaty  of  confederation  referred  to  the  na- 
tions assembled  as  being  "  bound  to  each  other  by  the 
ties  of  a  common  origin,  a  common  language,  a  com- 
mon religion,  common  customs,  and  the  common  cause 
for  which  they  have  struggled,  as  well  as  by  their 
geographical  position,  the  similarity  of  their  institu- 
tions, and  their  analogous  ancestors  and  reciprocal  in- 
terests." It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  this  particular 
congress  was  Spanish-American  rather  than  Pan 
American.^ 

In  1856  the  republics  of  Peru,  Chile,  and  Ecuador 
signed  at  Santiago  a  treaty  of  confederation,  known 
as  "  the  Continental  Treaty,"  for  the  purpose  of  "  ce- 
menting upon  substantial  foundations  the  union  which 
exists  between  them,  as  members  of  the  great  Ameri- 
can family,  which  are  bound  together  by  the  ties  of 
a  common  origin,  similar  institutions,  and  many  other 


*  International    American    Conference,    Vol.    IV     (Historical    Appendix), 
p.  202. 

296 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

signs  of  fraternity."  This  treaty  was  not  ratified.  It 
seems  to  have  been  dictated  by  a  spirit  of  hostihty  to 
the  United  States  as  the  result  of  the  filibustering  en- 
terprise of  William  Walker  in  Central  America. 

The  question  of  a  *'  continental "  league  was  dis- 
cussed between  Costa  Rica  and  Colombia  in  1862. 
After  stating  that,  "  There  are  not  always  at  the  head 
of  the  Great  Republic  moderate,  just,  and  upright  men 
as  those  who  form  the  administration  of  President 
Lincoln,"  Costa  Rica  continued: 

If  our  Republics  could  have  the  guaranty  that  they  have 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  United  States  of  North  America, 
it  is  mdubitable  that  no  other  nation  could  be  more  useful 
and  favorable  to  us.  Under  the  shelter  of  her  powerful 
eagles,  under  the  influence  of  her  wise  institutions,  and 
under  the  spur  of  her  astonishing  progress  our  newly-born 
nationalities  should  receive  the  impulse  which  they  now  need, 
and  would  be  permitted  to  march  with  firm  step,  without 
experiencing  the  troubles  and  difficulties  with  which  they 
have  had  to  struggle.  ...  In  view  of  the  above  considera- 
tions, the  idea  has  occurred  to  my  government  that  a  new 
compact  might  be  draughted  by  which  the  United  States  of 
North  America  should  bind  themselves  solemnly  to  respect, 
and  cause  others  to  respect,  the  independence,  sovereignty, 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  sister  republics  of  this  con- 
tinent ;  not  to  annex  to  their  territory,  either  by  purchase  or 
by  any  other  means,  any  part  of  the  territory  of  the  said 
republics;  not  to  allow  filibustering  expeditions  to  be  fitted  up 
against  the  said  nations,  or  to  permit  the  rights  of  the  latter 
to  be  in  any  way  abridged  or  ignored.* 

In  January,  1864,  the  government  of  Peru  issued 
invitations  to  all  the  governments  of  the  Spanish  na- 

«  Internationa!    American    Conference,    Vol.    IV     (Tl.storical    Appendix). 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

tions  of  America  to  join  in  a  congress  to  be  held  at 
Lima.  The  objects  of  the  meeting  as  stated  in  the 
invitation  were  "  to  declare  that  the  American  nations 
represented  in  this  congress  form  one  single  family," 
to  improve  postal  facilities,  to  exchange  statistical 
data,  to  provide  for  the  settlement  of  all  boundary 
disputes,  and  "  to  irrevocably  abolish  war,  superseding 
it  by  arbitration,  as  the  only  means  of  compromising 
all  misunderstandings  and  causes  for  disagreements 
between  any  of  the  South  American  republics."  In 
accepting  the  invitation  to  the  congress  Colombia  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  "  the  United  States  ought  not 
to  be  invited,  because  their  policy  is  adverse  to  all  kind 
of  alliances,  and  because  the  natural  preponderance 
which  a  first-class  power,  as  they  are,  has  to  exercise  in 
the  deliberations,  might  embarrass  the  action  of  the 
congress."  So  far  as  definite  results  were  concerned, 
this  congress  at  Lima  was  of  no  greater  importance 
than  its  predecessors. 

The  French  invasion  of  Mexico  and  the  war  be- 
tween Spain  and  the  republics  on  the  west  coast  of 
South  America  in  1865-66  brought  about  a  realization 
of  their  danger  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish- American 
republics  and  a  fuller  appreciation  of  the  friendship 
of  the  United  States.  In  the  war  between  Spain  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  allied  republics  of  Peru,  Chile, 
Bolivia,  and  Ecuador  on  the  other,  the  United  States 
declared  its  neutrality  as  usual,  but  at  an  early  period 
of  the  struggle  Secretary  Seward  offered  to  mediate 
between  the  warring  nations.  Spain  refused  to  ac- 
cept this  offer,  and  the  war  dragged  on  in  a  state  of 
"  technical  continuance  "  merely.  The  offer  of  media- 
tion was  again  renewed  by  Secretary  Fish,  with  the 

298 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

result  that  a  conference  was  held  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment in  1870  attended  by  the  representatives  of  Spain, 
Peru,  Chile,  and  Ecuador.  While  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  conclude  a  formal  peace,  the  delegates 
signed  an  armistice  April  11,  1871,  by  which  the  de 
facto  suspension  of  hostilities  was  converted  into  an 
armistice  which  was  to  continue  indefinitely  and  could 
not  be  broken  by  any  of  the  belligerents  without  three 
years'  notice,  given  through  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  of  intention  to  renew  hostilities.* 

Within  ten  years  of  the  signature  of  this  perpetual 
armistice,  war  broke  out  between  Chile,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Peru  and  Bolivia,  on  the  other  (1879-83). 
The  subject  of  dispute  was  the  nitrate  deposits  of 
northern  Chile.  In  1880  Chile  signed  with  Colombia 
an  arbitration  treaty  which  provided  that  in  case  the 
two  parties  should  be  unable  in  any  given  case  to  agree 
upon  an  arbitrator,  the  matter  should  be  referred  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  Article  III  of  this 
treaty  was  as  follows : 

The  United  States  of  Colombia  and  the  Republic  of  Chile 
will  endeavor,  at  the  earliest  opportunity,  to  conclude  with 
the  other  American  nations  conventions  like  unto  the  pres- 
ent, to  the  end  that  the  settlement  by  arbitration  of  each  and 
every  international  controversy  shall  become  a  principle  of 
American  public  law. 

A  few  weeks  later,  without  waiting  for  the  ratifica- 
tion of  this  treaty,  Colombia  issued  invitations  to 
the  other  Spanish-American  republics  to  attend  a 
conference  at  Panama  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
their  adherence  to  the  treaty.     The   failure  to   in- 

*  Moore,  "Digest  of  International  Law,"  Vol,  VII,  pp.  g-io. 

299 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

elude  the  United  States  in  the  invitation  to  the  con- 
ference was  explained  by  our  minister  to  Colombia 
as  being  due  "  to  the  reason  that  the  position 
assigned  to  the  government  of  the  United  States  by 
the  proposed  treaty  is  to  maintain  and  exercise  a 
friendly  and  judicial  impartiality  in  the  differences 
which  may  arise  between  the  powers  of  Spanish  Amer- 
ica." ^  The  continuance  of  the  war  between  Chile  and 
Peru  led  to  the  indefinite  postponement  of  the  con- 
ference. 

On  November  29,  1881,  Secretary  Blaine  extended 
"  to  all  the  independent  countries  of  North  and  South 
America  an  earnest  invitation  to  participate  in  a  gen- 
eral congress,  to  be  held  in  the  city  of  Washington  on 
the  24th  day  o  November,  1882,  for  the  purpose  of 
considering  a:  'i  Jiscussing  the  methods  of  preventing 
war  between  t'le  nations  of  America."  He  expressed 
the  desire  that  the  attention  of  the  congress  should  be 
strictly  confined  to  this  one  great  object,  and  he  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  in  setting  a  day  for  the  as- 
sembling of  the  congress  so  far  ahead,  the  war  that 
was  then  in  progress  on  the  South  Pacific  coast  would 
be  ended,  and  the  nations  engaged  would  be  able  to 
take  part  in  the  proceedings.®  In  this  expectation  Mr. 
Blaine  was  disappointed.  The  war  between  Chile  and 
Peru  continued,  and  the  invitations  to  the  conference 
were  withdrawn. 

Toward  the  close  of  President  Cleveland's  first  ad- 
ministration, the  Congress  of  the  United  States  passed 
an  act  authorizing  the  President  to  invite  the  republics 


»  International    American    Conference,    Vol.     IV    (Historical    Appendix), 
p.   217. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  255. 

300 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

of  Mexico,  Central  and  South  America,  Haiti,  Santo 
Domingo,  and  the  Empire  of  Brazil,  to  join  the  United 
States  in  a  conference  at  Washington  on  October  2, 
1889.  Among  the  subjects  proposed  for  discussion 
were  the  adoption  of  a  customs  union,  the  improve- 
ment of  the  means  of  communication  between  the  vari- 
ous countries,  uniform  customs  regulations,  a  uniform 
system  of  weights  and  measures,  laws  f'^r  the  protec- 
tion of  patents  and  copyrights,  extra ^'L  jn,  the  adop- 
tion of  a  common  silver  coin,  and  tb  ''ormulation  of 
a  definite  plan  for  the  arbitration  of  international  dis- 
putes of  every  character.  When  the  conference  as- 
sembled, Mr.  Blaine  was  again  secretary  of  state,  and 
presided  over  its  opening  sessions.  The  conference 
formulated  a  plan  for  international  arbitration  and 
declared  that  this  means  of  settling  disputes  was  "  a 
principle  of  American  international  law."  Unfortu- 
nately this  treaty  was  not  ratified  by  the  governments 
whose  representatives  adopted  it.  The  most  lasting 
achievement  of  the  conference  was  the  establishment 
of  the  Bureau  of  American  Republics  in  Washington. 
While  the  conference  was  in  session  Brazil  went 
through  a  bloodless  revolution,  which  converted  the 
empire  into  a  republic.  Thus  disappeared  the  only 
independent  monarchy  of  European  origin  which  ever 
existed  on  American  soil. 

Scarcely  had  the  Washington  conference  adjourned, 
when  the  United  States  and  Chile  got  into  an  ugly 
wrangle  and  were  brought  to  the  verge  of  war  over 
an  attack  on  American  sailors  on  shore  leave  at  Val- 
paraiso. During  the  civil  war  between  President  Bal- 
maceda  and  the  Congressional  party,  the  American 
minister,  Mr.  Egan,  admitted  to  the  American  legation 

301 


UB^^^"* 


■\t^' 


t«' 


sc 


^yl  f  »5t 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

certain  adherents  of  the  President.  The  people  of 
Chile  resented  the  action  of  the  American  minister, 
and  were  further  aroused  against  the  United  States 
by  the  detention  of  the  Itata,  a  vessel  which  left  San 
Diego,  California,  with  a  cargo  of  arms  for  the  Con- 
gressional party  and  was  overhauled  by  an  American 
warship.  The  United  States  cruiser  Baltimore  was 
lying  in  the  harbor  of  Valparaiso  when  news  of  this 
incident  was  received.  Members  of  her  crew  who 
happened  to  be  on  shore  leave  were  attacked  by  the 
populace  and  several  of  them  killed.  As  this  attack 
upon  American  sailors  appeared  to  be  due  to  resent- 
ment against  the  official  acts  of  their  government,  an 
apology  was  immediately  demanded,  but  refused. 
After  considerable  delay,  President  Harrison  had  just 
laid  the  matter  before  Congress  when  a  belated  apol- 
ogy from  Chile  arrived,  and  war  was  fortunately 
averted.  The  charge  that  the  United  States  had  in- 
terfered in  behalf  of  one  of  the  parties  in  a  civil 
strife  created  an  unfavorable  impression  throughout 
Latin  America  and  counteracted,  to  a  considerable 
extent,  the  good  effects  of  the  Washington  conference. 
The  Second  International  American  Conference 
was  held  in  the  city  of  Mexico  1901-02.  This  confer- 
ence arranged  for  all  Latin-American  States  to  be- 
come parties  to  the  Hague  Convention  of  1899  ^o^ 
the  pacific  settlement  of  international  disputes,  and 
drafted  a  treaty  for  the  compulsory  arbitration  of 
pecuniary  claims,  the  first  article  of  which  was  as 
follows : 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  submit  to  arbitra- 
tion all  claims  for  pecuniary  loss  or  damage  which  may 

1302 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

be  presented  by  tbeir  respective  citizens,  and  which  cannot 
be  amicably  adjusted  through  diplomatic  channels  and  when 
said  claims  are  of  sufficient  importance  to  warrant  the  ex- 
penses of  arbitration. 

This  treaty  was  signed  by  the  delegates  of  seventeen 
states,  including  the  United  States  of  America/ 

The  Third  International  American  Conference  was 
held  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  1906.  Among  other  things 
it  extended  the  pecuniary  claims  convention  drafted  by 
the  previous  conference  for  another  period  of  five 
years,  and  recommended  to  the  governments  repre- 
sented that  they  invite  the  Second  Hague  Conference, 
which  had  been  called  for  1907,  "  to  examine  the 
question  of  the  compulsory  collection  of  public  debts, 
and,  in  general,  means  tending  to  diminish  between 
nations  conflicts  having  an  exclusively  pecuniary 
origin."  *  Added  significance  was  given  to  the  Rio 
conference  by  the  presence  of  Secretary  Root  who, 
although  not  a  delegate,  made  it  the  occasion  of  a 
special  mission  to  South  America.  The  series  of  nota- 
ble addresses  which  he  delivered  on  this  mission  gave 
a  new  impetus  to  the  Pan  American  movement. 

The  Fourth  International  American  Conference  was 
held  at  Buenos  Aires  in  1910.  It  drafted  treaties  re- 
lating to  patents,  trade-marks,  and  copyrights.  It  ex- 
tended the  pecuniary  claims  convention  for  an  indefi- 
nite period.  And  finally,  it  enlarged  the  scope  of  the 
Bureau  of  American  Republics  and  changed  its  name 
to  the  Pan  American  Union.^    A  fifth  conference  was 


''  Second  International  American  Conference,  English  text  (Mexico, 
Government   Printing   Office,    1902),   p.    309. 

»  Third  International  American  Conference,  Minutes,  Resolutions,  Doc- 
uments   (Rio   de   Janeiro,    Iraprensa    Nacional,    1907),   p.    605. 

•  Bulletin  of  the  Pan   American  Union,  Vol.  31,  p.  796. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

called  to  meet  at  Santiago,  Chile,  in  19 14,  but  was 
postponed  on  account  of  the  European  war. 

The  conferences  above  described  were  political  or 
diplomatic  in  character.  Besides  these  there  have  been 
held  two  Pan  American  scientific  congresses  in  which 
the  United  States  participated,  one  at  Santiago,  Chile, 
in  1908,  and  one  at  Washington,  December,  191 5,  to 
January,  19 16.  There  have  also  been  held  two  Pan 
American  financial  conferences  in  the  city  of  Wash- 
ington, the  first  in  May,  191 5,  and  the  second  in  Jan- 
uary, 1920.  These  conferences  have  accomplished  a 
great  deal  in  the  way  of  promoting  friendly  feeling 
and  the  advancement  of  science  and  commerce  among 
the  republics  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  First 
Financial  Conference  recommended  the  establishment 
of  an  International  High  Commission,  to  be  composed 
of  not  more  than  nine  members  resident  in  each  coun- 
try appointed  by  the  Minister  of  Finance  of  such  coun- 
try for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  the  work  of  the 
conference.  This  recommendation  was  adopted  by  the 
various  countries,  and  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  by  act  of  February  7,  1916,  authorized  the 
establishment  of  a  section  in  this  country.  The  Inter- 
national High  Commission  carries  on  its  labors  largely 
through  the  various  national  sections.  Its  first  general 
meeting  was  held  at  Buenos  Aires  in  April,  1916. 

The  American  Institute  of  International  Law,  or- 
ganized at  Washington  in  October,  1912,  is  a  body 
which  is  likely  to  have  great  influence  in  promoting  the 
peace  and  welfare  of  this  hemisphere.  The  Institute  is 
composed  of  five  representatives  from  the  national  so- 
ciety of  international  law  in  each  of  the  twenty-one 
American  republics.     At  the  suggestion  of  Secretary 

304 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

Lansing  the  Institute  at  a  session  held  in  the  city  of 
Washington,  January  6,  191 6,  adopted  a  Declaration 
of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Nations,  which  was  as 
follows : 

I.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  exist  and  to  protect  and 
to  conserve  its  existence;  but  this  right  neither  implies  the 
right  nor  justifies  the  act  of  the  state  to  protect  itself  or 
to  conserve  its  existence  by  the  commission  of  unlawful  acts 
against  innocent  and  unoffending  states. 

II.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  independence  in  the 
sense  that  it  has  a  right  to  the  pursuit  of  happiness  and  is 
free  to  develop  itself  v^'ithout  interference  or  control  from 
other  states,  provided  that  in  so  doing  it  does  not  interfere 
with  or  violate  the  rights  of  other  states. 

III.  Every  nation  is  in  law  and  before  law  the  equal  of 
every  other  nation  belonging  to  the  society  of  nations,  and 
all  nations  have  the  right  to  claim  and,  according  to  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  of  the  United  States,  "  to  as- 
sume, among  the  powers  of  the  earth,  the  separate  and  equal 
station  to  which  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  nature's  God 
entitle  them." 

IV.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  territory  within  de- 
fined boundaries,  and  to  exercise  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
its  territory,  and  all  persons  whether  native  or  foreign 
found  therein. 

V.  Every  nation  entitled  to  a  right  by  the  law  of  nations 
is  entitled  to  have  that  right  respected  and  protected  by  all 
other  nations,  for  right  and  duty  are  correlative,  and  the 
right  of  one  is  the  duty  of  all  to  observe. 

VI.  International  law  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  both 
national  and  international;  national  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
the  law  of  the  land  and  applicable  as  such  to  ihe  decision 
of  all  questions  involving  its  principles;  international  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  the  law  of  the  society  of  nations  and 
applicable  as  such  to  all  questions  between  and  among  the 
members  of  the  society  of  nations  involving  its  principles.^" 


^' Am.  Journal  of  International  Law,  Vol.  lo,  p.  212. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

This  Declaration  has  been  criticized  as  being  too 
altruistic  for  a  world  in  which  diplomacy  has  been 
occupied  with  selfish  aims. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  above  Declaration  was 
made  public,  President  Wilson  delivered  a  notable  ad- 
dress before  the  Second  Pan  American  Scientific  Con- 
ference then  in  session  at  Washington.  In  the  course 
of  this  address  he  said : 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  proclaimed  by  the  United  States 
on  her  own  authority.  It  has  always  been  maintained,  and 
always  will  be  maintained,  upon  her  own  responsibility.  But 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  demanded  merely  that  European  gov- 
ernments should  not  attempt  to  extend  their  political  systems 
to  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  It  did  not  disclose  the  use  which 
the  United  States  intended  to  make  of  her  power  on  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  It  was  a  hand  held  up  in  warning,  but 
there  was  no  promise  in  it  of  what  America  was  going  to 
do  with  the  implied  and  partial  protectorate  which  she  ap- 
parently was  trying  to  set  up  on  this  side  of  the  water,  and 
I  believe  you  will  sustain  me  in  the  statement  that  it  has 
been  fears  and  suspicions  on  this  score  which  have  hitherto 
prevented  the  greater  intimacy  and  confidence  and  trust  be- 
tween the  Americas.  The  states  of  America  have  not  been 
certain  what  the  United  States  would  do  with  her  power. 
That  doubt  must  be  removed.  And  latterly  there  has  been  a 
very  frank  interchange  of  views  between  the  authorities  in 
Washington  and  those  who  represent  the  other  states  of  this 
hemisphere,  an  interchange  of  views  charming  and  hopeful, 
because  based  upon  an  increasingly  sure  appreciation  of  the 
spirit  in  which  they  were  undertaken.  These  gentlemen  have 
seen  that,  if  America  is  to  come  into  her  own,  into  her 
legitimate  own,  in  a  world  of  peace  and  order,  she  must 
establish  the  foundations  of  amity,  so  that  no  one  will  here- 
after doubt  them.  I  hope  and  I  believe  that  this  can  be  ac- 
complished. These  conferences  have  enabled  me  to  foresee 
how  it  will  be  accomplished.    It  will  be  accomplished,  in  the 

306 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

first  place,  by  the  states  of  America  uniting  in  guaranteeing 
to  each  other  absolute  political  independence  and  territorial 
integrity.  In  the  second  place,  and  as  a  necessary  corollary 
to  that,  guaranteeing  the  agreement  to  settle  all  pending 
boundary  disputes  as  soon  as  possible  and  by  amicable  pro- 
cess; by  agreeing  that  all  disputes  among  themselves,  should 
they  unhappily  arise,  will  be  handled  by  patient,  impartial 
investigation  and  settled  by  arbitration ;  and  the  agreement 
necessary  to  the  peace  of  the  Americas,  that  no  state  of 
either  continent  will  permit  revolutionary  expeditions  against 
another  state  to  be  fitted  out  in  its  territory,  and  that  they 
will  prohibit  the  exportation  of  the  munitions  of  war  for 
the  purpose  of  supplying  revolutionists  against  neighboring 
governments. 

President  Wilson's  Pan  Americanism  went  further 
than  some  of  the  Latin-American  states  were  willing 
to  go.  A  treaty  embodying  the  above  proposals  was 
actually  drafted,  but  some  of  the  states  held  back 
through  the  fear  that,  though  equal  in  terms,  it  would 
in  fact  give  the  United  States  a  plausible  pretext  for 
supervising  the  affairs  of  weaker  states." 

President  Wilson  has  not  hesitated  to  depart  from 
many  of  the  fundamental  ideas  which  have  hitherto 
guided  so-called  practical  statesmen.  His  handling  of 
the  Mexican  situation,  although  denounced  as  weak 
and  vacillating,  has  been  in  full  accord  with  his  new 
Latin-American  policy.  On  February  i8,  1913,  Fran- 
cisco Madero  was  seized  and  imprisoned  as  the  result 
of  a  conspiracy  formed  by  one  of  his  generals,  Vic- 
toriano  Huerta,  who  forthwith  proclaimed  himself  dic- 
tator. Four  days  later  Madero  was  murdered  while 
in  the  custody  of  Huerta's  troops.  Henry  Lane  Wil- 
son, the  American  ambassador,  promptly  urged  his 

»*  John  Bassett  Moore,  "  Principles  of  American  Diplomtcy,"  pp.  407-408. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

government  to  recognize  Huerta,  but  President  Taft, 
whose  term  was  rapidly  drawing  to  a  close,  took  no 
action  and  left  the  question  to  his  successor. 

President  Wilson  thus  had  a  very  disagreeable  sit- 
uation to  face  when  he  assumed  control  of  affairs  at 
Washington.  He  refused  to  recognize  Huerta  whose 
authority  was  contested  by  insurrectionary  chiefs  in 
various  parts  of  the  country.  It  was  claimed  by  the 
critics  of  the  administration  that  the  refusal  to  recog- 
nize Huerta  was  a  direct  violation  of  the  well  known 
American  policy  of  recognizing  de  facto  governments 
without  undertaking  to^  pass  upon  the  rights  involved. 
It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  United  States  has  con- 
sistently followed  the  policy  of  recognizing  de  facto 
governments  as  soon  as  it  is  evident  in  each  case  that 
the  new  government  rests  on  popular  approval  and  is 
likely  to  be  permanent.  This  doctrine  of  recognition 
is  distinctively  an  American  doctrine.  It  was  first 
laid  down  by  Thomas  Jefferson  when  he  was  secretary 
of  state  as  an  offset  to  the  European  doctrine  of  divine 
right,  and  it  was  the  natural  outgrowth  of  that  other 
Jeffersonian  doctrine  that  all  governments  derive  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed.  Huerta 
could  lay  no  claim  to  authority  derived  from  a  ma- 
jority or  anything  like  a  majority  of  the  Mexican 
people.  He  was  a  self-constituted  dictator,  whose  au- 
thority rested  solely  on  military  force.  President  Wil- 
son and  Secretary  Bryan  were  fully  justified  in  refus- 
ing to  recognize  his  usurpation  of  power,  though  they 
probably  made  a  mistake  in  announcing  that  they 
would  never  recognize  him  and  in  demanding  his  elimi- 
nation from  the  presidential  contest.  This  announce- 
tpent  made  him  deaf  to  advice  from  Washington  and 

308 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

utterly  indifferent  to  the  destruction  of  American  life 
and  property. 

The  next  step  in  the  President's  course  with  refer- 
ence to  Mexico  was  the  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz.  On 
April  20,  1914,  the  President  asked  Congress  for  au- 
thority to  employ  the  armed  forces  of  the  United 
States  in  demanding  redress  for  the  arbitrary  arrest 
of  American  marines  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  the  next  day 
Admiral  Fletcher  was  ordered  to  seize  the  custom 
house  at  that  port.  This  he  did  after  a  sharp  fight 
with  Huerta's  troops  in  which  nineteen  Americans 
were  killed  and  seventy  wounded.  The  American 
charge  d'affaires,  Nelson  O'Shaughnessy,  was  at  once 
handed  his  passports,  and  all  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Mexico  were  severed. 

A  few  days  later  the  representatives  of  the  so-called 
ABC  powers,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  tendered 
their  good  offices  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  con- 
flict and  President  Wilson  promptly  accepted  their 
mediation.  The  resulting  conference  at  Niagara,  May 
20,  was  not  successful  in  its  immediate  object,  but  it 
resulted  in  the  elimination  of  Huerta  who  resigned 
July  15,  1914.  On  August  20,  General  Venustiano 
Carranza,  head  of  one  of  the  revolutionary  factions, 
assumed  control  of  affairs  at  the  capital,  but  his  au- 
thority was  disputed  by  General  Francisco  Villa,  an- 
other insurrectionary  chief.  On  Carranza's  promise  to 
respect  the  lives  and  property  of  American  citizens  the 
United  States  forces  were  withdrawn  from  Vera  Cruz 
in  November,  1914. 

In  August,  191 5.  at  the  request  of  President  Wilson 
the  six  ranking  representatives  of  Latin  America  at 
Washington  made  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  reconcile 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

the  contending  factions  of  Mexico.  On  their  advice, 
however,  President  Wilson  decided  in  October  to  rec- 
ognize the  government  of  Carranza,  who  now  con- 
trolled three-fourths  of  the  territory  of  Mexico.  As 
a  result  of  this  action  Villa  began  a  series  of  attacks 
on  American  citizens  and  raids  across  the  border, 
which  in  March,  1916,  compelled  the  President  to  send 
a  punitive  expedition  into  Mexico  and  later  to  dis- 
patch most  of  the  regular  army  and  large  bodies  of 
militia  to  the  border." 

The  raids  of  Villa  created  a  very  awkward  situa- 
tion. Carranza  not  only  made  no  real  effort  to  sup- 
press Villa,  but  he  vigorously  opposed  the  steps  taken 
by  the  United  States  to  protect  its  own  citizens  along 
the  border,  and  even  assumed  a  threatening  attitude. 
There  was  a  loud  and  persistent  demand  in  the  United 
States  for  war  against  Mexico.  American  investments 
in  land,  mines,  rubber  plantations,  and  other  enterprises 
were  very  large,  and  these  financial  interests  were  par- 
ticularly outraged  at  the  President's  policy  of  "  watch- 
ful waiting."  The  President  remained  deaf  to  this 
clamor.  No  country  had  been  so  shamelessly  exploited 
by  foreign  capital  as  Mexico.  Furthermore  it  was 
suspected  and  very  generally  believed  that  the  recent 
revolutions  had  been  financed  by  American  capital. 
President  Wilson  was  determined  to  give  the  Mexi- 
can people  an  opportunity  to  reorganize  their  national 
life  on  a  better  basis  and  to  lend  them  every  assistance 
in  the  task.  War  with  Mexico  would  have  been  a  very 
serious  undertaking  and  even  a  successful  war  would 


**  *'  Affairs  in  Mexico,"  Sixty-fourth  Cong,,  First  Sess.,  Sen.  Doc.  No. 
324.  The  World  Peace  Foundation  has  issued  two  pamphlets  containing 
documents  on  Mexico  under  the  title  of  "  The  New  Pan  Americaniim," 
Parts   T   and    II    (February   and    April,    1916}. 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

have  meant  the  military  occupation  of  Mexico  for  an 
indefinite  period.  President  Wilson's  refusal  to  be- 
come involved  in  war  with  Mexico  convinced  the 
world  of  his  sincerity  and  gave  him  a  hearing  during 
the  Great  War  such  as  no  political  leader  of  any  nation 
ever  before  commanded. 

It  has  been  charged  that  there  was  a  lack  of  con- 
sistency between  the  President's  Mexican  policy  and 
his  Haitian  policy.  The  difference  between  the  two 
cases,  however,  was  that  the  Haitian  situation,  if  taken 
in  time,  could  be  handled  without  bloodshed,  while  the 
same  method  applied  to  Mexico  v/ould  have  led  to  a 
long  and  bloody  conflict.  It  would  be  easy  enough  to 
go  into  Mexico,  but  exceedingly  difficult  to  get  out. 
The  most  novel  feature  of  the  President's  Mexican 
policy  was  his  acceptance  of  the  mediation  of  the 
ABC  powers  and  his  subsequent  consultation  with 
the  leading  representatives  of  Latin  America.  This 
action  has  brought  the  Pan  American  ideal  to  the  point 
of  realization.  It  has  been  received  with  enthusiasm 
and  it  has  placed  our  relations  with  Latin  America  on 
a  better  footing  than  they  have  been  for  years. 

It  has  been  suggested  by  more  than  one  critic  of 
American  foreign  policy  that  if  we  are  to  undertake 
to  set  the  world  right,  we  must  come  before  the  bar 
of  public  opinion  with  clean  hands,  that  before  we 
denounce  the  imperialistic  policies  of  Europe,  we  must 
abandon  imperialistic  policies  at  home.  The  main  fea- 
tures of  President  Wilson's  Latin-American  policy,  if 
we  may  draw  a  general  conclusion,  have  been  to  pledge 
the  weaker  American  republics  not  to  do  anything 
which  would  invite  European  intervention,  and  to 
secure  by  treaty  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  inte&r 

3" 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

vene  for  the  protection  of  life,  liberty,  and  property, 
and  for  the  establishment  of  self-government.  The 
test  of  such  a  policy  is  the  degree  of  unselfishness  with 
which  it  is  carried  out. 

The  loyalty  of  the  Latin-American  states  to  the 
principles  of  Pan  Americanism  was  put  to  a  severe 
test  when  the  United  States  entered  the  Great  War. 
When  President  Wilson  announced  to  Congress  the 
severance  of  relations  with  Germany  and  declared  his 
intention  of  protecting  our  commerce  on  the  high  seas, 
he  expressed  the  confident  hope  that  all  neutral  gov- 
ernments would  pursue  the  same  course.  He  prob- 
ably had  especially  in  mind  our  Latin- American  neigh- 
bors, but  if  so,  his  expectation  was  not  fully  realized. 
Only  eight  of  the  twenty  Latin- American  republics 
eventually  entered  the  war :  Brazil,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba, 
Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Panama. 
Five  others  broke  off  relations  with  Germany :  Bolivia, 
Peru,  the  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  and  Uruguay. 
Seven  remained  neutral :  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia, 
Mexico,  Salvador,  Venezuela,  and  Paraguay." 

Only  two  Latin-American  states,  Brazil  and  Cuba, 
took  an  active  part  in  the  war.  At  the  request  of  the 
British  government  in  December,  1917,  Brazil  sent 
two  cruisers  and  four  destroyers  to  European  waters 
to  cooperate  with  the  British  navy,  and  a  few  months 
later  a  group  of  Brazilian  aviators  took  their  place  on 
the  Western  front.  A  number  of  physicians  and  sev- 
eral Red  Cross  units  from  Brazil  also  cooperated  with 
the  Allies.  Cuba  turned  over  to  the  United  States  sev- 
eral German  steamships  interned  in  her  waters.     A 


''Percy   A.   Martin,   "Latin   America   and  the  War"    (issued  by  the 
World  Peace  Foundation,   August,    1919). 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

compulsory  military  service  law  was  passed  and  a 
number  of  training  camps  established.  In  October, 
19 18,  the  Cuban  government  announced  that  it  had 
25,000  troops  ready  to  send  to  France,  but  the  armi- 
stice was  signed  before  arrangements  could  be  made 
for  their  transportation.  The  only  active  service  ren- 
dered by  Cubans  was  in  the  field  of  aviation,  where 
several  individuals  won  high  distinction. 

Of  the  ABC  powers  Argentina  and  Chile  re- 
mained neutral.  So  also  did  Mexico.  Brazil  was  thus 
the  only  one  of  the  larger  states  that  actually  entered 
the  war.  The  relations  between  Brazil  and  the  United 
States  have  almost  always  been  peculiarly  close  and 
friendly.  From  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war 
strong  sympathy  for  the  allied  cause  was  manifested 
in  Brazil,  and  a  league  for  aiding  the  Allies  through 
the  agency  of  the  Red  Cross  was  organized  under  the 
presidency  of  Ruy  Barbosa,  the  most  distinguished 
statesman  of  Brazil  and  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
orators  of  Latin  America.  Brazil's  experience  during 
the  period  of  neutrality  was  very  similar  to  that  of  the 
United  States.  Her  commerce  was  interfered  with 
and  her  ships  were  sunk  by  German  submarines.  A 
few  weeks  after  the  United  States  entered  the  war, 
Brazil  severed  relations  with  Germany  and  seized  the 
forty-six  German  ships  interned  in  Brazilian  harbors. 
In  a  circular  note  of  June  2  the  Brazilian  government 
declared  to  the  world  that  it  had  taken  this  step  because 
the  Republic  of  Brazil  was  bound  to  the  United  States 
"by  a  traditional  friendship  and  by  a  similarity  of 
political  opinion  in  the  defense  of  the  vital  interests  of 
America  and  the  principles  accepted  by  international 
law,"  and  because  it  wished  to  give  to  its  foreign 

313 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

policy,  in  this  critical  moment  of  the  world's  history, 
"a  practical  form  of  continental  solidarity — a  policy 
indeed  which  was  that  of  the  old  regime  on  every  oc- 
casion on  which  any  of  the  other  friendly  sister  na- 
tions of  the  American  continent  were  in  jeopardy." 
President  Wilson's  reply  to  this  note  expressed  the 
deep  appreciation  of  the  United  States  and  the  hope 
that  the  act  of  the  Brazilian  Congress  was  "  the  fore- 
runner of  the  attitude  to  be  assumed  by  the  rest  of  the 
American  states."  On  October  26,  1917,  on  the  re- 
ceipt of  the  news  of  the  torpedoing  of  another  Brazil- 
ian ship  by  a  German  submarine,  a  resolution  recog- 
nizing "  the  state  of  war  initiated  by  the  German  Em- 
pire against  Brazil "  was  adopted  by  the  unanimous 
vote  of  the  Brazilian  Senate  and  by  a  vote  of  149  to  1 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies."  Brazil's  enthusiastic 
support  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  allied  cause 
has  been  recognized  by  those  powers  in  giving  her 
representation  on  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  In  fact  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  Council 
in  London  in  February,  1920,  Brazil  was  the  sole 
American  power  represented. 

Argentina,  the  largest  and  most  important  of  the 
states  of  Spanish  origin,  remained  neutral  throughout 
the  war,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a  large  part  of 
the  population  and  some  of  the  leading  newspapers 
yrere  strongly  pro-Ally.  When  the  United  States  de- 
clared war,  Senor  Drago,  the  former  minister  of  for- 
eign affairs  and  author  of  the  doctrine  that  bears  his 
name,  issued  a  statement  in  which  he  said : 

The  war  between  Germany  and  America  is  a  struggle  of 


**>Martifl,  "Latin  Americs  and  the  War,"  pp.  X3-iS* 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

democracy  versus  absolutism,  and  no  American  nation  can 
remain  neutral  without  denying  its  past  and  compromising 
its  future. 

About  the  same  time  a  note  was  sent  through  Am- 
bassador Naon  stating  that  "  in  view  of  the  causes 
which  have  prompted  the  United  States  to  declare 
war  against  the  government  of  the  German  Empire," 
the  Argentine  government  recognizes  "  the  justice  of 
that  decision."  But  German  propaganda,  which  had 
its  headquarters  in  Buenos  Aires,  and  the  attitude 
of  President  Irrigoyen  kept  the  country  out  of  the 
war.  Popular  indignation  was  aroused  by  the  Lux- 
burg  disclosures,  which  revealed  the  fact  that  the 
German  representative,  after  coming  to  an  under- 
standing with  the  President,  had  advised  his  gov- 
ernment that  two  Argentine  ships  then  approaching 
the  French  coast  "be  spared  if  possible,  or  else  sunk 
without  a  trace  being  left"  (spurlos  versenkt).  The 
Senate  and  Chamber  of  Deputies  passed  by  large  ma- 
jorities a  resolution  severing  relations  with  Germany, 
but  to  the  surprise  of  everybody  President  Irrigoyen 
expressed  himself  as  satisfied  with  Germany's  dis- 
avowal of  Luxburg's  conduct  and  continued  his  policy 
of  neutrality. 

Chile  was  so  far  removed  from  the  scene  of  the  war 
in  Europe  and  had  so  few  ships  engaged  in  European 
trade  that  her  government  did  not  have  the  same 
provocation  that  others  had.  Furthermore,  German 
propaganda  had  made  great  headway  in  Chile  and  the 
Chilean  army,  trained  by  German  officers,  was  strongly 
pro-German.  In  the  navy,  on  the  other  hand,  senti- 
ment was  strongly  in  favor  of  the  Allies,  This  was  a 
matter   of   tradition,    for   since   the   days   of   Lord 

315 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Cochrane,  whose  exploits  have  been  described  in  an 
earlier  chapter  of  this  book,  the  Chilean  navy  has 
followed  English  ideals.  Under  these  circumstances 
Chile  remained  neutral,  though  before  the  end  of  the 
war  public  sentiment  had  shifted  to  the  side  of  the 
Allies/' 

Peru,  Ecuador,  Bolivia,  and  Uruguay  in  severing  re- 
lations with  Germany  proclaimed  their  adherence  to 
the  principle  of  American  solidarity.  Paraguay's  neu- 
trality was  due  to  her  isolation.  Colombia,  still  smart- 
ing under  the  loss  of  the  Isthmus,  was  not  disposed  to 
take  sides  with  the  United  States.  In  Venezuela  most 
of  the  government  officials  were  under  German  in- 
fluence. Panama  and  four  of  the  five  Central  Ameri- 
can republics  declared  war  on  Germany,  Salvador 
alone  remaining  neutral.  Cuba  and  Haiti  also  de- 
clared war  on  Germany,  while  the  Dominican  Republic 
severed  consular  relations.  Mexico  proclaimed  its 
neutrality,  but  permitted  its  soil  to  become  a  hot-bed 
of  German  intrigue  and  President  Carranza  exhibited 
at  times  a  spirit  of  hostility  to  the  United  States  which 
tended  to  increase  the  tension  that  already  existed  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

In  an  article  on  "  The  European  War  and  Pan 
Americanism  "  ^^  Ambassador  Naon  of  the  Argentine 
Republic  draws  the  following  interesting  conclusions, 
conclusions  that  are  all  the  more  interesting  because 
his  country  was  not  one  of  those  that  took  the  course 
to  which  he  gives  his  approval.  He  says  :  "  The  politi- 
cal action  developed  by  the  different  governments  of 


•°  Enrique  Rocuant.  "  The  Neutrality  of  Chile  and  the  Grounds  that 
Prompted  and  Justified   It,"    (Valparaiso,   1919). 

'"  Reprinted  in  International  Coneiliation,  Inter-American  Division, 
Bulletin   No.   20    (April,    1919). 


316 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

tHe  continent  in  the  presence  of  the  European  conflict, 
especially  since  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities  between 
the  United  States  and  Germany,  has  not  been  either 
the  best  advised  or  the  most  propitious  for  achieving 
the  consolidation  of  Pan  Americanism."  The  situa- 
tion created  by  the  European  war,  he  continues,  "  af- 
fected the  entire  continent  in  the  same  manner  and 
with  the  same  political  and  economic  intensity  as  the 
United  States,  and  both  self-interest  and  moral  obliga- 
tions ought  to  have  counseled  the  consummating  of 
solidarity,  here  and  now,  by  making  common  cause 
and  endorsing  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  to  the 
extreme  limit,  until  the  disturbing  force  should  be 
overcome.  The  political  action  of  America  did  not 
take  this  direction,  however.  Some  of  the  most  im- 
portant governments  of  the  continent,  going  counter  to 
the  political  aspirations  and  doubtless  to  the  political 
interests  of  their  own  countries,  adhered  to  the  policy 
of  neutrality.  In  America  this  was  equivalent  to  a 
policy  of  isolation,  and  thus  the  solidarity  of  the  con- 
tinent was  broken,  with  consequent  prejudice  to  Pan 
Americanism.  Yet  even  if  in  those  countries,  the 
action  of  the  governments  could  not  be  counted  upon, 
nevertheless,  the  sentiment,  expressed  in  eloquent 
manifestations  of  public  opinion  and  in  complete  dis- 
agreement with  that  attitude  of  the  governments,  per- 
sisted throughout  the  crisis.  Thus  the  spirit  of  Pan 
Americanism  was  saved,  and  we  are  justified  in  be- 
lieving that  there  will  come  a  reaction  which  will 
restore  the  disturbed  equilibrium  and  save  the  mighty 
interests  involved." 

Ambassador    Naon    believes,    however,    that    Pan 
Americanism  has  many  obstacles  in  the  way  of  its  com-9 

317 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

plete  realization.  Among  them  he  mentions  "the 
recognition  of  politico-intellectual  inferiorities"  by 
the  peace  conference  at  Paris  in  the  classification  o£ 
nations  as  great  powers  and  small  powers.  The  funda- 
mental principle  of  Pan  Americanism  he  believes  to 
be  the  doctrine  of  equality.  He  further  points  out 
that  as  long  as  American  states  remain,  whether  as  the 
result  of  their  own  shortcomings  or  not,  in  these  con- 
ditions of  inferiority  in  world  politics,  "  there  will 
continue  to  exist  for  the  United  States  the  causes  that 
gave  rise  to  the  Monroe  Dextrine  and  consequently  all 
its  objections  will  continue  to  exist."  Finally  he  says 
that  "  the  idea  of  solidarity  is  being  weakened  or 
thwarted  by  another  idea,  the  unwholesome  one  of 
Latin  Americanism,  which  is  a  Teutonic  idea  in  its 
tendencies,  and  which  is  trying  to  replace  it,  basing  it- 
self upon  supposed  antagonisms  of  interests  and  ideals 
between  the  other  countries  of  America  and  the  United 
States.  This  purpose,  w^hich  is  anarchical,  might 
cause  American  solidarity  to  fail  if,  in  virtue  of  neg- 
lecting to  foster  this  tendency,  it  should  succeed,  by 
pandering  to  paltry  prejudices  and  flattering  national 
vanities,  in  gaining  a  footing  in  the  thought  of  the 
other  governments  of  the  continent  to  the  extent  of 
constituting  itself  a  political  force,  capable  of  replac- 
ing the  system  of  solidarity  which  Pan  Americanism 
seeks,  by  a  system  of  a  continental  equilibrium :  a  sys- 
tem which  has  just  failed  in  the  European  conflict." 

This  summary  of  the  views  of  the  distinguished  Ar- 
gentine statesman  is  sufficient  to  show  that  his  analysis 
of  the  situation  is  correct.  The  weakness  and  back- 
wardness of  certain  states,  specifically  those  in  the  zone 
of  the  Caribbean,  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  difficulty.    As 

31B 


PAN  AMERICANISM 

long  as  they  remain  in  their  present  condition  the 
United  States  must  continue  to  protect  them  against 
European  intervention  and,  when  occasion  arises, 
supervise  their  affairs  in  order  to  prevent  them  from 
provoking  such  intervention.  As  long  as  it  is  neces- 
sary to  pursue  this  course  the  United  States  will  have 
to  rest  under  the  suspicion  of  having  imperialistic  de- 
signs on  its  weaker  neighbors,  and  it  is  this  suspicion 
which  perpetuates  the  spirit  of  Latin  Americanism 
which  in  turn  must  be  overcome  before  we  can  fully 
realize  the  ideal  of  Pan  Americanism. 


3^9 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Monroe  Doctrine 

In  the  foregoing  chapters  we  have  discussed  the 
origin  and  the  more  important  applications  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  There  remain,  however,  certain 
general  aspects  of  the  subject  which  require  special 
consideration.  In  any  discussion  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  it  was 
in  its  origin  and  has  always  remained  purely  an  ex- 
ecutive policy.  Neither  house  of  Congress  has  ever 
expressly  sanctioned  the  language  of  President  Monroe 
or  attempted  to  formulate  a  new  definition  of  the 
policy.  On  January  20,  1824,  a  few  weeks  after  Mon- 
roe's famous  message,  Henry  Clay  made  an  effort 
to  get  Congress  to  endorse  the  policy  announced  by 
the  executive,  but  his  resolution  was  tabled.^  In  1856 
Senator  Clayton,  who  as  secretary  of  state  had  nego- 
tiated the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  declared  that  he 
would  be  willing  to  vote  to  assert  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  maintain  it,  but  that  he  would  "  not  expect 
to  be  sustained  in  such  a  vote  by  both  branches  of 
Congress.  Whenever  the  attempt  has  been  made  to 
assert  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  either  branch  of  Con- 
gress, it  has  failed."  And  he  added,  "  You  cannot 
prevail  on  a  majority,  and  I  will  venture  to  say  that 
you  cannot  prevail  on  one-third,  of  either  house  of 
Congress  to  sustain  it."  ^     In  fact,  the  Monroe  Doc- 

»  Moore,  "  Digest  of  International  Law,"  Vol.  VI,  p.  404. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  427. 

.^20 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

trine  never  received  anything  approaching  legislative 
sanction  until  1895,  when,  in  response  to  President 
Cleveland's  message  on  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dis- 
pute, Congress  appropriated  $100,000  to  pay  the  ex- 
penses of  the  commission  which  he  proposed  to  ap- 
point. 

For  nearly  a  hundred  years  we  have  successfully 
upheld  the  Monroe  Doctrine  without  resort  to  force. 
The  policy  has  never  been  favorably  regarded  by  the 
powers  of  continental  Europe.  Bismarck  described  it 
as  "  an  international  impertinence,"  In  recent  years 
it  has  stirred  up  rather  intense  opposition  in  certain 
parts  of  Latin  America.  Until  recently  no  American 
writers  appear  to  have  considered  the  real  nature  of 
the  sanction  on  which  the  doctrine  rested.  How  is  it 
that  without  an  army  and  until  recent  years  without 
a  navy  of  any  size  we  have  been  able  to  uphold  a 
policy  which  has  been  described  as  an  impertinence 
to  Latin  America  and  a  standing  defiance  to  Europe? 
Americans  generally  seem  to  think  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  has  in  it  an  inherent  sanctity  which  prevents 
other  nations  from  violating  it.  In  view  of  the  gen- 
eral disregard  of  sanctities,  inherent  or  acquired,  dur- 
ing the  past  few  years,  this  explanation  will  not  hold 
good  and  some  other  must  be  sought.  Americans  have 
been  so  little  concerned  with  international  affairs  that 
they  have  failed  to  see  any  connection  between  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
The  existence  of  a  European  balance  of  power  is  the 
only  explanation  of  our  having  been  able  to  uphold 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  so  long  a  time  without  a 
resort  to  force.  Some  one  or  more  of  the  European 
powers  would  long  ago  have  stepped  in  and  called  our 

321 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

bluff,  that  is,  forced  us  to  repudiate  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine or  fight  for  it,  had  it  not  been  for  the  well- 
grounded  fear  that  as  soon  as  they  became  engaged 
with  us  some  other  European  power  would  attack 
them  in  the  rear.  What  other  satisfactory  explana- 
tion is  there  for  Louis  Napoleon's  withdrawal  from 
Mexico,  for  Great  Britain's  backdown  in  the  Vene- 
zuelan boundary  dispute,  and  for  the  withdrawal  of 
the  German  fleet  from  Venezuela  in  1902? 

While  England  has  from  time  to  time  objected 
to  some  of  the  corollaries  deduced  from  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  she  has  on  the  whole  been  not  unfavorably 
disposed  toward  the  essential  features  of  that  policy. 
The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
been  an  open-door  policy,  and  has  thus  been  in  gen- 
eral accord  with  the  British  policy  of  free  trade.  The 
United  States  has  not  used  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for 
the  establishment  of  exclusive  trade  relations  with 
our  Southern  neighbors.  In  fact,  we  have  largely  neg- 
lected the  South  American  countries  as  a  field  for  the 
development  of  American  commerce.  The  failure 
to  cultivate  this  field  has  not  been  due  wholly  to 
neglect,  however,  but  to  the  fact  that  we  have  had 
employment  for  all  our  capital  at  home  and  conse- 
quently have  not  been  in  a  position  to  aid  in  the 
industrial  development  of  the  Latin-American  states, 
and  to  the  further  fact  that  our  exports  have  been 
so  largely  the  same  and  hence  the  trade  of  North  and 
South  America  has  been  mainly  with  Europe.  There 
has,  therefore,  been  little  rivalry  between  the  United 
States  and  the  powers  of  Europe  in  the  field  of  South 
American  commerce.  Our  interest  has  been  political 
rather  than  commercial.    We  have  prevented  the  es- 

322 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

tablishment  of  spheres  of  influence  and  preserved  the 
open  door.  This  situation  has  been  in  full  accord  with 
British  policy.  Had  Great  Britain  adopted  a  high 
tariff  policy  and  been  compelled  to  demand  commer- 
cial concessions  from  Latin  America  by  force,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  would  long  since  have  gone  by  the 
board  and  been  forgotten.  Americans  should  not  for- 
get the  fact,  moreover,  that  at  any  time  during  the 
past  twenty  years  Great  Britain  could  have  settled 
all  her  outstanding  difficulties  with  Germany  by  agree- 
ing to  sacrifice  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  give  her 
rival  a  free  hand  in  South  America.  In  the  face  of 
such  a  combination  our  navy  would  have  been  of  little 
avail.    ^ 

Contrary  to  a  widely  prevailing  opinion  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  has  undergone  very  little  change  since 
the  original  declaration,  and  the  official  statements 
of  the  doctrine  have  on  the  whole  been  very  con- 
sistent. The  only  important  extension  was  made 
less  than  two  years  after  the  original  declaration, 
when,  in  October,  1825,  Secretary  Clay,  acting  under 
the  direction  of  President  John  Quincy  Adams,  who 
assisted  in  formulating  the  doctrine,  notified  the 
French  government  that  we  could  not  consent  to  the 
occupation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  "  by  any  other 
European  power  than  Spain  under  any  contingency 
whatever."  Similar  declarations  were  made  to  the 
other  European  powers,  the  occasion  being  the  fear 
that  Spain  would  transfer  her  sovereignty  over  these 
islands  to  some  other  government.  President  Mon- 
roe had  declared  that  the  American  continents  were 
closed  to  colonization  from  Europe,  meaning  by  colo- 
nization very  probably,  as  Professor  John  Bassett 

323 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

Moore  says,  "  the  acquisition  of  title  to  territory  by 
original  occupation  and  settlement."  ^  He  had  made 
no  declaration  against  the  transfer  of  sovereignty  in 
America  from  one  European  power  to  another.  In 
fact  he  positively  renounced  any  such  idea,  when  he 
said:  "  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of 
any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered,  and 
shall  not  interfere."  Here,  then,  within  two  years 
we  have  a  distinct  advance  upon  the  position  taken 
by  President  Monroe.  Yet  this  advanced  ground  was 
held  by  succeeding  administrations,  until  President 
Grant  could  say  in  the  case  of  the  same  islands  in  his 
first  annual  message: 

These  dependencies  are  no  longer  regarded  as  subject  to 
transfer  from  one  European  power  to  another.  When  the 
present  relation  of  colonies  ceases,  they  are  to  become  in- 
dependent powers,  exercising  the  right  of  choice  and  of  self- 
control  in  the  determination  of  their  future  condition  and 
relations  with  other  powers.* 

And  Secretary  Hamilton  Fish  said  a  few  months  later 
that  the  President  had  but  followed  "  the  teachings 
of  all  our  history  "  when  he  made  this  statement.^ 

The  failure  of  Blaine  and  Frelinghuysen  to  oust 
Great  Britain  from  her  interests  in  the  canal  under 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by  an  appeal  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  the  successful  enforcement  of  the  doc- 
trine by  President  Cleveland  and  Secretary  Olney  in 
1895  have  been  discussed  at  sufficient  length  in  pre- 
vious chapters.     While  the  policy  of  Cleveland  and 

•  Political  Science  Quarterly.  Vol.   XT.  p.  3. 

*  "  Messages  and   Papers  of  the  Presidents, '  Vol.  VII,  p.  32, 
"Foreign   Relations,   1870,   pp.   254-260;   Moore,  "Digest  of   International 

Law,"  Vol,  VI,  p.  431' 

.324 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Olney  was  vehemently  denounced  at  the  time,  it  is 
now  generally  approved  by  American  writers  of 
authority  on  international  law  and  diplomacy. 

When  President  McKinley  decided  to  demand  from 
Spain  the  cession  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  the  oppo- 
sition that  the  step  encountered  was  based  to  some 
extent  on  the  fear  that  it  would  amount  to  a  re- 
pudiation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  that  if  we  invaded 
the  Eastern  Hemisphere  we  could  not  expect  to  keep 
Europe  out  of  the  Western.  The  use  of  the  term 
hemispheres  in  connection  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
has,  of  course,  been  merely  a  figure  of  speech.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  dealt  with  the  relations  between 
Europe  and  America,  and  Eastern  Asia  never  came 
within  its  purview.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  has  been  more  fully  and  more  frequently 
asserted  since  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  than 
ever  before.  The  participation  of  the  United  States 
in  the  First  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague  was 
taken  by  many  Americans  to  mark  the  end  of  the  old 
order  and  the  introduction  of  a  new  era  in  American 
diplomacy,  but,  contrary  to  their  expectations,  this 
meeting  was  made  the  occasion  for  an  emphatic  and 
effective  declaration  before  the  assembled  body  of 
European  nations  of  our  adherence  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Before  the  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Set- 
tlements of  International  Disputes  was  adopted,  the 
following  declaration  was  read  before  the  conference 
and  the  treaty  was  signed  by  the  American  delegates 
under  this  reservation: 

Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  require  the  United  States  of  America  to  depart 
from  its  traditional  policy  of  not  intruding  upon,  interfering 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political  questions  or  policy 
or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  state;  nor  shall 
anything  contained  in  the  said  convention  be  construed  to 
imply  a  relinquishment  by  the  United  States  of  America  of 
its  traditional  attitude  toward  purely  American  questions.* 

Prior  to  the  Roosevelt  administration  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  regarded  by  the  Latin-American  states 
as  solely  a  protective  policy.  The  United  States  did 
not  undertake  to  control  the  financial  administration 
or  the  foreign  policy  of  any  of  these  republics.  It 
was  only  after  their  misconduct  had  gotten  them  into 
difficulty  and  some  foreign  power,  or  group  of  for- 
eign powers,  was  on  the  point  of  demanding  repara- 
tion by  force  that  the  United  States  stepped  in  and 
undertook  to  see  to  it  that  foreign  intervention  did 
not  take  the  form  of  occupation  of  territory  or  inter- 
ference in  internal  politics.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
always  been  in  principle  a  policy  of  American  inter- 
vention for  the  purpose  of  preventing  European  in- 
tervention, but  American  intervention  always  awaited 
the  threat  of  immediate  action  on  the  part  of  some 
European  power.  President  Roosevelt  concluded  that 
it  would  be  wiser  to  restrain  the  reckless  conduct  of 
the  smaller  American  republics  before  disorders  or 
public  debts  should  reach  a  point  which  gave  Euro- 
pean powers  an  excuse  for  intervening.  He  held  that 
since  we  could  not  permit  European  powers  to  re- 
strain or  punish  American  states  in  cases  of  wrong- 
doing, we  must  ourselves  undertake  that  task.  As 
long  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  merely  a  policy  of 
benevolent  protection,  which  Latin-American  states 
Gould  invoke  after  their  unwise  or  evil  conduct  had 

• "  Treaties  and  Conventions  of  the  United  States "  (Compiled  by  W, 
M.  Malloy),  vol.  II,  p.  203a. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

brought  European  powers  to  the  point  of  demanding 
just  retribution,  it  was  regarded  with  favor  and  no 
objection  was  raised  to  it;  but  the  Roosevelt  declara- 
tion, that  if  we  were  to  continue  to  protect  Latin- 
American  states  against  European  intervention,  we  had 
a  right  to  demand  that  they  should  refrain  from  con- 
duct which  was  likely  to  provoke  such  intervention, 
was  quite  a  different  thing,  and  raised  a  storm  of 
criticism  and  opposition. 

The  Roosevelt  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine was  undoubtedly  a  perfectly  logical  step.  It  was 
endorsed  by  the  Taft  administration  and  has  been  ex- 
tended by  the  Wilson  administration  and  made  one 
of  our  most  important  policies  in  the  zone  of  the 
Caribbean.  President  Roosevelt  was  right  in  draw- 
ing the  conclusion  that  we  had  arrived  at  a  point 
where  we  had  either  to  abandon  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine or  to  extend  its  application  so  as  to  cover  the 
constantly  increasing  number  of  disputes  arising  from 
the  reckless  creation  of  public  debts  and  loose  financial 
administration.  It  was  absurd  for  us  to  stand  quietly 
by  and  witness  the  utterly  irresponsible  creation  of 
financial  obligations  that  would  inevitably  lead  to 
European  intervention  and  then  undertake  to  fix  the 
bounds  and  limits  of  that  intervention.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  note  that  President  Wilson  has  not  hesi- 
tated to  carry  the  new  policy  to  its  logical  conclusion, 
and  he  has  gone  so  far  as  to  warn  Latin-American 
countries  against  granting  to  foreign  corporations' con- 
cessions which,  on  account  of  their  extended  character, 
would  be  certain  to  give  rise  to  foreign  claims  which 
would,  in  turn,  give  an  excuse  for  European  inter- 
vention.     In   discussing   our    Latin-American  .policy 

Z^7 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

shortly    after    the    beginning    of    his    administration, 
President  Wilson  said : 

You  hear  of  concessions  to  foreign  capitalists  in  Latin 
America.  You  do  not  hear  of  concessions  to  foreign  capital- 
ists in  the  United  States.  They  are  not  granted  concessions. 
They  are  invited  to  make  investments.  The  work  is  ours, 
though  they  are  welcome  to  invest  in  it.  We  do  not  ask  them 
to  supply  the  capital  and  do  the  work.  It  is  an  invitation,  not 
a  privilege,  and  the  states  that  are  obliged  because  their  terri- 
tory does  not  lie  within  the  main  field  of  modern  enterprise 
and  action,  to  grant  concessions  are  in  this  condition,  that 
foreign  interests  are  apt  to  don:inate  their  domestic  affairs — a 
condition  of  affairs  always  dangerous  and  apt  to  become  in- 
tolerable. .  .  .  What  these  states  are  going  to  seek,  there- 
fore, is  an  emancipation  from  the  subordination  which  has 
been  inevitable  to  foreign  enterprise  and  an  assertion  of  the 
splendid  character  which,  in  spite  of  these  difficulties,  they 
have  again  and  again  been  able  to  demonstrate. 

These  remarks  probably  had  reference  to  the  oil 
concession  which  Pearson  &  Son  of  London  had  ar- 
ranged with  the  president  of  Colombia.  This  conces- 
sion is  said  to  have  covered  extensive  oil  interests 
in  Colombia,  and  carried  with  it  the  right  to  improve 
harbors  and  dig  canals  in  the  country.  However,  be- 
fore the  meeting  of  the  Colombian  Congress  in  Novem- 
ber, 1 91 3,  which  was  expected  to  confirm  the  conces- 
sion, Lord  Cowdray,  the  president  of  Pearson  &  Son 
withdrew  the  contract,  alleging  as  his  reason  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  United  States. 

Prior  to  the  Great  War,  which  has  upset  all  calcu- 
lations, it  seemed  highly  probable  that  the  Piatt  Amend- 
ment would  in  time  be  extended  to  all  the  weaker  states 
within  the  zone  of  the  Caribbean.  If  the  United  States 
is  to  exercise  a  protectorate  over  such  states,  the  right 

328 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

to  intervene  and  the  conditions  of  intervention  should 
be  clearly  defined  and  publicly  proclaimed.  Hitherto 
whatever  action  v^e  have  taken  in  Latin  America  has 
been  taken  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine, — a  policy  of 
doubtful  legal  sanction, — which  an  international  court 
might  not  recognize.  Action  under  a  treaty  would 
have  the  advantage  of  legality.  In  other  words,  the 
recent  treaties  with  Caribbean  states  have  converted 
American  policy  into  law. 

The  imperialistic  tendencies  of  our  Caribbean  pol- 
icy, whether  they  be  regarded  as  logical  deductions 
from  the  Monroe  Doctrine  or  not,  have  undoubtedly 
aroused  the  jealousies  and  fears  of  our  Southern  neigh- 
bors. One  of  the  results  has  been  the  formation  of 
the  so-called  ABC  Alliance,  based  on  treaties  between 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  the  exact  provisions  of 
which  have  not  been  made  public.  This  alliance  doubt- 
less serves  a  useful  purpose  in  promoting  friendly 
relations  between  the  three  great  states  of  South 
America,  and  since  the  acceptance  of  the  mediation 
of  these  powers  in  Mexico  by  President  Wilson  there 
is  no  reason  to  regard  it  as  in  any  sense  hostile  to 
the  United  States.  While  the  United  States  may 
very  properly  accept  the  mediation  of  other  American 
states  in  disputes  like  that  arising  out  of  the  Mexican 
situation,  the  United  States  would  not  feel  under  any 
obligation  to  consult  other  American  states  or  accept 
their  advice  on  any  question  involving  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  United  States  has 
always  maintained  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  principle 
of  self-defense,  and,  consequently,  on  its  own  author- 
ity. In  1825  the  Brazilian  government  proposed  that 
the  United  States  should  enter  into  an  alliance  with 

329 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

it  in  order  to  maintain  the  independence  of  Brazil  in 
case  Portugal  should  be  assisted  by  any  foreign  power 
in  her  efforts  to  reconquer  Brazil.  Secretary  Clay  re- 
plied that  while  President  Adams  adhered  to  the  prin- 
ciples set  forth  by  his  predecessor,  the  prospect  of 
peace  between  Portugal  and  Brazil  rendered  such  an 
alliance  unnecessary.^ 

In  recent  years  the  proposal  has  been  more  than 
once  made  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  Pan  Ameri- 
canized. This  proposal  was  discussed  by  Mr.  Root  in 
his  address  before  the  American  Society  of  Interna- 
tional Law  in  1914  in  the  course  of  which  he  said: 

Since  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  based  upon 
this  nation's  right  of  self -protection,  it  cannot  be  trans- 
muted into  a  joint  or  common  declaration  by  American  states 
or  any  number  of  them.  If  Chile  or  Argentma  or  Brazil 
were  to  contribute  the  weight  of  its  influence  toward  a  similar 
end,  the  right  upon  which  that  nation  would  rest  its  declara- 
tion would  be  Its  own  safety,  not  the  safety  of  the  United 
States.  Chile  would  declare  what  was  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  Chile.  Argentina  would  declare  what  was  neces- 
sary for  the  safety  of  Argentina.  Brazil,  what  was  neces- 
sary for  the  safety  of  Brazil.  Each  nation  would  act  for  itself 
and  in  its  own  right  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  go  beyond 
that  except  by  more  or  less  offensive  and  defensive  alliances. 
Of  course  such  alliances  are  not  to  be  considered.* 

President  Wilson  in  his  address  before  the  Second 
Pan  American  Scientific  Congress  in  1916  agreed  in 
part  with  this  when  he  said :  "  The  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  proclaimed  by  the  United  States  on  her  own 
authority.  It  has  always  been  maintained,  and  always 
will  be  maintained,  upon  her  own  responsibility." 

'  Moore,  "  Digest  of  International  Law,"  Vol.  VI,  p    427. 
'"Addresses  on  International  Subjects,"   Elihu   Root,  p.    120. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

The  relation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  Declara- 
tion of  Rights  and  Duties  of  Nations,  drafted  by  the 
American  Institute  of  International  Law,  was  dis- 
cussed by  Mr.  Root  in  his  address  before  the  Ameri- 
can Society  of  International  Law  in  1916.  He  said  in 
part: 

Whether  the  United  States  will  soon  have  occasion  or  will 
long  have  the  ability  or  the  will  to  maintain  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  lies  in  the  uncertain  future.  Whether  it  will  be 
necessary  for  her  to  act  in  defense  of  the  doctrine  or 
abandon  it,  may  well  be  determined  by  the  issue  of  the 
present  war.  Whether  when  the  occasion  comes  she  will 
prove  to  have  the  ability  and  the  will  to  maintain  the  doctrine, 
depends  upon  the  spirit  of  her  people,  their  capacity  for  pa- 
triotic sacrifice,  the  foresight  and  character  of  those  to  whose 
initiative  in  foreign  affairs  the  interests  of  the  people  are 
entrusted.  Whether  the  broader  doctrine  affirmed  by  the 
American  Institute  of  International  Law  is  to  be  made 
effective  for  the  protection  of  justice  and  liberty  throughout 
the  world  depends  upon  whether  the  vision  of  the  nations 
shall  have  been  so  clarified  by  the  terrible  lessons  of  these 
years  that  they  can  rise  above  small  struggles  for  advantage 
in  international  affairs,  and  realize  that  correlative  to  each 
nation's  individual  right  is  that  nation's  duty  to  insist  upon 
the  observance  of  the  principles  of  public  right  throughout 
the  community  of  nations.* 

It  is  not  probable  that  our  participation  in  the  Great 
War  will  result  in  any  weakening  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. That  principle  has  been  fully  justified  by  a 
century  of  experience.  It  has  saved  South  America 
from  the  kind  of  exploitation  to  which  the  continents 
of  Africa  and  Asia  have,  during  the  past  generation, 
fallen  a  prey.     It  would  be  strange  indeed  if  the 


•  "  Addresses  on  International  Subjects,"  by  Elihu  Root,  p.  425. 

33^ 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

United  States,  having  insisted  on  the  non-interference 
of  European  powers  in  America  when  it  was  itself  a 
weak  power  from  the  mihtary  point  of  view,  should 
now  in  the  plenitude  of  its  power  relax  what  has  been 
for  so  many  years  the  cardinal  principle  of  its  foreign 
policy.  The  abandonment  of  our  policy  of  neutrality 
and  isolation  does  not  by  any  means  mean  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  President  Wilson 
made  this  quite  clear  in  his  address  to  the  Senate  on 
January  22,  1917,  when  he  said: 

I  am  proposing,  as  it  were,  that  the  nations  should  with 
one  accord  adopt  the  doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as  the 
doctrine  of  the  world;  that  no  nation  should  seek  to  extend 
its  polity  over  any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every 
people  should  be  left  free  to  determine  its  own  polity,  its 
own  way  of  development,  unhindered,  unthreatened,  un- 
afraid, the  little  along  with  the  great  and  powerful.  I  am 
proposing  that  all  nations  henceforth  avoid  entangling  alli- 
ances which  would  draw  them  into  competitions  of  power, 
catch  them  in  a  net  of  intrigue  and  selfish  rivalry,  and  dis- 
turb their  own  affairs  with  influences  intruded  from  without. 
There  is  no  entangling  alliance  in  a  concert  of  power. 

The  policy  of  isolation  or  the  avoidance  of  entan- 
gling- alliances,  which  so  many  Americans  confuse  with 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  is  in  principle  quite  distinct  from 
it  and  is  in  fact  utterly  inconsistent  with  the  position 
and  importance  of  the  United  States  as  a  world  power. 
The  difference  in  principle  between  the  two  policies  can 
perhaps  be  best  illustrated  by  the  following  supposi- 
tion. If  the  United  States  were  to  sign  a  permanent 
treaty  with  England  placing  our  navy  at  her  disposal 
in  the  event  of  attack  from  some  European  power,  on 
condition  that  England  would  unite  with  us  in  oppos- 

332 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

ing  the  intervention  of  any  European  power  in  Latin 
America,  such  a  treaty  would  not  be  a  violation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  a  distinct  recognition  of  that 
principle.  Such  a  treaty  would,  however,  be  a  depar- 
ture from  our  traditional  policy  of  isolation,  originally 
announced  by  Washington  and  Jefferson. 

The  participation  of  the  United  States  in  the  League 
of  Nations  would,  if  that  League  be  considered  an  en- 
tangling alliance,  be  a  departure  from  the  policy  of 
isolation  but  not  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
In  order  to  allay  the  fears  of  Americans  on  this  point. 
President  Wilson  caused  to  be  inserted  in  the  consti- 
tution of  the  League  of  Nations  the  following  clause: 

Nothing  in  this  Covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the 
validity  of  international  engagements,  such  as  treaties  of 
arbitration  or  regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

This  clause  did  not  serve  the  purpose  for  which  It 
was  intended,  and  a  heated  controversy  at  once  arose 
as  to  the  meaning  of  the  language  employed.  When 
the  treaty  came  before  the  Senate  this  clause  was 
the  object  of  attack,  and  Senator  Lodge  included 
among  the  fourteen  reservations  which  he  proposed 
the  following  one  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine : 

The  United  States  will  not  submit  to  arbitration  or  to  in- 
quiry by  the  assembly  or  by  the  council  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  provided  for  in  said  treaty  of  peace,  any  questions 
which  in  the  judgment  of  the  United  States  depend  upon  or 
)relate  to  its  long-established  policy,  commonly  known  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine;  said  doctrine  is  to  be  interpreted  by 
die  United  States  alone  and  is  hereby  declared  to  be  wholly 
outside  the  jurisdiction  of  said  League  of  Nations  and  en- 

333 


UNITED  STATES  AND  LATIN  AMERICA 

tirely  unaffected  by  any  provision  contained  in  the  said  treaty 
of  peace  with  Germany. 

The  recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  the 
League  of  Nations,  taken  in  connection  with  the 
Senate's  assertion  of  the  exclusive  right  to  interpret 
its  meaning,  has  caused  some  of  the  Latin-American 
countries  to  delay  joining  the  League  until  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  clearly  defined.  In  February, 
1920,  Salvador  brought  this  subject  to  the  attention 
of  the  United  States  in  a  formal  note  in  which  she 
argued  that,  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  so  variously 
interpreted  by  prominent  thinkers  and  public  men 
even  in  the  United  States,  it  should  be  officially  de- 
fined.^" In  reply  Salvador  was  referred  to  what  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  said  on  the  subject  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  his  address  of  January  6,  1916,  before  the 
Pan  American  Scientific  Congress  at  Washington." 
These  remarks  have  already  been  quoted  in  Chapter 
VIII."  Salvador  was  informed  that  no  further  defi- 
nition was  deemed  necessary.  The  speech  referred  to 
may,  therefore,  be  considered  the  latest  official  inter- 
pretation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  ^ 


"The    New   York   Times,    February  8,    1920. 
"  The   New   York  Times,   March  2,   1920. 
**  Ante,  pp.   306-307. 


THE    END 


334 


INDEX 


ABC  Alliance,  offers  to  medi- 
ate in  Mexican  crisis,  309; 
divided  in  Great  War,  313; 
attitude  towards  United 
States,  329. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  tries  to  pre- 
vent annexation  of  Texas  by 
United   States,  262,  263. 

Abolitionists,  oppose  admission 
of  Texas,  262. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  minister  to  Eng- 
land, views  on  the  Mexican 
situation,  202 ;  warns  his  gov- 
ernment against  designs  of 
Louis  Napoleon  on  Mexico, 
208;  on  Mexican  policy  of 
Great  Britain,  209. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  opposes 
joint  action  with  England, 
70,  71 ;  influence  on  Monroe's 
message  of  December  2,  1823, 
72;  informs  Russia  that 
American  continents  are  no 
longer  open  to  European 
colonization,  75 ;  views  on 
Cuba,  86;  appoints  delegates 
to    Panama    Congress,    292, 

293- 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  conference  of 
1818,  58,  59. 

Alexander  I,  Czar  of  Russia, 
and  Holy  Alliance,  61. 

American  Institute  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  304 ;  adopts  Dec- 
laration of  Rights  and  Du- 
ties   of    Nations,   305-306. 

Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  266. 


Arbitration,  international,  of 
Venezuelan  boundary  dis- 
pute, 248,  249 ;  of  pecuniary 
claims  against  Venezuela, 
255.  256. 

Argentina,  British  invasion  of, 
23-25 ;  beginnings  of  revolu- 
tion in,  30 ;  remains  neutral 
in  Great  War,  314,  315. 

Assiento,  contract  for  supply- 
ing slaves  to  Spanish  col- 
onies, 12-14. 

Audiencia,  in  Spanish  colonies, 

4.  5. 
Austria,  suppresses  revolution 
in  Naples  and  in  Piedmont, 
59,  60 ;  warned  not  to  send 
troops  to  assistance  of  Maxi- 
milian in  Mexico,  232,  233. 

Balfour,  A.  J ,  on  forcible  col- 
lection  of   pecuniary   claims, 

257- 

Baltimore,  U.  S.  Cruiser,  mem- 
bers of  crew  attacked  by 
Chileans,  302. 

Barbosa,  Ruy,  Brazilian  states- 
man, 313. 

Bay  Islands,  British  claims  to, 
157,  160,  161. 

Beaupre,  A.  M.,  minister  to 
Colombia,  186. 

Belize,  British  claims  to,  157, 
160,   161. 

Bell,  J.  Franklin,  in  Cuba.  142. 

Belligerent  rights,  accorded  to 
Spanish   colonies,   48;    with- 


335 


INDEX 


held  from  Cubans,  110-113; 
House  resolution,  113;  joint 
resolution  of  Congress,  127. 

Bigelow,  John,  minister  to 
France,  222,  225,  227. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  on  Monroe 
Doctrine,  321. 

"Black  Friday,"  no. 

Black  Warrior,  case  of,  101-103. 

Blaine,  J.  G.,  outlines  new  canal 
policy,  169-171 ;  proposes 
modifications  of  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  172-173;  calls 
International  American  Con- 
ference at  Washington,  300, 
presides  at  opening  session, 
301. 

Blanco,  Ramon,  governor  of 
Cuba,  129. 

Bliss,  Tasker  H.,  in  charge  of 
Cuban  customs,  140. 

Bolivar,  Simon,  character,  37; 
joins  patriot  cause,  38;  career 
in  Venezuela  and  Colombia, 
39-42;  in  Ecuador  and  Peru, 
43,  44;  interest  in  Isthmian 
canal,  147;  summons  Pan- 
ama Congress,  292. 

Bonaparte,  Louis  Napoleon,  in- 
terest in  Isthmian  canal,  148; 
designs  on  Mexico,  207 ; 
places  Maximilian  on  the 
throne,  214-220;  forced  to 
withdraw  troops,  226-232. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  invasion 
of  Spain.  26-28 ;  cedes  Louisi- 
ana to  United  States,  261. 

Bowen,  Herbert  W.,  minister  to 
Venezuela,  252. 

Brazil,  becomes  a  republic,  301 ; 
stands  by  United  States  in 
war  with  Germany,  312-314. 

British  Guiana,  dispute  over 
boundary  of,  238-249. 


British  Honduras.     See  Belize. 

Brougham,  Lord,  on  Monroe's 

message  of  December  2,  1823, 

77. 

Bryan,  William  J.,  favors  rati- 
fication of  Spanish  treaty, 
136 ;  tries  to  adjust  differences 
with  Colombia  resulting  from 
Panama  Revolution,  274-276; 
negotiates  treaties  with  Ni- 
caragua, 285,  286;  refuses  to 
recognize  Huerta,  308. 

Buchanan,  James,  proposes 
purchase  of  Cuba,  92 ;  con- 
nection with  Ostend  Mani- 
festo, 104,  105 ;  recommends 
congressional  action  on  Cu- 
ban question.  106;  criticises 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  157, 
suggests  abrogation  of,  163, 
announces  satisfactory  ad- 
justment of  disputes  growing 
out  of,  165. 

Buenos  Aires,  captured  by  the 
British,  24. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry  Lytton, 
signs  canal  treaty,  154. 

Bunau-Varilla,  Philippe,  and 
Panama  revolution,  187 ;  first 
minister  from  Republic  of 
Panama,  189. 

Bureau  of  American  Republics, 
301,  303- 

California,  acquisition  of,  264. 

Campbell,  L.  D.,  minister  to 
Mexico,  234-236. 

Canal.  See  Panama  Canal, 
Nicaragua  Canal. 

Canning,  George,  on  commer- 
cial relations  with  Spanish 
colonies,  54-55 ;  on  recogni- 
tion of,  55-56;  on  European 
congresses,  58,  59 ;  on  French 


336 


INDEX 


intervention  in  Spain,  63,  64 ; 
conferences  with  Rush  on 
schemes  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance, 65-67,  y2  \  interviews 
with  Prince  Polignac  on 
Spanish-American  situation, 
T2t,  74'f  comments  on  Mon- 
roe's message  of  December 
2,  1823,  78,  79;  decides  to 
recognize  Mexico  and  Colom- 
bia, 80,  81 ;  opposes  French 
occupation  of  Cuba,  88. 

Caribbean  Sea,  naval  suprem- 
acy in,  261,  264-266;  new 
American  policies  in,  267, 

Carranza,  Venustiano,  succeeds 
Huerta,  309;  recognized  by 
United  States,  310,  permits 
German  intrigue,  316. 

Casa  de  Contratacion,  8. 

Castelar,  Emilio,  President  of 
the  Spanish  Republic,  115. 

Central  American  Court  of 
Justice,  281-287. 

Chile,  liberation  of,  32,  33; 
war  with  Spain,  298 ;  with 
Peru,  299-300;  quarrel  with 
United  States,  301,  302;  re- 
mains neutral  in  Great  War, 
315.  316. 

Claims.    See  Pecuniary  claims. 

Clay,  Henry,  advocates  recog- 
nition of  South  American  in- 
dependence, 49-51,  82;  Cuban 
policy  of,  88;  views  on 
Isthmian  Canal,  148;  and 
Panama  Congress,  292-295 ; 
applies  Monroe  Doctrine  to 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  323. 

Clayton,  J.  M.,  secretary  of 
state,  signs  canal  treaty,  154; 
criticised  by  Buchanan,  157; 
on  refusal  of  Congress  to  en- 
dorse Monroe  Doctrine,  320. 


Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  154- 
156;  disputes  arising  out  of, 
159-165 ;  attempts  of  Blaine 
and  Frelinghuysen  to  secure 
modifications  of,  172-177; 
alleged  British  violation  of, 
178-180;  abrogated,  181. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  transmits  to 
Congress  correspondence  of 
Secretary  Fish  on  Cuba,  125 ; 
recognizes  state  of  insur- 
gency in  Cuba,  126;  ignores 
resolution  of  Congress  rec- 
ognizing belligerency,  127; 
message  on  Cuba,  128; 
canal  policy  of,  177;  asserts 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  Ven- 
ezuelan boundary  dispute, 
238-239. 

Cochrane,  Lord  (Earl  Dun- 
donald),  commander  of  Chil- 
ean navy,  34,  35. 

Colombia  (New  Granada),  war 
of  liberation,  39-42 ;  signs 
canal  treaty  of  1846,  149,  150; 
rejects  Hay-Herran  conven- 
tion, 186;  demands  arbitra- 
tion of  Panama  question, 
192 ;  strained  relations  with 
United  States  arising  out  of 
Panama  Revolution,  268-276; 
remains  neutral  in  the  Great 
War,  312,  316 

Commerce,  British,  with  Span- 
ish colonies,  53-55- 

Conference.  See  International 
American. 

Convention  of  London  of  1861, 
providing  for  joint  interven- 
tion in  Mexico,  203. 

Costa  Rica,  protests  against 
protectorate  over  Nicaragua, 
285-287. 

Cromwell,  W.  N.,  attorney  for 


337 


INDEX 


French  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany, 187. 

Cuba,  British  or  French  ac- 
quisition opposed  by  United 
States,  84-90 ;  annexation 
schemes,  91-106;  "  Ten  Years' 
War"  in,  107-125;  insurrec- 
tion of  1895,  125-129;  inter- 
vention of  the  United  States 
in,  130-133;  American  occu- 
pation of,  136-140;  reciproc- 
ity with,  140-142;  second 
period  of  American  occupa- 
tion, 142,  143;  enters  war 
against  Germany,  312,  313. 

Cushing,  Caleb,  mission  to 
Spain,  119-124. 

Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  amen- 
ded by  Senate  and  rejected 
by  Great  Britain,  161,  162. 

Danish  West  Indies,  annexa- 
tion proposed  by  Seward, 
264;  purchased  by  United 
States,  289,  290. 

Davis,  Cushman  K.,  commis- 
sioner to  negotiate  peace  with 
Spain,  135. 

Dawson,  T.  C,  minister  to 
Dominican  Republic,  negoti- 
ates treaty  establishing  finan- 
cial supervision,  277-279. 

Day,  W.  R.,  commissioner  to 
negotiate   peace  with   Spain, 

135- 

Dayton,  W.  L.,  minister  to 
France,  214,  217,  219,  221. 

DeLesseps,  Ferdinand,  begins 
construction  of  Panama 
canal,  146 ;  effect  on  canal  pol- 
icy of  United  States,  167-169. 

DeLhuys,  Drouyn,  French 
minister  of  state,  217,  221, 
225,  231. 


338 


Dewey,  George,  at  Manila  Bay, 
134;  prepared  to  arrest  Ger- 
man action  against  Venezu- 
ela, 253.  254. 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  president  of 
Mexico,  joint  mediator  with 
President  Roosevelt  in  Cen- 
tral American  affairs,  280- 
282. 

Dominican  Republic,  under 
financial  supervision  of  Uni- 
ted States,  276-280. 

Drago,  L.  M.,  Argentine  minis- 
ter, on  war  between  Germany 
and  United  States,  314.  3iS- 

Drago  Doctrine,  257-260. 

DuBois,  J.  T.,  minister  to  Co- 
lombia, efforts  to  settle  dif- 
ferences arising  out  of  Pan- 
ama Revolution,  270-274, 

Evarts,  W.  M.,  report  on  obli- 
gations of  United  States  with 
respect  to  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama, 169. 

Ferdinand  VII,  of  Spain,  de- 
throned by  Napoleon,  27 ;  res- 
toration of,  29;  attempts  to 
recover  American  colonies, 40. 

Filibusters,  Cuban,  92-96. 

Financial  supervision,  over 
Dominican  Republic,  276- 
280 ;  over  Nicaragua,  283 ; 
over  Haiti,  289. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  secretary  of 
state,  Cuban  policy  of,  108- 
124;  on  British  infringement 
of  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
167 ;  acts  as  mediator  in  war 
between  Spain  and  republics 
on  West  coast  of  South 
America,  298,  299. 

Florida  treaty,  52,  85,  261. 


INDEX 


Fonseca  Bay,  naval  base  on, 
offered  to  United  States  by 
Honduras,  153,  leased  from 
Nicaragua,  286. 

Forsyth,  John,  secretary  of 
state,  90 ;  minister  to  Mexico, 
194. 

France,  interest  in  Cuba,  87,  88, 
97 ;  claims  against  Mexico, 
197 ;  severs  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Juarez  govern- 
ment, 199;  decides  on  joint 
intervention  in  Mexico,  203 ; 
supports  Maximilian  on 
Mexican  throne,  220-234. 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.,  corres- 
pondence with  Lord  Granville 
on  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
175.  176;  signs  canal  treaty 
with  Nicaragua,  177. 

Frye,  W.  P.,  commissioner  to 
negotiate  peace  with  Spain, 
135. 

Garfield,  J.  A.,  canal  policy  of, 
169. 

Germany,  intervention  in  Ven- 
ezuela, 249-252;  forced  to 
withdraw,  252-255. 

Goethals,  G.  W.,  in  charge  of 
construction  of  Panama 
Canal,  191. 

Gomez,  Maximo,  leader  of 
Cuban  insurrection,   125. 

Grace-Eyre-Cragin  Syndicate, 
secures  concession  for  canal 
through  Nicaragua,   183. 

Grant,  Ulysses  S.,  Cuban  policy 
of,  108-124;  favors  driving 
French  from  Mexico,  227 ; 
proposes  annexation  of  Santo 
Domingo,  265 ;  on  Monroe 
Doctrine,  324. 

Gray,  George,  commissioner  to 


negotiate  peace  with  Spain, 
135- 

Great  Britain,  secures  monop- 
oly of  slave  trade,  12-14; 
entertains  idea  of  revolution- 
izing Spanish  America,  14- 
22,  26;  sends  expedition  to 
the  Plate,  23-25 ;  commercial 
relations  with  Spanish  Amer- 
ica, 53-55;  attitude  towards 
Holy  Alliance,  60,  63 ;  recog- 
nizes independence  of  Mex- 
ico and  Colombia,  80;  atti- 
tude towards  Cuba,  85,  86,  90, 
97;  signs  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  154;  disagrees  with 
United  States  as  to  interpre- 
tation of  the  treaty,  160-164; 
refuses  to  relinquish  rights 
under  treaty,  174;  interferes 
in  affairs  of  Mosquito  Indi- 
ans, 178-180;  claims  against 
Mexico,  196;  severs  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Juarez 
government,  199;  decides  on 
joint  intervention  in  Mexico, 
203 ;  grows  suspicious  of 
France,  207-209 ;  withdraws 
troops  from  Mexico,  212, 
213;  controversy  with  Vene- 
zuela over  boundary  of  Bri- 
tish Guiana,  238-249;  inter- 
venes in  Venezuela  for  col- 
lection of  claims,  249-252 ; 
opposes  annexation  of  Texas 
by  United  States,  262-263; 
attitude  towards  Monroe 
Doctrine,  322,  323. 

Greytown,  British  occupation 
of,  157-160. 

Guiana.     See  British  Guiana. 

Gwin,  W.  M.,  plan  for  coloniz- 
ing ex-Confederates  in  Mex- 
ico, 223. 


339 


INDEX 


Hague  Conference  of  1907, 
resolutions  on  forcible  collec- 
tion of  contract  debts,  259-260. 

Hague  Court,  decision  in  Ven- 
ezuelan case,  256. 

Haiti,  occupied  by  U.  S.  Ma- 
rines, 288;  agrees  to  Ameri- 
can financial  supervision, 
289;  declares  war  on  Ger- 
many, 316. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  inter- 
ested in  Miranda's  projects, 
17-19. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  dispute 
with  Chile,  302. 

Hay,  John,  secretary  of  state, 
negotiates  new  canal  treaty 
with  England,  180,  181 ;  ne- 
gotiates canal  treaty  with 
Colombia,  185;  calls  Ger- 
many's attention  to  Monroe 
Doctrine,  251  ;  advises  sub- 
mission of  Venezuelan  case 
to  Hague  Court,  255. 

Hay-Herran  convention,  signed, 
185;  rejected  by  Colombia, 
186,  187. 

Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  pro- 
visions, 180,  181 ;  practical 
recognition  of  American  su- 
premacy in  Caribbean,  265- 
267. 

Hayes.  R.  B.,  announces  new 
canal  policy,  168. 

Hepburn  Bill,  184. 

Hoar,  G.  F.,  on  acquisition  of 
the  Philippines,  136. 

Holleben  incident,  252-254. 

Holy  Alliance,  treaty  of  the,  61. 

Honduras.  Knox  treaty  estab- 
lishing financial  supervision 
over,  283 ;  protests  against 
protectorate  over  Nicaragua, 
285. 


Huerta,  Victorlano,  Mexican 
dictator,  307-309. 

India  House,  8. 

Indies,  Council  of  the,  4,  5 ; 
laws  of  the.  4. 

International  American  Con- 
ference at  Washington,  300, 
301 ;  at  Mexico,  302 ;  at  Rio 
de  Janeiro,  303;  at  Buenos 
Aires,  303. 

International  High  Commis- 
sion, 304. 

Intervention,  European  doc- 
trine of,  57. 

Isthmian  canal,  difficulties  of, 
144;  comparative  merits  of 
Panama  and  Nicaragua 
routes,  145,  146 ;  international 
questions  involved  in,  146,  147. 

Italy,  intervention  in  Vene- 
zuela, 249-252. 

Itata,  case  of  the,  302. 

Iturbide,  Augustin  de,  leads 
revolution  against  Spain  in 
Mexico,  45.  46;  proclaims 
himself  emperor,  47. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  interview 
with  Miranda,  20:  letter  to 
President  Monroe  on  Can- 
ning's proposals,  68-70;  views 
on  Cuba,  84,  87 ;  on  recogni- 
tion of  de  facto  governments, 
308. 

Juarez,  Benito,  president  of 
Mexico,  194 ;  recognized  by 
United  States,  195  ;  suspends 
payment  on  foreign  debt,  199 ; 
driven  from  capital  by  the 
French,  214,  215;  urged  by 
United  States  to  spare  Maxi- 
milian's life,  235;  orders  his 
execution,  227. 


340 


INDEX 


King,  Rufus,  correspondence 
with  Miranda,   17-20. 

Knox,  P.  C,  investigates  title 
of  Panama  Canal  Company, 
185 ;  tries  to  settle  differences 
with  Colombia  resulting  from 
Panama  Revolution,  270-274; 
Central  American  policy,  282- 
28s. 

Lansing,  Robert,  secretary  of 
state,  negotiates  treaty  for 
purchase  of  Danish  West 
Indies,  290;  suggests  adop- 
tion of  Declaration  of  Rights 
and  Duties  of  Nations,  305. 

Latin  America,  and  the  Great 
War,  312-318. 

Laybach,  conference  of  powers 
at.  59- 

League  of  Nations,  and  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  333,  334. 

Lee,  Fitzhugh,  consul-general 
at  Havana,   129. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  views  on 
Panama  canal,  151. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  on  conference 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  58;  on 
French  intervention  in  Spain, 

63. 

Lodge,  H.  C,  on  alleged  secret 
alliance  with  England,  266; 
reservation  of  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 333. 

Lome,  Enrique  Dupuy  de,  inci- 
dent and  recall,  129,  130. 

Loomis,  F.  B.,  acting  secretary 
of  state,  188, 

Lopez,  Narciso,  Cuban  patriot, 
92-96. 

Louis  Napoleon.  See  Bona- 
parte. 

Louis  Philippe,  suggested  as 
possible    ruler    for    Spanish 


America,  26;  and  annexation 
of  Texas,  262,  263. 
Louisiana,    ceded    to    United 
States,  261. 

McKinley,  William,  Cuban 
policy  of,  128-132;  demands 
cession  of  Philippine  Islands, 
135- 

McLane,  R.  M.,  minister  to 
Mexico,  195. 

Mackintosh,  Sir  James,  on 
Monroe's  message  of  Decem- 
ber 2,   1823,  78. 

Madero,  Francisco,  murder  of, 
307. 

Madison,  James,  receives  Mi- 
randa informally,  20;  favors 
joint  action  with  England 
against  intervention  of 
powers  in  Spanish  America, 
70;  views  on  Cuba,  84. 

Magoon,  C.  E.,  provisional 
governor  of  Cuba,  142. 

Magruder,  J.  B.,  accepts  office 
under  Maximilian  in  Mexico, 
224. 

Maine,  U.  S.  battleship,  sent  to 
Havana,  129;  blown  up,  130. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  secretary  of 
state,  Cuban  policy  of.  99-105. 

Maritime  Canal  Company,  se- 
cures concessions  from  Ni- 
caragua, 183. 

Mason,  John  Y.,  connection 
with  Ostend  Manifesto,  104. 

Maury,  M.  F.,  accepts  office 
under  Maximilian  in  Mexico, 
224. 

Maximilian,  Archduke  Ferdi- 
nand, suggested  for  Mexican 
throne,  208-211;  offered  the 
position  of  Emperor  of  Mex- 
ico,  215 ;   not   recognized   by 


341 


INDEX 


the  United  States,  218,  219; 
career  in  Mexico,  220-234; 
death,  21"]. 

Mexico,  becomes  independent 
of  Spain,  45-47;  frequent 
changes  of  government  in, 
193;  claims  of  foreigners 
against,  196;  joint  interven- 
tion of  England,  France,  and 
Spain,  203-212;  war  with 
United  States,  263,  264;  re- 
lations with  United  States 
under  Huerta,  307-309;  un- 
der Carranza,  309-311;  hot- 
bed of  German  intrigue,  316. 

Miles,  Nelson  A.,  occupies 
Porto  Rico,  134. 

Miranda,  Francisco  de,  plans 
for  revolutionizing  Spanish 
America,  15-19;  organizes 
expedition  in  New  York,  20; 
attempts  to  land  in  Vene- 
zuela, 21,  22;  takes  part  in 
Venezuelan  revolution,  38; 
imprisonment  and  death,  39. 

Monroe,  James,  attitude  toward 
South  American  struggle  for 
independence,  52,  53 ;  letter 
to  Jefferson  on  Canning's 
proposals,  67,  68;  message  of 
December  2,  1823,  76,  jy. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  text  of  mes- 
sage of  December  2,  1823, 
76-77 ;  and  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  157,  IS9,  I75.  176;  and 
French  intervention  in  Mex- 
ico, 222,  223 ;  asserted  by 
President  Cleveland  in  Vene- 
zuelan boundary  dispute,  238- 
249;  tested  by  Germany,  249- 
25s ;  imperialistic  tendencies 
of,  290,  291,  329;  President 
Wilson's  statement  of.  before 
Pan  American  Scientific  Con- 


ference, 306-307;  an  execu- 
tive policy,  320;  relation  to 
European  balance  of  power, 
321,  322;  attitude  of  England 
toward,  322 ;  consistently  in- 
terpreted, 323 ;  does  not  per- 
mit transfer  of  American 
colonies  from  one  European 
power  to  another,  Z'2'2»  324 ; 
reservation  of,  at  Hague 
Conference,  325,  326;  as  ap- 
plied by  President  Roosevelt, 
326,  327 ;  proposals  to  Pan 
Americanize,  330;  probable 
effects  of  Great  War  on,  331, 
332 ;  distinct  from  policy  of 
isolation,  332,  333;  recog- 
nized in  covenant  of  League 
of  Nations,  2>j^2> ;  Lodge  reser- 
vation, 333;  definition  of, 
demanded  by  Salvador,  334. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  secretary 
of  commission  to  negotiate 
peace  with  Spain,  135;  on 
Monroe  Doctrine,  323. 

Morgan,  J.  T.,  advocates  Ni- 
caragua canal  route,  184. 

Mosquito  Coast,  Great  Bri- 
tain's claims  to,  157-159; 
British  interference  in,  178- 
180. 

Motley,  J.  L.,  minister  to  Aus- 
tria, 232,  233. 

Naon,  R.  S.,  Argentine  ambas- 
sador to  the  United  States, 
on  "  European  War  and  Pan 
Americanism,"  316-318. 

Napoleon.     See  Bonaparte. 

New  Granada.     See  Colombia. 

Nicaragua,  signs  canal  treaty 
of  1867  with  United  States, 
166;  canal  treaty  of  1884 
withdrawn    from    Senate   by 


342 


INDEX 


Cleveland,  177;  sovereignty 
over  Mosquito  Coast,  178- 
180;  relations  with  United 
States  under  Roosevelt,  280, 
281;  under  Taft,  282-285; 
under  Wilson,  285-288 ;  treaty 
of  1916,  286. 
Nicaragua  Canal,  comparative 
merits  of  Nicaragua  and 
Panama  routes,  145,  146; 
draft  of  treaty  for  construc- 
tion of  canal,  152,  153;  route 
investigated  by  Walker  com- 
mission, 182. 

O'Higgins,  Bernardo,  Chilean 
patriot,  32,  33. 

Olney,  Richard,  secretary  of 
state,  on  Cuba,  127 ;  on  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty,  180;  in- 
terpretation of  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  Venezuelan  boundary 
dispute,  240. 

Ostend  Manifesto,  104,  105. 

Ouseley,  Sir  William,  mission 
to  Central  America,  162-164. 

Palma,  T.  E.,  first  president  of 
Cuba,  140,  142. 

Panama,  Republic  of,  recog- 
nized by  President  Roose- 
velt, 189;  leases  Canal  Zone 
to  United  States,  191. 

Panama  Canal,  comparative 
merits  of  Panama  and  Ni- 
caragua routes,  145,  146; 
treaty  of  1846  with  Colom- 
bia, 149;  opened  to  com- 
merce, 191. 

Panama  Canal  Company,  or- 
ganized by  De  Lesseps,  167; 
reorganization  and  extension 
of  concession,  182;  offers  to 
sell  to  United  States,  184, 185. 


Panama  Congress,  292-295. 

Panama  Railroad,  146,  150. 

Panama  Revolution,  187-189. 

Pan  American  Financial  Con- 
ferences, 304. 

Pan  American  Scientific  Con- 
ferences, 304. 

Pan  American  Union,  303. 

Pan  Americanism,  definition 
of,  292;  promoted  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  Mexican  policy, 
309,  311 ;  put  to  test  in  the 
Great  War,  312-317. 

Pecuniary  Claims,  against  Mex- 
ico, 196,  197 ;  British  policy  in 
regard  to,  198;  attempt  to 
collect  by  force  from  Vene- 
zuela, 249-257 ;  Resolutions 
of  Second  Hague  Confer- 
ence, 259,  260 ;  considered  by 
International  American  Con- 
ferences, 302,  303. 

Peru,  liberation  of,  33-37;  war 
with  Spain,  298;  with  Chile, 
299,  300;  severs  relations 
with  Germany,  316. 

Philippine  Islands,  ceded  to 
United  States,  135,  136. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  Cuban  policy 
of,  99-105. 

Piatt  Amendment,  text  of,  138- 
139;  treaty  with  Nicaragua 
embodying,  defeated  by  Sen- 
ate, 285,  286;  applied  in  part 
to  Haiti,  289. 

Poinsett.  Joel  R.,  49,  53. 

Polk,  J.  K.,  and  Mexican  War, 
263,  264. 

Porter,  Horace,  presents  reso- 
lution to  Hague  Conference 
of  1907  on  forcible  collection 
of  pecuniary  claims,  259. 

Porto  Rico,  cession  of,  de- 
manded by  United  States,  135. 


343 


INDEX 


Quitman,  John  A,,  relations 
with  Lopez,  93-94. 

Recognition,  withheld  from 
Huerta,  308.  See  Belliger- 
ent Rights. 

Reed,  Walter,  yellow-fever  in- 
vestigations, 137. 

Reid,  Whitelaw,  comtnissioner 
to  negotiate  peace  with  Spain, 

135- 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  and  Cu- 
ban reciprocity,  140-142 ; 
signs  canal  bill,  185 ;  de- 
nounces Colombia's  rejection 
of  Hay-Herran  convention, 
186;  recognizes  Republic  of 
Panama,  189;  on  acquisition 
of  Canal  Zone,  190 ;  creates 
strained  relations  with  Col- 
ombia, 192;  on  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 251 ;  interview  with 
Holleben  on  German  inter- 
vention in  Venezuela,  252- 
254;  refuses  to  arbitrate 
Panama  question,  268 ;  de- 
nounces Bryan  treaty  with 
Colombia  as  blackmail,  275 ; 
establishes  financial  super- 
vision over  Dominican  Re- 
public, 276-280;  Central 
American  policy,  280,  281 ; 
attempts  to  purchase  Danish 
West  Indies,  290;  interpreta- 
tion of  Monroe  Doctrine, 
326,  2>2-7. 

Root,  Elihu,  author  of  Piatt 
Amendment,  139;  attempts  to 
settle  differences  with  Co- 
lombia, 268-270;  visits  South 
America,  303 :  on  Monroe 
Doctrine,  330,  331. 

Rush,  Richard,  minister  to 
England,    conferences     with 


Canning  on  schemes  of  Holy 
Alliance,  65-67,  72,  "jz. 
Russia,  claims  to  northwestern 
coast  of  America,  75. 

Sagasta,  P.  M.,  Spanish  minis- 
ter, Cuban  policy  of,  128. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  reply  to  01- 
ney's  dispatch  on  Venezuelan 
boundary  dispute,  242  ;  agrees 
to  arbitration  of  the  boundary 
dispute,  248. 

Salvador,  protests  against  pro- 
tectorate over  Nicaragua, 
285-287  ;  requests  official  defi- 
nition  of   Monroe   Doctrine, 

334. 

Sampson,  W.  T.,  blockades 
Cuba,   134. 

San  Ildefonso,  secret  treaty  of, 
261. 

San  Martin,  Jose  de,  takes  part 
in  Argentine  revolution,  30- 
Z2\  liberates  Chile,  32,  2)2>\ 
liberates  Peru.  zyZl\  rela- 
tions with  Bolivar,  43,  44; 
death,  45. 

Santo  Domingo,  annexation 
proposed  by  Seward,  264.  by 
Grant,  265.  See  Dominican 
Republic. 

Schenck,  Robert  C,  minister 
to  England,   120. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  informal  mis- 
sion to  France,  22"]. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  views  on 
Panama  canal,  151 ;  favors 
expansion,  165 ;  raises  ques- 
tion as  to  binding  force  of 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  166; 
proposes  to  assume  payment 
of  interest  on  foreign  debt 
of  Mexico,  200;  declines  to 
unite  with  European  powers 


344 


INDEX 


in  measures  against  Mexico, 
205,  206;  attitude  towards 
French  in  Mexico.  214-231 ; 
efforts  to  annex  Santo  Do- 
mingo and  Danish  West 
Indies,  264,  265. 

Shaw,  Albert,  and  Panama 
Revolution,  189. 

Sherman,  John,  secretary  of 
state,  128. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  selected  for 
special  mission  to  Mexico, 
234,  235. 

Sickles,  Daniel  E.,  mission  to 
Spain,  109-118. 

Slave  trade,  12-14. 

Slavery,  in  Cuba,  89,  90,  106, 
107,  III. 

Slidell,  John,  introduces  bill  for 
purchase  of  Cuba,  106. 

Smuggling,  in  Spanish  colonies, 
II. 

Soule,  Pierre,  mission  to  Spain, 
99-105. 

Spain,  colonial  policy  of,  4-12; 
revolution  of  1820,  56,  sup- 
pressed by  French  army,  63 ; 
revolution  of  1868,  107 ;  re- 
public proclaimed  in,  113; 
treaty  of  1898  with  United 
States,  136;  claims  against 
Mexico,  197;  decides  on  joint 
intervention  in  Mexico,  203 ; 
withdraws  troops  from  Mex- 
ico, 212,  213;  extent  of  colo- 
nial empire  at  beginning  of 
nineteenth  century,  261 ;  war 
with  Chile,  Peru,  Bolivia, 
and  Ecuador,  298,  299. 

Spanish-American  republics,  ac- 
corded belligerent  rights,  48; 
recognized  as  independent 
by  United  States,  53,  by  Eng- 
land, 80. 


Spanish  Colonies,  revolt  of,  28. 

Spooner,  J.  C,  offers  amend- 
ment to  canal  bill,  184. 

Sucre,  Antonio  Jose  de,  Vene- 
zuelan general,  42-44. 

Suez  Canal  Convention,  and 
Hay-Pauncefote   treaty,    181. 

Sumner,  Charles,  opposes  an- 
nexation of  Danish  West 
Indies  and  Santo  Domingo, 
264,  265. 

Taft,  W.  H.,  proclaims  pro- 
visional government  in  Cuba, 
142;  tries  to  settle  differences 
with  Colombia  resulting  from 
Panama  Revolution,  270-274; 
relations  with  Nicaragua  and 
Honduras,  280-285 ;  and 
Huerta  revolution,  308. 

Taylor,  Hannis,  minister  to 
Spain,  128. 

Taylor,  Zachary,  issues  procla- 
mation warning  Americans 
against  aiding  Lopez  expedi- 
tion against  Cuba,  93 ;  and 
Mexican  War,  263. 

Texas,  claim  to,  abandoned  by 
the  United  States,  261 ;  es- 
tablishment of  independence 
of,  262;  admitted  to  Union, 
263. 

Thayer,  W.  R.,  version  of  Hol- 
leben  incident,  252-254. 

Trade,  with  Spanish  colonies, 
monopoly  of,  12-14. 

Troppau,   conference   of    1820, 

59. 
Tupac  Amaru,  last  of  the  In- 

cas,  6. 
Tyler,  John,  and  annexation  of 

Texas,  262,  263. 


Utrecht,  treaty  of,  12. 


345 


INDEX 


Venezuela,  declares  indepen- 
dence, 38;  war  of  liberation, 
39-42;  dispute  with  Great 
Britain  over  boundary  of 
British  Guiana,  238-249 ;  in- 
tervention of  Germany,  Eng- 
land, and  Italy  in,  249-252 ; 
neutral  in  Great  War,  312, 
316. 

Vera  Cruz,  landing  of  Ameri- 
can Marines  at,  309. 

Verona,  Congress  of,  60-63. 

Viceroy,  office  of,  in  Spanish 
colonies,  4,  5,  12. 

Vienna,   Congress   of,   58. 

Villa,  Francisco,  Mexican  in- 
surrectionary chief,  309,  310. 

Virgin  Islands.  See  Danish 
West  Indies. 

Virginius,  case  of  the,  1 14-1 18. 

Walker,  J.  G.,  head  of  com- 
mission to  investigate  canal 
routes,  182;  report  of,  183, 
184. 

Walker,  William,  invasion  of 
Central  America,  163. 

Webster,  Daniel,  Cuban  policy 
of,  90,  97. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  with- 
draws from  Congress  of 
Verona,  60. 

Weyler,  Valeriano,  captain- 
general  of  Cuba,  125,  126, 129. 


William  II,  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many, intervention  in  Vene- 
zuela, 249-252 ;  forced  to 
withdraw,  252-255. 

Wilson,  Henry  Lane,  ambas- 
sador to  Mexico,  307. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  submits 
treaty  with  Colombia  adjust- 
ing differences  resulting  from 
Panama  Revolution,  274,  275  ; 
Central  American  policy, 
285-287;  Haitian  policy,  288, 
289;  relations  with  Latin 
America,  291 ;  interpretation 
of  Monroe  Doctrine,  306, 
307 ;  Mexican  policy  of,  307- 
311;  Latin-American  policy, 
309,  311 ;  opposes  concessions 
to  foreign  capitalists  in 
Latin  America,  328 ;  proposes 
to  extend  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  the  world,  332. 

Wood,  Leonard,  military  gov- 
ernor of  Cuba,  137-140. 

Woodford,  S.  L.,  minister  to 
Spain,  128,  130,  134. 

Wyke,  Sir  Charles,  British 
minister  to  Mexico,  198,  199, 
203,  207. 

Wyse,  L.  N.  B.,  secures  conces- 
sion for  Panama  Canal,  167. 

Zelaya,  president  of  Nicaragua, 
280-283. 


346 


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